Relationship between moral and practical

[Free Capitalist 0]

What's the contradiction?

[Capitalism Forever 0]

What's the contradiction?

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In your diagram, the band for "moral" has an overlap with the band for "impractical." This means--at least the way I have interpreted these diagrams--that there can be actions that are morally OK but impractical at the same time. If acting impractically can be morally OK, then you don't need to act practically if you want to qualify as a moral person.

In your later post, you advocated that it "be necessary to live successful lives in order to live up to a good moral standard." If I understand you correctly there, that means that acting impractically is NOT morally OK; that you only qualify as moral if you act practically. The kind of people Betsy talked about qualify as amoral at best; they do not get to call themselves moral.

It is the latter view that I agree with and that is what I seek to express in my diagram.

[Sarah Beth 0]

No NEW POST button appears at the bottom of the page I am seeing. There is an ADD REPLY button. Is that what you mean?

Are you looking at the thread's main page, or at the page where you can enter a reply? The button I am talking about is on the thread page, in the row with the four buttons, "FST REPLY" "NEW POST" "OPTIONS" "NEW TOPIC." (The buttons may have different labels in different skins, though; on the OO Forum, for example, they are "FAST REPLY" "ADD REPLY" "OPTIONS" "NEW TOPIC.")

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It's different depending on what skin you have up on this site. Fluid or aesthetic I think are the choices. Anyway, New Post and Add Reply are the same function.

Thanks for the tip CF.

[Sarah Beth 0]

What the phrase "the moral is always the practical" tells us is that this is not a mere coincidence, but an absolute law of reality that applies not only to the choice of political systems, but to EVERY choice.

It's simpler than that. Until you have determined whether or not they are practical, you cannot say whether or not they are moral; they are not "moral" but "waiting to be evaluated." In fact, determining their morality and their practicality is the same process: The question you have to ask is, "Does this choice serve my rational, long term self-interest?"

Sure. Every choice is contextual.

Because every choice is contextual.

(The principles of morality aren't in a flux, of course, only the specifics of how you apply them are.)

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This was either the best answer or I just finally unwound my head enough to grasp it It's funny how I feel like I already knew that the whole time, but got confused over all the diagrams, and also the placement of the choice.

If acting impractically can be morally OK, then you don't need to act practically if you want to qualify as a moral person.

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Right, which can't be moral because it's an impractical means to obtain morality

Well the issues settled for me. Thanks CF.

[Capitalism Forever 0]

It's funny how I feel like I already knew that the whole time

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That's a feeling I often get when reading Objectivist literature. It's nice to see your unexpressed ideas spelled out in clear and simple language.

Well the issues settled for me. Thanks CF.

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Glad I could help!

[Free Capitalist 0]

If acting impractically can be morally OK, then you don't need to act practically if you want to qualify as a moral person.

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There's a small but important error in this: practicality does not have primacy over morality. Whether you do practical or impractical things has no bearing at all on morality, because morality comes first, based on human nature. Practicality is built on top of it. So a literal understanding of your quote above will be wrong because moral evaluation cannot begin from practical evaluation. It's the other way around.

However, what I think you were trying to accuse me of was to say that I claim that a person can qualify as a moral person and still be inadequate and unsuccessful. If so, then you're absolutely right, and I do claim that. And I still don't see any contradiction.

In your later post, you advocated that it "be necessary to live successful lives in order to live up to a good moral standard."

Where?

The kind of people Betsy talked about qualify as amoral at best; they do not get to call themselves moral.

So what you're saying is that, although these people hang out with Objectivist crowds, and are friends with oldtime Objectivists who recognize them as fullblown Objectivists too, that these people who can probably lecture you and me on fine points of Ayn Rand's philosophy, they are somehow amoral?!

And what does "amoral" mean in this context, anyway?

[Capitalism Forever 0]

Where?

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So what you're saying is that, although these people hang out with Objectivist crowds, and are friends with oldtime Objectivists who recognize them as fullblown Objectivists too, that these people who can probably lecture you and me on fine points of Ayn Rand's philosophy, they are somehow amoral?!

If they have been talking about virtues but not practicing them, then yes, they have not been moral in that respect. Integrity is a part of the Objectivist ethics, after all. (And even if it weren't, ...)

And what does "amoral" mean in this context, anyway?

"Not moral."

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I think I am beginning to understand where you come from. We have both been telling people to act practically, but we've been expressing it differently.

You: "Morality tells you this-and-that, but don't just be moral, be practical too."

I: "Morality tells you to practice these and these virtues. You can only claim to be a moral person if you have been practicing these virtues."

[Free Capitalist 0]

CF,

So what you're saying is that, although these people hang out with Objectivist crowds, and are friends with oldtime Objectivists who recognize them as fullblown Objectivists too, that these people who can probably lecture you and me on fine points of Ayn Rand's philosophy, they are somehow amoral?!

If they have been talking about virtues but not practicing them, then yes, they have not been moral in that respect.

Then your understanding of morality is different, in that respect, from the aforementioned people who called such a person fully moral.

And what does "amoral" mean in this context, anyway?

"Not moral."

That's not an answer. Then what is the difference between "amoral" and "immoral"? Properly defined, "moral" and "immoral" are the two exclusive alternatives in ethical evaluation. "Amoral" refers to actions that do not belong within the moral sphere at all, such as a North Korean scientist who is forced at gunpoint to build the nuclear bombs for the government. His action is amoral, because no moral evaluation is possible for targets of initiation of force. Another amoral kind of action is when you breathe in and breathe out. Your body does it, but you don't really tell it to, nor does it operate according to your values. You can usurp volitional control over breathing and then moral evaluation would apply, but that would be an exception; breathing in the usual meaning of the world would not properly qualify for moral judgment.

In essence then, as I said, "amoral" is a word used to describe things that do not fall within the moral sphere. This is why your definition of the word, "not moral", is inadequate -- the definition could be used to mean both something that isn't open for moral evaluation, and something that is open but and is deemed immoral. Both such interpretations are possible with your definition, whereas it is precisely between these two meanings that I am asking you to distinguish. Those people Betsy mentioned, why not just come out and clearly call them immoral, in open disagreement both with Betsy's evaluation, and those of other Objectivists?

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I too am beginning to see where you're coming from, and I will have to ponder abit about how to properly put my thoughts into words. It is in this future reply that I will address your quote of me. You're not seeing what I was trying to say there, and that's what I will have to try to formulate.

[Capitalism Forever 0]

This is why your definition of the word, "not moral", is inadequate -- the definition could be used to mean both something that isn't open for moral evaluation, and something that is open but and is deemed immoral. Both such interpretations are possible with your definition, whereas it is precisely between these two meanings that I am asking you to distinguish.

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OK, that's fair enough. What I actually meant by it is neither; I meant that they are open for moral evaluation, but do not tilt the scale in either direction. They may have some virtues, but these are offset by the vice they have (lack of integrity).

[Andrew Sternberg 0]

Stephen,

I am not sure just how you are using "practicality" here. Could you please take a particular instance -- a value and an action -- and connect that to the moral and practical as you mention them above.

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I am using practicality to mean action that is successful in achieving your goal.  If you have a particular end in mind, the practical is the means to achieve it.

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This is part of the reason I asked for a concrete relating action and value. If the "practical" is that action which enables you to achieve your goal, then to some extent action can be divorced from morality. You may work hard for a promotion in your business, but by sleeping with the boss is not a moral option. The action may achieve your goal, but it disconnects from a proper morality. I think something more must be specified for "practicality," and I doubt that it can be done unless there are long-range considerations.

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As for the issue of action being divorced from morality, my follow-post addressed this:

I think the context of this discussion, since we are all Objectivists, implies that "what one wishes to practice" is their life and the corresponding values that support it.

The loosest meaning of "practical" is "the means that are succesful in achieving a given end".

But we are restricting this meaning since we are arn't talking about any end, we are talking about one's life as the ultimate end.  A slightly less restricted meaning when we talk about particular values being the end refered to by "practical" (keeping in mind that these are simultaneously lesser ends that contribute to the ultimate end).

When you choose life as the end, the nature of existence and the nature of man, gives rise to the Objectivist moral code as the means.  But a study of the nature of existence and of man will not give you a list of particular values that you must choose to pursue: there are options. 

It is a combination of these options, which morality can't choose, and the specific facts of one's fluxuating surroundings, which morality can't predict, that gives rise to the concept 'practical'.

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So to be clear, I am not using "practical" to mean "whatever works in achieving whatever end" (which is a valid use in a non-delimited context), but rather what works in achiving the particular values in ones life validated by one's life as the standard.

[Andrew Sternberg 0]

CF, you said this at the end of an earlier post:

...

(The principles of morality aren't in a flux, of course, only the specifics of how you apply them are.)

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I have been trying to say that "the specifics of how you apply them [moral principles]" IS what the sphere of practicality refers to.

This tells me that you DO acknowledge that their is additional thinking to be done after one has moral principles, but what I don't understand is why you don't want to use "practicality" to capture this concept.

I suspect it has something to do with the fact that in one important aspect, morality alone DOES take the above into consideration, which would cause you to view practicality as a superfluous concept; because morality includes the virtue of rationality, which includes the advice of "figure out what works and do it", i.e. "be practical". But the concept is NOT superfluous because what works depends on the combination of Objectivist moral principles with one’s specific values and surrounding context, and both of these latter are in flux (I assume you agree with this sentence because if you didn’t, then why would you include the second clause in your sentence that I quoted at the beginning of this post?).

So, is my suspicion correct?

[Free Capitalist 0]

CF, moral evaluation does not depend on how much someone "tilts" the scales in one direction or the other. It depends on adherence to our nature qua rational animals. Every action and every man can be morally evaluated in one direction or another, based on that standard; if the people Betsy mentioned do not violate moral rules, then they should be considered moral, in agreement with her evaluation of them.

I didn't think you would have such a serious disagreement on the nature of morality, so at this point all I can do is to point to VoS and relevant chapters in OPAR. They don't explicitly address our current predicament here, but they do explain the nature of proper morality, and thus serve as the foundation for continuing to debate this.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

So to be clear, I am not using "practical" to mean "whatever works in achieving whatever end" (which is a valid use in a non-delimited context), but rather what works in achiving the particular values in ones life validated by one's life as the standard.

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I was mainly trying to lead you towards the notion that when considering a practical issue in a moral context it is the long-range implications and values that must be considered, not solely the satisfaction, even for good moral reasons, of the immediate goal.

[Andrew Sternberg 0]

I just thought of something, and it is more a response to the topic of the thread, than to any individual poster in this thread.

Is the moral practical? Yes. Why? Because moral principles are a necessary condition for fulfilling rational values.

Is the practical moral? Yes. Why? Because practicality is implied by the moral virtue of rationality.

Is the immoral practical? No. Why? Because you are acting in contradiction to proven moral principles, shown to conform to reality. By acting in contradiction to these moral principles, you are acting in contradiction to reality, which will only prove successful when reality isn't looking, which is never.

Is the impractical moral? Sometimes*. Why? If the root of the impractical action is an HONEST error (made prior to undertaking the action**).

Is the impractical immoral? Most of the time*. Why? If the root of the impractical action is an error by EVASION (made prior to undertaking the action**).

*I agree with Peikoff that honest errors are less frequent than error by evasion than people often acknowledge. Thus impractical actions undertaken by honest error happen some of the time, whereas impractical actions undertaken by errors of evasion happen most of the time.

**I say “prior” because if you wait until after the action fails, you KNOW that it was impractical, and this fosters an omniscient standard for the practical/impractical distinction.

[Andrew Sternberg 0]

I was mainly trying to lead you towards the notion that when considering a practical issue in a moral context it is the long-range implications and values that must be considered, not solely the satisfaction, even for good moral reasons, of the immediate goal.

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If your immediate goals are to be legitimate values, they must be validated by your life as the standard, which implies that your life is considered long-term. So, I thought that I was covering "the long-term considerations" when I said: "validated by one's life as the standard", since that validation cannot be accomplished without those long-term considrations.

By the way, what does the "satisfaction of an immediate goal", even "for good moral reasons" mean when it is deemed so, irrespective of the long-term implications

Did you misspeak, or are you keeping secrets from me?

[Andrew Sternberg 0]

Is the moral practical?  Yes.  Why?  Because moral principles are a necessary condition for fulfilling rational values.

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I would like to amend my own statement here. Just because the moral is a necessary condition for successful fulfillment of rational values, this does not guarantee that acting morally will guarantee success. This is true because of our non-omniscient status; we can still make honest errors.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

I was mainly trying to lead you towards the notion that when considering a practical issue in a moral context it is the long-range implications and values that must be considered, not solely the satisfaction, even for good moral reasons, of the immediate goal.

By the way, what does the "satisfaction of an immediate goal", even "for good moral reasons" mean when it is deemed so, irrespective of the long-term implications

Did you misspeak, or are you keeping secrets from me?

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First, please do not quote me with words I did not say. Quoting is not for what one approximately said, but for what one actually said. If for clarity you need to modify something, the proper way to do so is to acknowledge that a modification was done. So, it is not proper to take the words "not solely the satisfaction, even for good moral reasons, of the immediate goal" and transform them into "satisfaction of an immediate goal" since what the quotations marks surround is not what was said. A better way to accomplish what you wanted to do, would be "satisfaction ... [of] ... [an] immediate goal." That acknowledges that some words were deleted from, and others added to, what I actually said.

I think I know you well-enough to realize that you meant no harm in what you did, but nevertheless quoted words should be taken very seriously.

As to what I meant, I am not sure what you are asking, but the context of my words was meant to highlight to you the importance of long-range implications and values when talking about moral action in satisfying an immediate goal.

[Andrew Sternberg 0]

I think I know you well-enough to realize that you meant no harm in what you did, but nevertheless quoted words should be taken very seriously.

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I agree, and in this case I should have just dropped the quotes all together. If I was trying to maliciously twist your words, I wouldn't be doing a very good job at it--since the exact quote appears right above it in the same post.

As to what I meant, I am not sure what you are asking, but the context of my words was meant to highlight to you the importance of long-range implications and values when talking about moral action in satisfying an immediate goal.

And I was trying to make clear that I already know this. Given everything that I have said in this thread, what made you think that I didn't already know this?

I was mainly trying to lead you towards the notion that when considering a practical issue in a moral context it is the long-range implications and values that must be considered, not solely the satisfaction, even for good moral reasons, of the immediate goal.

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The latter part of your statement here still confuses me. You seem to be saying that there are 2 ways of considering practical issues in a moral context: 1) you can take into account long-range implications and long-range values, or 2) you can NOT take these into account. And your saying that the first approach is proper and the second isn't. So far I am in complete agreement.

What I don't understand is the "even for good moral reasons" part applied to the second approach. As I understand it, there is NEVER a good moral reason for NOT taking long-range implications and values into account, but you seem to be saying otherwise.

[Bill Bucko 0]

Understanding the relationship between the moral and the practical is a life-and-death issue, philosophically.

[Disclaimer: I have not read every word in this thread, I've only skimmed through it. But what I have to say seems to come at the issue from a different angle than has been made explicit before.]

Around 1970, I knew a person who was interested in Objectivism but had major flaws in his thinking. So major, that he enthusiastically joined the then-new fad of endorsing anarchism rather than limited government.

I remember a striking phrase by him, in the [mis-named] Reason magazine: "The moral determines the practical, not vice versa." He argued that for a pre-existing government to initiate force against someone who was starting up a competing "defense agency" i.e. government, was immoral [notice that he held a valid Objectivist principle, but applied it grossly out of context]. Since Ayn Rand had proved that the moral and the practical were the same, he then concluded: having competing governments was practical.

Practical how? Blank-out. [He arrived at his position rationalistically, totally unconcerned with checking it against actual facts.]

Miss Rand's approach, by contrast, was strikingly different.

According to one source, the first time someone approached her with the idea that there should be "competing governments" in the same geographical area, Miss Rand immediately tied the issue to reality:

"Like in a civil war?" she asked. (Remember she lived--just barely--through the Russian Civil War.)

According to Objectivism, morality should serve life. If something is moral, it is also practical.

But which come first?

We first discover what life requires, by induction. We observe, in each area, how we need values in order to live--and we grasp that we can't pursue those values successfully in the middle of a civil war.

Miss Rand formed her moral philosophy, on the basis of what made human life possible. This means that what's practical (for living) determines what's moral. If it makes life possible, it's good. Good means good for life.

The moral and the practical are co-terminous. They overlap perfectly. They have the same scope and extent.

But contrary to what that jerk of an anarchist was proposing, the practical determines the moral, not vice versa.

* * *

In the above discussion, I've been using "practical" in the widest, most philosophical sense. I do NOT mean to disagree with Betsy, when she says some things can be morally permitted, but not very practical (which is pretty obviously true). I think we must be using the term in two different, though related, senses-- as I see some of the posts have touched upon.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

In concrete situations, there are many "white" options and it is practical and proper to pursue ANY of them. [...] There is no need to obsess over picking "the best" option.  Picking one of the good options is just fine.

Sure; when all the good options look just about equally good on the face of them, there is no point in ruminating about which one is a tiny little bit better than the rest. Investing a lot of time to gain a tiny little bit of an advantage is irrational (and therefore immoral and impractical). The rational (and therefore moral and practical) thing to do is to pick one at random.

But when you already know that one option is pretty good but the other is absolutely GREAT, then it is a vice to deliberately forgo the great for the just-good.

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A vice??

This strikes me as holding "The Moral" as some kind of Platonic ideal and as "a scarecrow standing in a barren field, waving a stick to chase away your pleasures." I see absolutely nothing wrong with choosing a good option, if that is what one wants, even if a great one is available.

Here's an example of what I mean. A former close associate of Ayn Rand (who later disavowed just about everything Ayn Rand ever stood for) accused Miss Rand of being a traitor to her professed ideals because she would waste hours with her stamp collection when she should have been writing books, making public appearances, and promoting Objectivism. Does what Ayn Rand did strike you as a "vice?" If not, why not?

In another post, you wrote:

If acting impractically can be morally OK, then you don't need to act practically if you want to qualify as a moral person.

[...]

The kind of people Betsy talked about qualify as amoral at best; they do not get to call themselves moral.

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What is this wanting to "qualify as a moral person" and "they do not get to call themselves moral?" This makes it sound as if qualifying as moral is the goal, and the values we seek and the actions we take are the means to that goal. Isn't that backwards?

The goal of life is not to be moral. The goal of morality is to enjoy life.

[Andrew Sternberg 0]

A vice??

This strikes me as holding "The Moral" as some kind of Platonic ideal and as "a scarecrow standing in a barren field, waving a stick to chase away your pleasures."  I see absolutely nothing wrong with choosing a good option, if that is what one wants, even if a great one is available.

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Yes, I would certainly call this a vice too. Opting for a good value rather than a great one is trading a value for a lesser or non-value, which is a vice.

Here's an example of what I mean.  A former close associate of Ayn Rand (who later disavowed just about everything Ayn Rand ever stood for)  accused Miss Rand of being a traitor to her professed ideals because she would waste hours with her stamp collection when she should have been writing books, making public appearances, and promoting Objectivism.  Does what Ayn Rand did strike you as a "vice?"  If not, why not?

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No it does not.

Your example uses the associate's judgment of what a great value to Ayn Rand is. But he doesn't get to choose values for other people or their relative importance. Only Ayn Rand gets to choose her own values, and in this case she valued dedicating a small percentage of her time to her stamp collection, rather than to promoting Objectivism.

I think you have said before, and I have agreed, that one's value hierarchy is in flux, and that this is one of the reason's why practicality is an issue at all.

For example, while food is a value to me, it is not fixed relative to all my other values. If I just ate, its relative value is demoted. If I haven’t eaten all day, it moves up again. If I am stranded on a desert Island and have not eaten for 2 weeks, it would be quite near the top.

Because of these fluctuating values, you have to constantly adjust your hierarchy to fit the surrounding facts (such as a grumbling stomach). Ayn Rand's stamp collection hobby probably followed the same pattern.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

The latter part of your statement here still confuses me.  You seem to be saying that there are 2 ways of considering practical issues in a moral context: 1) you can take into account long-range implications and long-range values, or 2) you can NOT take these into account.  And your saying that the first approach is proper and the second isn't.  So far I am in complete agreement.

What I don't understand is the "even for good moral reasons" part applied to the second approach.  As I understand it, there is NEVER a good moral reason for NOT taking long-range implications and values into account, but you seem to be saying otherwise.

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Andrew, you seem to thinking only of a person who chooses not to consider the long-term implications of his actions. But, people are not omniscient, and a person might not take into consideration the actual long-term implications of his actions simply because he does not have the knowledge to make the necessary connections. Or, he may do so but be in error of judgment and thereby reach the wrong conclusion. In either of these cases the person's action would be taken "for good moral reasons" though, in fact, for lack of knowledge or error in judgment, the long-term implications of his actions were not actually taken into account.

Got it now?

[Betsy Speicher 0]

A former close associate of Ayn Rand (who later disavowed just about everything Ayn Rand ever stood for)  accused Miss Rand of being a traitor to her professed ideals because she would waste hours with her stamp collection when she should have been writing books, making public appearances, and promoting Objectivism.  Does what Ayn Rand did strike you as a "vice?"  If not, why not?

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Your example uses the associate's judgment of what a great value to Ayn Rand is.  But he doesn't get to choose values for other people or their relative importance.  Only Ayn Rand gets to choose her own values, and in this case she valued dedicating a small percentage of her time to her stamp collection, rather than to promoting Objectivism. 

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In fact, she spent many, many hours in her last years with her stamp collection,. She also played Scrabble with Harry Binswanger, entertained friends, and watched TV. She stopped writing The Ayn Rand Letter in 1976 and turned down dozens of invitations for speeches and public appearances limiting them to 2-3 a year. She was, for the most part, retired from Objectivism, yet still in reasonably good health. This bugged the former associate no end.

My own reaction is: Good for Ayn Rand! She was a woman who knew the meaning of morality, knew how to value, and, above all, knew the value of her own life.

[Andrew Sternberg 0]

But, people are not omniscient, and a person might not take into consideration the actual long-term implications of his actions simply because he does not have the knowledge to make the necessary connections. Or, he may do so but be in error of judgment and thereby reach the wrong conclusion. In either of these cases the person's action would be taken "for good moral reasons" though, in fact, for lack of knowledge or error in judgment, the long-term implications of his actions were not actually taken into account.

Got it now?

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Yes, and I agree completely. But let me defend myself with regard to the following:

Andrew, you seem to thinking only of a person who chooses not to consider the long-term implications of his actions.

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Yes, I am thinking only of a person who chooses not to, but isn't this what your statement was originally saying? Here is what you wrote:

I was mainly trying to lead you towards the notion that when considering a practical issue in a moral context it is the long-range implications and values that must be considered, not solely the satisfaction, even for good moral reasons, of the immediate goal.

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When you said, “must be considered”, you do not mean to imply some duty. So, I translated this to mean, “should be considered, if successful action is the goal”. So, your statement is talking about what one should or should not consider. But should implies choice. Therefore, it was your original statement that was limiting this particular facet of the discussion down to “only of a person who chooses not to consider the long-term implications of his actions.”

You have made clear what you actually believe, I have made clear what I believe, and we are in agreement. This facet of the discussion has probably gone further than it should have, so since we are in agreement, lets move on. Agreed?

[Capitalism Forever 0]

This tells me that you DO acknowledge that their is additional thinking to be done after one has moral principles

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LOL Sure, especially because the moral principles tell you to do just that. I am certainly not advocating that you read OPAR up till Chapter 8 and then sit back and wait for good things to happen to you!

Quite on the contrary, I have been saying that "being moral" includes doing the "additional thinking." Until you have done all the thinking required for your life qua man and acted on your thoughts, you cannot claim moral accomplishment.

but what I don't understand is why you don't want to use "practicality" to capture this concept.

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Where did I say anything to this effect? I don't have a strong opinion on this one way or the other. If the title of this thread were, "Drawing the line between the theory of morality and the field of practicality," I probably wouldn't even have clicked on it, due to a lack of interest. Obviously, there is an objective way to delineate the fields ("disciplines," "spheres," etc.) of thought, and I find it unfortunate when people use the various labels incorrectly, but that is not something I would get particularly agitated about.

In the statement "The moral is the practical," "the moral" and "the practical" refer to actions. "A moral action is always practical and a practical action is always moral." To clarify even further: "A morally good action always practically good, and a practically good action is always morally good." It is not about "understanding moral principles" vs. "using one's 'practical faculty'" ; it is about "morally good" vs. "practically good" (where the "vs." actually resolves to an "="). It is not about delineating spheres of thought; it's about telling in what combinations any one action can have the attributes "morally good" and "practically good" and their respective opposites.

I have been arguing that the table of possible combinations looks like this:

MORALLY GOOD and PRACTICALLY GOOD: CAN BE

MORALLY GOOD and PRACTICALLY BAD_: CANNOT BE

MORALLY BAD_ and PRACTICALLY GOOD: CANNOT BE

MORALLY BAD_ and PRACTICALLY BAD_: CAN BE

and not like this:

MORALLY GOOD and PRACTICALLY GOOD: CAN BE

MORALLY GOOD and PRACTICALLY BAD_: CAN BE

MORALLY BAD_ and PRACTICALLY GOOD: CANNOT BE

MORALLY BAD_ and PRACTICALLY BAD_: CAN BE