"Fact and Value"

[Burgess Laughlin 0]

Paul, you pointed out that Ayn Rand, in ITOE, pp. 241 and 243, generally ("primarily") used the term/concept "fact" to refer to an existent correctly cognized (as opposed to an alleged existent erroneously or wishfully "cognized"). Thank you for pointing that out. However, I am convinced that, in Ayn Rand's writings, "fact" (of reality) has a metaphysical use as well as the general ("primary," that is, main) epistemological use. The status of the term "fact" is thus analogous to the dual-use terms/ideas "objectivity" ("Objectivity," The Ayn Rand Lexicon, p. 345) and "fundamentality" (ITOE, p. 45).

Note that in the following quotation Ayn Rand speaks of cognition (identification) of facts of reality. Clearly, to me, the phrase "facts of reality" is being used in a secondary sense to mean existents that exist independently of consciousness:

"While cognitive abstractions identify the facts of reality, normative abstractions evaluate the facts, thus prescribing a choice of values and a course of action. Cognitive abstractions deal with that which is; normative abstractions deal with that which ought to be (in the realms open to man's choice)." ("The Psycho-Epistemology of Art," The Romantic Manifesto, p. 20, pb 18, ""Normative Abstractions," ARL, p. 340.

For me, this issue too is closed. I conclude that "facts" and "facts of reality" in Ayn Rand's writings have dual usage: epistemological and metaphysical.

[Burgess Laughlin 0]

  [...] it is not that every fact we discover has implications for our self-preservation, [...]

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If you mean that we might, for example, discover a fact (existent) about a far galaxy and that neither the fact (existent) itself nor the cognition of that fact (existent) would affect all of our lives, then yes, I certainly agree. But one can't know that without evaluating the fact. Thus facts, once cognized, demand evaluations.

I wonder, however, have we been having a miscommunication? Have you been thinking that I mean by "fact implies value" some sort of billiard-ball type of causal relationship?

If I hear of the discovery of a new planet in our solar system, that cognized fact does not bang into my life (as a non-astronomer) and thereby create a new value. But it certainly can and should evoke an evaluation, no matter how brief and no matter what the conclusion is (such as indifference or "not much," as Betsy indicated). Of course, if I am an astronomer, the newly discovered fact (existent) might call for a formal evaluation and, further, evoke a strong emotion, that is, an automatic response to my evaluation of the newly discovered fact.

[...] it is the fact of one's own life that requires newly discovered facts be evaluated.

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I agree. Does anyone in this thread disagree? Is not your statement the context in which Dr. Peikoff's article is written? That is: We are alive, and to stay fully alive -- not just having a beating heart, but flourishing in the achievement of all of our personal and philosophical values -- we need to integrate all facts and evaluate them.

Dr. Peikoff's conclusion about the tolerationists follows naturally: People who want to separate off some domains of cognition as not subject to evaluation are, at best, making a mistake, and, at worst, they are maliciously sundering what should be an integrated body of knowledge about the world.

Paul, since the purpose of this topic-thread is to discuss Dr. Peikoff's article, "Fact and Value," and since you have said you disagree with at least one point in it, I have another question, one that goes to the conclusion of the article:

If you disagree with one or more of Dr. Peikoff's premises, does that mean you also disagree with the conclusions of his article? Do you believe the tolerationists are correct in their stance?

[Paul's Here 0]

Paul, you asked if I would "support [my] claim" that Ayn Rand holds that every fact, once cognized, demands evaluation (which means, I think, an identification of the relationship between identified facts and values).

Providing an example is easy to do. With my underlining for emphasis, Ayn Rand says: "Just as sensations are the first step of the development of a human consciousness in the realm of cognition, so they are its first step in the realm of evaluation." ("The Objectivist Ethics," Virtue of Selfishness, p. 7, pb. 17; Ayn Rand Lexicon, p. 521)

In that passage, she specifies the first step, and by doing so implies a continuing relationship between cognition and evaluation. In other words, all cognition is (or should be) connected to evaluation.

For me, the case is closed on this sub-issue. If you want to further argue the point, I will leave that to others. After my next post, I want to move back to the main point of the article, which is the subject of this topic-thread: the relationship of fact and value, particularly as it applies to the tolerationists.

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I'm sorry you consider the issue closed, but I don't see that quote as referring to the issue under discussion. The "first step" that Rand is referring to is the issue of sensations of pleasure and pain and how they form the basis for discovering the concept "value." She is demonstrating that values are based upon facts and experience.

Let me make something clear because I would think at this point, my view would be clear. I fully recognize and accept that cognition and evaluation are intimately connected. I'm not sure if you've been reading my responses to others in this thread, but I've stated that several times. I agree that all values are based upon facts, i.e., that values are types of facts. I agree that an aspect of reality, once known by me, is a fact that has value significance even if to say "I don't care about it." However, the assumption that because someone, "we," have knowledge of an aspect of reality means that that aspect of reality has value significance to me is the point that I have been addressing here in this entire thread.

In F&V, Peikoff acknowledges that metaphysical given facts are beyond evaluation. He then proceeds to evaluate them. [Note that ,except for one instance, nowhere was I able to find the combination "metaphysically given facts" in Rand's writing on the Obj. Research CD. The one time was in the article on the Metaphysical vs. the Man-Made in which she distinguished it from "man-made facts." She always used the term "metaphysically given." "Metaphysically given facts" are used several times in OPAR.]

By using the concept "fact" in connection to the metaphysically given, the evaluation is instantly brought into the discussion because, as Rand pointed out, the concept "fact" is an epistemological concept. A fact is an aspect of reality that you are aware of, perceptually or conceptually. So the "metaphysically given" becomes not something that exists independent of man whether we know them or not, but "metaphysically given facts" are now equated with those things that we know as facts, and, of course, demand our evaluation. Referring to metaphysically given facts, Peikoff states "such facts constitute reality." Rand never formulated her metaphysics in that manner. For her, it is not facts, but entities that constitute reality.

[Paul's Here 0]

Paul, you asked if I would "support [my] claim" that Ayn Rand holds that every fact, once cognized, demands evaluation (which means, I think, an identification of the relationship between identified facts and values).

Providing an example is easy to do. With my underlining for emphasis, Ayn Rand says: "Just as sensations are the first step of the development of a human consciousness in the realm of cognition, so they are its first step in the realm of evaluation." ("The Objectivist Ethics," Virtue of Selfishness, p. 7, pb. 17; Ayn Rand Lexicon, p. 521)

In that passage, she specifies the first step, and by doing so implies a continuing relationship between cognition and evaluation. In other words, all cognition is (or should be) connected to evaluation.

For me, the case is closed on this sub-issue. If you want to further argue the point, I will leave that to others. After my next post, I want to move back to the main point of the article, which is the subject of this topic-thread: the relationship of fact and value, particularly as it applies to the tolerationists.

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I'm sorry you consider the issue closed, but I don't see that quote as referring to the issue under discussion. The "first step" that Rand is referring to is the issue of sensations of pleasure and pain and how they form the basis for discovering the concept "value." She is demonstrating that values are based upon facts and experience.

Let me make something clear because I would think at this point, my view would be clear. I fully recognize and accept that cognition and evaluation are intimately connected. I'm not sure if you've been reading my responses to others in this thread, but I've stated that several times.

In F&V, Peikoff acknowledges that metaphysical given facts are beyond evaluation. He then proceeds to evaluate them. [Note that,except for one instance, nowhere was I able to find the combination "metaphysically given facts" in Rand's writing on the Obj. Research CD. The one time was in the article on the Metaphysical vs. the Man-Made in which she distinguished it from "man-made facts." She always used the term "metaphysically given." "Metaphysically given facts" are used several times in OPAR.]

By using the concept "fact" in connection to the metaphysically given, the evaluation is instantly brought into the discussion because, as Rand pointed out, the concept "fact" is an epistemological concept. A fact is an aspect of reality that you are aware of, perceptually or conceptually. So the "metaphysically given" become not something that exists independent of man whether we know them or not, but "metaphysically given facts" are now equated with those things that we know as facts, and, of course, demand our evaluation. Referring to metaphysically given facts, Peikoff states "such facts constitute reality." Rand never formulated her metaphysics in that manner. For her, it is not facts, but entities that constitute reality.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

In that passage, she specifies the first step, and by doing so implies a continuing relationship between cognition and evaluation. In other words, all cognition is (or should be) connected to evaluation.

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Most importantly, evaluation is the whole purpose and reason for the very existence of cognition.

Cognition -- i.e., consciousness -- is our means of survival. We need cognition in order to know what is good for us and bad for us so we can direct our actions to preserve and enhance our lives.

What else is consciousness for if not for evaluation?

[Betsy Speicher 0]

In F&V, Peikoff acknowledges that metaphysical given facts are beyond evaluation. He then proceeds to evaluate them.

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There is a serious equivocation here. The term "evaluation" is being used to mean both (1) moral evalution and (2) finding a fact's place within a hierarchy of values.

Metaphysically given facts are beyond moral evaluation. It doesn't make sense to ask "Should the law of gravity exist?" or "Is it right or proper that the law of gravity exists?" Evaluating the law of gravity, in the second sense, keeps me from walking off cliffs.

By using the concept "fact" in connection to the metaphysically given, the evaluation is instantly brought into the discussion because, as Rand pointed out, the concept "fact" is an epistemological concept. 

Where? She generally uses "fact" to mean what exists in reality -- i.e., something metaphysical rather than epistemological. When the referent is epistemological, she uses the concept of "truth."

I see another equivocation here. The term "metaphysical" is being used to mean both (1) something real as opposed to unreal and (2) something existing without human intervention as opposed to something manmade. An example: It is a fact (something about reality and metaphysical) that my computer is manmade and not metaphysically given. Got the difference between metaphysical and metaphysically given?

A fact is an aspect of reality that you are aware of, perceptually or conceptually.

Again, this is the reverse of Ayn Rand's usage. For her, a "truth" is an aspect of reality that you are aware of. A "fact" is anything that exists in reality, whether you are aware of it or not.

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I suspect a lot of the confusion would be cleared up with well-defined and consistently used concepts.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

Rand never formulated her metaphysics in that manner.  For her, it is not facts, but entities that constitute reality.

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"Facts" and "entities" are not mutually exclusive. A "fact," in Ayn Rand's usage, is ANYTHING that exists or existed in reality. Entities that exist ARE facts. So are their properties. So are their actions. So are their past properties and actions.

It is a fact that Ayn Rand was born in 1905. It is a fact there is a pen on my desk. It is a fact my desk exists. It is a fact that I exist.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

By using the concept "fact" in connection to the metaphysically given, the evaluation is instantly brought into the discussion because, as Rand pointed out, the concept "fact" is an epistemological concept.  A fact is an aspect of reality that you are aware of, perceptually or conceptually.  So the "metaphysically given" become not something that exists independent of man whether we know them or not, but "metaphysically given facts" are now equated with those things that we know as facts, and, of course, demand our evaluation.  Referring to metaphysically given facts, Peikoff states "such facts constitute reality."  Rand never formulated her metaphysics in that manner.  For her, it is not facts, but entities that constitute reality.

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I must confess to not having closely followed this thread, but I do have difficulty understanding the point being made. How to you interpret the following canonical statement from The Objectivist Ethics?

Is the concept of value, of "good or evil" an arbitrary human invention, unrelated to, underived from and unsupported by any facts of reality—or is it based on a metaphysical fact, on an unalterable condition of man's existence? (I use the word "metaphysical" to mean: that which pertains to reality, to the nature of things, to existence.) Does an arbitrary human convention, a mere custom, decree that man must guide his actions by a set of principles—or is there a fact of reality that demands it?

[Paul's Here 0]

There is a serious equivocation here.  The term "evaluation" is being used to mean both (1) moral evalution and (2) finding a fact's place within a hierarchy of values.

Metaphysically given facts are beyond moral evaluation.  It doesn't make sense to ask "Should the law of gravity exist?"  or "Is it right or proper that the law of gravity exists?"  Evaluating the law of gravity, in the second sense,  keeps me from walking off cliffs.

I don't know about you, but I do no such evaluation. Outside of physics, how do you put the law of gravity within your hierarchy of values? If I'm equivocating, what are you doing by saying that "evaluation" is "moral evaluation'? The only evaluation I do is whether I want to continue living. I don't even have to know about the law of gravity to make such an evaluation. I know I will fall, regardless of the reason. Every species, except perhaps sheep, is aware that if they jump off something they will fall. My evaluation is based upon ethical principles and actions as effected by metaphysical conditions. But I am not evaluating the metaphysical conditions. That is, I am evaluating how my values will be affected by those conditions in relation to my actions.

Where?  She generally uses "fact" to mean what exists in reality -- i.e., something metaphysical rather than epistemological.  When the referent is epistemological, she uses the concept of "truth."

She uses the concept to mean that which exists in reality that we know of.

"Fact" is merely an epistemological convenience. 

"[E]xistent" primarily refers to a metaphysical status [such as entity, attribute, etc.].

It is a concept necessitated by our form of consciousness...

[W]hichever aspects, events, or existents you happen to know, these are the facts of reality...

I see another equivocation here.  The term "metaphysical" is being used to mean both (1) something real as opposed to unreal and (2) something existing without human intervention as opposed to something manmade.  An example: It is a fact (something about reality and metaphysical) that my computer is manmade and not metaphysically given.  Got the difference between metaphysical and metaphysically given?

Yes I understand the difference. I wasn't using the terms in that manner. Which relates back to my main point that one evaluates one's values in relation to the effects of the metaphysical given, not the metaphysically given (as you seem to imply in your "gravity" example).

Again, this is the reverse of Ayn Rand's usage.  For her, a "truth" is an aspect of reality that you are aware of.  A "fact" is anything that exists in reality, whether you are aware of it or not. 

I disagree. See above quotation. "Truth is the recognition of reality" (from Galt's speech) is the only definition that I was able to find. Truth and fact are very closely related concepts, but I think that truth comes first. For example, the statement, "the American Revolution happened in 1776" can be established as being true by studying history. Once it is so established, one can state that the American Revolution happened in 1776 is a fact.

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I suspect a lot of the confusion would be cleared up with well-defined and consistently used concepts.

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[Burgess Laughlin 0]

If I'm equivocating, what are you doing by saying that "evaluation" is "moral evaluation'?  The only evaluation I do is whether I want to continue living.  I don't even have to know about the law of gravity to make such an evaluation.  I know I will fall, regardless of the reason.  Every species, except perhaps sheep, is aware that if they jump off something they will fall.  My evaluation is based upon ethical principles and actions as effected by metaphysical conditions.  But I am not evaluating the metaphysical conditions.  That is, I am evaluating how my values will be affected by those conditions in relation to my actions. 

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[underlining added for emphasis.]

Paul, would you define "evaluation"?

I don't have a formal one, but for discussion I can suggest this: An evaluation is the mental action of examining the effect of some aspect of reality (man-made or "natural") on one or more of one's myriad values (both personal and philosophical), ranging from life itself to the most particular, optional personal value.

An evaluation looks at an aspect of reality, examines its effects on a value, and decides whether that aspect of reality is good (supportive of value) or bad (destructive of value). (Taking action based on the assessment of good or bad is the next step, but is not part of evaluation.)

A moral evaluation is an evaluation of an individual's volitional behavior, that is, behavior that should be guided by moral principles. I can morally evaluate a bank robber but not cold weather.

Is that your understanding of the terms?

[Stephen Speicher 0]

She uses the concept [fact] to mean that which exists in reality that we know of.

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Paul, you have claimed this repeatedly, yet in the same section of ITOE from which you continue to quote, Ayn Rand explicitly acknowledges that fact refers not solely to that portion of reality that we know, but to all that is possible to know.

Prof. B: It's not that the fact refers to the knowledge; it refers to the reality known, or possibly known.

AR: That is correct.

[Paul's Here 0]

[underlining added for emphasis.]

Paul, would you define "evaluation"?

I don't have a formal one, but for discussion I can suggest this: An evaluation is the mental action of examining the effect of some aspect of reality (man-made or "natural") on one or more of one's myriad values (both personal and philosophical), ranging from life itself to the most particular, optional personal value.

An evaluation looks at an aspect of reality, examines its effects on a value, and decides whether that aspect of reality is good (supportive of value) or bad (destructive of value). (Taking action based on the assessment of good or bad is the next step, but is not part of evaluation.)

A moral evaluation is an evaluation of an individual's volitional behavior, that is, behavior that should be guided by moral principles. I can morally evaluate a bank robber but not cold weather.

Is that your understanding of the terms?

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Yes, I would agree with that definition and everything you've stated above. Evaluation is a subset of cognition. Cognition identifies aspects of reality, evaluation relates two or more aspects together. Within the context of this thread, evaluation pertains to values and facts.

[Xyhm 0]

Paul, you have claimed this repeatedly, yet in the same section of ITOE from which you continue to quote, Ayn Rand explicitly acknowledges that fact refers not solely to that portion of reality that we know, but to all that is possible to know.

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And 'truth' refers to a known fact. One is an epistemological concept, and the other a metaphysical one. If the X-Files wanted to get it right, they should have stated "the fact is out there" or "the truth is in here", or perhaps "that which the coming truth will be based on is out there". Sounds a little silly though.

[Paul's Here 0]

Paul, you have claimed this repeatedly, yet in the same section of ITOE from which you continue to quote, Ayn Rand explicitly acknowledges that fact refers not solely to that portion of reality that we know, but to all that is possible to know.

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This may be a fine point of distinction, but I don't think that the term "possibly known" is referring to those things that are unknown. I think the context seems to make "possibly known" refer to things that we think we know but are in error, or perhaps things we only have partial knowledge of. If we truly don't know anything about an aspect of reality, then how can we make an assumption that that something can be "possibly known?" Wouldn't we have to have some knowledge of it?

Prof. B: So "fact" then designates existents, but it is used in a context in which it is relevant to distinguish knowledge from error.

AR: That's right.

Prof. B: It's not that the fact refers to the knowledge; it refers to the reality known, or possibly known.

AR: That is correct. It is a concept necessitated by our form of consciousness—that is, by the fact that we are not infallible. An error is possible, or a lie is possible, or imagination is possible. And, therefore, when we say something is a fact, we distinguish primarily from error, lie, or any aberration of consciousness.

[My emphasis]

"Fact" is not used to distinguish known from unknown ("all that is possible to know"), but known from error.

[Paul's Here 0]

"Facts" and "entities" are not mutually exclusive.  A "fact," in Ayn Rand's usage, is ANYTHING that exists or existed in reality.  Entities that exist ARE facts.  So are their properties.  So are their actions.  So are their past properties and actions.

It is a fact that Ayn Rand was born in 1905.  It is a fact there is a pen on my desk.  It is a fact my desk exists.  It is a fact that I exist.

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Gremlins exist in my imagination. Are they facts that exist in reality?

[Paul's Here 0]

Paul, you pointed out that Ayn Rand, in ITOE, pp. 241 and 243, generally ("primarily") used the term/concept "fact" to refer to an existent correctly cognized (as opposed to an alleged existent erroneously or wishfully "cognized"). Thank you for pointing that out. However, I am convinced that, in Ayn Rand's writings, "fact" (of reality) has a metaphysical use as well as the general ("primary," that is, main) epistemological use. The status of the term "fact" is thus analogous to the dual-use terms/ideas "objectivity" ("Objectivity," The Ayn Rand Lexicon, p. 345) and "fundamentality" (ITOE, p. 45).

Note that in the following quotation Ayn Rand speaks of cognition (identification) of facts of reality. Clearly, to me, the phrase "facts of reality" is being used in a secondary sense to mean existents that exist independently of consciousness:

"While cognitive abstractions identify the facts of reality, normative abstractions evaluate the facts, thus prescribing a choice of values and a course of action. Cognitive abstractions deal with that which is; normative abstractions deal with that which ought to be (in the realms open to man's choice)." ("The Psycho-Epistemology of Art," The Romantic Manifesto, p. 20, pb 18, ""Normative Abstractions," ARL, p. 340.

For me, this issue too is closed. I conclude that "facts" and "facts of reality" in Ayn Rand's writings have dual usage: epistemological and metaphysical.

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I agree with you that they have dual usage. I have no objection to saying "this pencil is an entity" or "this pencil is a fact." However, I disagree with someone's statement "this pencil is a fact whether or not I have any awareness of it."

But I have been addressing the issue of whether facts are simply another word for existent, entity, attribute, action, relationship, etc. With such a distinction in this context, "fact" has to lean toward the epistemological side. Additionally, my principle objection has been to using the term "metaphysically given facts." I think this is mixture that is not proper. As I noted previously, Miss Rand used that formulation only once in all of her writing (based upon a search on the Obj. CD) whereas Dr. Peikoff has used it several times, in F&V and OPAR. I have not reviewed every example, but my objection has been to its usage in F&V.

[Paul's Here 0]

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After my next post, I want to move back to the main point of the article, which is the subject of this topic-thread: the relationship of fact and value, particularly as it applies to the tolerationists.

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Perhaps you could explain more about that point. I was not aware that was where you wanted to go. Can you give a definition or description of that term and what issues in F&V that you'd like to go into?

[Paul's Here 0]

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Paul, since the purpose of this topic-thread is to discuss Dr. Peikoff's article, "Fact and Value," and since you have said you disagree with at least one point in it, I have another question, one that goes to the conclusion of the article:

If you disagree with one or more of Dr. Peikoff's premises, does that mean you also disagree with the conclusions of his article? Do you believe the tolerationists are correct in their stance?

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Perhaps you could state the conclusion, either quote or in your own words, so that we have a basis for continued discussion with a minimum of misunderstanding.

Please define or describe the term. What is their stance?

If, by chance, you are talking about Kelley's writing previous to and after F&V, then I could say that there are some ideas I agree with and many I disagree with. I suspect the main point you're concerned about is the relationship between truth, values and ideas. Needless to say, I think ideas are both true/false and good/evil. I have some problems with the way Dr. Peikoff formulated those issues and the examples he gave. And I disagree with the way Kelley responded to this issue. Nor do I think that toleration is a major virtue, if that's what your focus is on.

[Paul's Here 0]

By using the concept "fact" in connection to the metaphysically given, the evaluation is instantly brought into the discussion because, as Rand pointed out, the concept "fact" is an epistemological concept.  A fact is an aspect of reality that you are aware of, perceptually or conceptually.  So the "metaphysically given" become not something that exists independent of man whether we know them or not, but "metaphysically given facts" are now equated with those things that we know as facts, and, of course, demand our evaluation.  Referring to metaphysically given facts, Peikoff states "such facts constitute reality."  Rand never formulated her metaphysics in that manner.  For her, it is not facts, but entities that constitute reality.

I must confess to not having closely followed this thread, but I do have difficulty understanding the point being made. How to you interpret the following canonical statement from The Objectivist Ethics?

Is the concept of value, of "good or evil" an arbitrary human invention, unrelated to, underived from and unsupported by any facts of reality—or is it based on a metaphysical fact, on an unalterable condition of man's existence? (I use the word "metaphysical" to mean: that which pertains to reality, to the nature of things, to existence.) Does an arbitrary human convention, a mere custom, decree that man must guide his actions by a set of principles—or is there a fact of reality that demands it?

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I take it to mean exactly what it states. The phrase "facts of reality" is not being used in a context that implies that "facts" are outside of one's awareness ("underived from and unsupported by..." clearly implies that some cognitive act needs to be performed to be able to call it a fact.) As Burgess mentioned and I agreed with in Post 41, there are clearly times when "fact" can be used in a metaphysical context.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

Paul, you have claimed this repeatedly, yet in the same section of ITOE from which you continue to quote, Ayn Rand explicitly acknowledges that fact refers not solely to that portion of reality that we know, but to all that is possible to know.

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And 'truth' refers to a known fact. One is an epistemological concept, and the other a metaphysical one. If the X-Files wanted to get it right, they should have stated "the fact is out there" or "the truth is in here", or perhaps "that which the coming truth will be based on is out there". Sounds a little silly though.

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I think usually when we refer to concepts as being epistemological or metaphysical, we mean in terms of the referents of the concept. So, I agree that "facts" are "out there." But "truth" is not solely an epistemological concept. "Truth" also has a metaphysical component, correspondence to the facts of reality.

An example of a purely epistemological concept would be "certainty," where the referent is our evidentiary assessment.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

Metaphysically given facts are beyond moral evaluation.  It doesn't make sense to ask "Should the law of gravity exist?"  or "Is it right or proper that the law of gravity exists?"  Evaluating the law of gravity, in the second sense,  keeps me from walking off cliffs.

I don't know about you, but I do no such evaluation.  Outside of physics, how do you put the law of gravity within your hierarchy of values?

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Very simple. You ask, "What's it to me?"

Things fall down. What's it to me? Don't walk off cliffs.

This is poison. What's it to me? Don't eat it.

They just discovered a new subatomic particle. What's it to me? Not much.

If I'm equivocating, what are you doing by saying that "evaluation" is "moral evaluation'?  The only evaluation I do is whether I want to continue living.

Perhaps we are talking past each other. "Evaluation," in general means measuring something by reference to a standard. You might evaluate how long something is by reference to a yardstick.

Let's say I evaluated the color of an object and also its length and someone declared, "That's a contradiction! First you said you evaluate it as red. Then you said you evaluate it as a foot long. Well, which one is it?" In fact, there were two different standards being used in two different contexts and they are both right.

When I brought up the equivocal use of the word "evaluation," it was because you seemed to be saying that there was a contradiction between Ayn Rand's view that metaphysically given facts cannot be evaluated and Peikoff's that metaphysically given facts should be evaluated.

If you look at the context in which the two views were stated, you will see that the term "evaluation" was referring, in each context, to a different type of evaluation using a different standard, so there is no contradiction. Ayn Rand was discussing measuring metaphysically given facts by a moral standard -- i.e., by the standard of what is proper to man qua man. This doesn't make sense because the metaphysically given does not have free will.

Peikoff in F&V was talking about evaluation by the standard of "good for me or bad for me" or, as I would put it, "What's it to me?" That DOES make sense because metaphysically given facts can be good or bad for us. Thus, it is not a contradiction to say that metaphysically given facts are beyond moral evaluation, but they should be evaluated as to whether they are good or bad for us.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

Gremlins exist in my imagination.  Are they facts that exist in reality?

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It is a fact that they exist in your imagination.

It is a fact that gremlins do not exist in the reality.

It is a fact that what you imagine may not be a fact.

[Paul's Here 0]

It is a fact that they exist in your imagination. 

It is a fact that gremlins do not exist in the reality. 

It is a fact that what you imagine may not be a fact.

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I'm glad we got our facts straight!!

[Paul's Here 0]

Very simple.  You ask, "What's it to me?" 

Things fall down.  What's it to me?  Don't walk off cliffs. 

This is poison.  What's it to me?  Don't eat it.

They just discovered a  new subatomic particle.  What's it to me?  Not much. 

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I agree with that formulation in the first two examples. In the third, if "every fact bears on the choice to live," (F&V), then how can you be so unconcerned about the new subatomic particle? If I do a Google search on a concept, I get 4 million matches. Does every fact mentioned in those matches bear on my choice to live? The fact that one can state "this fact has no relevance to my life" seems to conflict with "every fact bears on the choice to live."

If one holds that values are a type of fact, is not the implication in the above quote mean that all facts are values? Ayn Rand held that "every 'is' implies an 'ought'." I have always interpreted that as meaning every value (a fact that has been evaluated in relation to sustaining man's life) implies an action be taken to gain and/or keep it. She used the "is-ought" argument in an ethical context. I don't see how it can be elevated to a metaphysical level without implying that any act of cognition implies a specific action be taken to gain/keep the fact. Knowing the fact that the American Revolution occurred in 1776 implies what when it comes time for me to sustain my livelihood as an engineer?

Am I correct in this and is this what your are implying? Are you converting all facts into values?

Consider a very real metaphysical fact: I am alive for only a certain time on this earth. That fact alone determines that I only have time to think about certain facts and not others. How is it possible that "every fact bears on [my] choice to live"?

[Paul's Here 0]

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Perhaps we are talking past each other.  "Evaluation," in general means measuring something by reference to a standard.  You might evaluate how long something is by reference to a yardstick.

Let's say I evaluated the color of an object and also its length and someone declared, "That's a contradiction!  First you said you evaluate it as red.  Then you said you evaluate it as a foot long. Well, which one is it?"  In fact, there were two different standards being used in two different contexts and they are both right.

Yes, that's what the Laws of Identity and Contradiction enables us to grasp.

When I brought up the equivocal use of the word "evaluation,"  it was because you seemed to be saying that there was a contradiction between Ayn Rand's view that metaphysically given facts cannot be evaluated and Peikoff's that metaphysically given facts should be evaluated.

If you look at the context in which the two views were stated, you will see that the term "evaluation" was referring, in each context, to a different type of evaluation using a different standard, so there is no contradiction.  Ayn Rand was discussing measuring metaphysically given facts by a moral standard -- i.e., by the standard of what is proper to man qua man.  This doesn't make sense because the metaphysically given does not have free will.

Peikoff in F&V was talking about evaluation by the standard of "good for me or bad for me" or, as I would put it, "What's it to me?"  That DOES make sense because metaphysically given facts can be good or bad for us.  Thus, it is not a contradiction to say that metaphysically given facts are beyond moral evaluation, but they should be evaluated as to whether they are good or bad for us.

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Perhaps I was making that error. In light of rethinking about it, I still don't think that Dr. Peikoff's method is correct. I don't see how the a metaphysical fact can or should be evaluated (except by cognitive evaluation). Or, perhaps I should rephrase it. A metaphysical fact can only be referred to as "good for us or bad for us" after a detailed scientific investigation and a great deal of knowledge is acquired to even know that the effects (discussed below) are associated with the metaphysical fact. Dr. Peikoff was reasoning from his observation of metaphysical fact, our observation of the sun, and it is good because of the sunlight, the heat, the enabling of planting crops. It is the heat, light and crops that are "good for us or bad for us." These are the metaphysical facts that should be the basis for evaluation because they directly bear on our values.

His argument begins by applying the "is-ought" argument. See my post above to you for some disagreements with this approach on this point. Peikoff focuses on the "effects" of the metaphysically given. The sun is good because it provides heat, light, etc. This process pushes the argument down one further step: why is heat and light "good"? How do you know they're coming from the sun? Etc. The basis fact (i.e., value) is that man needs food and warmth to survive, and light to see. An understanding of the source of these requirements involves a scientific investigation. I am not saying that knowing that the sun provides heat and light is not important. It is, and it dramatically effects man's actions. Saying that the sun is good for you is perhaps metaphorical, since the direct value is heat and light.

Are you implying that "good for me or bad for me" is outside the context of "what is proper to man qua man?" Perhaps you could give brief explanation.