To be or not to be...

[PRN 0]

In Viable Values, Tara Smith argues that the choice to live or not is outside of morality and reason. This is because nothing is good or bad for oneself unless one chooses to live, and nothing can be judged reasonable or unreasonable unless it is relative to some goal, and only the choice to live makes goals possible.

While I think I understand her argument, I cannot reconcile it with my conviction that when a good life is possible, to choose death is wrong. The only justification for choosing death rather than life would be when one knows he has nothing but pain to look forward to—when life no longer holds the possibility of being a positive and becomes a negative.

But to choose a zero over a positive—a good life—makes no sense. Would not such a choice in such a context be the ultimate evil? Rather than being outside of morality and reason, would it not be immoral and irrational?

I seem to have a problem of clashing contexts here. Can anyone help?

[Stephen Speicher 0]

In Viable Values, Tara Smith argues that the choice to live or not is outside of morality and reason. This is because nothing is good or bad for oneself unless one chooses to live, and nothing can be judged reasonable or unreasonable unless it is relative to some goal, and only the choice to live makes goals possible.

While I think I understand her argument, I cannot reconcile it with my conviction that when a good life is possible, to choose death is wrong. The only justification for choosing death rather than life would be when one knows he has nothing but pain to look forward to—when life no longer holds the possibility of being a positive and becomes a negative.

But to choose a zero over a positive—a good life—makes no sense. Would not such a choice in such a context be the ultimate evil? Rather than being outside of morality and reason, would it not be immoral and irrational?

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Such a choice would be the ultimate evil -- a rejection of reality itself -- as determined by those who choose life over death. But the choice to reject life removes that person from the issue of morality and reason, since the negation of life for him removes the basis for each. In a sense, then, we reaffirm our commitment to life with each exercise of reason and every moral choice we make. But the horror of the one who makes a commitment to death no longer has any claim to reason or morality, so his action is neither irrational nor immoral.

[PRN 0]

...

But the horror of the one who makes a commitment to death no longer has any claim to reason or morality, so his action is neither irrational nor immoral.

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If his action is not irrational or immoral then what is it?

[Stephen Speicher 0]

If his action is not irrational or immoral then what is it?

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It is amoral and arational -- without morality or reason.

(Is "arational" a proper word? Maybe pre-rational?)

[piz 0]

Such a choice would be the ultimate evil -- a rejection of reality itself -- as determined by those who choose life over death. But the choice to reject life removes that person from the issue of morality and reason, since the negation of life for him removes the basis for each. In a sense, then, we reaffirm our commitment to life with each exercise of reason and every moral choice we make. But the horror of the one who makes a commitment to death no longer has any claim to reason or morality, so his action is neither irrational nor immoral.

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I agree with that as long as the only further actions that person ever takes affect only himself (presumably whatever steps are necessary to end his own life). But what if he chooses to enact his choice by, say, flying a passenger jet into a skyscraper? Is that action neither irrational nor immoral?

I would say no, because until he dies he is in fact, in a disgusting, perverted, and evil way, choosing life. He's choosing to live to achieve a purpose other than his own death. It's exactly as if he's saying, "First I'll do this, then I'll commit to dying." Even if his own death comes a split second after achieving his purpose (or even simultaneously with it), as long as he pursues that purpose instead of directly pursuing his own death, and only his own death, he has not made a committment to death.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

I agree with that as long as the only further actions that person ever takes affect only himself (presumably whatever steps are necessary to end his own life). But what if he chooses to enact his choice by, say, flying a passenger jet into a skyscraper? Is that action neither irrational nor immoral?

I would say no, because until he dies he is in fact, in a disgusting, perverted, and evil way, choosing life. He's choosing to live to achieve a purpose other than his own death. It's exactly as if he's saying, "First I'll do this, then I'll commit to dying." Even if his own death comes a split second after achieving his purpose (or even simultaneously with it), as long as he pursues that purpose instead of directly pursuing his own death, and only his own death, he has not made a committment to death.

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That's interesting. I have never thought of it that way. Leave it to you to come with that!

But doesn't the full negation of life -- the complete commitment to death -- literally only apply to the instant of the actual taking of his own life? Afterall, in a sense even his last breath was in the service of his life. The only way to consistently practice a negation of life is in the instant of dying. There seems to be a perfect symmetry there, a matter of metaphysical justice.

[piz 0]

That's interesting. I have never thought of it that way. Leave it to you to come with that! 

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Hey, that's what you pay me for!

But doesn't the full negation of life -- the complete commitment to death -- literally only apply to the instant of the actual taking of his own life?

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Literally, yes. It was said in a different context, but I think it applies here: "...the only way to reject [life] is to shut one's mouth, expound no theories [, take no actions] and die." [my substitutions/additions to fit this context]

Afterall, in a sense even his last breath was in the service of his life. The only way to consistently practice a negation of life is in the instant of dying. There seems to be a perfect symmetry there, a matter of metaphysical justice.

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Yes. It is only in the final act of rejecting life - the actual dying - that it's appropriate to consider someone's actions amoral and a-rational. Any actions prior to that do not warrant that status (usually - see below). Consider, for example, someone who has just received a fatal injury, who struggles to remain alive yet cannot succeed, and who, at the last moment, comes to a brief realization that there is no hope and for those final few seconds reconciles himself to his fate. That sort of final acceptance of death over life certainly falls into this category. I once read an account, by someone who was with him at the time, of the death of comedian Sam Kinison in a car accident. Lying injured after the crash, and mere seconds before dying, Kinison seemed suddenly to become calm, and his last words were a resigned, "OK...OK...." That seems a perfect example.

On the other hand, I would personally place in that amoral, a-rational realm, for the entire duration of his final efforts, a terminally ill patient who is harming no one while taking the necessary time and steps to achieve his own comfortable suicide. I might even grant that status to one who is not terminally ill but still harms no one else on the road to death - even raising the pistol takes a few seconds.

Not so the suicide bomber. Even though his actions lead to his own death, and even if he declares that his death is his intention, his purpose is not his own death but the destruction of other life. His own death could even be considered an attempt to evade the consequences of his evil, rather than a rejection of life. ("Ha ha! I'm in heaven with my 72 virgins - you can't catch me!") I can't see how he can be granted amoral, a-rational status.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

Hey, that's what you pay me for!

You will find the usual amount, in the usual place, under the third rock on the left.

On the other hand, I would personally place in that amoral, a-rational realm, for the entire duration of his final efforts, a terminally ill patient who is harming no one while taking the necessary time and steps to achieve his own comfortable suicide.

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With this I would disagree. I think such an action can be perfectly rational and moral and in no way is it a negation of life. In fact, in a sense it is a celebration of life, an action that states life is so precious that it can only be lived under circumstances proper to man.

[PRN 0]

I've been really struggling with this issue.

Here's my current thinking:

As long as one still draws breath one is choosing life, so morality and reason still apply. But the moment one dies one no longer exists, so morality and reason no longer apply.

Therefore—when one has the potential to live a good life—to seek death is irrational and immoral all the way up until the actual moment of death. The choice one made only becomes amoral and arational once one's life goes out of existence.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

I've been really struggling with this issue.

Here's my current thinking:

As long as one still draws breath one is choosing life, so morality and reason still apply. But the moment one dies one no longer exists, so morality and reason no longer apply.

Therefore—when one has the potential to live a good life—to seek death is irrational and immoral all the way up until the actual moment of death. The choice one made only becomes amoral and arational once one's life goes out of existence.

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A funny thing, Patrick. Hearing the same basic idea that I had voiced, but said by another in slightly different words from mine, now makes me question my original view. Perhaps it is at the point of making the commitment to death itself that one has removed one's basis for reason and morality. Granted that there are involuntary and voluntary acts such as breathing that the person will perform between the time of the commitment and pulling the trigger, so to speak, but the purpose of those actions for that person are not towards the service of life, but towards his negation of life.

[PRN 0]

A funny thing, Patrick. Hearing the same basic idea that I had voiced, but said by another in slightly different words from mine, now makes me question my original view.

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Sorry. I should have acknowledged that I got the basic idea from this post ← of yours.

Once I read it I thought it must be the solution. The choice to die is only amoral or arational after one’s life ends. As long as one is still alive, morality and rationality still apply.

Perhaps it is at the point of making the commitment to death itself that one has removed  one's basis for reason and morality. Granted that there are involuntary and voluntary acts such as breathing that the person will perform between the time of the commitment and pulling the trigger, so to speak, but the purpose of those actions for that person are not towards the service of life, but towards his negation of life.

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I’m not sure. It seems that since man has free will, as long as life is still possible, a commitment to death can always be retracted. I would think that unless one has already jumped, or already pulled the trigger, the choice to die is not “binding” yet. So then wouldn’t morality and reason still apply to the person who is capable of retracting the commitment to death?

I realize this is a morbid topic. Most people would simply choose life and then get on with theirs. But what I’m after is philosophy for Ragnar, not just for Rearden.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

Perhaps it is at the point of making the commitment to death itself that one has removed  one's basis for reason and morality. Granted that there are involuntary and voluntary acts such as breathing that the person will perform between the time of the commitment and pulling the trigger, so to speak, but the purpose of those actions for that person are not towards the service of life, but towards his negation of life.

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I’m not sure. It seems that since man has free will, as long as life is still possible, a commitment to death can always be retracted. I would think that unless one has already jumped, or already pulled the trigger, the choice to die is not “binding” yet. So then wouldn’t morality and reason still apply to the person who is capable of retracting the commitment to death?

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I'm not completely sure either, but my newly stated view seems to make a bit more sense to me than what I originally thought. Also, I'm not sure why the issue of "binding" should be relevant. Should a person change his mind then he reinstates himself, in effect, so I do not see why that should be a consideration.

I think the issue boils down to this: Is the commitment to death -- the negation of life -- a physical and mental action at the split instant that the person takes his life, or is it really the mental action of the commitment, simply awaiting the means for it to be physically accomplished. I originally thought the former, but I now think the latter, since the physical act is just a consequence of a serious mental determination.

[CodyD 0]

Wait. Of suicide-

You said that it would be okay if there was only pain and suffering left. But, what if all happiness has been achieved? Would it then be right? Suicide as the "seal" on your life to say that it was happy and great-and that no new happiness could be drawn from it? You have achieved all that you have desired, you are truly happy-and see no reason in pursuing more. Would this be a reasonable suicide?

[Burgess Laughlin 0]

But, what if all happiness has been achieved?  Would it then be right?  Suicide as the "seal" on your life to say that it was happy and great-and that no new happiness could be drawn from it?  You have achieved all that you have desired, you are truly happy-and see no reason in pursuing more.

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What do you mean by "all happiness"? Happiness isn't a particular heap of feelings with fixed limits. Happiness is a state of mind that continues as long as one achieves one's basic values. (See "Happiness," Ayn Rand Lexicon, for leads to Ayn Rand's discussions of happiness and its requirements.)

Further, why would you, as a rational person, not want to continue being happy?

[CodyD 0]

Yes, yes. Point taken. I do not know exactly why one would not want to continue living happily. You'd have to be them. I'm not.

[piz 0]

I'm not completely sure either, but my newly stated view seems to make a bit more sense to me than what I originally thought. Also, I'm not sure why the issue of "binding" should be relevant. Should a person change his mind then he reinstates himself, in effect, so I do not see why that should be a consideration.

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I would agree that revoking the decision "reinstates" the person into the moral, rational realm.

I think the issue boils down to this: Is the commitment to death -- the negation of life -- a physical and mental action at the split instant that the person takes his life, or is it really the mental action of the commitment, simply awaiting the means for it to be physically accomplished. I originally thought the former, but I now think the latter, since the physical act is just a consequence of a serious mental determination.

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It's the latter that I meant in my posts, with the exception stated - the suicide bomber has other purposes and so is still subject to morality. It is only the person whose actions after the decision are directed solely toward accomplishing his death who is in the amoral, a-rational realm.

[PRN 0]

I'm not completely sure either, but my newly stated view seems to make a bit more sense to me than what I originally thought. Also, I'm not sure why the issue of "binding" should be relevant. Should a person change his mind then he reinstates himself, in effect, so I do not see why that should be a consideration.

I think the issue boils down to this: Is the commitment to death -- the negation of life -- a physical and mental action at the split instant that the person takes his life, or is it really the mental action of the commitment, simply awaiting the means for it to be physically accomplished. I originally thought the former, but I now think the latter, since the physical act is just a consequence of a serious mental determination.

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I think I see what you mean. It's not the physical act of taking one's life that is the commitment to death, but the act of choice itself. The mental determination, as you wrote.

Given that, I'm still struggling with the clash between two contexts.

On one hand, it looks like the commitment to death is outside of morality. On the other, I’m certain the rejection of life in favor of death would be the ultimate immoral act.

But this is a contradiction. Either it's immoral, or it isn't.

I'm stumped.

I think I’ll re-read Viable Values as well as the relevant parts of OPAR.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

I think the issue boils down to this: Is the commitment to death -- the negation of life -- a physical and mental action at the split instant that the person takes his life, or is it really the mental action of the commitment, simply awaiting the means for it to be physically accomplished. I originally thought the former, but I now think the latter, since the physical act is just a consequence of a serious mental determination.

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I think I see what you mean. It's not the physical act of taking one's life that is the commitment to death, but the act of choice itself. The mental determination, as you wrote.

Given that, I'm still struggling with the clash between two contexts.

On one hand, it looks like the commitment to death is outside of morality. On the other, I’m certain the rejection of life in favor of death would be the ultimate immoral act.

But this is a contradiction. Either it's immoral, or it isn't.

I'm stumped.

But didn't we deal with this before, by saying that the choice to reject life removes the basis for morality and that such an action is amoral and arational -- without morality or reason? Perhaps what you see as a contradiction -- and here I am just guessing -- is that you think because his act is amoral and arational that there is no basis for us to condemn such an act? If so, I would say just the opposite, namely that the arbitrary rejection of life is deserving of the ultimate condemnation; how else to characterize a man who chooses to remove himself from the human race, who arbitrarily chooses death over life? The fact that his act negates the basis of morality and reason, and therefore of all value, does not mean that those of who do value should not pronounce the worst judgment upon him.

I think I’ll re-read Viable Values as well as the relevant parts of OPAR.

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By all means, please do, and let us know the results of your thinking. This is a somewhat unusal issue and I thank you for bringing it up.

[PRN 0]

The results of my thinking so far:

We have been discussing this issue so far in moral terms. But I think a distinction should be made between the “ostensively good” and morality.

By “ostensively good” I mean things like the taste of ice cream or the feeling of joy. It’s directly experienced and can only be ostensively defined—one knows that joy feels good in the same way one knows red objects look red—it’s self-evident. It is also an end in itself. One does not feel joy as a means to an end but for its own sake.

Morality is very different. One cannot directly perceive what is morally good, but must figure it out. And unlike ostensively good things, morality is not an end in itself, but a means to an end. One achieves certain ends in virtue of certain types of actions.

The Objectivist Ethics is a moral code based on the choice to live. If one chooses to live, one must follow principles derived from the requirements of life. But if one rejects life, the moral code is inapplicable. In terms of the moral code, it’s impossible to condemn someone who rejects life, because the choice to live is the basis of all morality.

But we do not need to base our condemnation on the moral code alone. Instead we can condemn the rejection of life in the name of the ostensively good. A flourishing life is full of ostensively good experiences, and a rejection of such a life in favor of oblivion would be an evasion of the self-evident.

That’s why it’s wrong.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

But I think a distinction should be made between the “ostensively good” and morality.... By “ostensively good” I mean things like the taste of ice cream or the feeling of joy.... In terms of the moral code, it’s impossible to condemn someone who rejects life, because the choice to live is the basis of all morality.... But we do not need to base our condemnation on the moral code alone. Instead we can condemn the rejection of life in the name of the ostensively good. A flourishing life is full of ostensively good experiences, and a rejection of such a life in favor of oblivion would be an evasion of the self-evident....That’s why it’s wrong.

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Patrick, I'm confused about what you are saying here. Leaving aside the issue of the validity of the "ostensively good," why do you find this "ostensively good" to be a more satisfying basis for the condemnation of one who arbitrarily rejects life, rather than the basis that is inherent in the choice of those who do accept life? What does this "ostensively good" add beyond the fundamental acceptance of life as the standard?

[PRN 0]

Patrick, I'm confused about what you are saying here. Leaving aside the issue of the validity of the "ostensively good," …

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I realize the term "ostensively good" is dubious. Enjoyment is the concept I was trying to get at, but at the time I wrote my last post I had not made that connection.

… why do you find this "ostensively good" to be a more satisfying basis for the condemnation of one who arbitrarily rejects life, rather than the basis that is inherent in the choice of those who do accept life? 

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I’m not sure what you mean by “the basis that is inherent in the choice of those who do accept life.” What is that basis?

What does this "ostensively good" add beyond the fundamental acceptance of life as the standard?

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My idea here is that life as such (merely having a pulse) is not of any value apart from enjoyment. It is enjoyment that makes life worth living. A life without potential for enjoyment is worse than death.

By enjoyment I mean all types of good experiences, both physical and spiritual, from momentary physical pleasure to the profound happiness one feels at the achievement of a lifelong goal.

There are some things about enjoyment as such which I think are crucial to this discussion:

First, enjoyment is self-evidently good. If you have ever experienced happiness or pleasure, you know that it feels good by direct experience.

Second, because it is directly experienced, enjoyment can only be defined ostesively. One knows what enjoyment feels like in the same way one knows what salt tastes like.

Third, because enjoyment is self-evidently good, it is an end-in-itself. It requires no outside justification.

To answer you question, what enjoyment adds beyond the fundamental acceptance of life is the fact that it is self-evidently good whereas life per se is not. Thus life as such is not the standard, but the life proper to man—which I am arguing is only a flourishing, enjoyable life.

The status of the person who rejects life can thus be determined by using the flourishing and enjoyable life as the standard. Because the rejecter of life is rejecting the self-evident good of enjoyment, his choice is wrong. It is not outside of reason at all, but thoroughly irrational, because the act of evading the good of enjoyment is analogous to denying that two plus two is four or that existence exists.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

The status of the person who rejects life can thus be determined by using the flourishing and enjoyable life as the standard. Because the rejecter of life is rejecting the self-evident good of enjoyment, his choice is wrong. It is not outside of reason at all, but thoroughly irrational, because the act of evading the good of enjoyment is analogous to denying that two plus two is four or that existence exists.

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Patrick, your focus on enjoyment adds nothing to the principle that Peikoff already identified as the choice to live being the acceptance of the realm of reality. It is that choice itself which is the precondition for both morality and reason, and you have not demonstrated that a focus on enjoyment changes any part of the principle involved.

[PRN 0]

I’m trying to approach this issue inductively and base my understanding on direct experience. In my own direct experience, enjoyment is good. I ask myself why I choose life over oblivion and my answer is: because I enjoy my life. My own choice to remain in reality is the choice to continue pursuing and experiencing an enjoyable life.

Doctor Peikoff identifies the grounds for the choice to live as all of reality:

There are grounds for a (certain) primary choice, and those grounds are reality—all of it. The choice to live, as we have seen, is the choice to accept the realm of reality. This choice is not only not arbitrary. It is the precondition of criticizing the arbitrary; it is the base of reason.

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But more specifically, wouldn’t certain facts of reality rather than others provide the grounds for the choice to live? Based on my own experience, some experiences are better than others, such as enjoyment being preferable to pain.

I realize that one must choose the realm of reality in order to experience the good things in life, but wouldn’t it be those good things themselves which would be the ultimate basis for choosing reality over oblivion?

[Stephen Speicher 0]

I’m trying to approach this issue inductively and base my understanding on direct experience.

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That's fine, but none of what you have identified -- whether right or wrong -- goes directly to the issue that you initially raised. The Objectivist view, as stated by Ayn Rand, and as explicated by Peikoff and Smith, is that the choice to live is a precondition for morality and reason. To this you asked about your conflicting view that choosing death "[r]ather than being outside of morality and reason, would it not be immoral and irrational?"

I am not positive, but I think in one sense you have backed off of the view that it is immoral and irrational, and yet your explanation is still based on "evasion" and an explanation why it is "wrong," based on "ostensively good experiences." Note how Tara Smith puts it in Viable Values.

'What makes life worth living?' is thus a question without a rational answer. My point is not to deny that life is worthwhile; the point is that one cannot reason another person into the choice to live. No roster of wonderful things constitutes the correct explanation of why all human beings sghould live. The choice depends on what kind of ecpoerience a given individual finds satisfactory.

[...]

I concluded in chapter two, one could have no reason to be rational. At bottom, we found, the authority of rationality stands on two things: the nature of reality and a person's desire to remain within reality -- that is, his desire to live.

Thus, the best answer to "What makes life worth living?" is: life. Inspiring an answer as this may be to many, it is not an answer that anyone is logically compelled to accept. A given person can take life or leave it, without commiting any lapse of reason. Reason's requirements arise once a person embraces life.

[B. Royce 0]

Patrick, you have been implying that a man can be alive and conscious, yet not be experiencing pleasure(I am obviously disregarding states of pain here) and that that experience is a next step. Is there not pleasure in mere breathing? in opening one's eyes? This pleasure is not as intense as many forms of sensual pleasure, but is there, nevertheless.