Gilliatt

What is the ideological difference between throwing a woman off a building for adultery and throwing a woman in jail for abortion?

Would it be remiss to interpret this as a pragmatic stance?Please do not take this the wrong way, but if you're saying that understanding politics requires understanding the need to compromise on one's rights, I strongly disagree. I don't think fighting for our rights requires abdicating "less important" rights for "more important" rights - which I think is one of Peikoff's points. If that wasn't a pragmatic statement, why do you suggest that Peikoff doesn't know what he's talking about? The fundamental question (in terms of analyzing Peikoff's statement) is: Are the Republicans advancing a religious agenda? Truthfully, I think this is so obviously a "yes" that is shouldn't require an answer, but if it does, it could be proven in the same way that it's proven that the Democrats are advancing a socialist agenda. If Republicans are pushing a religious agenda, you could disagree with his solution, but you would have to admit that Peikoff does understand the problem.

In a sense.What "we" want is for Republicans to realize that "we" rational men will not accept the sacrifice of one set of rights for the protection of others. If not voting for Republicans made them more religious in order to pursue the religious vote(a possibility I grant), what reason is there to think that voting for them wouldn't cause them to realize that they, despite their religious agenda, have the rational vote... and therefore can become more religious and also get the religous vote?

Would you accept a proof that if people vote for Republican regardless of the religion-based laws they are intending, then voting for them will lead to the imminent establishment of theocratic laws?Forgive me, but I don't see the significance in distinguishing between establishing a theocracy and establishing theocratic laws. I took Peikoff's position to mean that either one would be reason to vote the Republicans out.

I took some time to think about what was said, but some things still aren't clear to me. Specifically: What are the consequences of firing an employee, or of lying to a stranger? To say that there are consequences is not to necessarily say that there are/should be legal consequences. If bearing a child is not an initiation of force, and legal consequences exist only for initiations of force, then why should there be legal consequences for bearing a child?

Hmm. I specifically don't see how it is proper to apply this to a rape victim. Are you saying that the rape victim has the responsibility to either have an abortion (with its physical risks) or to provide for the child (a sacrifice if she doesn't desire this?) Is this in her self-interest? Is she obligated here to make a sacrifice?

If the element of choice means having alternative actions, then the samaritan also has the element of choice. If that's not the proper meaning, what element of choice does the mother possess that the samaritan does not?

I'm not sure I'm getting your question, but for example, if the stranger has severly injured his arms and legs, or falls into a coma immediately after he's saved by the samaritan.

I agree that the parent is responsible - if they are the custodian. But to me, there seems to be similar situations that would improperly make a person a custodian.E.g. A good samaritan might shoot a bear that is attacking a stranger. If this stranger is unable to independently survive, would this and the fact that the samaritan chose to help, mean that the samaritan should be legally obligated to assume responsibility/custodianship?

I'm new here (but not to Objectivism itself,) and this is a question I've pondered to no satisfactory solution so far. Hopefully, someone will be able to help me out with this. Does this mean that a mother, in not stopping her pregnancy, should be legally responsible: *if she's raped, but has the legal option of abortion? *if she chooses to have sex, but abortion is legally banned?