inventor

To THE FORUM: A number of members of THE FORUM have at times attacked my ideas, and these attacks have been groundless. I want the respective writers to have corrected their ideas and to make apologies. Where I have made mistakes in my writings, I have made errors, and I have found that some readers of THE FORUM have pointed them out. Thank you for that. I hope that I have made the necessary corrections. I won't name names. If, for fictional example, a scientist from Princeton U. who has a PhD. in astrophysics says that there was a Big Bang or original creation of the universe where there was nothing prior, I, in this fictional example, would have pointed out the error, possibly in a post on THE FORUM. If I were to have been called out because I said that the comments violated the principles of the Existence Axiom, continuity of the universe principle, the Identity Axiom, or actual facts of physics identified by experiment and measurement, that counter attack would have been erroneous. Attacks or criticisms of my ideas for such reasons would have been erroneous. Such ideas need to be corrected. The historical record on THE FORUM must be correct. Ethics requires that posters on the FORUM who write true ideas must not have their ideas demeaned. My grammar has not been perfect, especially regarding the identification and expression of new, and yet true, scientific concepts. I find that it is difficult to edit the posts, and due to the rules of quotations some of the errors remain unchanged and uncorrected. What would have been preferable would have been that the commentators suggested a better approach for my writings based upon the factual and logical premises that they would suggest. That is true constructive criticism of the highest order, and I would welcome that type of discussion. Those commentators would have my respect. If a commentator in the spirit of rational interpretation had suggested a new and improved way of saying the intended concepts, or shown the errors of the identifications or logic they would have my attention. That is what constructive ethical and scientific criticism is all about. I would meet their reply to the best of my abilities and knowledge with a revision that is respectfully made in terms of facts, logic and inductive reasoning. Those person would deserve credit. That type of moral and intellectual action is what THE FORUM graciously permits. To non-scientific commentators of my ideas I have avoided making replies of the back-and-forth type, and some commentators have objected to the fact that I have not responded to their non-scientific comments or to mere argumentation. The authors of the attacks of my ideas need to review their ideas and to make corrections. Accordingly, I would make the appropriate factual and logical changes to any specific sentence or premise that I wrote, and that has been shown to be in error. I would not reply to blanket condemnations of my ideas. Also, publicly on THE FORUM and in private emails sent to me, I have received messages that identified me in terms of profane language. Another person has, in not too specific terms, asked to leave THE FORUM, and it has been further suggested that if I don't nicely go along with the attacks and comments against me that I could write my own blogs or on HPO. That is unacceptable. I have made no moral, factual, or logical errors, and if I have, or found that a revision of my writings was called for, I have made the appropriate revisions. Nor have I, except in one example where I though what I had written was humorous, been discourteous. If there is more work to do I will do so. I don't want my posted ideas to be attacked or falsely demeaned with groundless comments. History requires that all posts be true. I have removed as much of my profile information, images and writings from the FORUM as I was able. When the commentators who have attacked my writings and character have been removed or quit THE FORUM I will apply to the FORUM to be reinstated. I ask that all my writings and ideas on science, art, economics and political science, for example, that I have posted on THE FORUM and elsewhere be checked for accuracy and correct identification by all members of THE FORUM who care to do so. I will reply. Thank you all who have found a degree of value in what I have written. Inventor These selected appropriate rules of THE FORUM are quoted verbatim. THE FORUM Rules and Guidelines 1. You do not have to have knowledge of, or agree with, all of Objectivism, but you should be here because you value Ayn Rand's ideas and want to learn more about them. If your goal is to argue with, "convert," exploit, or insult Ayn Rand, her ideas, her admirers, and/or the Ayn Rand Institute, this is definitely not the place for you. Trolling[*], proselytizing, and flaming posts will be deleted, and those who post them may be permanently banned. b. Profanity. There are definitely occasions for what Ayn Rand called "the kind of language I do not like to see in print" -- but not on THE FORUM. If you want to express profound and extreme evaluations, be clever and create your own alternatives to the usual overused and offensive curse words. 3. Be sure that your posts are well-grounded in facts and logic because, if they're not, other members of THE FORUM will call you on it. You might find that educational, but it can also be very embarrassing. If you're not really sure about something, ask a question instead of making an ill-informed assertion. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Thank you.

The concept of the continuity of functioning of concepts is a corollary to the concept of the universal identity of concepts. All concepts identify only finite metaphysical and epistemological existents, and all functionings, proofs, and demonstrations of concepts have finite results. Everything in the universe is finite, that is, all things are exist only as finite existents. The is nothing else except the continuum of all finite things which exist. All concepts identify finite existents or are completed only in finite results. No concepts identify nothing or result in nothing. Inventor

Yes. Harriman has not provided a properly stated definition. I agree with you that Harriman has provided a "description" of the concept being the "narrower class". At best Harriman has provided the characteristics of the concept given by narrower class, 'first-level generalization'. He has provided the raw phrases with which a proper definition could be written, however, we are discussing philosophy and science in a precise way, and the sentence that he offered fails to be a proper definition. Interestingly, he permits the reader to cast the parts in to a new definition, which he didn't give, however, we are here not permitted to say what he may have meant. On balance, what he said amounts to what you said, and that is that the statement is a "description". That the statement is a "description" and not a definition is unfortunate because there is so much future thought that must be based upon the precisely stated definition. There has been considerable confusion by the readers of THE FORUM regarding that sentence, and the remarks posted do not provide additional clarity of thought regarding the phrase written by Harriman. Inventor

My favorite workbooks are the first two: The Elements of Style, by William Strunk Jr. and E. B. White, MacMillan, Publ. Practical English Handbook, Instructor's Annotated Edition, by Floyd C. Watkins and William B. Dillingham, Houghton Mifflin Co., Publ. They will act as good psychology books in the sense that the mind is taught new ways to deal with ideas and to more precisely express the ideas with language. Reading them is a pleasure for the mind. A good dictionary is useful. Ayn Rand said that the oldest dictionary that you can find is the best because the modernistic-nuanced meanings are not presented as definitions in the older editions. A working list of words and their sentence contexts is helpful. Then find the meaning and use the appropriate words in your own writings. Books regarding Objectivism: The Ayn Rand Lexicon, Objectivism from A to Z, edited by Harry Binswanger, Meridian, Publ. The philosophy terms are good to learn, e.g., deductive and inductive logic, and others. The words that were the most difficult for me to integrate are epistemology and metaphysics. I struggled with the meanings of those for months or years, and I still re-read passages by Ayn Rand and Aristotle to further understand the meanings. Inventor

Thanks for the EVO link. Beautiful. Unbelievable torque. Weight -3,000lbs. Quiet. Vectored 4WD power. Inventor

That's a powerful idea, and I would hope that that realm of functioning may be developed further. My take on that is that the child's grasp of the associated perceptions functions on a primary axiomatic level. For example, the simultaneity of two effects permits the perceiver to link them in a certain relationship, that, for example, one thing results from the other. Or, they may have a characteristic in common, whether or not that is an essential defining chartacteristic. Some associations may, in fact, be causally related, and some not. Some are true and some not. Associations may be tested, validated, or corroborated to provide certainty. I have a different question. Would you care to remark on my post, #247, regarding the statement regarding "first--level generalizations" that Harriman provided or intended to be a definition of the term? Your thoughts would be welcome. Inventor

Betsy says the item is a definition. "QUOTE (Betsy Speicher @ Oct 2 2010, 04:55 PM) * [...] Implication? He defines a "first-level generalization" as "one derived directly from perceptual observation ..." (p. 19). He said "observation," not "reduction." Observation means perception, does it not?" I say that the statement by Harriman is not a valid definition. The genus of a definition cannot be the same as the concept being defined. If '"one" means "generalization"', or, if '"one" means "first-level generalization"', and if "one" is the genus of the definition, and if "one" is synonymous with "first-level generalization", then both "one" and "first-level generalization" are also the genus of the definition. But a definition cannot include the concept being defined within the definition as either the genus or the differentia. Nor can the concept being defined, "first-level generalization", be the wider class, or genus, "one" or "first-level generalization", of the concept, which was claimed by the definition. Therefore, also, the statement is not a definition. I would add that a "first-level generalization" is a sub-class of the wider class of concepts, "generalization", and that in the Harriman definition they are not interchangable terms. I, also, have an issue with the statement, "....without the need of any antecedent generalizations". Harriman said, and I quote, "A first level generalization is one derived directly from perceptual observations, without the need of any antecedent generalizations." I think that the "first level generalization" would always have an implicit statement or concept that exists on the axiomatic level of perception, and that is, that there is something there that is being perceived. The substance of existents is the primary, and after that there are the properties, potentials, functionings, and relationships of that which is being perceived. I hypothesize that a single instance of perception may not be the basis for a completed perception or completed epistemological induction. I think that a child will repeat a first perception and gain corroboration from multiple instances. Upon validation an inductive conclusion may be formed. A child may, in order to corroborate a perception, continue the action of perception to gain more information. For example, a child may think the axiomatic equivalent of, "Its still there." Alternatively, I think that a child will validate a first perception by the use of a different mode of perception. For example, touching to validate the experience of perceiving that which is being seen. That would be the equivalent of a postulate or the demonstration in actuality of the axiomatic equivalent of, "Its still there both seen and touched." The child gains validation by corroboration from multiple instances of different types of perception. Multiple simultaneous perceptions of the same or different types that may be perceived at different times and compared may be the basis of instances of induction. I don't recall Peikoff having said that in his DIM Hypothesis or that Harriman said that. If they did, I am interested in finding out what they said. Inventor

That's a definition, he says. I say that its not a definition. Definitions require proof, that is, a validation that the units of the subclass have the proper conceptual common denominator, that they are completely within and are not identical with the greater class or genus, "one", and that they refer to existents in the real world. A definition of a concept is proved by taking the universal concept and generating a particular concept conclusion by means of deductive logic. Definitions of postulates, that may be axiomatic concepts or corollaries of axioms, are also proved by means of deduction. Postulates may also be of the type wherein they may be validated by demonstration in actuality. Harriman doesn't discuss direct perception in those axiomatic terms, however. [see my posts regarding postulates.] The problem that I see with the definition of a "first-level generalization" by Harriman, is that he gives as the genus of the concept being defined, "first-level generalization", the single word, "one". We don't know what he means by "one". In trying to fathom the meaning for the "one", I find more than a single possibility: 1) The "one" is a conceptual unit or a number. 2) The "one" or the "first-level generalization" is an 'inductive conclusion' that is "derived directly from perceptual observation..." I would say that 'Inductive conclusion' is a better genus than "one" in a definition that I would write. 3) The concept of "one" is synonymous with 'conceptual induction' or 'epistemological induction'. Either of these two terms could be used as the genus of a definition, for example. 5) The concept of "one" is synonymous with "first-level generalization" exactly as stated in the quotation of the definition. In the definition of a "first-level generalization", we find that the synonym for "first-level generalization", "one", is used within the definition. When a syllogism is written to prove the definition it may be seen that the term in the conclusion, "first-level generalization", is used in synonym form "one" in one of the premises. That is an example of the fallacy of logic called post hoc ergo propter hoc. A proper syllogism cannot be written, that is, it is a plainly circular expression that is not a proof. Nor is the statement a definition. If not any of the above explanations, and if Harrimann has not defined "one" elsewhere in his book, there is no genus for the differentia, "...derived directly from perceptual observation ...". Then, for this reason also, there is no definition. Inventor

Thanks for the question. No, we are not. I pictured a setting in which a child in a crib was crawling around the crib, and who was making his first attempts at exploring the local universe on his/her own. A world where seeing, touching, and moving are all important. To the child what may be perceived has axiomatic importance as real existents. To that child there are no epistemological existents. Even then, I realized that there may be a lot of learning that takes place at stages earlier than solo crib time. Piaget has something to say regarding induction, and that is that the child takes reality for granted, and the child finds that everything in his/her world exists. If something has a particular color that's the color it is, for example. Inventor

Then why not simply use the concept of 'continuation' and ignore, or not use, the concept of infinity which identifies nothing factual in the realms of physical existence or ideas? Continuation in the metaphysical sense is a corllary to the concept of existence. Neither existence nor continuity can exist without the other. Existince is the continued being of everything. Continuation in the epistemological sense is a corollary to the concept of the universality of concepts. Neither the functioning (and potential application) of a concept nor the continuation of identification of an existent may exist without the other. Infinity is a claimed substitution for the concept of existence in some uses in language and religion, however, the concepts of existence, continuity, size, universal concept, or extended functioning are the claimed synonyms for infinity. The so-called concept of infinity, however, has no actual or finite referent in the realms of physics and ideas. Infinity identifies nothing. I suspect that Ayn Rand may have accepted the concept of method as valid on the say so of mathematicians who have promoted the concept of infinity based upon the meanings of the above mentioned synonyms. To a limited extent the synonyms function, however, when the concept being extended must be actualized or given number no finite existent is to be found. The metaphysical idea of infinity has been rejected by her in that there is nothing in the universe except that which exists, and only existents exist. There is no more in the universe than that which exists, and entensions of being have no physical referents. All instances of epistemology identify all instances of metaphysics. I suspect that if Ayn Rand had taken the concept of infinity in the sense of epistemology to identify the so-called huge or small extents of the pro-infinitist's claims, that there would have been found nothing. It would have been fun to discuss the concept of infinity with Ayn Rand. That idea may have been one of the problem or unfinished ideas that she left here and there in her writings. It isn't a big issue; the idewa of infinity simply is relatively useless in the sense of method. The method implied by the concept of continuity functions for all epistemological concepts, and insofar as concepts identify the facts of existents in the universe, so does the concept of continuity function with finite results. Inventor

The example of the child pushing the ball and causing it to roll, seeing it roll, and supposedly, hence, experiencing a causal event is more complex than has been expressed on the thread. The child first sees a blurry entity that may be a color, say, yellow. The blurry entity perceived is the result of the existence of the substance of the ball. That substance is the Material Cause (Aristotle, see defn. of MC). Of course, the ball has properties that are integral with its subtance, e.g., the color, yellow. The child may not yet have differentiated simple colors from each other, and that is not so easy a task. The child may perceive colors, however, all that is recognized is a quality of difference, e.g., that the entity is not the same as items in the background of vision. Further exercise of the process of color differentiation requires further knowledge, and color differentiation and matching require advanced knowledge than mere perceived differences. The child may recognize that the entity seen is a something, and that the something is locally unique. That differentiation is a first level generalization. (See defn. of FLG.) The child may have already experienced touch, and that things touched result in the sensation of touch. The child may recognize that the entity touched is a something, and that the something is locally unique. To the child the entity of the yellow ball that is no more to the child than a suspected entity. The physical existence of the child is a second Material Cause The physical properties of the ball and of the child are a second Efficient Cause. The child may reach out towards the entity. That is a major discovery being actualized: that what was experienced prior may be used to experience once again. Already, this analysis is more complex that was previously thought, for the prior existing conditions must be taken into account. The hypothesis by the child that an entity exists is untested. A second order generalization has occured. (See defn. of SLG.) The child reaches towards the yellow ball. That the child may act to gain information is also a discovery. That's another component of the combination of Efficient Causes of the ball and the child. That action, or the possibility to act, is probably a first order generalization. The location of the yellow ball and the location of the child are, again, Material Causes, in that they are properties of the ball and child, or they are corollaries of same. The possibilities of the specific action by the child, being vision, the attermpt to see, and the attempt to reach out towards the seen entity, however, are capabilities that are possible actions that may be taken towards the yellow ball by the child. The possible properties of action (finding out what is out there via seeing, physical vision, moving towards, and touching) by the child and the properties of the possible functioning of the child are the Efficient Causes (Aristotle, see defn. of EC). The child may see that the action of reaching and touching, taken as one process, may be directed towards the yellow entity. That an action, however exploratory at first action, may be taken towards, something that is only perceived and hypothesized as a something. That possibility of action or tentative intention towards something possible, partially known, or implicitly hypothesized, that may have a similar result as prior vision and, also, touching, is a implicit goal. The goal (finding out what is out there via seeing, moving towards, and touching) is a Formal Cause (Aristotle, see defn. of FC). So far the child has not yet actually identified the entity or clearly seen the entity in terms of its properties except for the being of its substance. The existgence of the substance is unvalidated. The child may act, and here the process of volition, or action towards a goal or value, is involved. I won't discuss that here, and more could be said on that. The child starts and continues to act. We may ignore the dynamic processes of the visual experience, e.g., changes of the apparent size or visual location of the yellow ball, and of the kinesthetic processes of the sense of location of the child and the parts of its body. There may be huge amounts of learning going on at that time, and much may be being written to the brain insofar as location data and actualized processess. That so far for the child seems to have worked ok. The child acts towards the yellow ball. Just when the quality, yellow, appears as a unique visual property of the ball as differentiated from other entities may be a matter of that discovery occuring before, during, or even after, the act of reaching out towards the entity. That may be discussed separately, anthough, in other examples of the actions of children, some actions of the child may be integral with or dependent upon other actions. Those example are not here discussed. The child completes touching the entity. The sensations of touch occur, and the entity touched provides a tactile sensation. Something is there that was touched, the child perceives. That differentiation is a first level generalization. (See defn. of FLG.) That is the Final Cause (Aristotle, see defn. of FIC). The Final Cause is the completion of the previous causes in an integration of the causes. What has happened is not just one thing, but several, all three being completed together simultaneously. The child has validated the existence of the entity, and has experienced touching the substance of the entity. The child has validated the process of acting towards something. The child has validated that so acting, so contacting, and so experiencing, the substance of the entity, has completed a combination of causes. The child has discovered that it, me, and my actions, have resulted in the completion of a process. To the child the entity is an "it - there". That combination or integration, is an example of a Final Cause (Aristotle, see defns. of FIC). (I have also written explanations of the FIC.) The realization that the entity is there in substantial and sensory form is another first level generalization. (See defn. of FLG.). The realization that the entity that is completely seen, acted towards, and touched, taken together as a single cause is a something is a discovery. With that realization a second order generalization has occured. (See defn. of SLG.) Based upon this evaluation, I suspect that the child may be aware, in some forms, of the existence or use of three of the Four Causes, or, more likely, in combination with one another as a Final Cause. Based upon this evaluation, I suspect that the child may be aware in different ways of both First and Second Level Generalizations. I suggest that the method of inquiry, at this stage, be granted an experimantal design, or a plan for further investigation. There are the prior conditions of the child that need to be evaluated. Those, for example, may be the prior discoveries and learning by the child, the physical properties of, and the physical changes to the child. Conditions existing at birth and at the stages of growth prior to the touching of the ball should also possibly be investigated. All in all, I suggest that the Four Causes of Aristotle be applied to the basic philosophy of psycholgy. In that way all prior conditions may be assessed and the integrations of all relationships evaluated. Inventor

What is the method that Ayn Rand was referring to? I don't speak high-level mathematics, and I would probably find the answer comprehensible if it were stated in philosophical conceptual terms. I understand that mathematics uses the concept of infinity in some limited uses, and I have heard it explained that the concept of infinity does not identify anything in physical reality, or, for that matter, in epistemology that cannot be explained by the use of the concepts, continuity, continuous application of a universal concept, extension, endless, or non-finite, for example. What is the method of infinity used in mathematics? What is the method of infinity used in physics? Inventor

A reading of the post yields several good ideas, and also some phrases that are difficult to understand. There are a number of grammatical problems with the sentences that I provided, and I should have broken the long sentences down into shorter statements. That's probably the reason the Ancient Greek geometers wrote their geometry proofs in the form of complete, short and concise sentences. I hope that I may have the chance to employ better grammar and to re-write the post. There's another question . . . . . It just appeared. "What is the best way to break down a complex of possibly inter-related observations or statements into tersely stated concepts and comprehensible identifications?" [ Once one's inductive faculty is turned on, and given context and means, the answers appear into consciousness seemingly automatically and without specific interventions. ] Inventor