"Fact and Value"

[Paul's Here 0]

All facts, however you classify them, *can be* evaluated in reference to one's life. You seem to keep wanting to imply that there is some kind of Kantian duty to systematically appraise each fact in your awareness in order to ascertain its importance to your life. (Obviously, a fact not in awareness cannot be evaluated - which doesn't mean that it will not affect your life regardless. Millions of people will die of the *fact* of undetected but existing cancerous tumors for instance.)

Do you have any idea how many facts there are in the universe? Are you telling me that in the average lifespan of 70+ years I have, all of them can be evaluated? And what happens after I die? Those alleged facts that are values no longer are values. Well, if all facts cease being a value because I'm dead, then I'm sure there are some facts which are not values when I was alive.

I don't keep wanting to imply any such thing. If someone says ALL facts affect my choice to live, then I expect a demonstration, an argument, a proof of that statement.

People die because of the undetected tumor, not because of the fact of an undetected tumor. Entities are the basic building block of man's perceptual and conceptual awareness and the basic, irreducible metaphysically given.

As with every other rational moral principle, there is no "duty" to evaluate facts - but if your goal is the best life, then you will actively do so, as time and energy permits.

And of course, any particular evaluation of personal relevance of a fact will be on a scale, representing its position in your hierarchy of values:

It might be a *dis*-value - the cancer example. But it is *good* and *important* that you *know* about that fact in time to do something about it, and if a man is rational, it would be extremely important knowledge.

It might be a *non*-value.

Or it might be a *positive* value. (negative, zero, positive, on the same axis representing personal value.)

What is the referent for the concept "fact"? Is it not the entity/attribute/event/relationship? Please point to an entity designated fact.

Whether a particular fact was "man-made" or "metaphysical" is also essentially irrelevant in judging personal value of a fact. Knowledge of the fact of a man-made crumpled ball of paper in the corner, vs. knowledge of the fact of an impending natural volcanic eruption in my vicinity, are not the same magnitude of personal importance.

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I don't get your example. Anyway, I wasn't talking about the relationship of the type of fact to the judgment of its value. I was talking about the nature of the value. There is a clear difference between saying a car is a value to me and saying an asteroid spinning around some nebula is a value to me.

[Paul's Here 0]

Further, most personal values are hinged on the man made, aside from things like bad weather canceling a picnic in the park. So I too don't see what all the fuss is about metaphysical versus man made facts.

I agree, but a famous Objectivist philosopher has stated that all facts bear on the choice to live.

Facts are facts, regardless of their origin.

Not true. Facts can be classified on the basis of metaphysical reality and man's choices. If you are in a prison on an unjustified charge, you'd fight that fact with all of your financial and intellectual abilities. If you fall off a wall and break a leg, you have no choice and no option about the fact that gravity pulled you down. You would not and could not fight it, and no intellectual effort on your part would make gravity behave any differently.

One must ALWAYS tie one's values to facts in reality, otherwise one is engaging in flights of fancy, or worse.

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[Paul's Here 0]

I don't see that as a clear, useful, or essential distinction.  The "cognitive value" described above is really a cognitive goal or purpose, so why not just call it a goal or purpose?

"Ethical value" described above, seems like an instance of the virtue of integrity in the delimited context of acting to correct an error.  The combination of the concepts "ethical" and "value," however, make it sound like it should be something more fundamental.  The things I would describe as an ethical value would be something like purpose or self-esteem.

I don't see any reason to coin new terms when existing concepts like "goal" or "integrity" would suffice and would be less ambiguous.

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Thanks, those are useful observations for me to think about. It may help me clarify some issues.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

Do you have any idea how many facts there are in the universe?  Are you telling me that in the average lifespan of 70+ years I have, all of them can be evaluated?  And what happens after I die?  Those alleged facts that are values no longer are values.  Well, if all facts cease being a value because I'm dead, then I'm sure there are some facts which are not values when I was alive. 

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Certainly, because values are not intrinsic. Values are always "Of value to whom and for what?"

Therefore, any given fact may not be of value to a given person at any given time. So what? It might be of value to someone sometime and therefore, when you become aware of a fact, it is a good idea to consider if and how it might be of value to you.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

Is "value significance" the same as value?

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No. Value significance means that something is important and bears on our survival and wellbeing. Disease is not a value, but it has value significance.

If something is "good for us or bad for us to varying degrees in some contexts" can the degree be zero? 

Yes.

If values apply in contexts to various people, can the number of people who value a fact in a specific context be zero?

At a given time, it certainly could be. There are many things we value today, like uranium, that were not valued by anyone in the past.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

Peikoff is not saying that all facts (man-made or metaphysical) are values.  He is saying that cognition and evaluation should not be separated.

Thus, in Peikoff’s view, the very purpose of cognition is to discover facts that do have implications for one’s self-preservation; and that, as facts are uncovered, one must evaluate them and act accordingly.  This is the proper course of action, as opposed to discovering facts at random or accumulating knowledge as an end in itself or pursuing one’s whims.

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That is the heart of the matter, thank you!

[Paul's Here 0]

Just when I think I understood your question, it changes.  If this is the issue for you, then there are at least a couple points of confusion.

Which question did you think it was?

1. Facts are not the same thing as values.  Facts become values when they become the object of a living organism's effort to gain and/or keep.

I never implied that facts are the same thing as values. Values are types of facts, as you state in your second sentence. The only exception is with the basis for values: life is both a fact and the basic value that makes all other values possible.

2. The metaphysical vs. man-made distinction has no relevance to this issue.  There are plenty of both kinds that can be values, so long as a living organism pursues them.  An inanimate object, whether metaphysically given or man-made, is incapable of being a value in the absence of a living organism to pursue it.

I believe the distinction is important because any object created by man is, by that fact, a value. "A man-made product did not have to exist, but, once made, it does exist. A man's actions did not have to be performed, but, once performed, they are facts of reality." "Things of human origin ... may be designated as "man-made facts"—as distinguished from the metaphysically given facts." (The AR Letter, Metaphysical vs. Man-Made, Part 2) The metaphysically given is not a product of volition. Its relationship to values ("every fact bears on the choice to live" in F&V) is important if one is to maintain, as I do, that not all facts are values.

As for examples of metaphysically given values, see ch. 6 of OPAR for discussion of the metaphysical nature of man.  For a man to live, he must act in accordance with his metaphysically given nature.  His need of food, clothing, shelter; the fundamental alternative of life and death; his need to use his conceptual, volitional consciousness; his need to act according to certain principles (i.e., virtues) are a few examples.

If one rejects the idea that metaphysically given facts can be values, then there is no objective basis for ethics, since anything one pursues can be a value.  For ethics to be objective, to connect to reality, there must be a metaphysically given standard: man's life.

I did not reject the idea that the metaphysically given can be a value: life is the basic value and it is metaphysically given; water is metaphysically given and it is a value. The issue that I take exception to is "every fact bears on the choice to live."

Thinking a little more, the issue is even deeper.  The fact that existence exists (a metaphysical given) is the basis for establishing truth, since reasoning consists of identifying aspects of reality.  If the metaphysically given cannot be a value, then a line of reasoning cannot pursue something metaphysically given (since such cannot be a value, i.e., the object of one's thinking, in this case).  So we have to chuck reason out the window.  The fact of identity? Metaphysically given.  Causality?  That, too.

So it all ties together.  It's either accept that the metaphysically given can be values, or throw out the Objectivist ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics.

Now if you want a direct quote from Ayn Rand that says exactly what you asked for, I hope you see now that you won't find it.  If you want examples of metaphysically given values, you have them.  If you want to understand the important connection of the metaphysically given to Objectivism, you have that as well.  But direct quotes from Ayn Rand?  I don't carry those around.  I'm more interested in understanding her philosophy for myself, and looking at reality to determine what's true.

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I hope my comments above indicate that you were arguing against ideas I didn't support. I'm curious as to how you could attempt to understand her philosophy if you can't find a quotation about a fundamental philosophic issue concerning Objectivism. If I asked you to find her definition of "concept" would you be able to provide it for me? Part of "looking at reality to determine what's true" is integrating new knowledge with previously acquired knowledge. Since I would hardly expect you to have Rand's entire corpus memorized, if there were some issues in Objectivism you were not confident in your understanding, how would you know where to go look for clarification? Are you going to reread everything?

[Stephen Speicher 0]

The way you are thinking about the concept "fact" is the way I used to think of it before I read, or reread, what Rand stated in ITOE Appendix in the context of this thread.  I don't want to requote her as I've already done so several times.  But she clearly states that "fact" is an epistemological concept ...

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First, what exactly do you mean by an "epistemological concept?" Second, where does Miss Rand "clearly state that 'fact' is an epistemological concept?"

[Paul's Here 0]

Certainly, because values are not intrinsic.  Values are always "Of value to whom and for what?"

Therefore, any given fact may not be of value to a given person at any given time.  So what?  It might be of value to someone sometime and therefore, when you become aware of a fact, it is a good idea to consider if and how it might be of value to you.

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I don't understand why it is not clear what seems obvious to me. Let's see if I can come up with a concrete example. Let's say that there are 1000 facts that are known by 10 people who are in a room. That means 100 facts per person. There is no overlapping of known facts by some else. I agree, that the 100 facts that each person knows is a value to him. And that the facts known by everyone else could be a value to each person if they knew the facts. As a minimum, they would be able to evaluate the facts and conclude that the facts are irrelevant to their lives. Person A dies without telling anyone else the facts he knew; that leaves 1000 facts for 9 people; but the 9 people don't know the facts Person A knew. So there are only 900 known facts. Are you saying that the 100 Person A-facts are values to the remaining 9, even though they don't know the facts? Did the 100 facts that Person A know go out of existence with his death?

My argument is that the 100 facts still exist but are not of value to anyone else because they don't know the facts. If you agree with this analysis, how does it fit with "every fact bears on the choice to live"?

[Paul's Here 0]

First, what exactly do you mean by an "epistemological concept?" Second, where does Miss Rand "clearly state that 'fact' is an epistemological concept?"

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Prof. B: What is the difference between the concepts "fact" and "existent," and is "fact" an axiomatic concept?

AR: No. "Fact" is merely an epistemological convenience. The term "fact" can apply to a particular existent, to an aspect, to an attribute, or to an event. An existent is a concrete. "Existent" is a very convenient term in that it subsumes entities and attributes and actions and even mental events. They exist.

Prof. B: Relationships too?

AR: Yes—everything that exists on which you can focus, anything which you can isolate, whether it is an entity, a relationship, an action, or an attribute. The concept "existent" refers to something which exists. And it is wider than the concept "entity," because it permits you to subsume under that concept, and focus on, attributes or relationships or actions—on that which depends on an entity but can be studied separately.

Now, "fact" is merely a way of saying, "This is something which exists in reality"—as distinguished from imagination or misconception or error. So you could say, "That the American Revolution took place is a fact," or, "That George Washington <ioe2_242> existed is a fact." In the first case you refer to an enormously complex series of events over a period of years. In the second case you refer to just one  individual. Both are facts.

Prof. E: You wouldn't say, for instance, that the American Revolution is or was an existent?

AR: No.

Prof. E: Or a war wouldn't be an existent?

AR: You could treat it as that, but in speaking of it you wouldn't talk that way. Why? Because "existent" primarily refers to a metaphysical status [such as entity, attribute, etc.].

Prof. E: And a war or revolution would be an enormous complex of entities, relations, and actions.

AR: Of all sorts of existents.

Prof. E: So that when you have that complexity, it is easier to say "fact."

AR: It is easier, and there is a certain subtle distinction

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Prof. B: Is "fact" like "necessity" then—in that we need the concept "fact" for two reasons, both deriving from the nature of our form of consciousness? Number one is that our form of consciousness, like any, is limited and, therefore, we get information bit by bit, so to speak, and "fact" designates the bit of information or of reality that we have gotten. Or is it that "fact" is a concept which we need because we are capable of error?

AR: It is the second.

Prof. E: Which would not be true of the concept "existence."

AR: No.

Prof. B: So "fact" then designates existents, but it is used in a context in which it is relevant to distinguish knowledge from error.

AR: That's right.

[Burgess Laughlin 0]

[...] a famous Objectivist philosopher has stated that all facts bear on the choice to live.

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[bold added for emphasis.]

Everyone, thank you. This discussion has certainly helped me in reaching my goal for this topic: To better understand Leonard Peikoff's article.

Paul, I assume that the part I have put in bold above is an idea you have picked up from the article -- specifically the paragraph (p. 2 of my printout) which begins: "In the objective approach, since every fact bears on the choice to live, every truth necessarily entails a value-judgment, and every value-judgment necessarily presupposes a truth." (Added underlining.)

I wonder, do you see any significance in the fact that, in his immediately preceding paragraph (beginning "Objectivism holds ..."), Dr. Peikoff has stated that "values are a type of facts; they are facts considered in relation to the choice to live"? (Bold emphasis added.) In other words, Dr. Peikoff here is not saying all facts (existents) are values, but rather only those "considered in relation to the choice to live."

In the next paragraph, Dr. Peikoff sets the context for "every fact bears on the choice to live" by first saying, "In the objective approach ...." The objective approach is the approach in which, as AisA and Betsy have pointed out, one looks logically at the world in order to find facts that affect one's life, that is, all of one's values.

I wonder if you have missed, as I have until now, the significance of those context-setting words: "type ... considered ... In the objective approach ...."?

[Paul's Here 0]

[bold added for emphasis.]

Everyone, thank you. This discussion has certainly helped me in reaching my goal for this topic: To better understand Leonard Peikoff's article.

Paul, I assume that the part I have put in bold above is an idea you have picked up from the article -- specifically the paragraph (p. 2 of my printout) which begins: "In the objective approach, since every fact bears on the choice to live, every truth necessarily entails a value-judgment, and every value-judgment necessarily presupposes a truth." (Added underlining.)

I wonder, do you see any significance in the fact that, in his immediately preceding paragraph (beginning "Objectivism holds ..."), Dr. Peikoff has stated that "values are a type of facts; they are facts considered in relation to the choice to live"? (Bold emphasis added.) In other words, Dr. Peikoff here is not saying all facts (existents) are values, but rather only those "considered in relation to the choice to live."

In the next paragraph, Dr. Peikoff sets the context for "every fact bears on the choice to live" by first saying, "In the objective approach ...." The objective approach is the approach in which, as AisA and Betsy have pointed out, one looks logically at the world in order to find facts that affect one's life, that is, all of one's values.

I wonder if you have missed, as I have until now, the significance of those context-setting words: "type ... considered ... In the objective approach ...."?

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I will take another look at it and get back to you on this point. Thanks for bringing it up.

[Paul's Here 0]

I have a substantially different interpretation of what I perceive to be the central issue in Fact & Value. 

I have a few comments below

Peikoff is not saying that all facts (man-made or metaphysical) are values. 

"all facts bear on the choice to live"

He is saying that cognition and evaluation should not be separated.

What he is saying is that cognition an moral evaluation should not be separated. (A point I should mention that I agree with.)

Thus, in Peikoff’s view, the very purpose of cognition is to discover facts that do have implications for one’s self-preservation; and that, as facts are uncovered, one must evaluate them and act accordingly.

I'm not sure how you'd focus on discovering "facts that do have implications for one’s self-preservation" from those that don't until after discovering it and determining its value significance. The purpose of cognition is to identify reality in conceptual form so that one can guide one's actions. Whether the facts affect one's self-preservation is a separate identification.

This is the proper course of action, as opposed to discovering facts at random or accumulating knowledge as an end in itself or pursuing one’s whims.

Man must seek to discover facts that have implications for his actions; in doing so, it would be folly for him not to evaluate what he learns.  Granted, in this process, he may uncover facts that have little or no bearing on his existence.  But he does not know that until the fact has been evaluated.

Or, to use other terms:  Every is implies an ought, and we should seek to discover the “is” with the most important “oughts”.  The first “ought” that must follow every “is” is an evaluation of its implications for one’s survival. The outcome of that evaluation, depending on the “is” involved, may be anything from, “I ought to hold this particular fact (say, the fact of one’s rationality) as my highest value” to “I ought to ignore this fact and move on.” 

Your formulation is somewhat confusing. You state the every "is" implies and "ought" but then you state that every "is" has to be evaluated for survival implications, and then that determines what "ought" to be done. How can one evaluate an "is" for its survival implication unless one as already assumed what "ought" to be done. In other words, aren't you implying that what "ought" to be done is to evaluate "is" for it's survival implications? If that is the case, your second "ought" of valuing or ignoring the facts is besides the point because you've already done what "ought" to be done.

Peikoff identifies the implications of this approach vis-à-vis the ideas of others in his next paragraph:

This, the refusal to split cognition and value with respect to ideas and those who hold them, is the heart of Peikoff’s argument with Kelly.  Kelly says, in “A Question of Sanction”:

Thus, Kelly is indeed claiming an entire realm of facts – the realm of ideas and of those who hold them – to be beyond evaluation.

To summarize, the issue is not whether every fact is a value or implies a value, buth whether any fact can be declared off-limits to evaluation.  Peikoff says no, and I agree with him.

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[Stephen Speicher 0]

First, what exactly do you mean by an "epistemological concept?" Second, where does Miss Rand "clearly state that 'fact' is an epistemological concept?"

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[...]

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Paul, I asked first what you mean by an "epistemological concept," and second, where, as you claim, Miss Rand "clearly state that 'fact' is an epistemological concept?" You did not address the first, and for the second you just copied over several paragraphs from ITOE on the CD-ROM. In none of those paragraphs does Ayn Rand explicitly state that "fact" is an "epistemological concept."

Now, it is one thing if you choose not to answer for yourself, but another thing entirely when you make a claim about Ayn Rand and fail to provide a direct quote to substantiate your claim. Without a direct quote you need to explain exactly what you mean by an "epistemological concept" and then point to the specific words from Ayn Rand that you interpret that way.

[Xyhm 0]

Peikoff is not saying that all facts (man-made or metaphysical) are values.  He is saying that cognition and evaluation should not be separated.

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"all facts bear on the choice to live"

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I think you need to distinguish between a fact being a value, and a fact having a value-implication. Cancer isn't a value, but it certainly has a value-implication. Objectivism, as I understand it, says that all facts have value-implications, but not all facts are values.

[Paul's Here 0]

I think you need to distinguish between a fact being a value, and a fact having a value-implication. Cancer isn't a value, but it certainly has a value-implication. Objectivism, as I understand it, says that all facts have value-implications, but not all facts are values.

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Cancer may not be a value to the organism that has the tumor, but the cells are alive and, from that fact, and they have values and needs.

I wouldn't say that cancer has value-implication. It simply has negative value, i.e., it is dis-valued.

[Paul's Here 0]

Since I've been quite busy with this topic the last few days (my company is closed the final week of the year giving me a lot of time at home), I wanted to let everyone know that I will be out of town for several days, until after the New Year. So I won't be able to respond until around Jan. 2. I will be going to the Ayn Rand Society meeting in New York. I will be leaving in about 2 hours to drive to NY.

I wanted to say that I really appreciate all the discourse within this thread. It has been many, many years since I've considered these ideas. The chance to revisit them has been well worthwhile and intellectually stimulating for me. I hope it has been for you too. I look forward to returning here next year.

So, everyone,

HAVE A HAPPY NEW YEAR 2006!!

[Stephen Speicher 0]

Since I've been quite busy with this topic the last few days (my company is closed the final week of the year giving me a lot of time at home), I wanted to let everyone know that I will be out of town for several days, until after the New Year.  So I won't be able to respond until around Jan. 2.  I will be going to the Ayn Rand Society meeting in New York.  I will be leaving in about 2 hours to drive to NY.

I wanted to say that I really appreciate all the discourse within this thread.  It has been many, many years since I've considered these ideas.  The chance to revisit them has been well worthwhile and intellectually stimulating for me.  I hope it has been for you too.  I look forward to returning here next year. 

So, everyone,

HAVE A HAPPY NEW YEAR 2006!!

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And a Happy New Year to you and Michelle. Enjoy the ARS meeting.

[Xyhm 0]

I wouldn't say that cancer has value-implication.  It simply has negative value, i.e., it is dis-valued.

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And it has an effect on your other values (time, money, your ability to enjoy things, and so on), it may even end your life. If a certain fact affects ones values, I'd say it has a value-implication.

[Xyhm 0]

And happy new year.

[Ed from OC 0]

I wouldn't say that cancer has value-implication.  It simply has negative value, i.e., it is dis-valued.

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With no need to ask: to whom? for what? What you are saying is that cancer is intrinsically a negative value.

There are certainly cases where cancer can be a good thing. For instance, a research scientist may be excited to see an exotic, new form of cancer. Or a decent, rational person may be happy to learn the leader Iran is coming down with incurable cancer.

Also, notice that your first sentence claims there's no connection between cancer and values (no "value-implication") while your second one states that cancer always has a negative value.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

My argument is that the 100 facts still exist but are not of value to anyone else because they don't know the facts.  If you agree with this analysis, how does it fit with "every fact bears on the choice to live"?

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Why is this an issue? Why do you interpret eight words, out of context, in a way that leads to problems when a more charitable, contextual reading would not?

Why is the fact that Peikoff wrote those eight words so important -- i.e., such a value or disvalue?

[Paul's Here 0]

Why is this an issue?  Why do you interpret eight words, out of context, in a way that leads to problems when a more charitable, contextual reading would not? 

Why is the fact that Peikoff wrote those eight words so important -- i.e., such a value or disvalue?

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If I think something is wrong or is not consistent with what Miss Rand stated, the number of words it takes to state it is not important. In what way am I taking it out of context?

There are two important issues for me here. One, is the statement true, which I've argued that it isn't. Two, is the statement implied or consistent with what Miss Rand stated, i.e., Objectivism, which I have argued that it isn't.

Since it's been a while, I'll restate the essence of my argument. First, even if one were to minimally accept that "every fact bears on the choice to live" to the extent that one could issue an intellectual judgment that "this particular fact has no bearing on my choice to live" (as I believe you've argued), the conclusion clearly contradicts the statement. Also, according to Objectivism, the choice to live is a primary choice from which all values flow. I do not make the choice to live because I like astronomy, ice cream, engineering, or any other value. Nor can facts or truths outside of my awareness ("every fact") bear on my choice to live. I'm sure there are many facts and values that affected your life that I have no knowledge of. How do those facts affect my choice to live?

Second, as the statement relates to its consistency with Miss Rand's formulation, she formulated the "is-ought" controversy within the context of ethics. The only implication is that every "is" (particular value) implies what one ought do (actions to keep and gain the value). See the Objectivist Ethics. Where does the "is" refer to metaphysical facts (beyond the fact of life) in her argument and the "ought" refer to specific evaluations (either cognitive or moral)?

[Paul's Here 0]

With no need to ask: to whom? for what?  What you are saying is that cancer is intrinsically a negative value.

There are certainly cases where cancer can be a good thing.  For instance, a research scientist may be excited to see an exotic, new form of cancer.  Or a decent, rational person may be happy to learn the leader Iran is coming down with incurable cancer.

Also, notice that your first sentence claims there's no connection between cancer and values (no "value-implication") while your second one states that cancer always has a negative value.

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I was not claiming that there was no connection between cancer and values (no value-implication). I was stating that I would not use the term "value-implication" in that context. Simply stating that this is a value or is not a value is all that is required.

I never stated that cancer is always a negative value, outside of any context. Clearly I stated that to the cancer cells themselves, they have value as living organisms. Your examples above only indicate that value stands in relation to the valuer, which I agree. I haven't stated anything against that position.

[Paul's Here 0]

Paul, I asked first what you mean by an "epistemological concept," and second, where, as you claim, Miss Rand "clearly state that 'fact' is an epistemological concept?" You did not address the first, and for the second you just copied over several paragraphs from ITOE on the CD-ROM. In none of those paragraphs does Ayn Rand explicitly state that "fact" is an "epistemological concept."

Now, it is one thing if you choose not to answer for yourself, but another thing entirely when you make a claim about Ayn Rand and fail to provide a direct quote to substantiate your claim.  Without a direct quote you need to explain exactly what you mean by an "epistemological concept" and then point to the specific words from Ayn Rand that you interpret that way.

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I thought the quote made it clear what I meant. If it doesn't, I'll give my explanation. An "epistemological concept" is a concept that has as it's primary referent an epistemological subject, although of course, all concepts must ultimately have existential referents. For example, "knowledge" refers to the organization of factual material within one's mind. Of course, the organization and the facts must correspond with reality. But I have knowledge of Greek mythology even though there is no existential referent corresponding to any Greek god.

This is how I interpret her statement " 'Fact' is merely an epistemological convenience." "Fact" can designate many existential things as well as claims of knowledge. "I am an entity" corresponds to reality whether I am aware of it or not, whether I am alive or not. To hold "I am an entity" or "The American Revolution occurred in 1776" as a fact, I must be aware of it an all the associated events and relationships.