"Fact and Value"

[Burgess Laughlin 0]

Every proper value-judgment is the identification of a fact: a given object or action advances man's life (it is good): or it threatens man's life (it is bad or an evil). The good, therefore, is a species of the true; it is a form of recognizing reality. The evil is a species of the false; it is a form of contradicting reality.

A. If a given object or action advances man's life, then it is a value. [OK with me]

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Perhaps I am missing a point, but here is my understanding:

1. If I say, "This object in front of me is a table," that is a true statement.

2. If I say, "This table advances my life because it holds the equipment I use to do the work I love (value)," that is also a true statement, a statement that identifies a good -- that is, evaluates a fact (recognized as such in a true statement) as beneficial.

So, an identification of the good -- that is, an evaluation, a value-judgment -- is indeed a species of the true. In other words, evaluative true statements are a kind (species) of true statement. Which kind? The evaluative kind.

However, not all facts are values in the sense of something to gain or keep. I can evaluate every fact, for its value-significance, without claiming every fact to be a value. A given fact, while not a value in itself, may have an effect on my values (my life itself, for example). Such a fact would be of value to me without being a value (in the sense of something to gain or keep).

[Paul's Here 0]

A.  If a given object or action advances man's life, then it is a value.  [OK with me]

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Perhaps I am missing a point, but here is my understanding:

1. If I say, "This object in front of me is a table," that is a true statement.

2. If I say, "This table advances my life because it holds the equipment I use to do the work I love (value)," that is also a true statement, a statement that identifies a good -- that is, evaluates a fact (recognized as such in a true statement) as beneficial.

This leads directly into how does what Dr. Peikoff state apply to what you're stating. He says "since every fact bears on the choice to live, every truth necessarily entails a value-judgment, and every value-judgment necessarily presupposes a truth." If you're talking about the table/desk in your house, then fine. But how does No. 2 apply if No. 1 is referring to a table in the store that you have no intention of buying. No. 1 is still true; No. 2 does not follow. In this case, the truth of No. 1 implies the opposite of No. 2 which is now not a true statement. In other words, every truth does not entail a value judgment.

So, an identification of the good -- that is, an evaluation, a value-judgment -- is indeed a species of the true. In other words, evaluative true statements are a kind (species) of true statement. Which kind? The evaluative kind.

Are you distinguishing between a cognitive evaluation and a moral evaluation here? The truth of the value judgment applies only if it it being applied to the value (that you have acted to gain and/or keep it) contained within the value judgment. How is the value judgment per se follow from the truth of the statement (Your No. 1)?

However, not all facts are values in the sense of something to gain or keep. I can evaluate every fact, for its value-significance, without claiming every fact to be a value. A given fact, while not a value in itself, may have an effect on my values (my life itself, for example). Such a fact would be of value to me without being a value (in the sense of something to gain or keep).

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While I agree with you that not all facts are values, how do you reconcile your view with what F&V states "... every fact of reality which we discover has, directly or indirectly, an implication for man's self-preservation and thus for his proper course of action." How can you hold that a given fact may effect affect your values in light of the quote that all facts require some action on your part? Such action would then make them values. No?

Perhaps you could explain what you mean by a fact being "of value" and not necessarily being "a value." Would a table in a store be "of value" but when you buy it, it now becomes "a value"? This is how I understand what your stating.

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PS. Burgess. I don't know if you missed it, but I'd find it very helpful if you could reply to my Post 125. (Unless, of course, you don't want to reply) Thanks.

[PhilO 0]

A value is some existent of any sort (not just an entity - there are intangible but very real values relating to states of consciousness), in the context of its relationship to your life.

Any and all existents can be judged in terms of their effect on your life. The universe is a whole. *In fact* that is true, i.e., all existents imply some level of value to your life, on a scale ranging from highly negative (it kills you) to neutral (it doesn't affect you in any significant way), to highly positive (it enhances your life greatly).

But to determine that actual relationship to yourself requires *value judgement*. So, there's the fact (or potential fact, if the value has yet to be created) of the value, and there's the judgement of that value.

Value judgement means to apply your consciousness to understanding the relationship of other entities to yourself, in essence. And, whether anybody chooses to do so or not, or does so accurately or not, *in fact* there will be an effect of any existent in the universe on you, in some fashion. The question is whether you know it or not.

There's a certain ambiguity in the term value. In one context, it can be used to mean only those existents which one has judged to be of positive worth to one's self and which one is acting to gain and/or keep. In a broader context, it applies to every existent in the universe, in the context of its actual relationship to one's self (negative, neutral, or positive). It's important not to equivocate on the two different but related meanings. The first meaning is a strict subset of the second: Those entities that I *know* about, and which I judge to be worthwhile and will therefore defend or pursue (positive). What is not considered by the first meaning is the subtraction of the two sets of existents: Entities that I *don't* know about, and/or entities that have no, or negative, effects on me.

[Paul's Here 0]

A value is some existent of any sort (not just an entity - there are intangible but very real values relating to states of consciousness), in the context of its relationship to your life.

Any and all existents can be judged in terms of their effect on your life. The universe is a whole. *In fact* that is true, i.e., all existents imply some level of value to your life, on a scale ranging from highly negative (it kills you) to neutral (it doesn't affect you in any significant way), to highly positive (it enhances your life greatly).

The fact that the universe is a whole does not imply that everything affects me in terms of my values. A snowflake melting on someone's car in Utah has no effect on my values. The existents that affect my values due so by causation, direct causation: it is raining, I need to be inside a house if I want to stay dry; so I buy a house to stay dry on rainy days. I don't understand how something that is neutral, if does not affect me, can be classified as a value, especially if I don't do anything to gain and/or keep it.

But to determine that actual relationship to yourself requires *value judgement*. So, there's the fact (or potential fact, if the value has yet to be created) of the value, and there's the judgement of that value.

Value judgement means to apply your consciousness to understanding the relationship of other entities to yourself, in essence.

I agree with that.

And, whether anybody chooses to do so or not, or does so accurately or not, *in fact* there will be an effect of any existent in the universe on you, in some fashion. The question is whether you know it or not.

I disagree for the reason I mentioned above. So, a butterfly flapping its wings in China creates a hurricane in Florida???? My values are not based on chaos theory.

There's a certain ambiguity in the term value. In one context, it can be used to mean only those existents which one has judged to be of positive worth to one's self and which  one is acting to gain and/or keep. In a broader context, it applies to every existent in the universe, in the context of its actual relationship to one's self (negative, neutral, or positive). It's important not to equivocate on the two different but related meanings. The first meaning is a strict subset of the second: Those entities that I *know* about, and which I judge to be worthwhile and will therefore defend or pursue (positive). What is not considered by the first meaning is the subtraction of the two sets of existents: Entities that I *don't* know about, and/or entities that have no, or negative, effects on me.

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I reject your use of the concept value in the "broader context." Such a conclusion implies that values have existence apart from me and my mind has no epistemological role to play in identifying, grasping, and formulating values. I just passively look and see what's good or bad. It may be that every existent could have an effect on me, when and if specific existential conditions are met. But to refer to them as values is outside the bounds of the concept value.

Also, in this thread I am trying to understand and relate what Dr. Peikoff says in F&V to the issues under discussion. Can you relate your ideas to his?

[PhilO 0]

I just passively look and see what's good or bad.  It may be that every existent could have an effect on me, when and if specific existential conditions are met.  But to refer to them as values is outside the bounds of the concept value.

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Values (in the positive sense) and passivity are virtually contradictory. They have to be identified (if already existing), or as potentials to be created. Both take work. Countless men walked over the sands of Saudi Arabia and the rocks of South Africa, never realizing that vast fortunes of oil and diamonds lay beneath their feet: potential values of which they were unaware (but there nonetheless), taking men of active awareness and value pursuit in order to identify and extract them.

Anyway, I've said these things before in different ways, but I give up trying to convey them to you.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

Perhaps I'm being dense here but it's still not clear to me how that clarifies what Peikoff is saying.

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Every proper value-judgment is the identification of a fact: a given object or action advances man's life (it is good): or it threatens man's life (it is bad or an evil). The good, therefore, is a species of the true; it is a form of recognizing reality. The evil is a species of the false; it is a form of contradicting reality.

A.  If a given object or action advances man's life, then it is a value.  [OK with me]

B.  That statement that "it is good" is a value judgment.  [OK with me]

C.  "The good, therefore, is a species of the true..."  [???]

If I equivocated about values and value judgments, then how does Statement C follow from Statement A about values and Statement B about value judgements?    In Statement C, does not "the good" refer to the value whereas "the true" refer to the value judgment?

Not exactly.

"C." means "The good is seeking to advance man's life by seeking to advance man's life. (It's true.) The evil is seeking to advance man's life by threatening man's life. (That's false. It contradicts reality.)"

[Guest Michelle F. Cohen]

A quick reminder of what Dr. Peikoff means by "fact:"

The fundamental issue raised by Kelley concerns the relationship between the true and the good. What kind of thing, Kelley asks, can be true or false, and what kind good or evil? In other words (my words): what is the relationship between fact and value?

Dr. Peikoff refers to "fact" as something one already identified in the context of one's life. Now the only question is whether this something can be evaluated only as true/falst, or must be evaluated as good/evil.

[Paul's Here 0]

Values (in the positive sense) and passivity are virtually contradictory. They have to be identified (if already existing), or as potentials to be created. Both take work. Countless men walked over the sands of Saudi Arabia and the rocks of South Africa, never realizing that vast fortunes of oil and diamonds lay beneath their feet: potential values of which they were unaware (but there nonetheless), taking men of active awareness and value pursuit in order to identify and extract them.

Anyway, I've said these things before in different ways, but I give up trying to convey them to you.

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Oil only became a value when there were industries (engines and automobiles) that required their use. I doubt if someone in the 12th century would have done anything with the crude oil even if they had discovered it there.

[Paul's Here 0]

Not exactly. 

"C." means "The good is seeking to advance man's life by seeking to advance man's life. (It's true.)  The evil is seeking to advance man's life by threatening man's life.  (That's false.  It contradicts reality.)"

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If that is truly what Dr. Peikoff means, then I will no longer hold myself responsible for lack of understanding. Such meaning should be clearly spelled out in the essay.

[B. Royce 0]

Oil only became a value when there were industries (engines and automobiles) that required their use.  I doubt if someone in the 12th century would have done anything with the crude oil even if they had discovered it there.

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The earliest use of oil was for lamps.

[Paul's Here 0]

The earliest use of oil was for lamps.

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"Vegetable oils were usually employed as fuel, but in some countries, such as Sicily and Babylon, mineral oils were used."

http://xoomer.virgilio.it/giobuse1/lucerna/history.html

[Paul's Here 0]

Values (in the positive sense) and passivity are virtually contradictory. They have to be identified (if already existing), or as potentials to be created. Both take work. Countless men walked over the sands of Saudi Arabia and the rocks of South Africa, never realizing that vast fortunes of oil and diamonds lay beneath their feet: potential values of which they were unaware (but there nonetheless), taking men of active awareness and value pursuit in order to identify and extract them.

Anyway, I've said these things before in different ways, but I give up trying to convey them to you.

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It has been brought to my attention that you seem to have regarded my statement "I just passively look and see what's good or bad" as something I held. If that was the case, then I should point out that is not what I meant. I meant to imply that my statement was implied by your statement regarding values in a broader context, which seemed to state that every existent in the universe were a value to me, whether I was aware of it or not. I do not hold that every existent in the universe is a value to me.

[B. Royce 0]

"Vegetable oils were usually employed as fuel, but in some countries, such as Sicily and Babylon, mineral oils were used."

http://xoomer.virgilio.it/giobuse1/lucerna/history.html

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And the first use of petroleum was also for lamps.

[Burgess Laughlin 0]

PS. Burgess.  I don't know if you missed it, but I'd find it very helpful if you could reply to my Post 125.  (Unless, of course, you don't want to reply)  Thanks.

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I don't want to slip into "postitis," the condition of responding to responses to responses. So, I will take your statements as best as I can at face value without laborious digging through previous posts. Since my main interest in this topic-thread is to advance my understanding of Dr. Peikoff's article, I will look at your points from that standpoint wherever I can.

[...]  A tidal wave is bad because it could kill a lot of people.  But if it occurs on, let's say, a remote Pacific uninhabited island, would it be considered bad?  No.

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Bad (or not) for whom? In what way? To what extent? In summary, what is the context? (Rhetorical question.)

Dr. Peikoff's article makes clear -- by using words such as "identification," "recognition," and "objective approach," as well as by context, the whole of Objectivism -- that an individual making an evaluation has to know about what is happening and have a context for it. The article also assumes of course that the individual is a passionate valuer and has a subconscious that makes lightning-like evaluations (subject to conscious correction), such as whether a particular fact (purported or verified) is of interest or not.

Judging from your brief tidal-wave analogy, I would say you do agree that a cause can be bad because of the potential destruction it could cause if carried out in certain circumstances, that is, where objective values are involved. Also, I note for future reference, that you say nothing here about needing to know the "full" consequences of the tidal-wave before judging whether it would be bad for people living in its path. The individual Dr. Peikoff assumes and partly describes has human abilities to logically imagine and infer. Objectivists aren't empiricists who believe one can only know what is in front of one's eyes or what is recorded in excruciating detail in history books.

For example, Marx's ideas [...] Suppose everyone had rejected his ideas and all the subsequent consequences were avoided, and he had faded into oblivion.  The full implementation of his ideas would never have been known and the full evil of his ideas could not have been gauged.  It would perhaps have taken a genius to grasp the full nature of the evil of his ideas back in the 1880's.

On the same token, I don't think anyone could have fully grasped the role that the mind plays in man's survival had it not been for the Industrial Revolution.  Thus, the full evaluation of man's mind as good could not be made until the events occurred. 

What do you mean by "full" in each case that I have put in bold? Do you have a standard of omniscience? How much detail do you need to know about the attacks of September 11, 2001 to know that the attacks -- and the ideas that led to them --were evil? Isn't essentializing enough?

Likewise, can't one infer, from the total of one's knowledge, the consequences of false ideas, such as Environmentalism, without (one hopes) ever seeing the "full" consequences of those ideas? (Again, rhetorical questions, all.)

[Burgess Laughlin 0]

[...] Kelley seems to be saying that the idea is not judged bad or evil until the consequences are known or until we know how a person arrived at an idea, and then it is "primarily" the consequences that are judged to be bad or evil.  As a result, Kelley holds, one can not evaluate as evil any particular person just because he holds a certain idea: "we must consider that way in which they arrived at their conclusions, and the relationship between those conclusions and the rest of their knowledge. 

Dr. Peikoff seems to disagree: "... every identification of an idea's truth or falsehood implies a moral evaluation of the idea and of its advocates. The evaluation, to repeat, comes from the answer to two related questions: what kind of volitional cause led people to this idea? and, to what kind of consequences will this idea lead in practice?"

I, for one, do not see very significant differences between what evaluation means in the above two quotes and the ideas they express.  [...] Perhaps you can point out any differences between these two statements.

[i added underlining and inserted a paragraph break above, for clarity.] I suggest that the difference lies not in the meaning of "evaluation," but in what is to be evaluated.

1. Dr. Peikoff holds that one should evaluate all facts as we know them: people, ideas, consequences, and even metaphysically given facts once cognized.

2. Kelley -- I would say, based on your descriptions -- holds we definitely should judge consequences (actions such as mass murder, presumably), but (and here is where the vagueness comes in) not "primarily" people or ideas except after vaguely delineated standards are met by unspecified means.

Judging from what you have provided, I would offer this distinction: Kelley, as you presented him, is saying one should "primarily" (whatever that means) judge the consequences of an idea, not the idea. In other words (mine), he is saying (with a vague and slight qualification in "primarily") that we must look at effects not at causes -- which here means setting ideas off-limits because they are or could be merely the causes of actions.

By contrast, Dr. Peikoff, as I understand his position, is saying that one can and should judge the ideas that are, will be, or could be the cause of actions. As he repeatedly stated, one should not sunder fact (cognition) and value (evaluation), or -- in this case -- one should not sunder ideas (as a protected class, so to speak) from their potential or actual consequences when judgment time comes.

[...] Would you go around arresting anyone who agreed with Hitler's ideas and publicly espoused them since they are so evil?  There are many laws in Germany that do restrict public expression of those ideas.  Should we implement them in the US also?

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Has someone in this topic-thread suggested such a thing as arresting people for their "public expression of those ideas"? In "Fact and Value" did Dr. Peikoff suggest such a thing? If not, why are you raising this specter? (Again, rhetorical questions -- I want to move on to other points.)

[Paul's Here 0]

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For example, Marx's ideas [...] Suppose everyone had rejected his ideas and all the subsequent consequences were avoided, and he had faded into oblivion.  The full implementation of his ideas would never have been known and the full evil of his ideas could not have been gauged.  It would perhaps have taken a genius to grasp the full nature of the evil of his ideas back in the 1880's.

On the same token, I don't think anyone could have fully grasped the role that the mind plays in man's survival had it not been for the Industrial Revolution.  Thus, the full evaluation of man's mind as good could not be made until the events occurred.

What do you mean by "full" in each case that I have put in bold? Do you have a standard of omniscience? How much detail do you need to know about the attacks of September 11, 2001 to know that the attacks -- and the ideas that led to them --were evil? Isn't essentializing enough?

Likewise, can't one infer, from the total of one's knowledge, the consequences of false ideas, such as Environmentalism, without (one hopes) ever seeing the "full" consequences of those ideas? (Again, rhetorical questions, all.)

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By "full" I mean the actualization in reality of the ideas implicit within another idea. I base this on the assumption that the nature of an idea is to guide action, i.e., to be implemented. I was not implying omniscience, only that it takes time for implicit ideas to develop and be implemented from more fundamental ideas. And one would not know the specific implementation without the passage of time, as well as the possibility that opposing ideas may prevent their implementation. In judging or trying to judge an idea, there may be many complications and if one does not grasp the basic premise behind an idea, it would be very difficult to assert the ideas as evil. There is a continuum, I believe, in what evidence most people require to grasp the full meaning of an idea. Some can identify the basic premises quickly, some need more evidence to demonstrate the basic premises, some need to see the idea implemented to grasp the full meaning. Of course, it is preferable to reject an idea once one has grasped its basic premise, before any disaster occurs.

I don't know about you, but without an understanding of Objectivism, I doubt whether I'd have any grasp of the basic premises of environmentalism or other major philosophic or political systems. If I thought that environmentalism just advocated keeping the air and water clean, how would I grasp the real basic premise involved, especially without Objectivism?

I think one of the basic reasons for the collapse of philosophy in the 20th century was the fact that the culmination of all the philosophers dreams (their basic premises) resulted in Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and Red China and World War II. No longer was anyone able to hide behind the ideas without knowing what the results were.

[Guest Michelle F. Cohen]

I've read in multiple places that Mendelssohn referred to Kant as the "all-destroyer"; I suspect that this is just a different translation of "the Smasher of everything."  However, for the life of me I cannot find a reference for this either.  I will keep looking through my Kant books and post if/when I find it.

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I found a reference in the Cambridge Companion to Kant:

Kant is famous for his criticisms (which Moses Mendelssohn called "world-crushing" (Weltzermalmend)) of the traditional proofs for God's existence.

Given Mendelssohn's religion, he could not use this term in approval of Kant.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

I found a reference in the Cambridge Companion to Kant:

Kant is famous for his criticisms (which Moses Mendelssohn called "world-crushing" (Weltzermalmend)) of the traditional proofs for God's existence.

Given Mendelssohn's religion, he could not use this term in approval of Kant.

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Even if it expresses disapproval, the object of Mendelssohn's "world-crushing" is Kant's effect on "the traditional proofs for God's existence," not disapproval of Kant's philosophy generally.

[Guest Michelle F. Cohen]

Given Mendelssohn's religion, he could not use this term in approval of Kant.

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Even if it expresses disapproval, the object of Mendelssohn's "world-crushing" is Kant's effect on "the traditional proofs for God's existence," not disapproval of Kant's philosophy generally.

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According to Kant: A Biography (pp 308-309) Mendelssohn criticized Kant in a book called Morning Hours which was not translated to English. In this book, which was published four years after the publication of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Mendelssohn appealed to common sense, and one of his maxims is:

When I tell you what a thing causes or suffers, then do not ask the further question ‘What is the thing?’ When I tell you what concept you must form of a thing, then the other question ‘What is the thing in itself?’ does not make any sense.

This maxim was an attempt to refute Kant’s claim in CPR that the human mind cannot know “things in themselves.” Kant responded to Mendelssohn in the introduction he wrote for L.H. Jakob's Examination of the Mendelssohnian Morning Hours. In this introduction, Kant criticized the above maxim and defended the view that the human mind cannot know "things in themselves." At that point, Mendelssohn was already deceased and could not respond to Kant's response. (I realize I use a secondary source, but Kant: A Biography is a serious book published by Cambridge University Press.)

[Stephen Speicher 0]

According to Kant: A Biography (pp 308-309) Mendelssohn criticized Kant in a book called Morning Hours which was not translated to English.

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Okay. But, do you agree from the context that the "world-crushing" remark was specifically directed towards Kant's arguments against the traditional proofs for the existence of God?

[Guest Michelle F. Cohen]

Okay. But, do you agree from the context that the "world-crushing" remark was specifically directed towards Kant's arguments against the traditional proofs for the existence of God?

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Only from the context described in the Cambridge Compannion to Kant. According to Kant: A Biography, the comment was said in the context of reading Kant's Critique, which covers a lot more than arguments against the traditional proofs for the existence of God. Here is the quote from my post on Jan 17.

When the Critique first appeared, Kant expected not only that he would be understood, but also that other scholars would rally to support his project. He was eager to hear Mendelssohn's judgment about it. When he heard from Herz [a mutual friend] that Mendelssohn had put the book away and was not going to get back to it, he was 'very uncomfortable,' hoping it would 'not be forever.' Mendelssohn was, he thought, 'the most important of all the people who could explain this theory to the world.'...

In the same vein he wrote to Mendelssohn 'to encourage an examination of [his] theses,' because in this way, 'the critical philosophy would gain acceptability and become a promenade through a labyrinth, but with a reliable guide book to help us find our way out as often as we get lost...

Mendelssohn himself claimed that a nervous disability had made it impossible for him to analyze and think through the work of 'the all-crushing Kant.’

Kant knew that Mendelssohn upheld the traditional proofs for the existence of God. Why, then, did he expect Mendelssohn to support the Critique? Why was he surprised and concerned that Mendelssohn did not support it? Unless there was something else in the Critique which Mendelssohn disapproved of.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

Okay. But, do you agree from the context that the "world-crushing" remark was specifically directed towards Kant's arguments against the traditional proofs for the existence of God?

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Only from the context described in the Cambridge Compannion to Kant. According to Kant: A Biography, the comment was said in the context of reading Kant's Critique, which covers a lot more than arguments against the traditional proofs for the existence of God. Here is the quote from my post on Jan 17....

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With all due respect, you seem to have a very speculative interpretation of both Kuehn's remarks and of Kant's concern about Mendelssohn. I see nothing in Kuehn's words to support this interpretation, and Kant's concern (beyond God) goes against what I know of Mendelssohn's embrace of many aspects of Kant's philosophy. But, anyway, I think we are now just going in circles, so feel free to have the last word, if you like.

[Guest Michelle F. Cohen]

With all due respect, you seem to have a very speculative interpretation of both Kuehn's remarks and of Kant's concern about Mendelssohn. I see nothing in Kuehn's words to support this interpretation, and Kant's concern (beyond God) goes against what I know of Mendelssohn's embrace of many aspects of Kant's philosophy. But, anyway, I think we are now just going in circles, so feel free to have the last word, if you like.

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My interpretation is also based on other parts in Kant: A Biography. Kuhn is quoting from the correspondence between Kant and Mendelssohn, and indicates that Mendelssohn was critical of Kant's frivolous attitude toward metaphysics, and that Kant was concerned about Mendelssohn's criticism. Kuhn is also quoting from Kant's introduction to L.H. Jakob's Examination of the Mendelssohnian Morning Hours, where Kant goes out of his way to defend his views against Mendelssohn's criticism.

The difference between their views of belief in God, as I understand it, was that Mendelssohn thought it was possible to reconcile reason and religious belief, whereas Kant thought it was not possible, ergo reason is limited, and religious belief should be upheld beyond reason. I can conede that Mendelssohn's criticism stems from Kant's "crushing" of the traditional attempt to reconcile reason and faith, but this is not a minor issue, and certainly was not a minor issue for Mendelssohn.

[Guest Michelle F. Cohen]

Would you go around arresting anyone who agreed with Hitler's ideas and publicly espoused them since they are so evil?  There are many laws in Germany that do restrict public expression of those ideas.  Should we implement them in the US also?

People are not arrested for being evil or immoral, but for violating the rights of other individuals.

[Guest Michelle F. Cohen]

To clarify how Moses Mendelssohn relates to the topic of this thread: Mendelssohn was a contemporary of Kant who observed that some of Kant's ideas were not just true or false but "world crushing." Whether Mendelssohn agreed with Kant or not, he was aware of the power of ideas.