Judging other people

[Brian Smith 0]

1) Is there some name for the type of judgment that simply establishes the relationship between some existential condition and one's life?  Is what evaluation means?

I am not sure exactly what you are asking here. Could you give a couple of examples of the type of judgment of which you are speaking?

2) Can you help me to essentialize the basis for distinguishing between the four types of judgments that you name?

The basis for distinguishing between types of judgments is the difference between types of action. For example, what a man charges for his services is derived from economic principles, not moral principles. (Note: while proper economic principles are ultimately derived from proper moral principles, they are not moral principles themselves. They are distinct in their nature/focus.) In other words, the reason we distinguish between the types of judgments is same reason we distinguish between morality and economics in general, or morality and esthetics, etc..

3) I think you used the term ‘behavioral judgment’ in relation to judging a person on their actions alone. Where does this fit into your distinction (intellectual, economic, esthetic, moral)?

It doesn't. It represented a line of thought presented to me, which I have since rejected.

When the concept of judging a man's actions apart from any particular subject was first presented, I devised that term simply because I needed some way to distinguish non-subject judgment from specific subject judgment. And as I tried to integrate that concept - non-subject judgment, ie behavioral judgment - into my understanding of Objectivist ethics, I came to realize it was an invalid concept in this context. As such, I have discarded the term, as I have the concept.

I believe that you said something along the lines of: what you say and how you act are a window to who you are.  Is “who you are” in this context synonymous with your ‘character’, i.e. how one stands in relation to objective moral principles.

It is, in the context in which I made my statement.

4) Are the four types of judgment equal, hierarchically, or is one more fundamental than the rest?

Moral principles are certainly the most fundamental of the types of principles named, since any other type of principle a man accepts is shaped by the moral principles he accepts - the personal 'instruction manual' he writes for himself. BUT when one judges another person, it is the context of the judgement - the value one seeks to gain or keep - that determines the 'importance' between the types of judgment.

For instance, one may have to choose between carpenter Bob and carpenter Bill. Bill's work may be artistically brilliant. But he may also have a problem with reliability. Bob's work, on the other hand, may be artistically mundane. But he may be the most reliable man you have ever known. Depending on the value you are seeking - say an artistically stunning foyer - you may decide to risk Bill's moral deficiency for his artistic benefit. Or - if the context is getting your foyer done before a particular date - you may risk Bob's artistic deficiencies for his moral benefit.

Again - context is everything. There is no determination of 'good' without it. There is no way to judge a man's action without a context.

5) Is the following correct?

We must first understand WHAT moral judgment is before we can answer HOW to employ it.

I would say: 'We must first understand what moral judgment is before we can answer how to employ it PROPERLY.' One can always engage in moral judgment (even if one is not specifically aware that is what one is doing). But such judgments can lead to errors when judging others (ex - judging those who engage in the less-thorough moral judgments as unjust).

If you can establish that a man is in a favorable relationship to those principles you can conclude that he is beneficial to man on principle.  To be beneficial to man means to be beneficial to all men.

Again, beneficial in what respect? If a man is reliable, he may still be unjust in his treatment of other men. In one context, getting a job done on time, his reliability may be beneficial. In another context, jury duty, his unjust nature may be detrimental.

Again, there is no context-less 'good' - no intrinsic value. As Ayn Rand put it: "'value' presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what?" Without an answer to BOTH parts of the question, what you have is not a 'value'.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

an intellectual judgment

an economic judgment

an esthetic judgment

a moral judgment

Identifying any or all of the first three types of judgment as that of the fourth type of judgment would be an error.

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I don't think these terms are that useful as classifications because they are not mutually exclusive.

All judgments are intellectual in that they are made by a consciousness, i.e., an intellect. Also, because facts and values are inexorably linked, judgements of all four kinds mentioned serve the purpose of living a life proper to man.

The only reason to distinguish between types of judgements is when it serves a cognitive purpose, so here are how I would regard the four terms from the perspective of my own cognitive purposes.

an intellectual judgment

I don't use this term since it is redudant and the adjective doesn't qualify the noun.

an economic judgment

This is a sub-class defined by subject matter. The genus is "judgment" and the differentia is "of relative values in terms of units of money."

an esthetic judgment

This is a sub-class defined by the standard of evaluation employed. The genus is "judgment" and the differentia is "according to a standard of artistic merit."

a moral judgment

I use this term to mean an evaluation of a person's characteristic actions by reference to an abstract ethical standard. A moral judgement is distinguished from a simple "good for me/bad for me" assessment of a particular person's impact on my life and is more long-range and universal.

Sometimes a moral judgement and a personal impact judgment can vary, so it is important for me to make the distinction. For instance, I might avoid a certain person because all he is interested in talking about is his clothing business and, after five minutes, I'm bored to tears. Nonetheless, I may judge him as a fine and morally admirable person who is rational, purposeful, and proud.

[Andrew Sternberg 0]

1) Is there some name for the type of judgment that simply establishes the relationship between some existential condition and one's life?  Is what evaluation means?

I am not sure exactly what you are asking here.  Could you give a couple of examples of the type of judgment of which you are speaking?

I mean the basic judgement that x is a value or disvalue (to me and with life as the standard). When am saying "a relationship between some existential condition one's life" as an elaboration on the meaning of value. The reason for my occasional elaboration such as this is to make it easier for you to check my premises.

I can evaluate food to be a value because it stands in a certain positive relationship to my life.

I can evaluate a certain art work to be a value because it stands a certain postivie relationship to my life.

I can evaluate rationality to be a value because it is the means by which I can acquire all my other values.

etc.

Betsy uses the following wording:

...

A moral judgement is distinguished from a simple "good for me/bad for me" assessmentof a particular person's impact on my life and is more long-range and universal.

...

On this point, I am only asking whether "a simple "good for me/bad for me" assessment" means the same thing as evaluation? If you have cognitive and normative judgement, the above would seems to be the broadest way to

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2) Can you help me to essentialize the basis for distinguishing between the four types of judgments that you name?  Let me start and you can tell me if I have going in the right direction.

Judgment requires some standard in order to establish a spectrum on which 'good' is at one end and 'bad' at the other.  If there are different categories of judgment, they have to get their identity from the differing standards they employ

The basis for distinguishing between types of judgments is the difference between types of action.  For example, what a man charges for his services is derived from economic principles, not moral principles.  (Note: while proper economic principles are ultimately derived from proper moral principles, they are not moral principles themselves.  They are distinct in their nature/focus.)  In other words, the reason we distinguish between the types of judgments is same reason we distinguish between morality and economics in general, or morality and esthetics, etc..

I posited that the differentia for each was a unique standard employed by each. You say it is the uniqueness of the action.

Are you saying that it is the uniquness of action instead of or in addtion to the uniqueness of standard employed?

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On points 3 and 4, I agree.

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5) I the following correct?

We must first understand WHAT moral judgment is before we can answer HOW to employ it.

I would say:  'We must first understand what moral judgment is before we can answer how to employ it PROPERLY.'  One can always engage in moral judgment (even if one is not specifically aware that is what one is doing).  But such judgments can lead to errors when judging others (ex - judging those who engage in the less-thorough moral judgments as unjust).

Agreed.

If you can establish that a man is in a favorable relationship to those principles you can conclude that he is beneficial to man on principle.  To be beneficial to man means to be beneficial to all men.

Again, beneficial in what respect?  If a man is reliable, he may still be unjust in his treatment of other men.  In one context, getting a job done on time, his reliability may be beneficial.  In another context, jury duty, his unjust nature may be detrimental. 

Again, there is no context-less 'good' - no intrinsic value.  As Ayn Rand put it: "'value' presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what?"  Without an answer to BOTH parts of the question, what you have is not a 'value'.

When I say beneficial, I mean beneficial to man and for man's life. I don't think this would classify as intrinsicism.

If I say, "being rational is beneficial to man", I am answering both parts of the question. I am saying it is beneficial to man and for his life. Substitue any particular man for the universal man: Being rational is beneficial to you, and for you life, just as it is beneficial for me and my life, just as it is beneficial to each and every other human being, and their lives.

[Brian Smith 0]

I don't think these terms are that useful as classifications because they are not mutually exclusive.

I am not certain in which sense of the term you are using 'mutually exclusive'. But as to being useful, I have to disagree. Furthermore, these are not terms I simply made up. These are some of the classifications of judgment Dr. Peikoff explicitly identified in OPAR:

Moral judgment is not the only form of evaluating men.  Moral values are fundamental values; on their basis, many specialized kinds of value are defined, including intellectual value, esthetic value, and economic value.  Such values, too, must be judged objectively, and their creators or possessors treated appropriately.  The virtue of justice thus has many applications that do not involve moral appraisal as such.  But the precondition of all such derivative evaluations is moral evaluation, which latter also indicates the pattern of a just process in any of its forms.

I agree with the fact that one needs to identify the specialized kinds of value - that they are not moral evaluations "as such" - and that they include, but are not limited to, the kinds of specialized values he identifies.

All judgments are intellectual in that they are made by a consciousness, i.e., an intellect.

The term 'intellectual' is not used to identify the person making the judgment. It identifies the person who is being judged And it specifically identifies what about that person is being judged - his intellect, his morality, his artistry, etc.. For instance, when you make a moral judgment, it is not your morality which is being judged. It is someone else's morality you are judging. And it is the context of the goal - the value - you seek to gain or keep which identifies the specific moral principles, or esthetic principles, or intellectual principle, or political principles, etc, which are being evaluated.

Example: you have a transmission problem with your car and you need it to be fixed. You know a couple different mechanics. In most respects, they are the same. They are both morally good, they both charge around the same amount for their work, etc. But Bob is a transmission specialist while Jim is a brake specialist. So you choose Bob, because he knows transmissions. This type of judgment evaluates a man's intellect - and does so within the context of the value you seek to gain or keep. Specifically, in the context of your goal - a fixed transmission - it is Bob who is a value to you. And he is a value based on an intellectual - not a moral, or a political, or an economic, etc - standard. Thus the identification of this type of judgment as an 'intellectual' judgment.

Put simply, the term 'intellectual' identifies specifically what is being judged (as opposed to what is not being judged). Here - the man's intellect, not his morality etc. is being judged. Distinguishing between judging a man intellectually vs morally (or politically, etc) seems quite useful.

Also, because facts and values are inexorably linked, judgements of all four kinds mentioned serve the purpose of living a life proper to man.

This is not under dispute. Nor does it change the fact that one's esthetic principles are not moral principles. As you yourself indicated, moral principles don't tell you the style of car you should drive. So, unless you seek to condemn someone morally for their bad esthetic tastes, you need to specifically identify the type of principles you are using to judge a man. And the identification of that type is used as the modifier for the term judgment - thus 'moral' judgment; 'esthetic' judgment; etc.

Sometimes a moral judgement and a personal impact judgment can vary, so it is important for me to make the distinction.

Again, there is no disagreement here - except over the failure to identify the subject of the judgments you are distinguishing from moral. As I indicated, through explicit example, failure to identify what one is judging can lead to errors in judgment.

For instance,  I might avoid a certain person because all he is interested in talking about is his clothing business and, after five minutes, I'm bored to tears.  Nonetheless, I may judge him as a fine and morally admirable person who is rational, purposeful, and proud.

Again - not under dispute. No one is (or at least, I am not) questioning whether a judgment of someone's intellectual knowledge, or his social acumen, etc is valid or not. One can indeed judge someone for reasons other than morality. This has been stated more than once. In fact, by identifying separate categories of judgment, one is not only stating this to be the case, one is in fact acting on this principle.

No. The only thing under dispute is the failure to identify that which is being judged - or, worse, the mis-identification of that which is being judged (ie to say someone is intellectually deficient when in fact they are artistically deficient - or someone is artistically deficient when in fact they are morally deficient).

Specifically, the thing in dispute here is your identification of particular moral judgments as a non-moral judgment. In other words, you identified some judgments in which the subject of the judgment was not the person's social skills, not his political views, not his intellectual know-how, not his artistry, etc etc - but was his morality (ie - is he reliable, is he lazy, can he be trusted, etc). And yet you explicitly claimed this was not a moral judgment - in fact that it was not a specific type of judgment at all. Not only that, but when asked to morally assess someone who did identify these as moral judgments, you agreed such a person would be unjust.

Nothing you just posted address this dispute at all.

[Brian Smith 0]

Andrew - let me know if my answer to Betsy does not answer your fundamental questions. If it doesn't then please tell me what questions still remain and I will try to answer them.

[Andrew Sternberg 0]

Andrew - let me know if my answer to Betsy does not answer your fundamental questions.  If it doesn't then please tell me what questions still remain and I will try to answer them.

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Can you respond to points 1, 2 and 5 in my most recent post. Your post was a illuminating elaboration other issues and these three questions still linger in my mind. Thanks.

[Brian Smith 0]

1) Is there some name for the type of judgment that simply establishes the relationship between some existential condition and one's life?  Is what evaluation means?

I mean the basic judgement that x is a value or disvalue (to me and with life as the standard).

Are you searching for the term "value-judgment" - an evaluation of facts which serves to identify what one will seek to keep or achieve (all of which ultimately serve one's ultimate value - in the case of Objectivism, one's own life) - and thus distinguishes them from things one does not one to keep or even seeks to avoid (ie non-values and disvalues)? Is that the term you are trying to identify? It certainly fits your question - and each of the types of judgment we have thus far identified (and many we have not identified at all) are specifically types of value-judgments.

I posited that the differentia for each was a unique standard employed by each. You say it is the uniqueness of the action. 

Are you saying that it is the uniquness of action instead of or in addtion to the uniqueness of standard employed?

The way you have phrased the question, the answer is "in addition to". In other words, when you judge a person, you are judging a particular kind of action against a particular kind of standard.

For example, when you engage in moral judgment, you evaluate the particular actions of a man which relate to morality - as opposed to, say, artistry. Thus, you do not judge a man's brush stroke to determine if he is just. You do not judge a man's visual composition to determine if he is honest.

To be beneficial to man means to be beneficial to all men.

When I say beneficial, I mean beneficial to man and for man's life.

For something to be 'beneficial' means some action might produce a favorable result for one's self or others in a given instance. But the fact that a man is moral does not mean that he will get a favorable result from any particular action. Nor does someone being immoral mean that one will get unfavorable results from those actions.

For instance, robbers could count on a police officer's reliability in performing his duties - specifically in making his rounds. As a result, if the police officer is virtuous, the victim will lose his values. The victim will most definitely not benefit from the officer's virtue. He will suffer because of it. However, if the police officer turns out not to be virtuous - if he slacks off and comes around when he feels like it instead of when he is supposed to - then he could accidentally foil the robbery and save the man's values. Thus, the victim would benefit from the officer's vice. And the robbers would most certainly suffer.

Does this mean reliability should not be a virtue? No. Does it mean benefit is a result of the context of an action? Yes.

This example illustrates the fact that, though a virtue might be benefitial in some, or even most instances, it does not mean it is benefitial in all instances to all men. Put simply, without identifying to whom and in what context, one cannot state an action will be of benefit to any particlar man, let alone all men. Such an unqualified assertion is, as I previously suggested, an example of intrinsicism - that 'benefit' exists in the action regardless of context.

If you need a different example, you can reference the one provided by Dr. Peikoff in OPAR about honesty:

The principle of honesty, in the Objectivist view, is not a divine commandment or a categorical imperative.  It does not state that lying is wrong "in itself" and thus under all circumstances, even when a kidnapper asks where one's child is sleeping (the Kantians do interpret honesty this way).  But one may not infer that honesty is therefore "situational," and that every lie must be judged "on its own merits," without reference to principle.  This kind of alternative, which we hear everywhere is false.  It is another case of intrinsicism vs subjectivism preempting the philosophical field.

Lying is absolutely wrong - under certain conditions.  it is wrong when a man does it in the attempt to obtain a value.  But, to take a different kind of case, lying to protect one's values from criminals is not wrong.  If and when a man's honesty becomes a weapon that kidnappers or other wielders of force can use to harm him, then the normal context is reversed; his virtue would then become a means serving the ends of evil.

This is why Dr. Peikoff says:

Just as particular objects must be evaluated in relation to moral principles, so moral principles themselves must be defined in relation to the facts that make them necessary.  Moral principles are guides to life-sustaining action that apply within a certain framework of conditions.  Like all scientific generalizations, therefore, moral principles are absolutes within their conditions.  They are absolutes - contextually.

(emphasis in original)

And so, when it comes to evaluating the virtues (as with evaluating anything else) context is of supreme importance:

Virtue does not consist in obeying concrete-bound rules ("Do not lie, do not kill, do not accept help from others, make money, honor your parents, etc.").  No such rules can be defended or consistently practiced; so people throw up their hands and flout all rules.

The proper approach is to recognize that virtues are broad abstractions, which one must apply to concrete situations by a process of thought.  In the process, one must observe all the rules of correct epistemology, including definition by essentials and context-keeping.

This is the only way there is to know what is moral

This is the reason I stated the claim that 'something beneficial to man means beneficial to all men' is intrinsicism. There is nothing which is either a benefit - or a value - regardless of specific context.

Put simply, honesty - and any virtue - is contextually a value, not intrinsically a value.

[Andrew Sternberg 0]

1)

Your right, value-judgment is exactly the term I was looking for. But I still don't know what evaluation means. I don't know which types of mental identification it refers to and which types are excluded from it.

By providing me the value-judgement term, you also reminded me that there are two general categories of identification: fact and value (x is true, x is good).

Value-judgement covers half of this distinction, and you go on to name other sub-categories of value-judgements: moral-judgement being the most fudamental of these sub-categories, with esthetic, economic, intellectual, etc. (etc. since you imply others).

Is there an already existing term for the other half, fact-judgements, or is that it?

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2)

In other words, when you judge a person, you are judging a particular kind of action against a particular kind of standard.

Ah. I think I understand. Since a person effects reality (including other people) through their actions, it is a man's action that one must make value-judgments of.

There are different categories of value-judgments because there are different categories of action. What type of value-judgment one should properly employ in any given context depends on the perspective one is looking at it from. The proper perspective also depends on context. I agree with you that context is everything.

Ok, but given a context in which it is proper to perform a certain type of value-judgment (esthetic, economic, moral), how do you perform that value-judgment validly? This is where judging a particular kind of action "against a particular kind of standard", comes into the equation. But in order to do this you need to know the principles characteristic of that standard, and you need to know the method for applying those principles.

Given a context in which esthetic-judgment is proper, in order to determine something as esthetically good/bad, you need to know the standard for good and bad art, and then you need to know the method for applying that standard to the art-work being judged

Given a context in which economic-judgment is proper, in order to determine something as economically good/bad, you need to know the standard for good and bad economic action, and then you need to know the method for applying that standard to the economic action being judged.

Given a context in which moral-judgment is proper, in order to determine something as morally good/bad, you need to know the standard for good and bad moral action, and then you need to know the method for applying that standard to the moral action being judged.

This last, moral-judgment, has been the primary focus of this thread. But there seem to have been two separate questions being discussed: 1) In what context is moral-judgment appropriate, and 2) given a context in which moral-judgment is appropriate, what is the valid method for applying the Objectivist ethics, as our standard, to the action being judged.

Betsy seemed to be focusing primarily, but not exclusively on the first, and Brian, your questions seem to be focused primarily, but not exclusively, on the second.

I think there is much more that could be said on both questions, and I am anxiously awaiting the answers.

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5) I need to give more thought to this part, your claim that I am speaking intrinsically (bad), rather then in contextual absolutes (good), and specifically more thought to whether or not I know what principles are. I think I need to re-'chew' the meaning of principles, and that may take some time. Once I have, I'll bring this point back up again in another thread. That is, if it is even necessary.

[Brian Smith 0]

Is there an already existing term for the other half, fact-judgements, or is that it?

One does not judge facts. There is no standard against which to 'measure' them. Facts simply are. As such, one merely identifies them. And man's means of doing that is reason.

So - if I understand your question correctly, the answer you are looking for is this: one reasons to identify facts (identify that which exists). And then one judges to identify values (identify which existents are good or bad for man).

how do you perform that value-judgment validly? This is where judging a particular kind of action "against a particular kind of standard", comes into the equation. But in order to do this you need to know the principles characteristic of that standard, and you need to know the method for applying those principles.

Yes. In order to make a valid moral judgment, for instance, one must first know what are valid moral principles.

But there seem to have been two separate questions being discussed: 1) In what context is moral-judgment appropriate, and 2) given a context in which moral-judgment is appropriate, what is the valid method for applying the Objectivist ethics, as our standard, to the action being judged.

Betsy seemed to be focusing primarily, but not exclusively on the first, and Brian, your questions seem to be focused primarily, but not exclusively, on the second.

No. The question, as both Betsy and I agree, is that we are defining "moral judgment" differently. In fact, it appears we are not even identifying the modifiers to the term "judgment" in the same manner. As such, we have not even gotten to the point of being able to debate what context the same concept of 'moral judgment' should be applied. Nor have we gotten to the point of being able to debate what should be the 'valid method' of applying the same concept of 'moral judgment' to a properly identified context.

Before we can do any of those things, we have to settle the debate over what is a 'moral judgment' in the first place.

I think I need to re-'chew' the meaning of principles

Okay. Good luck - or better yet, good premises.

[Burgess Laughlin 0]

By providing me the value-judgement term, you also reminded me that there are two general categories of identification: fact and value (x is true, x is good).

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I have a different understanding. A fact (in the metaphysical/ontological meaning of that term/idea) is some aspect of reality. If I have objectively identified that fact, my identification is true. I can then e-valu-ate that identified fact: Is it good for me or bad for me, that is, is it of value to me or not?

"Fact" can be used in an epistemological sense to mean "my identification of an aspect of reality." In that sense of the term/idea, a fact can be true. For the sake of clarity of thought and simplicity, I prefer to restrict "fact" to aspects of reality, and to explicitly identify identifications as identifications. That is where the phrase "fact of reality" is so helpful for emphasizing the existence of something independent of my consciousness.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

Moral judgment is not the only form of evaluating men.  Moral values are fundamental values; on their basis, many specialized kinds of value are defined, including intellectual value, esthetic value, and economic value.  Such values, too, must be judged objectively, and their creators or possessors treated appropriately.  The virtue of justice thus has many applications that do not involve moral appraisal as such.  But the precondition of all such derivative evaluations is moral evaluation, which latter also indicates the pattern of a just process in any of its forms.

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I see the context you and Dr. Peikoff were referring to, so I will address that.

Dr. Peikoff is discussing the various ways we evaluate other people. While moral values are fundamental, we also judge them as to how much we can learn from them (intellectual value), how much we enjoy their appearance (esthetic value), how much we can gain from them in trade (economic value), and in other ways, not mentioned, that are not primarily moral evaluations.

Peikoff's point is that the virtue of justice requires that all evaluations of others, primarily moral or not, must be made and acted on objectively.

[Brian Smith 0]

I see the context you and Dr. Peikoff were referring to, so I will address that.

Dr. Peikoff is discussing the various ways we evaluate other people.  While moral values are fundamental, we also judge them as to how much we can learn from them (intellectual value), how much we enjoy their appearance (esthetic value), how much we can gain from them in trade (economic value), and in other ways, not mentioned, that are not primarily moral evaluations. 

Peikoff's point is that the virtue of justice requires that all evaluations of others, primarily moral or not, must be made and acted on objectively.

His particular point was not the issue (though of course the one you identify is correct). His identification of other forms of judgment simply served to support an element of the point I was making. That is the issue. The identification of different principles by which to judge these different types of action is the issue (which his statement also corroborates). And the identification of these particular types of judgment by what they are judging and the standard they use is the issue.

Now, I might disagree with the specific identifications you make concerning those different types of values. But, regardless, the point remains. The differences between the types of judgment do exist. They exist because different types of actions exist - and because one is required to judge each of those types of actions with different standards. Thus, to distinguish between these types of judgment, one adds a modifier to the term 'judgment' to distinguish between one type of action/standard and another. That is why the term 'moral judgment' refers to the type (the subject and standard) of judgment one is making - not the thoroughness of the inquiry used to arrive at the conclusion about a person's morality. (This same holds true of the rest of the types of judgments. They are esthetic judgments, regardless of the thoroughness used to come to a conclusion about a person's esthetics. They are intellectual judgments, regardless of the thoroughness used to come to a conclusion about a person's intellect, etc.).

In other words, the term identifies the type of principles and actions referenced in a particular judgment, not the contextual certainty of the judgment.

Now, if the above is correct, then a claim that a judgment is not moral even though a person's actions are being judged against a standard of morality, would be an incorrect claim. (As would any claims of injustice pertaining to the incorrect claim.)

And that is my point - as well as the main point of dispute.

What all of this also means, though, is that one does not make a judgment without a specific type of principle against which to judge the particular actions. Such principles are used, whether they are held implicitly or stated explicitly. As such, one cannot claim a judgment to be of no particular type, unless one is claiming the judgment is using no particular set of principles to gage the actions. And if that is the case, then such a judgment would be a "situational" judgment, not a principled judgment - ie it would be a subjective judgment, as opposed to (assuming objective principles) an objective judgment.

[Brian Smith 0]

Just an added point, for the sake of clarity. As I said, it is not the thoroughness of a judgment which defines whether an evaluation is a moral judgment or some other kind of judgment. And the reason for this is that the accuracy of a judgment (and/or the certitude of one's accuracy) does not dictate the nature of judgment. For instance, whether a judgment of a particular moral characteristic is correct or not (ie whether a person is lazy or not - or unreliable or not, etc) does not change the fact that one is judging a moral characteristic. Even if one blows the answer completely, it is still a moral characteristic one is judging - and thus a moral judgment one is making. It is just a wrong moral judgment.

That is why - regardless of the thoroughness of a judgment - such thoroughness, certainty, accuracy etc., do not determine whether an evaluation is a moral judgment or not.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

In other words, the term ["moral judgment"] identifies the type of principles and actions referenced in a particular judgment, not the contextual certainty of the judgment.

Now, if the above is correct, then a claim that a judgment is not moral even though a person's actions are being judged against a standard of morality, would be an incorrect claim.  (As would any claims of injustice pertaining to the incorrect claim.)

And that is my point - as well as the main point of dispute.

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Then I wouldn't dispute that. To some extent, all judgments of people have at least some moral component which may be merely implicit ("He did this, but could have done otherwise.")

I was making a distinction between simply judging someone's actions and an in depth analysis of the motives, premises, and character of a person using an explicit moral standard. The former is required for all people whose actions impact our lives and the latter when there is a long-term relationship and/or very important values at stake.

What all of this also means, though, is that one does not make a judgment without a specific type of principle against which to judge the particular actions.  Such principles are used, whether they are held implicitly or stated explicitly.  As such, one cannot claim a judgment to be of no particular type, unless one is claiming the judgment is using no particular set of principles to gage the actions.  And if that is the case, then such a judgment would be a "situational" judgment, not a principled judgment - ie it would be a subjective judgment, as opposed to (assuming objective principles) an objective judgment.

Every evaluation involves a comparison to some standard. How you classify that judgment may vary since there are several cognitive options. You can classify the judgment by the standard used (moral, economic, esthetic, etc.), by the effort expended (superficial, in depth), by the cognitive method employed (objective, subjective), etc. The same thing -- in this case, a judgment of another person -- can be classified in more than one way depending on your reason for making the classification. What objectivity demands is that the classification be based on real similarities and differences.

[Brian Smith 0]

Then I wouldn't dispute that.  To some extent, all judgments of people have at least some moral component which may be merely implicit ("He did this, but could have done otherwise.")

No. That is one of the points Dr. Peikoff was making. Merely making a choice does not make a particular action a moral action. To use the example you indicated earlier about style of vehicle - just because a man could have chosen one style of car instead of another style, does not make the choice a moral choice. It makes it a value-judgment - yes. But it makes it an esthetic one, not a moral one.

I was making a distinction between simply judging someone's actions and an in depth analysis of the motives, premises, and character of a person using an explicit moral standard.  The former is required for all people whose actions impact our lives and the latter when there is a long-term relationship and/or very important values at stake.

I understood that. In other words, you were making a distinction between thorough moral judgments and all other kinds of judgments. I never disputed this as being your distinction. I disputed your identification of it as the only form of moral judgment. And I indicated at least one of the reason I did so was because it leads to errors in judgment (as demonstrated by the example I provided).

Every evaluation involves a comparison to some standard.

Yes.

How you classify that judgment may vary since there are several cognitive options.  You can classify the judgment by the standard used (moral, economic, esthetic, etc.)

Yes. And this classification applies to all value-judgments - ie all value-judgments will fall into one of the types of this classification.

by the cognitive method employed (objective, subjective), etc.

Yes. And this classification applies to all value-judgments - ie all value-judgments will fall into one of the types of this classification.

by the effort expended (superficial, in depth),

Yes. Though this classification does not apply to all value-judgments - ie not all value judgments will fall into one of the types of this classification (at least as you have identified the classification).

While there are certainly cognitively useful reasons to make the first two classifications, there is no cognitive usefulness in classifying all value-judgments simply on the basis of the effort involved in reaching their conclusions. In fact, one could make a very good argument that such a classification would hamper cognition. And you (at least implicitly) seem to recognize this fact because, in applying this classification, you did not apply it universally. You limited it. As you have indicated, your purpose in creating a 'thoroughness' (or 'effort') classification is to identify the relative accuracy and certainty of an evaluation's identification of a man's fundamental characteristics in relation to reality. And you make such a classification because the context is that of a greater value than those of the less thorough types of evaluation.

But this means your classification would not pertain to anything but the objective type of cognitive judgment, since the thoroughness of a subjective evaluation (ie an evaluation using a subjective cognitive method) will still produce subjective results, regardless of the 'effort' put into the judgment (ie they will not be accurate nor certain, because there is no relation to reality (no objectivity)). Not only that, but this also means your classification would not pertain to anything but the moral type of principled judgment, since the thoroughness of an esthetic evaluation (ie an evaluation using esthetic principles to judge esthetic actions, etc) will not identify a man's moral characteristics, regardless of the 'effort' put into the judgment (ie they will not be accurate nor certain, because there is no identification of man's fundamental characteristics (no morality)).

In other words, while the cognitive classification applies to all judgments - and the principles classification applies to all judgments - your 'thoroughness' (or 'effort') classification applies only to a particular type of principles classification, which is itself, only a particular type of cognitive classification. Put simply your classification deals specifically with one particular set of principles - morality (the identification of a man's fundamental characteristics). And it deals with one particular type of cognitive method - objective (the relation to reality). Thus, unlike the other two classifications, it is not a fundamental classification. It is a very specific derivative - a sub-sub-classification. As such, it is invalid to compare it to fundamental classifications as if it was a fundamental classification. And it is thus invalid to use it in the same context as those fundamental classifications, as if it were a fundamental classification. But that is what you just did.

Now the reason I identify these fact is to point out that there is no logical - no non-contradictory - way to identify certain objective moral judgments as objective moral 'moral' judgments, while identifying others as objective, moral, 'non-moral' judgments. Yet, again, that is what you did. Not only that, but you further identified certain types of objective, moral judgments as unjust, based on the above form of classification. It is these two claims which caused all the confusion here. And it is these two claims with which I must disagree.

They are not true.

No. In this context, one may identify certain objective moral judgments as objective, moral, more-thorough judgments, while identifying others as objective, moral, less-thorough judgments. Or one may shorten this identification to more-thorough judgments and less thorough judgments. But in doing so, one cannot ignore what is still implicit in this shortening - that they are still only about objective types of judgment - and more specifically, objective moral types of judgment.

And thus the point I have been making is: the claim that some objective moral judgments are moral and some are non-moral is an invalid premise. And consequently, the claim that it is unjust to identify certain objective moral judgment as a moral judgments, is also an invalid premise.