Binswanger's Spherical Universe

[dondigitalia 0]

But at-rest with respect to what?

With respect to other entities. The whole reason I included the note at the end was to make sure it was understood that I wasn't regarding space as "laid out on graph paper," but rather that I was talking about it as a particular kind of relationship between entities.

[Paul's Here 0]

With respect to other entities. The whole reason I included the note at the end was to make sure it was understood that I wasn't regarding space as "laid out on graph paper," but rather that I was talking about it as a particular kind of relationship between entities.

←

That is what "at rest" means: the position of two entities does not change relative to one another. "Fixed" does not mean "at rest with respect to other objects, it means unmoving. On a graph paper, one can "fix" an object and plot positions of other objects relative to the "fixed" point or origin. There is no way to fix a position or origin in space since there is no universal coordinate system.

When talking about the solar system, the sun is "fixed" and measurements of the orbits of planets around the sun can be made. But the sun is not fixed in space and the planets are not moving in orbits.

[dondigitalia 0]

That is what "at rest" means: the position of two entities does not change relative to one another.

←

I'm not sure if you were arguing with me, because that was the point of the post you quoted.

The only reason I chose the word "fixed" in the first place was because it was the same word Stephen used in post #15. I certainly didn't mean to indicate that anything was actually literally fixed on some cosmic coordinate system (hence the scare quotes), and I really doubt Stephen did either (hence his scare quotes).

[ELS 0]

Stephen Speicher,Feb 19 2006, 02:06 AM]

Perhaps, but more relevant to the question "Are all the entities in the universe a quantity?", I think the principles that Alex identifies (and chews) in his essay are more fundamental and certainly sufficient to answer the question.

"Perhaps" what, Stephen?

Best if I go to Harry's points and try and answer them.

Harry's responses to Alex indicate what might be problems in his (Alex's) formulations, but I'm not sure some of HB's points are accurate.

Which is not to say that Alex is completely correct either.

ELS

[Stephen Speicher 0]

Stephen's (and HB's) observations are key to understanding the epistemological nature of the problem of scale in the reference points of a constantly changing universe.

←

Perhaps, but more relevant to the question "Are all the entities in the universe a quantity?", I think the principles that Alex identifies (and chews) in his essay are more fundamental and certainly sufficient to answer the question.

←

"Perhaps" what, Stephen?

Perhaps [what you said is correct], but more relevant to the question ...

Best if I go to Harry's points and try and answer them.

Okay.

Harry's responses to Alex indicate what might be problems in his (Alex's) formulations,

I do not see any problems in Alex's formulations.

but I'm not sure some of HB's points are accurate.

Then you need to decide.

Which is not to say that Alex is completely correct either.

At some point you are going to fall off that fence.

[ELS 0]

Date: Sat, 07 Sep 2002 01:05:38 -0400

From: Harry Binswanger <hblist@hblist.com>

...I also agree with his [Alex's] parallel between time and space--the universe is not

in time or in space, and just as it is wrong to say "an infinite time has

passed before now" so it is wrong to say "an infinite number of entities

exist extending out from here." (And, by the same token, it is wrong to say

that time or distance is finite.)

That last sentence is totally wrong. ALL times and distances MUST be finite, in the sense of being "definite", i.e., specific, or they can not exist. There is no way to measure "the sum of all that exists". Because any measurements (of any kind) made are on a human epistemological scale, which cannot, given "the crow", encompass all of an existence which is changing on whatever many scales from the perceptual level there are.

I think Ayn Rand recognized this in saying in her early views: "...this kind of view merely means: rationalizing from an arrested state of knowledge." And referring to "men who 'rationalized' on the ground of taking partial knowledge as omniscience." (see Paul's Here post on AR's early views)

Since her view of "the Universe" - All that exists - was close to her concept of "existence - and she never elaborated further - we're left to infer any differences or similarities based on her metaphysics and her earlier views.

...He [Alex] writes:

"If everything that exists must be finite, then *everything that exists*

(i.e., existence) *must be finite*."

That could be read as committing the fallacy of composition. It does not

follow from the finiteness of each thing that the totality of all things

must be finite. But I think his argument is actually: If to exist is to be

finite, then since the universe exists, it must be finite.

I believe Harry is correct here, and it is what Ayn Rand is referring to in her Journal entry.

A conclusion drawn about the whole ("all that which exists") based on the attributes of its constituents (such as "extension", "size", "length", "boundary") may or may not be fallacious. But this requires clearly differentiating the metaphysical aspects of physical existents which would apply to the whole of existence - to be certain the fallacy is not being committed.

In holding that the universe must be "finite", because everything that exists is "finite, the problem is epistemological, not metaphysical. It involves the concept of correlatives: "finite" versus "infinite" or "non-finite", and "definite" versus "indefinite" or "non-definite". These concepts are like existence and non-existence: the latter only exist in relation to the former. As concepts - not as existents.

This would mean that physical concepts are not applicable because the concept "universe" cannot be conceptualized using any particular physical attributes of existents (e.g., "extension", "size", "length", "boundary") nor to any relationships among existents (e.g., "Time" or "Space"); nor to any actions of existents (e.g., "change").

Harry then analyzes Alex's "stealing the concept of 'number'", and says:

"... I don't follow his argument about the relation of number to quantity as being

relevant here. My point would be: there is no such thing as "the entire

history of the universe." And the parallel for number would be: there is no

such thing as "the entire extent of the universe."

I agree; the concept of "extent" is physical, not metaphysical.

Why not?

For one thing, since the universe is not "in time," it is at least very

unclear that there is one "now" for the whole universe. Ayn Rand held that

time was "local"--i.e., a single time does not apply to the whole universe.

...If there is no one "now" for the whole universe, how do we talk about the

number of things in the universe?

In other words, the universe as a metaphysically unchanging existence, of physically changing existents.

...I hold that it is an error to even in imagination survey the entire

universe, considering it a collection existing at one moment, as if one

were outside of it looking at it...

Exactly. And that eliminates all physical concepts as applying to "the Universe" per se.

Ayn Rand's early journal entry on this shows she was getting clear about the differences between physical and metaphysical concepts.

The physical concept of the universe comes from our application of concepts of physical attributes to that which is metaphysical, to existence per se. But the concept "universe" is metaphysical, not to be confused with any physical concepts.

An error Ayn Rand warned us about.

Edward Lewis Scheiderer (els)

[Stephen Speicher 0]

Date: Sat, 07 Sep 2002 01:05:38 -0400

From: Harry Binswanger <hblist@hblist.com>

...I also agree with his [Alex's] parallel between time and space--the universe is not

in time or in space, and just as it is wrong to say "an infinite time has

passed before now" so it is wrong to say "an infinite number of entities

exist extending out from here." (And, by the same token, it is wrong to say

that time or distance is finite.)

That last sentence is totally wrong. ALL times and distances MUST be finite, in the sense of being "definite", i.e., specific, or they can not exist.

I think you may be misinterpreting HB's last parenthetical comment about time and distance. I take him to mean that it is wrong to claim as finite the time the universe has existed, or its size.

...He [Alex] writes:

"If everything that exists must be finite, then *everything that exists*

(i.e., existence) *must be finite*."

That could be read as committing the fallacy of composition. It does not

follow from the finiteness of each thing that the totality of all things

must be finite. But I think his argument is actually: If to exist is to be

finite, then since the universe exists, it must be finite.

I believe Harry is correct here, and it is what Ayn Rand is referring to in her Journal entry.

A conclusion drawn about the whole ("all that which exists") based on the attributes of its constituents (such as "extension", "size", "length", "boundary") may or may not be fallacious. But this requires clearly differentiating the metaphysical aspects of physical existents which would apply to the whole of existence - to be certain the fallacy is not being committed.

In holding that the universe must be "finite", because everything that exists is "finite, the problem is epistemological, not metaphysical. It involves the concept of correlatives: "finite" versus "infinite" or "non-finite", and "definite" versus "indefinite" or "non-definite". These concepts are like existence and non-existence: the latter only exist in relation to the former. As concepts - not as existents.

I don't follow this reasoning. Clearly "identity" is metaphysical, yet in ITOE Ayn Rand says just as clearly that the universe possesses identity ("but we can say: since everything possesses identity, the universe possesses identity." p. 273).

the concept of "extent" is physical, not metaphysical.

I'm sorry, but this statement makes no sense to me. Using this later on in the post as an argument, is not valid.

[ELS 0]

(Stephen Speicher @ Feb 25 2006, 01:03 AM)

I think you may be misinterpreting HB's last parenthetical comment about time and distance. I take him to mean that it is wrong to claim as finite the time the universe has existed, or its size.

I don't see how that last comment fits logically with the rest. Harry seems to be emphasizing a contrast between the infinite and the finite in time and distance and stating that they cannot be conceived as finite. Perhaps I'm wrong; perhaps it's too vague a formulation of what he wanted to say. But I have to go by what he said, not what he might have wanted to say more accurately.

I don't follow this reasoning. Clearly "identity" is metaphysical, yet in ITOE Ayn Rand says just as clearly that the universe possesses identity ("but we can say: since everything possesses identity, the universe possesses identity." p. 273).

I'm sorry, but this statement makes no sense to me. Using this later on in the post as an argument, is not valid.

My argument is not about identity. It's about the application of physical concepts in a metaphysical context. It's about trying to apply concepts formed about existents, primarily concepts about attributes of physical entities, to the metaphysically fundamental. When Ayn Rand says that her concept of the universe is close to her concept of existence (all that exists), you have to integrate that with her earlier views about the difference between metaphysical and physical concepts. When you do that, you recognize that the concept "universe", while it obviously encompasses all the concepts pertaining to physical entities which we are aware of, it also must - being "all of existence" - integrate that of which we are not aware yet - and may or may not ever be aware. The glory of the axiomatic concepts

of Objectivism is that even if one can't know the nature of "all of existence" physically, one can know that nature metaphysically. Whatever exists as "all of existence" must have an identity, as you quote.

My only point is that beyond that you need to be extremely careful not to commit the fallacy of composition by applying physical concepts which are the epistemological grasp of that part of the universe we are aware of to all of existence. We can't logically extend our knowledge of the universe beyond the level of our knowledge of what we know of the universe. And since we aren't aware of all that exists, all we can know about the universe is the metaphysically fundamental about it. That Existence - the Universe - exists - and that it has identity. Since everything which is The Universe has identity, the sum must also have identity. In other words,the fallacy of composition cannot apply to metaphysical fundamentals; the axioms apply to "part" and "whole" without exception.

If anyone can show me how to logically apply concepts pertaining to physical entities to all that exists, without knowledge of all that exists - and without committing the fallacy of composition - I'm more than willing to learn.

Until then, any discussions of physical concepts such as "time", "distance", "size", "boundary", etc. as concepts pertaining to the universe are, I believe, invalid.

Ed Scheiderer (els)