To be or not to be...

[Burgess Laughlin 0]

Patrick, you have been implying that a man can be alive and conscious, yet not be experiencing pleasure(I am obviously disregarding states of pain here) and that that experience is a next step.  Is there not pleasure in mere breathing? in opening one's eyes?  This pleasure is not as intense as many forms of sensual pleasure, but is there, nevertheless.

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Could you cite a particular statement showing that Patrick is making that implication? I missed it.

I am puzzled by the formulation -- if I have understood it correctly -- that one is experiencing pleasure from breathing or opening one's eyes, if one is not experiencing pain. In my own experience, which is what I must start with in assessing any philosophical position, sometimes breathing does bring pleasure -- and sometimes it brings pain. I have had a long history of lung problems (collapses). Sometimes breathing was quite painful. And sometimes, later after I had recovered, it was pleasurable simply as an accomplishment in therapy. I cannot say, however, that the breathing itself was a pleasure but rather that the pleasure comes from relief at knowing a threat to my life has passed. Of course, that assessment involves reason and values -- which follow only after deciding I want to live.

Further, could you explain what you mean by "that experience is a next step"? Next step in what? If we are speaking in a circumstance which is pre-reason, how can there be any experiential or cognitive series of steps?

My problem here is that I do not understand how all of reality can be a basis for deciding life is worth living. My choice to keep living is based on the best of what living offers, not on all of it (as far as I know it).

P. S. -- However this discussion turns out, I am grateful to those who have been carrying the main burden. I have never considered these issues before. Patrick's questioning, in particular, has brought it to my attention for the first time. Ordinarily I don't get involved in philosophy-for-Ragnar issues (unless they relate to my work), but as I am approaching the last decades (at least, I hope!) of my life, the issue of what makes life satisfying enough to choose it becomes more interesting.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

My problem here is that I do not understand how all of reality can be a basis for deciding life is worth living. My choice to keep living is based on the best of what living offers, not on all of it (as far as I know it).

Your choice to keep living is, of course, a choice you make regularly every day, but that is not the actual issue. The issue is, on what rational and moral basis does such a choice rest? To answer that question, note that rational and moral actions depend upon and presuppose an ultimate value to be used as a standard in judging the rationality and morality of actions. In other words, the choice to live is a precondition for the very existence of rationality and morality, so it makes no sense to speak of a rational and moral justification for the choice to live. Choosing life is a primary, and in that sense it is an acknowledgement of reality and a choice to remain in all of reality.

[Burgess Laughlin 0]

Stephen, thank you for the concise summary.

Your choice to keep living is, of course, a choice you make regularly every day, but that is not the actual issue.

Based on my own experiences only, I would say I do not make this choice everyday -- certainly not explicitly. Rather, I occasionally revisit that choice (to keep living or not), and then, knowing, at least for now, the answer is a choice to live, I proceed with my life.

I said "occasionally" because certain kinds of events in my life prompt renewed attention to the question -- for example, the possibility of having a disease that will render me helpless and therefore incapable of achieving happiness or even, as consolation, peace of mind. I do not periodically review the question of whether to live or not. Rather, I make a decision and then keep going until something causes me to review the question.

This choosing, living, reviewing, and choosing again are my individual concerns. Thus, so far, I see this as a psychological issue. My choices based on my experiences apply to me -- not universally to all individuals, everywhere, and at all times, which would be a philosophical decision. Specifically, as I think Dr. Tara Smith was saying, as quoted in a post above, what satisfies one individual might not satisfy another individual as a justification for choosing life (at a particular point, I would add).

The issue is, on what rational and moral basis does such a choice rest?

This is a philosophical issue. If I understand it correctly, it is a question about the position of one statement (the answer to the problem, "Shall I choose life or not?") in a hierarchy of philosophical principles (specifically the need for morality, and, as a tenet of morality, the need to be rational). The question -- or rather the answer, "Yes, I choose to live" -- is the foundation of the rest of the hierarchy. The choice to live provides the standard, as you say:

To answer that question, note that rational and moral actions depend upon and presuppose an ultimate value to be used as a standard in judging the rationality and morality of actions. In other words, the choice to live is a precondition for the very existence of rationality and morality, so it makes no sense to speak of a rational and moral justification for the choice to live. Choosing life is a primary, and [...]

And now I understand this:

[...] in that sense it is an acknowledgement of reality and a choice to remain in all of reality.

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My life does not exist outside of reality nor only in a "piece" of reality, but in all of reality (because reality is all connected). If I choose life, I choose the reality in which I live -- lock, stock, and barrel.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

Stephen, thank you for the concise summary.

Based on my own experiences only, I would say I do not make this choice everyday -- certainly not explicitly. Rather, I occasionally revisit that choice (to keep living or not), and then, knowing, at least for now, the answer is a choice to live, I proceed with my life.

I said "occasionally" because certain kinds of events in my life prompt renewed attention to the question -- for example, the possibility of having a disease that will render me helpless and therefore incapable of achieving happiness or even, as consolation, peace of mind. I do not periodically review the question of whether to live or not. Rather, I make a decision and then keep going until something causes me to review the question.

You're welcome.

I was going to include "implicitly or explictly" in what I wrote, but I decided to leave it out. Bad choice. The choice to live is, at a minimum, implied in maintaining and sustaining your life, which is what I meant by "a choice you make regularly every day." All choices are made among alternatives, and the sheer effort exerted in living is a choice made against the alternative of death. I would think that when you say you "occasionally revisit that choice" you probably mean taking an overall assessment of your life to review its meaning and significance, to look at where you have been and where you are going. The result of this sort of conscious self-assessment continues to fuel you for some time, but in fact it is reaffirmed in the constant choices you make while maintaining and sustaining your life.

[PRN 0]

Patrick, you have been implying that a man can be alive and conscious, yet not be experiencing pleasure(I am obviously disregarding states of pain here) and that that experience is a next step.  Is there not pleasure in mere breathing? in opening one's eyes?  This pleasure is not as intense as many forms of sensual pleasure, but is there, nevertheless.

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Enjoyment and a life properly lived are inseparable. Enjoyment necessarily follows from living virtuously.

The idea I’ve been proposing is that enjoyment is the ultimate basis for the choice to live. I don’t see how the fact that enjoyment is the too-be-expected in a proper life takes away from that idea.

But I agree that simply being alive is a pleasure (barring pain, as you pointed out). I feel a sense of delight and awe when I contemplate the world and my own ability to perceive it. I feel happy just knowing I exist.

Sorry for the delay in replying. I had to focus on school for the last couple of days.

[PRN 0]

That's fine, but none of what you have identified -- whether right or wrong -- goes directly to the issue that you initially raised.

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I did not realize this at first, but I have moved into a more general inquiry about the status of choice to live or not, rather than focusing exclusively on morality and rationality. My deeper question is: what is the basis for choosing life? Sorry I did not make that clear.

The Objectivist view, as stated by Ayn Rand, and as explicated by Peikoff and Smith, is that the choice to live is a precondition for morality and reason. To this you asked about your conflicting view that choosing death "[r]ather than being outside of morality and reason, would it not be immoral and irrational?"

I am not positive, but I think in one sense you have backed off of the view that it is immoral and irrational, and yet your explanation is still based on "evasion" and an explanation why it is "wrong," based on "ostensively good experiences." …

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Note that I have abandoned the term "ostensively good." ←

I understand why the choice to live is outside of morality. My thinking is that the choice is still wrong in some pre-moral sense, and that morality does not exhaust what is good and bad. The choice to live or not, being pre-moral, must instead be based on more primary facts. I cannot think of anything more primary than enjoyment. Enjoyment is good even for those who cannot conceive of or practice morality, such as babies and animals.

In OPAR, Doctor Peikoff condemns those who would choose death:

A man who would throw his life away without cause, who would reject the universe on principle and embrace a zero for its own sake—such a man, according to Objectivism, would belong on the lowest rung of hell. … he would have to be condemned …

Evidently there must still be some basis for the choice to live, some grounds for why it is the right choice, even if those grounds are outside of morality. How else could we condemn one who chooses death?

[PRN 0]

... Note how Tara Smith puts it in Viable Values.

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Here are some examples of my confusion over Viable Values:

'What makes life worth living?' is thus a question without a rational answer. My point is not to deny that life is worthwhile; the point is that one cannot reason another person into the choice to live. No roster of wonderful things constitutes the correct explanation of why all human beings should live. The choice depends on what kind of experience a given individual finds satisfactory.

I really don’t understand this. Enjoyment feels good. How could one justify choosing oblivion over enjoyment? How could anyone say, in effect, “I don’t like enjoyment?”

I concluded in chapter two, one could have no reason to be rational. At bottom, we found, the authority of rationality stands on two things: the nature of reality and a person's desire to remain within reality -- that is, his desire to live.

The reason to be rational is in order to live. But isn’t the reason to live the fact that (a proper) life is enjoyable? What other reason could there be?

Thus, the best answer to "What makes life worth living?" is: life.

The life proper to man is an enjoyable one. So wouldn’t the choice to take life “lock, stock, and barrel,” as Burgess said, be based on the fact that enjoyment is part of the whole package? Isn’t it the “good stuff” that makes life worth living?

Inspiring an answer as this may be to many, it is not an answer that anyone is logically compelled to accept. A given person can take life or leave it, without committing any lapse of reason. Reason's requirements arise once a person embraces life.

Enjoyment is a primary, directly experienced fact. It is self-evidently good (in a pre-moral sense). How could the rejection of the self-evident not be a lapse of reason?

[Burgess Laughlin 0]

In OPAR, Doctor Peikoff condemns those who would choose death:

A man who would throw his life away without cause, who would reject the universe on principle and embrace a zero for its own sake—such a man, according to Objectivism, would belong on the lowest rung of hell. … he would have to be condemned …

Evidently there must still be some basis for the choice to live, some grounds for why it is the right choice, even if those grounds are outside of morality. How else could we condemn one who chooses death?

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Aren't there two issues of morality in this situation? First, is the question of whether Mr. X himself has any reason to be moral (which includes being rational) if he has not chosen to live.

The second question is whether others may rightly condemn him morally for his failure to choose life when, based on facts, it offers prospects of enjoyment.

In my case, for awhile, I was conflating the two.

[PRN 0]

Aren't there two issues of morality in this situation? First, is the question of whether Mr. X himself has any reason to be moral (which includes being rational) if he has not chosen to live.

The second question is whether others may rightly condemn him morally for his failure to choose life when, based on facts, it offers prospects of enjoyment.

In my case, for awhile, I was conflating the two.

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Maybe this is the key to my confusion? I don’t know.

I’ll have to give it some thought. This issue has been driving me crazy for weeks (but that's fine, because I enjoy thinking about it) .

[Stephen Speicher 0]

Evidently there must still be some basis for the choice to live, some grounds for why it is the right choice, even if those grounds are outside of morality.

But haven't we answered this previously? The choice to live, in the fundamental sense, is a primary upon which morality and rationality is based, so how can you ask for grounds of right or wrong, good or bad?

How else could we condemn one who chooses death?

As discussed before, on the basis of those who choose life. Values are objective once you choose life as the standard, so you disvalue he who arbitrarily chooses death.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

Here are some examples of my confusion over Viable Values:

'What makes life worth living?' is thus a question without a rational answer. My point is not to deny that life is worthwhile; the point is that one cannot reason another person into the choice to live. No roster of wonderful things constitutes the correct explanation of why all human beings should live. The choice depends on what kind of experience a given individual finds satisfactory.

I really don’t understand this. Enjoyment feels good. How could one justify choosing oblivion over enjoyment? How could anyone say, in effect, “I don’t like enjoyment?”

Some people seek physical and/or psychological pain. But, regardless, I think that the point Smith is making is that the choice to live is primary and justification relies on reason, and reason depends upon already choosing life as a standard of value.

I concluded in chapter two, one could have no reason to be rational. At bottom, we found, the authority of rationality stands on two things: the nature of reality and a person's desire to remain within reality -- that is, his desire to live.

The reason to be rational is in order to live. But isn’t the reason to live the fact that (a proper) life is enjoyable? What other reason could there be?

There exist a virtually endless array of reasons that might make life worthwhile living, but if life is not accepted as one's ultimate value then of what significance to the person are all of the reasons?

Thus, the best answer to "What makes life worth living?" is: life.

The life proper to man is an enjoyable one. So wouldn’t the choice to take life “lock, stock, and barrel,” as Burgess said, be based on the fact that enjoyment is part of the whole package? Isn’t it the “good stuff” that makes life worth living?

Sure, once you accept life as your ultimate value.

Inspiring an answer as this may be to many, it is not an answer that anyone is logically compelled to accept. A given person can take life or leave it, without committing any lapse of reason. Reason's requirements arise once a person embraces life.

Enjoyment is a primary, directly experienced fact. It is self-evidently good (in a pre-moral sense). How could the rejection of the self-evident not be a lapse of reason?

How can anything be "good" if you do not have a standard by which it is judged?

[PRN 0]

There exist a virtually endless array of reasons that might make life worthwhile living …

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But isn’t the common denominator of them all pleasure or enjoyment in some form?

… but if life is not accepted as one's ultimate value then of what significance to the person are all of the reasons? 

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Even for one who has made the commitment to death, wouldn't pleasure still feel “good” in some pre-moral sense?

How can anything be "good" if you do not have a standard by which it is judged?

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Perhaps something could be “good” in the sense that the experience is pleasurable, which is a different type of “good” than the one we mean when we discuss morality?

[PRN 0]

I have a question about the relationship between rationality and the choice to live.

This is my current understanding:

(1) Reason is only useful to those of us who choose life.

(2) However, what is reasonable is still reasonable regardless of the choice to live of not (two and two still equal four regardless of one’s choice to live or not).

To say that nothing can be judged reasonable or unreasonable unless one chooses life does not mean that two and two do not make four unless one chooses life, but that such knowledge is useful only to those who do choose life.

Is this correct?

[Stephen Speicher 0]

Perhaps something could be “good” in the sense that the experience is pleasurable, which is a different type of “good” than the one we mean when we discuss morality?

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Why would the "pleasurable" be of value to a person who chooses death rather than life?

[Stephen Speicher 0]

To say that nothing can be judged reasonable or unreasonable unless one chooses life does not mean that two and two do not make four unless one chooses life, but that such knowledge is useful only to those who do choose life.

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I would put it simply that reason is an objective value only to those who accept Man's life as a standard of value.

[Janet_Busch 0]

Patrick:

I'm having a problem with your formulation of enjoyment as a pre-moral basis for choosing life. The kind of things you are talking about, such as the taste of ice-cream, can only be enjoyed in the way you mean by a pre-cognitive child. A child takes unabashed pleasure in a lot of things that may be harmful in the long run. For an adult, however, even the taste of ice-cream can turn from a pleasurable experience to a negative if, say, you happen to weigh 200 lbs. It would then constitute a "guilty pleasure", which I take to mean something done even though it is, in reality, detrimental to one's life. The "pleasure" of a bowl of ice cream under such circumstances would not be rational, and therefore, would not be moral.

Context is everything. As an adult, the things which we enjoy must always be rational, i.e., not detrimental to the health and welfare of ones' long-term life. For an adult, even the pleasure of facing a new day occurs within the context of that person's whole life, and on the basis of the choice to live.

You need to essentialize. Pleasure and enjoyment, for an adult, are effects, not causes.

[PRN 0]

Why would the "pleasurable" be of value to a person who chooses death rather than life?

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It wouldn’t be of any value, since he would not act to gain and/or keep it. Since he has rejected life, he has rejected all values.

My point was only that pleasure would still feel "good" even to someone who has rejected life.

[PRN 0]

I would put it simply that reason is an objective value only to those who accept Man's life as a standard of value.

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Thank you. This makes sense to me.

In short, nothing can be of value apart from the choice to live. Is this correct?

[Stephen Speicher 0]

My point was only that pleasure would still feel "good" even to someone who has rejected life.

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And what would "good" mean to someone without a standard of life? We have a pleasure/pain mechanism, just like animals, but we choose the good in reference to a standard. I think that you continue to seek something intrinsic prior to accepting life, but reason, morality, and all consequent values depend on the choice to live, not on something intrinsic to man.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

In short, nothing can be of value apart from the choice to live. Is this correct?

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I would say so. Afterall, the choice to live is a precondition for morality, and what else are values if not that which we seek guided by our moral principles?

[PRN 0]

Patrick:

I'm having a problem with your formulation of enjoyment as a pre-moral basis for choosing life.  The kind of things you are talking about, such as the taste of ice-cream, can only be enjoyed in the way you mean by a pre-cognitive child.

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Hi Janet.

I enjoyed your posts in Objectivism Online. Glad to see you here.

Please note that I’m searching for the truth, my ideas on this subject are tentative, and that I might change my position at any moment if I discover I’m wrong.

To reply to your post:

I’m not sure what you mean by “enjoyed in the way you mean.” In what way do you think I mean it?

I’m also confused by the phrase “the kind of things you are talking about.” I’m unsure what you mean by that. Do you mean that I’ve been talking about only physical pleasure?

If so, please note what I wrote in post #21:

“By enjoyment I mean all types of good experiences, both physical and spiritual, from momentary physical pleasure to the profound happiness one feels at the achievement of a lifelong goal.” ←

A child takes unabashed pleasure in a lot of things that may be harmful in the long run.  For an adult, however, even the taste of ice-cream can turn from a pleasurable experience to a negative if, say, you happen to weigh 200 lbs.  It would then constitute a "guilty pleasure", which I take to mean something done even though it is, in reality, detrimental to one's life.  The "pleasure" of a bowl of ice cream under such circumstances would not be rational, and therefore, would not be moral. 

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My point was that the prospect of enjoyment in one’s life must be the pre-moral basis for choosing life. Once one has made the choice to live, life becomes the standard.

I realize that once one has chosen life, the pursuit of enjoyment without regard for consequences is wrong. Life makes enjoyment possible, and to fully live and enjoy one’s life requires the pursuit of non-contradictory joy.

If one chooses life, then he ought to embrace and practice the virtues required by life. A good, flourishing life full of enjoyment will result. I see no problem with this.

You need to essentialize.  Pleasure and enjoyment, for an adult, are effects, not causes.

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I agree with this. I’m not claiming that one can achieve a fully enjoyable life in any other way than acting morally. I’m claiming that enjoyment is the pre-moral basis for choosing life in the first place.

[PRN 0]

And what would "good" mean to someone without a standard of life?

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Morally, nothing. But pleasure still feels enjoyable, regardless. This is why I put the word “good” in quotes. I don’t mean good as in morally good. A virtuous action is good in a moral sense. The taste of a delicious meal is good in an amoral sense.

We have a pleasure/pain mechanism, just like animals, but we choose the good in reference to a standard.

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In regards to morality I agree. But isn’t enjoyment still pleasurable even in an amoral context?

I think that you continue to seek something intrinsic prior to accepting life, but reason, morality, and all consequent values depend on the choice to live, not on something intrinsic to man.

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I'm trying to figure out what the grounds for the choice to live are. The best answer to this question I have seen is given by Dr. Peikoff and Dr. Smith.

Dr. Peikoff writes: “Those grounds are reality—all of it” (OPAR 248)

Dr. Smith writes: “The best answer to the question ‘what makes life worth living?’ is: life.” (Viable Values 108)

The answer is that life is an end in itself. But by life surely they don’t mean merely having a pulse? Only a flourishing life full of enjoyment is worth living. This is why I continue to focus on enjoyment.

I would say so. Afterall, the choice to live is a precondition for morality, and what else are values if not that which we seek guided by our moral principles?

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This makes sense to me.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

I don't think anyone except a suicide or terminally ill person really chooses death. What is there to choose? Death is literally ... nothing.

What actually happens is that some people never choose to live. They exist, but they don't seek values. They don't expend much effort, because nothing is worth the effort. They take what they are given and they do what is expected of them. They are motivated by negatives: pain, fear, guilt, and resentment.

A good example of such a person is James ("Don't bother me! Don't bother me! Don't bother me!") Taggart and a perfect example would be what he ultimately became: a catatonic.

Such people are incapable of feeling pleasure. Here's Ayn Rand's description on James Taggart's affair with Betty Pope:

The nature of their relationship had the same quality. There was no passion in it, no desire, no actual pleasure, not even a sense of shame. To them, the act of sex was neither joy nor sin. It meant nothing. They had heard that men and women were supposed to sleep together, so they did.

And his reaction to Cheryl:

The hint of desire that he felt, was no more than a sense of physical discomfort. The sharpest impulse in his mind, nagging him to action, was not the thought of the girl, but of all the men who would not pass up an opportunity of this kind. He admitted to himself that she was a much better person than Betty Pope, perhaps the best person ever offered to him. The admission left him indifferent. He felt no more than he had felt for Betty Pope. He felt nothing. The prospect of experiencing pleasure was not worth the effort; he had no desire to experience pleasure.

That's what not wanting to live is like. Yuck!

[Stephen Speicher 0]

Morally, nothing. But pleasure still feels enjoyable, regardless. This is why I put the word “good” in quotes. I don’t mean good as in morally good. A virtuous action is good in a moral sense. The taste of a delicious meal is good in an amoral sense.

The physical pleasure-pain mechanism is biologically based, a consequence of natural selection. But in what sense is such a mechanism good apart from the acceptance of man's life as a standard? You have used terms like "pre-moral" and "amoral" and yet allude to some "good" which, somehow, is not the moral good. I simply do not know what that means.

Again, I really think that you are skirting around an attempt to establish some intrinsic value to use as that which underlies the choice to live. Intrinsic values do not exist, no matter what name you give to them. The choice to live is a primary.

[Burgess Laughlin 0]

Morally, nothing. But pleasure still feels enjoyable, regardless. This is why I put the word “good” in quotes. I don’t mean good as in morally good. A virtuous action is good in a moral sense. The taste of a delicious meal is good in an amoral sense.

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First, this discussion might benefit from definitions -- formally, by genus and differentia, if possible. What do you mean by good in each instance I have made bold, above? Trying to use the same term -- even with one in scare quotes -- in different ways in the same thought can be, at best, very confusing. At worst, it is a trap leading to equivocation.

Second, in the posts immediately preceding mine, Betsy gave a psychological explanation of the relation between the decision to live and enjoyment; and Stephen addressed again a philosophical explanation of the need to decide to live before morality (and therefore reason) is possible. Which context are you speaking in -- psychological or philosophical?

I have one more suggestion: If you believe that the pleasure of a delicious meal is "good," try dropping that word and using a more exact term -- such as pleasurable or delicious or enjoyable. By dumping the connotations of "good," your argument is simply -- and rightly -- stating a fact: a delicious meal is delicious. What inferences a particular individual draws from that are psychological, that is, they pertain to that individual but not necessarily all individuals. Failure of an individual to draw the proper inference -- Life is worth living when I have the prospect of enjoyment -- is worthy of condemnation, but that is a different issue from recognizing that the decision to live philosophically (that is, hierarchically) precedes the need for morality (including rationality).