"Fact and Value"

[Stephen Speicher 0]

Paul, you have claimed this repeatedly, yet in the same section of ITOE from which you continue to quote, Ayn Rand explicitly acknowledges that fact refers not solely to that portion of reality that we know, but to all that is possible to know.

←

This may be a fine point of distinction, but I don't think that the term "possibly known" is referring to those things that are unknown. I think the context seems to make "possibly known" refer to things that we think we know but are in error, or perhaps things we only have partial knowledge of. If we truly don't know anything about an aspect of reality, then how can we make an assumption that that something can be "possibly known?" Wouldn't we have to have some knowledge of it?

←

Whatever exists, exists independent of our knowledge of whatever exists. Whatever the facts of reality, those facts are facts independent of whether those facts are known to us.

Paul, if you do not limit the referents of "existents" to those existents of which you know, why do you limit "fact" to only those facts of which you are aware? What do you consider to be the referents of "fact?" If, say, the physical world is not a product of your consciousness, then do not all the facts related to the physical world exist independent of your awareness of them? Isn't it a fact, for instance, that the mountain at latitude 35.7167, longitude 76.7, has a peak elevation of 26,740 feet, whether or not you are aware of that fact?

[Betsy Speicher 0]

[if] "every fact bears on the choice to live," (F&V), then how can you be so unconcerned about the new subatomic particle?

If I do a Google search on a concept, I get 4 million matches.  Does every fact mentioned in those matches bear on my choice to live?  The fact that one can state "this fact has no relevance to my life" seems to conflict with "every fact bears on the choice to live"?

←

I am not UNconcerned about any fact. I am concerned enough to consider its place in my hierarchy of values. If I became aware of the new particle I may think long enough to decide that it isn't important to me. I might also wonder if I should tell Stephen. Then I would realize that if Stephen were interested, he has probably known about it before long before the scientist ever published his results.

If one holds that values are a type of fact, is not the implication in the above quote mean that all facts are values?

They are, but not necessarily to me and not necessarily now. That is something I evaluate when I become aware of a fact.

Ayn Rand held that "every 'is' implies an 'ought'."  I have always interpreted that as meaning every value (a fact that has been evaluated in relation to sustaining man's life) implies an action be taken to gain and/or keep it.

It does, IF one chooses to gain or keep it. One may choose not to. There are some values that everyone, because of their nature, ought to seek, like self-esteem. There are others, like a career in architecture, that are personal and not generally applicable. Every fact is a value because understanding reality is a value, but a particular fact may not be of very much value to a particular person.

  She used the "is-ought" argument in an ethical context.  I don't see how it can be elevated to a metaphysical level without implying that any act of cognition implies a specific action be taken to gain/keep the fact.

I does, IF that fact affects one's hierarchy of values.

Knowing the fact that the American Revolution occurred in 1776 implies what when it comes time for me to sustain my livelihood as an engineer?

It may not in that context, but it may when you are helping your child with history homework or planning a patriotic celebration.

Am I correct in this and is this what your are implying?  Are you converting all facts into values?

I am saying that all facts have value significance to some men in some contexts.

Consider a very real metaphysical fact: I am alive for only a certain time on this earth. That fact alone determines that I only have time to think about certain facts and not others. How is it possible that "every fact bears on [my] choice to live"?

It is because life is short and we can't pursue ALL possible values that we have to maintain a hierarchy of values. That allows us to rank our values so we can pursue the most important ones and get the most out of life.

That's why, when confronted with a fact, we have to decide if it is a value to us, and if or where it belongs in our hierarchy of values.

[Dufresne 0]

If one holds that values are a type of fact, is not the implication in the above quote mean that all facts are values?  Ayn Rand held that "every 'is' implies an 'ought'."  I have always interpreted that as meaning every value (a fact that has been evaluated in relation to sustaining man's life) implies an action be taken to gain and/or keep it.

I'd like to know why you wrote "a fact that has been evaluated in relation to sustaining man's life" in parenthesis behind the word "value". You have asked whether someone who holds that values are a type of facts would interpret the quote "every fact bears on the choice to live" as implying that all facts are values. If the above is in fact your definition of value then I find your question very logical. Otherwise, it just confuses me because criminals - to give just one example - are certainly facts but not values to me.

[Burgess Laughlin 0]

Perhaps you could state the conclusion, either quote or in your own words, so that we have a basis for continued discussion with a minimum of misunderstanding. 

←

NOTES ON THE "FACT AND VALUE" ARTICLE

Following are my notes (and a few personal comments) on the points in "Fact and Value" most important to me. My citations in parentheses refer to the pages of my printout of the article.

The purpose of the article is to identify the philosophical cause of the "schisms" in the Objectivist movement. (FaV, p. 1, full par. 2) (Personally, I would say "sheddings" rather than "schisms," because the latter term might imply equal worth in the two sides.)

"Tolerance", as the term is used among the advocates of tolerationism, is an anti-concept, one designed to obliterate judgment of the morality of certain individuals (especially intellectuals) and the ideas they advocate. As a purported virtue, it means one should be fair to intellectual opponents by not judging them, that is, by being "open-minded," which means by not evaluating them. In summary, it means "fairness through skepticism." (FaV, p. 10, full par. 4) In Dr. Peikoff's article, the meaning of "tolerate" is to "abide, stand, or put up with." (FaV, p. 7, full par. 3)

A moral tolerationist is a person who holds that "tolerance" is "a virtue in the cognitive realm." (Dr. Peikoff, apparently quoting Kelley, FaV, p. 1, full par. 4) A moral tolerationist splits the world of physical actions, as suitable for moral evaluation, from the world of ideas, as unsuitable for moral evaluation. (FaV, p. 8, last, partial par.)

An example of moral tolerationism is reacting tolerantly to a study of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason -- that is, refusing to make a moral judgment of it and him. (FaV, p. 8, full par. 1) An example of an evil man advocating evil ideas is Kant. (FaV, p. 7, last, partial par.)

More fundamentally, the moral tolerationist sunders fact from value, cognition from evaluation, mind from body. (FaV, p. 9, full par. 2) Moral tolerationists thus reject objectivity in values. (FaV, p. 9, last, partial par.) (Objectivity, in this [its epistemological] meaning, refers to a logical relationship between facts of reality and ideas formed from those facts.)

Dr. Peikoff's conclusion is that the philosophical cause of past schisms in the Objectivist movement is that the departing (or expelled) individuals have taken a nonobjective position on the issue of the relationship of fact and value. Those who repudiate Objectivism, including the Brandens and the Kelleyites, hold one side of the issue: A certain domain of human action -- the advocacy of ideas -- is off-limits to moral judgment, that is, judgment of whether a particular action (advocating arbitrary or false ideas) and the person doing the action are moral. (FaV, pp. 9, full par. 3 and 12, full pars. 2-4)

(As an aside, I want to note an element of Ayn Rand and Leonard Peikoff's 's writing style that initially confused me, but I think I now grasp. Phrases such as "moral judgment" indicate not a distinction from "immoral judgment," but instead mean "judgment of the morality of some object." So, along the same lines, a moral tolerationist, would be not a tolerationist who acts morally, but a person who tolerates -- that is, refuses to judge the morality of -- certain facts of reality [false or arbitrary ideas and their advocacy]. The adjective "moral" thus indicates the realm of action.)

[Paul's Here 0]

Paul, you have claimed this repeatedly, yet in the same section of ITOE from which you continue to quote, Ayn Rand explicitly acknowledges that fact refers not solely to that portion of reality that we know, but to all that is possible to know.

This may be a fine point of distinction, but I don't think that the term "possibly known" is referring to those things that are unknown. I think the context seems to make "possibly known" refer to things that we think we know but are in error, or perhaps things we only have partial knowledge of. If we truly don't know anything about an aspect of reality, then how can we make an assumption that that something can be "possibly known?" Wouldn't we have to have some knowledge of it?

Whatever exists, exists independent of our knowledge of whatever exists. Whatever the facts of reality, those facts are facts independent of whether those facts are known to us.

Paul, if you do not limit the referents of "existents" to those existents of which you know, why do you limit "fact" to only those facts of which you are aware? What do you consider to be the referents of "fact?" If, say, the physical world is not a product of your consciousness, then do not all the facts related to the physical world exist independent of your awareness of them? Isn't it a fact, for instance, that the mountain at latitude 35.7167, longitude 76.7, has a peak elevation of 26,740 feet, whether or not you are aware of that fact?

The way you are thinking about the concept "fact" is the way I used to think of it before I read, or reread, what Rand stated in ITOE Appendix in the context of this thread. I don't want to requote her as I've already done so several times. But she clearly states that "fact" is an epistemological concept that is used to designate existents, entities, relationships, attributes, and events when we are aware of them. If the referent for the concept "fact" is indeed a particular, an existent, an entity, then I have no trouble using the term as you used it.

"Fact" can refer to more that just existents or entities. It can refer to attributes, relationships, aspects, or events. That the American Revolution happened in 1776 is a fact, but it is not an existent or attribute. It is more than just a relationship among existents. It is an event, but not just an event relating causal factors like the event "the earth is orbiting the sun." An entire array of knowledge is required to establish it as a fact. So how can I simply state that "that the American Revolution happened in 1776" is independent of any awareness? I am not in any way implying here that my awareness brings the fact into existence; only that my awareness is necessary to establish it as a fact. If you want to refer to it an event among relationships of entities, then I will agree that it is independent of my awareness. But the only way for anyone to claim it is a fact, requires that one be aware of the causal relationships. Remember, the primary things that are independent of any awareness are entities.

As for your example concerning the mountain, I would state that the mountain is an entity, the earth is an entity, and the specific orientation of the mountain on the face of the earth is a relationship between the mountain and a reference point on the surface of the earth. Thus, latitude, longitude and height are attributes of spatial relationships between the surface of the earth and particular things on the earth. Entities and their attributes and relationships are metaphysically independent of any awareness (this does not imply that the attribute or relationship is metaphysically separable from the entity). If you are to claim as a fact, "the mountain at latitude 35.7167, longitude 76.7, has a peak elevation of 26,740 feet" I would have to have a knowledge of cosmology or geology (the shape of the earth), mathematics and geography (orientation and graphical representation), and probably physics which would be able to provide some mechanism to measure the mountain to such accuracy. Lacking such knowledge, I would not agree that that is a fact. At best, I would accept that you regard it as a fact.

[Paul's Here 0]

-----------

If one holds that values are a type of fact, is not the implication in the above quote mean that all facts are values?

They are, but not necessarily to me and not necessarily now.  That is something I evaluate when I become aware of a fact.

------------

←

Outside of Dr. Peikoff's article, can you demonstrate that "all facts are values" or "all facts imply values" within Objectivism? I've studied it for over 30 years, and I'm unaware of that principle.

This is the main point I want to address. So if you can demonstrate that to me satisfactorily, I will learn something new and we can conclude this element of our discussion.

Thanks.

[Paul's Here 0]

I'd like to know why you wrote "a fact that has been evaluated in relation to sustaining man's life" in parenthesis behind the word "value". You have asked whether someone who holds that values are a type of facts would interpret the quote "every fact bears on the choice to live" as implying that all facts are values. If the above is in fact your definition of value then I find your question very logical. Otherwise, it just confuses me because criminals - to give just one example - are certainly facts but not values to me.

←

The parenthetical comment was not a definition of value but a description of the concepts relationship to reality. I put it there to distinguish that values refer to certain facts and not other facts. Your citation of criminal as facts but not values is a good example that supports my argument against the view that "all facts are values." However, the fact of criminals certainly does bear on the choice to live: one avoids associating with criminals.

[Paul's Here 0]

----------------------

←

I have one question before I address these issues. I noticed that you did not provide a reference to any of Kelley's essays or articles. Have you read Kelley's articles concerning the issues that Peikoff is addressing to verify that what is being said about Kelley's ideas is accurate?

[Paul's Here 0]

---------------------

If one holds that values are a type of fact, is not the implication in the above quote mean that all facts are values?

They are, but not necessarily to me and not necessarily now. That is something I evaluate when I become aware of a fact.

---------------------

←

In my understanding of logic, All S is P only implies that Some P is S. How do you justify your statement?

[Paul's Here 0]

An issue related to the fact and value relationship is presented below. Is this distinction valid?

Is there a difference between cognitive value and ethical value? Cognitive value refers to the choice to exercise mental action, effort or thought in order to grasp, integrate and formulate ideas. For example, if I'm doing an engineering problem my mental action consists of identifying possible solutions. The solution is the cognitive value. I do not have any further requirement for action. There is no necessary ethical value involved.

Ethical value refers to the choice to change one's action or behavior as a result of discovering new facts or ideas. For example, if I've designed a building that is already under construction and I later discover that I've made an error in my calculations, I have to choose to take physical action to correct the problem, such as notifying others. There is a necessary relationship to cognitive value.

[Dufresne 0]

Your citation of criminal as facts but not values is a good example that supports my argument against the view that "all facts are values."

I agree with your opposition to the view that "all facts are values". Someone carrying around a malignant tumor in his body most likely does not value the tumor. The tumor could be of value to a researcher for learning more about cancer, though.

However, I believe Betsy did not mean that all facts are values to all people. I think she meant what she wrote in this quote: "I am saying that all facts have value significance to some men in some contexts".

Whether you agree with the principle "all facts are values" depends on how you interpret it...

[Paul's Here 0]

I agree with your opposition to the view that "all facts are values". Someone carrying around a malignant tumor in his body most likely does not value the tumor. The tumor could be of value to a researcher for learning more about cancer, though.

However, I believe Betsy did not mean that all facts are values to all people. I think she meant what she wrote in this quote: "I am saying that all facts have value significance to some men in some contexts".

Whether you agree with the principle "all facts are values" depends on how you interpret it...

←

I would still not agree with the proposition "all facts are values" if it meant "all facts are values to some men in some context." Let's suppose that on the day we are reading this, the proposition were true. That would mean some Fact A is a value only to me but not to you or anyone else. Let's suppose I die tomorrow. Then, Fact A is no value to anyone. Or to put it more generally, some of the facts George Washington valued are not of value to me or anyone else. The existence of Martha Washington and her marriage to George is a fact. I know of no one who wants to marry her right now. Thus, the proposition is refuted. I suppose you could respond, "well, in George's context when he was alive..." But then the principle is inapplicable to anyone alive and I'm not sure what use I'd have for it. It has no corresponding requirement for action to gain and/or keep the value on my part.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

Outside of Dr. Peikoff's article, can you demonstrate that "all facts are values" or "all facts imply values" within Objectivism?  I've studied it for over 30 years, and I'm unaware of that principle.

This is the main point I want to address.  So if you can demonstrate that to me satisfactorily, I will learn something new and we can conclude this element of our discussion. 

←

I don't have time to look it up now but it is all over the place in the Objectivist literature. If it is not stated explicitly in the same words Dr. Peikoff used, it certainly follows from well established Objectivist principles.

All facts imply values because consciousness is our means of survival. We need consciousness to know what the facts are because knowing the facts, knowing what things really are and how they impact our lives, is required for our survival. Any given fact has value significance. It is good for us or bad for us to varying degrees in some contexts. If facts did not have major value significance, we wouldn't need the faculty of consciousness for becoming aware of facts.

[Dufresne 0]

I would still not agree with the proposition "all facts are values" if it meant "all facts are values to some men in some context."  Let's suppose that on the day we are reading this, the proposition were true.  That would mean some Fact A is a value only to me but not to you or anyone else.  Let's suppose I die tomorrow.  Then, Fact A is no value to anyone.

I have not yet systematically induced the principle in question. All I know are a couple of examples in favor of the principle but I am not aware of any examples that contradict the principle.

Regarding your example above: What would be a concrete example of a fact that is a value to you and only to you?

Or to put it more generally, some of the facts George Washington valued are not of value to me or anyone else.  The existence of Martha Washington and her marriage to George is a fact.  I know of no one who wants to marry her right now.  Thus, the proposition is refuted.

Martha Washington and her marriage are facts that are of value to you for trying to refute the principle and I find it perfectly sane that nobody wants to marry Martha Washington because she does not exist anymore .

[jasonlockwood 0]

When I concretize this principle, I never try to come up with examples that are too abstract or that lack value FOR ME.

My current example is my impending purchase of a new car. There are several facts involved:

* the amount I still owe on my current car

* the price of the new car

* my financial stability

* the amount of my annual bonus

* the model of car I have in mind (there are a couple)

These things, as well as many other minor facts, drive the value for me. Ultimately I have to weigh all these facts BEFORE I make my final decision to buy (or not) the new car. And as with all facts, I have to determine what facts are most important to determine whether buying the car is a value to me.

[Paul's Here 0]

NOTES ON THE "FACT AND VALUE" ARTICLE

Following are my notes (and a few personal comments) on the points in "Fact and Value" most important to me. My citations in parentheses refer to the pages of my printout of the article.

The purpose of the article is to identify the philosophical cause of the "schisms" in the Objectivist movement. (FaV, p. 1, full par. 2) (Personally, I would say "sheddings" rather than "schisms," because the latter term might imply equal worth in the two sides.)

I agree with you that that is Dr. Peikoff's stated purpose in the essay. I think that the context provided in Paragraph 1 (P1) of F&V is also important to keep in mind. It defines why the article was written at that moment in time.

"Tolerance", as the term is used among the advocates of tolerationism, is an anti-concept, one designed to obliterate judgment of the morality of certain individuals (especially intellectuals) and the ideas they advocate. As a purported virtue, it means one should be fair to intellectual opponents by not judging them, that is, by being "open-minded," which means by not evaluating them. In summary, it means "fairness through skepticism." (FaV, p. 10, full par. 4)  In Dr. Peikoff's article, the meaning of "tolerate" is to "abide, stand, or put up with." (FaV, p. 7, full par. 3)

Can you cite where the term is used in this context by Kelley? [PS, I will not use the term 'tolerationist' for it does not deal with specific ideas and lumps many people into a group that is composed of people who do not agree with everything described by that term.] I hope you don't mind if I quote from Kelley since I have no way of discussing the ideas that are implicated in Peikoff essay. Dr. Peikoff’s essay assumed a context in which the reader was not familiar with Kelley's essay. Hence, the context that Kelley was talking within is not presented in F&V.

Kelley explicitly states in AQOS (A Question of Sanction) "tolerance is not a virtue where evil is concerned; evil flourishes by the tolerance of good people." He goes on to describe what he believes "tolerance in the cognitive realm" means: taking into account the context that others bring to a discussion. I don’t know of any place in the essay where he states “tolerance means one should be fair to intellectual opponents by not judging them.” Nor does he state or imply that one should be tolerant toward evil in the cognitive realm. He is talking about being tolerant toward people with whom you disagree for the purposes of discussion and intellectual engagement.

I do not think tolerance needs to be applied in the cognitive realm in the way Kelley does. The only things needed are rationality and independent judgment. Kelley seems to imply that the alternative to tolerance is intolerance, meaning arbitrary, emotional condemnation and assertions. I don't agree with his view of this. And I strongly disagree with, if not condemn, his implication by association with the anti-Enlightenment, that Objectivism, because it has an authorized source for referring to its meaning, creates "intolerance," or is doctrinaire, or has "rival sects," “constant schisms,” "intellectual xenophobia." Even if one were to believe that past events were due to “intolerance, rival sects or schisms” to due association with particular “Objectivists”, the association of Objectivism with those events is unwarranted in my view, especially since Kelley still purports to admire Objectivism.

-------------

[Paul's Here 0]

I don't have time to look it up now but it is all over the place in the Objectivist literature.  If it is not stated explicitly in the same words Dr. Peikoff used, it certainly follows from well established Objectivist principles.

All facts imply values because consciousness is our means of survival.  We need consciousness to know what the facts are because knowing the facts, knowing what things really are and how they impact our lives, is required for our survival.  Any given fact has value significance.  It is good for us or bad for us to varying degrees in some contexts.  If facts did not have major value significance, we wouldn't need the faculty of consciousness for becoming aware of facts.

←

I'm sorry, but a deductive argument is not satisfactory for me. I could just as easily substitute "some" for "all." Is "value significance" the same as value?

If something is "good for us or bad for us to varying degrees in some contexts" can the degree be zero? If values apply in contexts to various people, can the number of people who value a fact in a specific context be zero?

[Paul's Here 0]

When I concretize this principle, I never try to come up with examples that are too abstract or that lack value FOR ME.

My current example is my impending purchase of a new car. There are several facts involved:

* the amount I still owe on my current car

* the price of the new car

* my financial stability

* the amount of my annual bonus

* the model of car I have in mind (there are a couple)

These things, as well as many other minor facts, drive the value for me. Ultimately I have to weigh all these facts BEFORE I make my final decision to buy (or not) the new car. And as with all facts, I have to determine what facts are most important to determine whether buying the car is a value to me.

←

All of the issues you cite are "man-made" facts. All man-made facts are values. And the reason is that all values are only man-made facts and pertain to man's survival. There is no disagreement (at least by me) with that. The issue under disagreement and discussion is "are all metaphysical facts also values?"

[PhilO 0]

All of the issues you cite are "man-made" facts.  All man-made facts are values.  And the reason is that all values are only man-made facts and pertain to man's survival.  There is no disagreement (at least by me) with that.  The issue under disagreement and discussion is "are all metaphysical facts also values?"

←

All facts, however you classify them, *can be* evaluated in reference to one's life. You seem to keep wanting to imply that there is some kind of Kantian duty to systematically appraise each fact in your awareness in order to ascertain its importance to your life. (Obviously, a fact not in awareness cannot be evaluated - which doesn't mean that it will not affect your life regardless. Millions of people will die of the *fact* of undetected but existing cancerous tumors for instance.)

As with every other rational moral principle, there is no "duty" to evaluate facts - but if your goal is the best life, then you will actively do so, as time and energy permits.

And of course, any particular evaluation of personal relevance of a fact will be on a scale, representing its position in your hierarchy of values:

It might be a *dis*-value - the cancer example. But it is *good* and *important* that you *know* about that fact in time to do something about it, and if a man is rational, it would be extremely important knowledge.

It might be a *non*-value.

Or it might be a *positive* value. (negative, zero, positive, on the same axis representing personal value.)

Whether a particular fact was "man-made" or "metaphysical" is also essentially irrelevant in judging personal value of a fact. Knowledge of the fact of a man-made crumpled ball of paper in the corner, vs. knowledge of the fact of an impending natural volcanic eruption in my vicinity, are not the same magnitude of personal importance.

[jasonlockwood 0]

Further, most personal values are hinged on the man made, aside from things like bad weather canceling a picnic in the park. So I too don't see what all the fuss is about metaphysical versus man made facts. Facts are facts, regardless of their origin.

One must ALWAYS tie one's values to facts in reality, otherwise one is engaging in flights of fancy, or worse.

[AisA 0]

I have a substantially different interpretation of what I perceive to be the central issue in Fact & Value.

Peikoff is not saying that all facts (man-made or metaphysical) are values. He is saying that cognition and evaluation should not be separated.

Just as there can be no dichotomy between mind and body, so there can be none between the true and the good. Even in regard to metaphysically given facts, cognition and evaluation cannot be sundered. Cognition apart from evaluation is purposeless; it becomes the arbitrary desire for "pure knowledge" as an end in itself. Evaluation apart from cognition is non-objective; it becomes the whim of pursuing an "I wish" not based on any "It is."

Thus, in Peikoff’s view, the very purpose of cognition is to discover facts that do have implications for one’s self-preservation; and that, as facts are uncovered, one must evaluate them and act accordingly. This is the proper course of action, as opposed to discovering facts at random or accumulating knowledge as an end in itself or pursuing one’s whims.

Man must seek to discover facts that have implications for his actions; in doing so, it would be folly for him not to evaluate what he learns. Granted, in this process, he may uncover facts that have little or no bearing on his existence. But he does not know that until the fact has been evaluated.

Or, to use other terms: Every is implies an ought, and we should seek to discover the “is” with the most important “oughts”. The first “ought” that must follow every “is” is an evaluation of its implications for one’s survival. The outcome of that evaluation, depending on the “is” involved, may be anything from, “I ought to hold this particular fact (say, the fact of one’s rationality) as my highest value” to “I ought to ignore this fact and move on.”

Peikoff identifies the implications of this approach vis-à-vis the ideas of others in his next paragraph:

The same principle applies in regard to man-made facts—which brings us to the virtue of justice. Justice is an aspect of the principle that cognition demands evaluation; it is that principle applied to human choices and their products. Since man is volitional, evaluation of the man-made is of a special kind: it is moral evaluation.

This, the refusal to split cognition and value with respect to ideas and those who hold them, is the heart of Peikoff’s argument with Kelly. Kelly says, in “A Question of Sanction”:

The concept of evil applies primarily to actions, and to the people who perform them.................    Truth and falsity, not good or evil, are the primary evaluative concepts that apply to ideas as such.

Tolerance is not a virtue where evil is concerned; evil flourishes by the tolerance of good people. But it is a virtue in the cognitive realm. It is appropriate not only among people who disagree about the application of principles they share, but also among people who disagree on the principles themselves.

Thus, Kelly is indeed claiming an entire realm of facts – the realm of ideas and of those who hold them – to be beyond evaluation.

To summarize, the issue is not whether every fact is a value or implies a value, buth whether any fact can be declared off-limits to evaluation. Peikoff says no, and I agree with him.

[Paul's Here 0]

NOTES ON THE "FACT AND VALUE" ARTICLE

----------------

A moral tolerationist is a person who holds that "tolerance" is "a virtue in the cognitive realm." (Dr. Peikoff, apparently quoting Kelley, FaV, p. 1, full par. 4) A moral tolerationist splits the world of physical actions, as suitable for moral evaluation, from the world of ideas, as unsuitable for moral evaluation. (FaV, p. 8, last, partial par.)

An interesting definition, but why would one define the term in that manner, unless the rest of the paragraph is part of the definition also. Here again, context is important. To someone unfamiliar with Kelley’s writing, where is this coming from? In F&V, Peikoff states that one judges an idea morally by first identifying its truth or falsity, and then judging "the mental process which led to the idea, and the existential results to which the idea itself leads." Kelley states in AQOS "truth and falsity is the essential property of an idea; the good or ill it produces is derivative." If something "produces" good or ill, where is the implication that it cannot be morally evaluated as good or bad? He simply states that "truth and falsity ... are the primary evaluative concepts that apply to ideas as such." "Bad ideas," Kelley continues, "can be dangerous; thats one reason we shouldn't endorse them." Both maintain that ideas are evaluated as true or false. Dr. Peikoff continues that we need to morally evaluate the mental process which led to and idea, and the existential results. Kelley maintains that the concept of "evil applies primarily to actions and to the people who take them." Note he says primarily, not only.

I disagree with Kelley on this point. In fact, isn't part of the process of judging the truth or falsity of an idea trying to understand how it will be implemented and what its consequences would be? I think in identifying something as true or false, one has performed a moral evaluation. However, I'm not sure how I am supposed to morally evaluate the "mental process which led to an idea"? Am I a psychologist? Am I supposed to spend time wondering what went through the mind of someone who came up with such an irrational idea? Isn't it better, once I grasp that an idea is false, to simply dismiss it and continue on with my life? Short of being a genius or someone who devotes his whole life to studying ideas and how they get implemented, how am I supposed to be able to concretize any abstract idea to such an extent that I can predict what the consequences will be? I know Ayn Rand claimed that she was able to see the results of the Marxist credo the first time she heard it. How many people in history can make that claim? (It would be interesting to speculate that the only people who might fully know the consequences are the ones who formulate the ideas and those who are acting to produce the evil consequences.) And short of being fully conversant in Objectivism, how many people would even think about relating such a issues? I'm not sure how I would evaluate others "mental processes" who wouldn't have that perspective.

I think the issue here is to learn to think in principles. When one does this, the consequences of ideas become clearer. But to predict the extent of horror or greatness that an idea will create in 50 to 100 years is not very easy and is very time consuming. Even when Rand grasped the consequences of Marxist jargon, she was actually living in such a culture and she could perceive the consequences all too readily.

[Ed from OC 0]

The issue under disagreement and discussion is "are all metaphysical facts also values?"

←

Just when I think I understood your question, it changes. If this is the issue for you, then there are at least a couple points of confusion.

1. Facts are not the same thing as values. Facts become values when they become the object of a living organism's effort to gain and/or keep.

2. The metaphysical vs. man-made distinction has no relevance to this issue. There are plenty of both kinds that can be values, so long as a living organism pursues them. An inanimate object, whether metaphysically given or man-made, is incapable of being a value in the absence of a living organism to pursue it.

As for examples of metaphysically given values, see ch. 6 of OPAR for discussion of the metaphysical nature of man. For a man to live, he must act in accordance with his metaphysically given nature. His need of food, clothing, shelter; the fundamental alternative of life and death; his need to use his conceptual, volitional consciousness; his need to act according to certain principles (i.e., virtues) are a few examples.

If one rejects the idea that metaphysically given facts can be values, then there is no objective basis for ethics, since anything one pursues can be a value. For ethics to be objective, to connect to reality, there must be a metaphysically given standard: man's life.

Thinking a little more, the issue is even deeper. The fact that existence exists (a metaphysical given) is the basis for establishing truth, since reasoning consists of identifying aspects of reality. If the metaphysically given cannot be a value, then a line of reasoning cannot pursue something metaphysically given (since such cannot be a value, i.e., the object of one's thinking, in this case). So we have to chuck reason out the window. The fact of identity? Metaphysically given. Causality? That, too.

So it all ties together. It's either accept that the metaphysically given can be values, or throw out the Objectivist ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics.

Now if you want a direct quote from Ayn Rand that says exactly what you asked for, I hope you see now that you won't find it. If you want examples of metaphysically given values, you have them. If you want to understand the important connection of the metaphysically given to Objectivism, you have that as well. But direct quotes from Ayn Rand? I don't carry those around. I'm more interested in understanding her philosophy for myself, and looking at reality to determine what's true.

[Burgess Laughlin 0]

An interesting definition, but why would one define the term in that manner, unless the rest of the paragraph is part of the definition also.  Here again, context is important.  To someone unfamiliar with Kelley’s writing, where is this coming from?

←

I can say without doubt, based on personal experience, that moral tolerationism comes also from modern liberalism, which, in turn, based on my limited readings of a few of his works, comes from Kant.

Essentially the same message that I personally heard from Kelley supporters years ago (I no longer associate with them) I still hear from liberals, especially in academia, even today as liberalism fades away. They say, in effect, "Well, yes, Stalin did some bad things maybe, but you should not be intolerant of Marxist professors, because after all they are just talking about ideas and we can't and shouldn't judge those morally and certainly not morally judge the people espousing the ideas."

One of the break points for me, years ago, leading me to disassociate from local Kelleyites I had met, was the realization that these particular Kelleyites, at least, were trying to make Objectivism acceptable to "moderate" leftists. That is the same phenomenon I saw in the Libertarian Party, another cauldron of tolerance. Thanks but no thanks.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

An issue related to the fact and value relationship is presented below.  Is this distinction valid?

Is there a difference between cognitive value and ethical value?  Cognitive value refers to the choice to exercise mental action, effort or thought in order to grasp, integrate and formulate ideas.  For example, if I'm doing an engineering problem my mental action consists of identifying possible solutions.  The solution is the cognitive value.  I do not have any further requirement for action.  There is no necessary ethical value involved.

Ethical value refers to the choice to change one's action or behavior as a result of discovering new facts or ideas.  For example, if I've designed a building that is already under construction and I later discover that I've made an error in my calculations, I have to choose to take physical action to correct the problem, such as notifying others.  There is a necessary relationship to cognitive value.

←

I don't see that as a clear, useful, or essential distinction. The "cognitive value" described above is really a cognitive goal or purpose, so why not just call it a goal or purpose?

"Ethical value" described above, seems like an instance of the virtue of integrity in the delimited context of acting to correct an error. The combination of the concepts "ethical" and "value," however, make it sound like it should be something more fundamental. The things I would describe as an ethical value would be something like purpose or self-esteem.

I don't see any reason to coin new terms when existing concepts like "goal" or "integrity" would suffice and would be less ambiguous.