On Ayn Rand's "fallacy of the stolen concept".

[HaloNoble6 0]

Can you guys help me understand what role logical fallacies in general, and Ayn Rand's fallacy of the stolen concept in particular, play in formal logic as well as in Objectivism? My understanding of Ayn Rand's stolen concept is based on the following:

... "context-dropping" is really the wider (and more modern) name for Aristotle's "ignoratio elenchi"; and "the stolen concept" is the other side, the reverse, of "petitio principii." If this last is "begging the question" or "assuming that which you are attempting to prove," then "the stolen concept'' is "begging the answer" or "assuming that which you are attempting to disprove." (Many instances of "the stolen concept" are, in fact, instances of "petitio principii," such as ...etc.

Presently I understand fallacies to be particular manifestations of contradictory reasoning. I think of them, metaphorically, as tools in a logic tool box for identifying contradictions. Now, what role does the stolen concept, as understood by Ayn Rand, play in her philosophical system? Going back to my metaphor of a tool in a tool box (presuming it's valid), did she use this tool to build any part of her structure of Objectivism, thus meaning the validity of Objectivism is tied to the validity of the stolen concept as a fallacy?

(Some background: My questions above are motivated by an encounter with someone arguing against the idea that the stolen concept is truly a fallacy. In this thread I'm interested in understanding whether the stolen concept is part of Objectivism, and if so, in what sense.)

[dondigitalia 0]

Presently I understand fallacies to be particular manifestations of contradictory reasoning.

I don't think there's anything really wrong about this, but the way I look at it, it's a little more precise to say that fallacies are types of invalid arguments. It's not tremendously different from what you said, but it's a slightly different angle.

Going back to my metaphor of a tool in a tool box (presuming it's valid), did she use this tool to build any part of her structure of Objectivism, thus meaning the validity of Objectivism is tied to the validity of the stolen concept as a fallacy?

This is an interesting question. I'm going to draw particular attention to the way you phrased it; it's pretty near being an instance of the stolen concept, at least implicitly. I say it's "pretty near" only because I don't think an honest question can ever really be called fallacious. It's probably more correct to say that the phrasing of your question stems from the same fundamental error as the stolen concept.

The fallacy of the stolen concept relies on the idea that all concepts are abstractions, most of which are abstractions from abstractions. It relies on the notion that concepts (except those on the first level) are integrations of other concepts (and ultimately of existents). The fallacy of the stolen concept begins, fundamentally, with an attempt at reversing or ignoring the order of abstraction, i.e. hierarchy.

How does this relate to the phrasing of your question? Objectivism's validity doesn't rely on the stolen concept fallacy, but the validity (or invalidity, as the case may be) of the stolen concept definitely relies on the validity of Objectivism, particularly the theory of concepts and the recognition of hierarchal, contextual knowledge.

I do regard the fallacy of the stolen concept as part of Objectivism, since it is Ayn Rand's discovery and is a direct consequence of her epistemology. Let's see if others agree.

What is your friend's knowledge of Objectivist epistemology? Does he understand Ayn Rand's theory of concepts? What view of concepts does he accept? The fallacy of the stolen concept is far from self-evident, and accepting it really relies on first having accepted the Objectivist theory of concepts. If your friend holds to a different view, then he's probably not going to agree that it's a valid fallacy. (Gotta love oxymorons!)

[HaloNoble6 0]

How does this relate to the phrasing of your question? Objectivism's validity doesn't rely on the stolen concept fallacy, but the validity (or invalidity, as the case may be) of the stolen concept definitely relies on the validity of Objectivism, particularly the theory of concepts and the recognition of hierarchal, contextual knowledge.

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Thank you for identifying this error, that was very perceptive. Can you elaborate on how the stolen concept is a consequence of the Objectivist epistemology? In doing so perhaps I will then agree with you that is part of Objectivism.

What is your friend's knowledge of Objectivist epistemology? Does he understand Ayn Rand's theory of concepts? What view of concepts does he accept? The fallacy of the stolen concept is far from self-evident, and accepting it really relies on first having accepted the Objectivist theory of concepts. If your friend holds to a different view, then he's probably not going to agree that it's a valid fallacy. (Gotta love oxymorons!)

He appears to be quite knowledgeable of the Objectivist epistemology (based on prior discourse with him). I haven't probed his specific understanding of it at this point in time, however, not having made the integration that the validity of the fallacy is a tied to the validity of the Objectivist epistemology, not the other way around.

[dondigitalia 0]

Thank you for identifying this error, that was very perceptive.  Can you elaborate on how the stolen concept is a consequence of the Objectivist epistemology?  In doing so perhaps I will then agree with you that is part of Objectivism.

Perhaps it will help if I use an example. Existentialist try to make the claim, ultimately derived from Kant's idea of phenomena vs. noumena, that the world of human experience does not exist apart from concsiousness. They are, in effect, trying to deny the axiomatic concept "existence" and invoking extreme primacy of consciousness, i.e. subjectivism. Asserting that consciousness is all that our reality consists of, they ignore the fact that "existence" is implicit in every concept they use.

Now, in Objectivism, there is a hierarchy to concepts. Axiomatic concepts are included in all others, implicitly--they are the base from which we procede. Since all concepts include "existence" in them, it doesn't really make sense to try arguing against the reality of existence. This argument rests on the idea, however, that there is a hierarchy to concepts.

The fact that there is a hierarchal relationship between "existence" and all other concepts necessarily means that any attempt to deny "existence" involves accepting that which one is attempting to disprove. But, within the context of a theory of concepts that does not recognize hierarchy (e.g. intrinsicism and subjectivism), one can make these sort of assertions all day long without a problem.

He appears to be quite knowledgeable of the Objectivist epistemology (based on prior discourse with him).  I haven't probed his specific understanding of it at this point in time, however, not having made the integration that the validity of the fallacy is a tied to the validity of the Objectivist epistemology, not the other way around.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

By coincidence, I stumbled upon the discussion you were having on OO.net right after I made my initial post in this thread. I wouldn't waste too much time arguing with that guy. Past experience has shown me that he is attempting to reconcile parts of Objectivism with his own philosophy. I have seen him try to explicitly rewrite the Law of Identity to suit his purposes on a couple of occasions. I don't want to argue against him on THE FORUM, since he isn't here to defend his position, though, so I'll leave it at that.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

Going back to my metaphor of a tool in a tool box (presuming it's valid), did she use this tool to build any part of her structure of Objectivism, thus meaning the validity of Objectivism is tied to the validity of the stolen concept as a fallacy?

I'm not sure I understand the thrust of this question. The validity of Objectivism stems from its correspondence with reality, based on facts and proper reasoning, not fallacious reasoning such as the stolen concept. Identifying an instance of a stolen concept will reveal a certain kind of error in reasoning, but a positive, not a negative is required to advance philosophical knowledge.

[Burgess Laughlin 0]

Now, what role does the stolen concept, as understood by Ayn Rand, play in her philosophical system?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

HaloNoble6, are you asking one or more of these questions?

1. Is Ayn Rand's explicit, named identification of the Fallacy of the Stolen Concept an element of her philosophy?

2. Did Ayn Rand use the fallacy to help her uncover possible errors during the original development of her philosophy?

3. Is logic (which includes formal identification of fallacies) a part of philosophy or outside of it?

They are all intriguing questions -- either philosophically or historically -- but I am unsure which one(s) you are asking.

[HaloNoble6 0]

I'm not sure I understand the thrust of this question. The validity of Objectivism stems from its correspondence with reality, based on facts and proper reasoning, not fallacious reasoning such as the stolen concept. Identifying an instance of a stolen concept will reveal a certain kind of error in reasoning, but a positive, not a negative is required to advance philosophical knowledge.

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Don seems to think, and upon reflection I agree, that the validity of the stolen concept as a logical fallacy depends on Ayn Rand's theory of concepts, not vice versa, as I had thought when I asked the question you responded to.

In my original thinking I had reasoned that since fallacies are tools for identifying manifestations of contradictory reasoning, and since a philosophical system is built by proper reasoning (using logic) based on facts, finding a broken tool in one's logic toolbox could mean that the system one has built with this tool is faulty. What Don clarified for me was that Ayn Rand's identification of this particular fallacy stems from her theory of concepts, not that her theory of concepts stems from having established the fallacy a priori.

Forgive me if I'm not being clear; I'm not satisfied at present with the way I'm explaining myself.

[HaloNoble6 0]

HaloNoble6, are you asking one or more of these questions?

1. Is Ayn Rand's explicit, named identification of the Fallacy of the Stolen Concept an element of her philosophy?

2. Did Ayn Rand use the fallacy to help her uncover possible errors during the original development of her philosophy?

3. Is logic (which includes formal identification of fallacies) a part of philosophy or outside of it?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

In my original post I was asking your question 1. presuming the answer to your question 2. was "yes." Now that you pose 3., however, I would like the answer to this as well. In answering 3., I would to know precisely in what sense you view logic to be part of philosophy (I have my own ideas and would like to compare them to yours).

[Paul's Here 0]

Thank you for identifying this error, that was very perceptive.  Can you elaborate on how the stolen concept is a consequence of the Objectivist epistemology?  In doing so perhaps I will then agree with you that is part of Objectivism.

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<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Objectivism holds that all knowledge is held in the form of concepts; that all knowledge is contextual and hierarchical. This means that there is a specific structure, with a foundation and supporting concepts, arguments and principles at each level. If anyone denies an item from a lower level of knowledge, he cannot use any arguments or concepts from levels above that which he is denying. It would be like pulling the second floor out of a building and expecting the remaining structure to keep standing.

The fallacy of the Stolen Concept applies when a reasoning process denies or ignores the antecedent concepts that were used to formulate the higher level concept. Clearly, this fallacy depends upon one's theory of concept formation.

For example, there is a frequent bromide that the only thing that exists is "motion" or "change". The concepts "motion" and "change" are being stolen because in order to have first formulated concepts of motion or change, one would have to have perceived entities and formulated concepts of those entities that have not changed or moved. Or one would have to identify what they were before the change and what they are after the change. The concept "entity" is being denied.

Another example is the argument that asserts that "since man is capable of error, there is no way to know when he is right." The concept being stolen is "error" because the only way to form the concept error is in know instances of being "right." A variant of this example is the statement "man cannot be certain of anything."

[Stephen Speicher 0]

Don seems to think, and upon reflection I agree, that the validity of the stolen concept as a logical fallacy depends on Ayn Rand's theory of concepts ...

The fallacy of the stolen concept depends primarily upon the hierarchal structure of concepts, which is just one aspect of Ayn Rand's theory of concepts. Her theory of concepts has several fundamental elements, measurement omission for one. Therefore, I would rather say that the fallacy of the stolen concept depends upon an aspect of Miss Rand's theory of concepts.

[Ed from OC 0]

Objectivism holds that all knowledge is held in the form of concepts;

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That's not true. Some pieces of knowledge, like proper names or specific concretes, are not concepts.

that all knowledge is contextual and hierarchical.

Yes. A concept is "stolen" when it is taken out of its context, loosely speaking. More specifically, it is illogical to attempt to invalidate a concept using another concept on which it depends. For example, one can't prove "existence exists" because the process of proof itself presupposes that something exists.

How central is this to Objectivism? Well, it's a derivative issue. It's a particular way of violating some principles of epistemology.

[Burgess Laughlin 0]

[...] I would [like] to know precisely in what sense you view logic to be part of philosophy [...].

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I, speaking for myself, view logic as part of epistemology, which is part of philosophy. Logic is the art (and, I hold, science) of non-contradictory identification of the facts of reality. Logic is what one uses to know reality, and knowing reality is what epistemology studies. Also, logic, like epistemology, is both descriptive and prescriptive.

A second reason for holding that logic is an element of Ayn Rand's philosophy, Objectivism, is that the essence of Objectivism is the idea of "objectivity" (in its epistemological meaning). Objectivity is a certain kind of relationship between ideas in the mind and the facts of reality, a logical relationship. So, there can be no objectivity, and no Objectivism, without logic. Logic is thus an element of Objectivism, the philosophy Ayn Rand created.

Another question is where did the elements of logic (the tools in the toolkit) come from? Historically many came from earlier philosophers, mainly Aristotle, but Ayn Rand adopted them and added to them. This is an historical question.

[dondigitalia 0]

The fallacy of the stolen concept depends primarily upon the hierarchal structure of concepts, which is just one aspect of Ayn Rand's theory of concepts.  Her theory of concepts has several fundamental elements, measurement omission for one. Therefore, I would rather say that the fallacy of the stolen concept depends upon an aspect of Miss Rand's theory of concepts.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I just want to say that I agree with this completely, and I never intended to imply that the fallacy of the stolen concepts depended on any aspect of Ayn Rand's theory of concepts than hierarchy. I don't think it was implied in what i said, but since HaloNoble6 summarized my position in such a broad manner, I wanted to add further clarification.

[Paul's Here 0]

That's not true.  Some pieces of knowledge, like proper names or specific concretes, are not concepts.

Since man's knowledge is gained and held in conceptual form, the validity of man's knowledge depends on the validity of concepts.

All knowledge is in terms of concepts.

Yes.  A concept is "stolen" when it is taken out of its context, loosely speaking.  More specifically, it is illogical to attempt to invalidate a concept using another concept on which it depends.  For example, one can't prove "existence exists" because the process of proof itself presupposes that something exists.

How central is this to Objectivism?  Well, it's a derivative issue.  It's a particular way of violating some principles of epistemology.

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It is not just attempting to invalidate a concept because it may not be that explicit. It usually just consists of denying or not recognizing a higher level concept's dependency on a lower level concept.

[Paul's Here 0]

I, speaking for myself, view logic as part of epistemology, which is part of philosophy. Logic is the art (and, I hold, science) of non-contradictory identification of the facts of reality. Logic is what one uses to know reality, and knowing reality is what epistemology studies. Also, logic, like epistemology, is both descriptive and prescriptive.

A second reason for holding that logic is an element of Ayn Rand's philosophy, Objectivism, is that the essence of Objectivism is the idea of "objectivity" (in its epistemological meaning). Objectivity is a certain kind of relationship between ideas in the mind and the facts of reality, a logical relationship. So, there can be no objectivity, and no Objectivism, without logic. Logic is thus an element of Objectivism, the philosophy Ayn Rand created.

Another question is where did the elements of logic (the tools in the toolkit) come from? Historically many came from earlier philosophers, mainly Aristotle, but Ayn Rand adopted them and added to them. This is an historical question.

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Although almost all the subject matter of logic pertains to epistemology, the foundation, the Laws of Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle, are metaphysical statements about the nature of things. These Laws serve as the bridge between metaphysics and epistemology.

[ELS 0]

Paul's Here,Dec 19 2005, 09:30 AM]

Although almost all the subject matter of logic pertains to epistemology, the foundation, the Laws of Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle, are metaphysical statements about the nature of things.

That's partially correct. Your next statement is fully correct:

These Laws serve as the bridge between metaphysics and epistemology.

The really interesting question is: how -- and of what -- is that bridge built?

Why are the three Aristotelian logical Laws, and only those three, the essential "Laws"?

What are the objective relationships between the logical Laws of Identity, Contradiction and Excluded Middle?

Is the context a hierarchical relationship pertaining to cognition from philosophic fundamentals, i.e., The Law of Identity applied to cognition, resulting in the other two laws as principles which are essential derivatives? Is the Law of Contradiction essentially a principle for detecting error; the Law of Excluded Middle esentially a principle for preventing error? Thus, establishing a context for eliminating any possibility of error? In effect, establishing human cognition as close to the Law of Identity as metaphysically possible?

All assuming an objective conceptual theory -- such as Ayn Rand's?

(I believe I already know the answers, but I would be interested in the ideas of others)

ELS

[Paul's Here 0]

That's partially correct. Your next statement is fully correct:

On what basis do you say it's partially correct?

The really interesting question is: how -- and of what -- is that bridge built?

Why are the three Aristotelian logical Laws, and only those three, the essential "Laws"?

What are the objective relationships between the logical Laws of Identity, Contradiction and Excluded Middle?

Is the context a hierarchical relationship pertaining to cognition from philosophic fundamentals, i.e., The Law of Identity applied to cognition, resulting in the other two laws as principles which are essential derivatives? Is the Law of Contradiction essentially a principle for detecting error; the Law of Excluded Middle esentially a principle for preventing error? Thus, establishing a context for eliminating any possibility of error? In effect, establishing human cognition as close to the Law of Identity as metaphysically possible?

All assuming an objective conceptual theory -- such as Ayn Rand's?

(I believe I already know the answers, but I would be interested in the ideas of others)

ELS

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Each Law is a reformulation of the basic law Aristotle described: the Law Of Contradiction (See his Metaphysics, Book 4 Chapter 4). "We have now posited that it is impossible for anything at the same time to be and not to be, and by this means have shown that this is the most indisputable of all principles." (McKeon) The Law of Excluded Middle holds that a thing must either be this or not this; there is no middle ground or third alternative. The Law of Identity is a formulation that states that a thing is itself and cannot be a non-thing (a thing has only one identity). These are the only three laws because there are no other alternatives. A thing cannot be A and non-A at the same time in the same respect; a thing is either A or non-A; A is A.

Prior to this paragraph, Aristotle formulates the principle.

For a principle which everyone must have who understand anything that is, is not a hypothesis; and that which every one must know who knows anything, he must already have when he comes to a special study.  Evidently then such a principle is the most certain of all; which principle that is, let us proceed to say.  It is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect...

The laws are arrived at by observation of the attributes of things, and then grasping that if one is to have knowledge of those things one has to use those principles when thinking about those things. This is the bridge. Contradictions can only exist in man's knowledge, not in things themselves. The demonstration of a contradiction in one's knowledge is the demonstration that an error has been made in one's reasoning.

Using the Laws of Logic will not eliminate the possibility of error because man is not omniscient and unknown factors will affect one's conclusions. What the laws do is to guarantee that one's reasoning conforms to the nature of the objects being studied.

An objective theory of concepts depend on the Laws of Logic, not the other way around.

[ELS 0]

Paul's Here Posted Today, 01:10 AM

On what basis do you say it's partially correct?

Because the foundational principles -- the Laws of Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle -- are, as you say a bridge from metaphysics to epistemology: they are less "metaphysical statements about the nature of things" than they are the essential epistemological principles formed from the law of identity and its implications for knowledge.

Each Law is a reformulation of the basic law Aristotle described: the Law Of Contradiction (See his Metaphysics, Book 4 Chapter 4).

I disagree. The Law Of Contradiction makes no sense without the Law of Identity presupposed. (Nothing, of course, makes sense without it presupposed...)

"We have now posited that it is impossible for anything at the same time to be and not to be, and by this means have shown that this is the most indisputable of all principles."

Aristotle may not have recognized it, but the Law of Identity is, in fact, "the most indisputable of all principles". Ayn Rand did recognize it.

It is because anything is what it is, that "it is impossible for anything at the same time to be and not to be". Contradictions can't exist because they are a violation of the Law of Identity.

The Law of Excluded Middle holds that a thing must either be this or not this; there is no middle ground or third alternative.  The Law of Identity is a formulation that states that a thing is itself and cannot be a non-thing (a thing has only one identity).  These are the only three laws because there are no other alternatives.  A thing cannot be A and non-A at the same time in the same respect; a thing is either A or non-A; A is A.

But you have to start, not end with A is A.

Since a thing is what it is, and therefore, cannot be both what it is and also something else (at the same time, and in the same respect), it must be either A or non-A. You see the hierarchical inference here?

Each of the other two laws are applications of the Law of Identity to the only possible cognitive alternatives; that's the bridge from the metaphysical to the epistemological. The Law of Identity keeps the metaphysical context within an epistemological context.

Put another way: the Law of Identity keeps the primacy of existence principle in context, at all times, in all respects, during any cognition.

Put yet another way: the Law of Identity keeps the primacy of existence principle in any cognitive context, and sustains, on metaphyscial principle, the derivative nature of consciousness.

Using the Laws of Logic will not eliminate the possibility of error because man is not omniscient and unknown factors will affect one's conclusions.

Omniscience is not the problem; the Law of Identity is, in fact, a form of "omniscience". As to "unknown factors": that sounds arbitrary. What specific factors are you referring to? If they are unknown, how do you know they "will affect one's conclusions"? You are presupposing "factors" not in evidence.

What the laws do is to guarantee that one's reasoning conforms to the nature of the objects being studied.

The Laws of Logic are the basic principles of logic. They are (consonant with the "bridge") metaphysical-epistemological standards which determine all the other logical principles: what is and isn't logical for all the myriad cognitive operations man is capable of.

Using any of the rest of the logical principles derived from the Laws of Logic -- i.e., using Logic -- will guarantee that one's reasoning conforms to reality -- not just the nature of the objects being studied.

The nature of the objects being studied are what they are -- the epistemological processes of consciousness are what they are -- the relation between the two is what it is -- and only such relationship established by the Laws of Logic is objective.

An objective theory of concepts depend on the Laws of Logic, not the other way around.

Of course it does; you can't formulate a valid theory of concepts without valid logical reasoning. But it's a reciprocal process. Ayn Rand's valid logic led her to a valid conceptual theory -- which leads to a re-evaluation and re-formulation of the errors of past logical theory.

ELS

[Paul's Here 0]

Because the foundational principles -- the Laws of Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle -- are, as you say a bridge from metaphysics to epistemology: they are less "metaphysical statements about the nature of things" than they are the essential epistemological principles formed from the law of identity and its implications for knowledge.

Aristotle formulated the Law of Contradiction in his section on Metaphysics. So if you want to argue "less, more, >25%" feel free to do so. The fact is the Laws are metaphysical statements about the nature of things. The reason to think in accordance with the laws is to insure that our reasoning conforms to that nature.

I disagree. The Law Of Contradiction makes no sense without the Law of Identity presupposed. (Nothing, of course, makes sense without it presupposed...)

Each law makes sense, on its own, simply by looking at reality and grasping the nature of things.

Aristotle may not have recognized it, but the Law of Identity is, in fact, "the most indisputable of all principles". Ayn Rand did recognize it.

It is because anything is what it is, that "it is impossible for anything at the same time to be and not to be". Contradictions can't exist because they are a violation of the Law of Identity.

But you have to start, not end with A is A.

Since a thing is what it is, and therefore, cannot be both what it is and also something else (at the same time, and in the same respect), it must be either A or non-A. You see the hierarchical inference here?

Each of the other two laws are applications of the Law of Identity to the only possible cognitive alternatives; that's the bridge from the metaphysical to the epistemological. The Law of Identity keeps the metaphysical context within an epistemological context.

The Laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle are most certainly NOT deduced from the Law of Identity; nor are they "presupposed" by the Law of Identity. Nor are they "applications" of the Law of Identity. They are all statements of the same fact about nature. Where did Rand state that the Law of Identity was "the most indisputable of all principles" to the exclusion of the other Laws?

You state "It is because anything is what it is, that 'it is impossible for anything at the same time to be and not to be'." If all you had was the Law of Identity without the Law of Contradiction, then there would be no answer to the claim that something could be A and non-A at the same time in the same respect. The answer would be to such a claim, "that is its identity. That is, being A and non-A is its identity." There is no conflict within that statement with only knowledge of the Law of Identity. It is only the Law of Contradiction that refutes it.

Put another way: the Law of Identity keeps the primacy of existence principle in context, at all times, in all respects, during any cognition.

Put yet another way: the Law of Identity keeps the primacy of existence principle in any cognitive context, and sustains, on metaphyscial principle, the derivative nature of consciousness.

The above is somewhat confusing and clear to me. I don't understand what your aiming at. Consciousness is not derivative from (of?) existence. It is volition that keeps the Law Of Identity and the primacy of existence in context.

Omniscience is not the problem; the Law of Identity is, in fact, a form of "omniscience". As to "unknown factors": that sounds arbitrary. What specific factors are you referring to? If they are unknown, how do you know they "will affect one's conclusions"? You are presupposing "factors" not in evidence.

Let not forget what the question was on this point that I was addressing. You asked in Post 16 "Is the Law of Contradiction essentially a principle for detecting error; the Law of Excluded Middle essentially a principle for preventing error? Thus, establishing a context for eliminating any possibility of error?" The only error that is prevented in one of reasoning. Unless you are going to claim omniscience and assert that there is no possibility that future events will not affect your conclusion, then the Laws of Logic do not prevent this kind of error. This is not presupposing factors not in evidence, it is keeping in mind that all knowledge is contextual.

The Laws of Logic are the basic principles of logic. They are (consonant with the "bridge") metaphysical-epistemological standards which determine all the other logical principles: what is and isn't logical for all the myriad cognitive operations man is capable of.

Using any of the rest of the logical principles derived from the Laws of Logic -- i.e., using Logic -- will guarantee that one's reasoning conforms to reality -- not just the nature of the objects being studied.

Huh???? Are the objects different than reality?

The nature of the objects being studied are what they are -- the epistemological processes of consciousness are what they are -- the relation between the two is what it is -- and only such relationship established by the Laws of Logic is objective.

Of course it does; you can't formulate a valid theory of concepts without valid logical reasoning. But it's a reciprocal process. Ayn Rand's valid logic led her to a valid conceptual theory -- which leads to a re-evaluation and re-formulation of the errors of past logical theory.

ELS

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[Stephen Speicher 0]

Where did Rand state that the Law of Identity was "the most indisputable of all principles" to the exclusion of the other Laws?

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Those specific words are ELS' formulation. However, note that in ITOE (p. 112) Peikoff states "The principle at the base of the proper method is the fundamental principle of metaphysics: the Law of Identity." I think, as you correctly note, both identity and contradiction are statements of the same fact, but since contradiction is the negation of identity then the law of contradiction is really a kind of corollary of the law of identity.

[Paul's Here 0]

Those specific words are ELS' formulation. However, note that in ITOE (p. 112)  Peikoff states "The principle at the base of the proper method is the fundamental principle of metaphysics: the Law of Identity." I think, as you correctly note, both identity and contradiction are statements of the same fact, but since contradiction is the negation of identity then the law of contradiction is really a kind of corollary of the law of identity.

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Good point. I didn't use the concept of corollary, but that's what I meant. Remember, the Objectivist definition of logic is "the art of non-contradictory thinking" which emphasizes the Law of Contradiction. I think which Law is emphasized depends upon the context. I agree that the Law of Identity is the principle one to emphasize in metaphysics mainly because of Rand's subsequent, brilliant formulation: Existence is Identity, Consciousness is Identification. This not only serves as a bridge between metaphysics and epistemology, it basically states that identity is the bridge. I think the Law of Contradiction is emphasized in epistemological contexts: "No concept man forms is valid unless he integrates it without contradiction into the total sum of his knowledge."

[Paul's Here 0]

Consider this example that illustrates the relationship between the Laws of Identity and Contradiction.

I have a beach ball in which one half is red and the other half is blue. Using the Law of Identity, I am perfectly correct in stating "the ball is red" and "the ball is blue." Both state the identity of the ball accurately. Now, where does the problem come in? If I maintain "the ball is red" and "the ball is blue" at the same time in the same respect. Thus, the Law of Contradiction points out the error in my identification.

[ELS 0]

Stephen Speicher,Dec 21 2005, 01:02 AM

Those specific words are ELS' formulation. However, note that in ITOE (p. 112)  Peikoff states "The principle at the base of the proper method is the fundamental principle of metaphysics: the Law of Identity." I think, as you correctly note, both identity and contradiction are statements of the same fact, but since contradiction is the negation of identity then the law of contradiction is really a kind of corollary of the law of identity.

Exactly! Thank you, Stephen.

ELS

[ELS 0]

Paul's Here,Dec 21 2005, 12:32 AM]

The Laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle are most certainly NOT deduced from the Law of Identity; nor are they "presupposed" by the Law of Identity.  Nor are they "applications" of the Law of Identity.  They are all statements of the same fact about nature.  Where did Rand state that the Law of Identity was "the most indisputable of all principles" to the exclusion of the other Laws?

The Laws of logic are not deduced from the Law of identity -- they are formulated as corrolaries -- per the above post from Stephen Speicher --from that law. Which presupposes the existence of that law qua principle in one's mind.

A "presupposition" is, in this context, an application. A "corollary" presupposes it's primary formulation. That's what distinguishes a "corollary" from what it is a corollary of.

Ayn Rand emphasized that existence was identity. To exist is to be something. She certainly didn't state that the Law of Identity excluded any other Laws. But she definitely did emphasize the fundamentality of the principle of Identity throughout her writings.

You state "It is because anything is what it is, that 'it is impossible for anything at the same time to be and not to be'."  If all you had was the Law of Identity without the Law of Contradiction, then there would be no answer to the claim that something could be A and non-A at the same time in the same respect.  The answer would be to such a claim, "that is its identity.  That is, being A and non-A is its identity."

Which, is exactly what some modern philosophers (beginning, perhaps, with Hegel) would say!

The problem, of course, is with the original subject of this thread -- the fallacy of the stolen concept.

You cannot make sense of "identity" while claiming that "something could be A and non-A at the same time in the same respect". You would be trying to steal the concept "Identity".

What something could be contradictory? What could have an identity being both what it is (A), and what it is not (non-A)?

Let not forget what the question was on this point that I was addressing.  You asked in Post 16 "Is the Law of Contradiction essentially a principle for detecting error; the Law of Excluded Middle essentially a principle for preventing error? Thus, establishing a context for eliminating any possibility of error?"  The only error that is prevented [is] one of reasoning.

Because the Law of Contradiction is "proof of error" (per Ayn Rand) it is a principle which detects when one has made an error in reasoning.

That allows for a correction of your reasoning; unless, of course, you want to practice evasion.

Because the Law of the Excluded Middle requires you choose among the only metaphysically possible alternatives -- it is A, or it is not A -- it prevents error, in the sense that if you have to choose either A or non-A,

given all the facts available: what you choose cannot be both A and non-A -- presupposing a prior acceptance of the Law of Contradiction.

"Error", in this context, applies to how well you logically process the continuum of evidence. From "possible" to "certain", you cannot refrain from choosing at each step: either it is, or it isn't. There does not exist any third alternative which will allow you to get around that something either is or isn't A.

Which means that at each point on that evidential continuum, you are certain of something. The process of gathering evidence is either completed -- or not. The evidence is either conclusive -- or not. Either you're certain --or you're not. That's how the Law of the Excluded Middle is logically, and cognitively, applied.

Unless you are going to claim omniscience and assert that there is no possibility that future events will not affect your conclusion, then the Laws of Logic do not prevent this kind of error.  This is not presupposing factors not in evidence, it is keeping in mind that all knowledge is contextual.

My only claim to "omniscience" is in grasping and accepting that (1) existence exists, and (2) that existence is identity. That's as close as I (or you, or anyone else) will ever get to "omniscience".

The only thing that should affect my future conclusions are the facts in evidence. If I have made an error in logic, I am sure you and others on this forum will point any of them out (as you have already done; and, incidently, for which I thank you, and anyone else in advance! )

ELS

[Paul's Here 0]

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"Error", in this context, applies to how well you logically process the continuum of evidence. From "possible" to "certain", you cannot refrain from choosing at each step: either it is, or it isn't. There does not exist any third alternative which will allow you to get around that something either is or isn't A.

Which means that at each point on that evidential continuum, you are certain of something. The process of gathering evidence is either completed -- or not. The evidence is either conclusive -- or not. Either you're certain --or you're not. That's how the Law of the Excluded Middle is logically, and cognitively, applied.

My only claim to "omniscience" is in grasping and accepting that (1) existence exists, and (2) that existence is identity. That's as close as I (or you, or anyone else) will ever get to "omniscience".

The only thing that should affect my future conclusions are the facts in evidence. If I have made an error in logic, I am sure you and others on this forum will point any of them out (as you have already done; and, incidently, for which I thank you, and anyone else in advance! )

ELS

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So your conception of "error" involves only a process of reasoning? If I am fully consistent in my logical reasoning, I am incapable of error? Certainty only comes from logical processing of information? Is this what you are saying or am I misinterpreting you?

You state " 'Error', in this context, applies to how well you logically process the continuum of evidence." And then you state "the only thing that should affect my future conclusions are the facts in evidence." So if you form a logical conclusion and subsequently become aware of facts that you weren't aware of when you formed the conclusion, that is not considered an error in your conclusion?