The legitimacy of parental obligation

[organon 0]

An important philosophical point here is:

A value is not a value outside of the context of the virtue exercised in its achievement and/or preservation.

For example:

Money is not a value if obtained by fraud.

Sex is not a value if obtained by fraud.

Respect, admiration, love are not values if obtained by fraud.

I think you mean it is not moral, rather than it is not a value. If money wasn't a value because it is stolen, what is it that motivates the thief? I think your examples are of values, and should not be equated to the method of obtaining them. The methods are not virtuous.

Hi Arnold,

The thief, I think, is motivated by the value of the money, completely divorced from the context in which a rational man holds money as a value, namely, in the context of the virtuous action(s) that were required to obtain it. Were a rational man to grasp that a $10 bill he possesses was obtained through fraud or theft, it would no longer be a value to him.

[Brian Smith 0]

If virtue is defined as: an action, rational in nature, by which a rational value is achieved, no, I do not dispute it.

Which means, since the Objectivist definition of 'virtue' does NOT include 'rational' in it (and rightly so), you DO dispute it.

That explains our disagreement. You have an invalid definition of 'virtue'.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

Do you dispute the principle that creation of value is a virtue?

...I dispute it...

This presents a problem.

Objectivism identifies "the process of creating...values" (specifically material values) to BE a virtue - specifically the virtue of 'productiveness'. 'Creation' is "the process of creating." Thus it appears you dispute this Objectivist principle. However, your dispute appears to be over something greater than a single virtue. Your dispute seems to be with the Objectivist definition of 'virtue' itself.

Objectivism defines 'virtue' as the action by which one gains and keeps a value. Creating a value is exactly that action. By definition the creation of value IS virtue. Yet you claim it is not.

Thus the question is, on what basis do you dispute the Objectivist definition of 'virtue'? And - what is your alternate definition of 'virtue'?

"Value" can have two meanings: 1) That which, in fact, promotes human life and 2) anything a living thing seeks to gain and or keep. 1) is a rational, objective value and 2) is a generic value that applies to neurotic defense values, irrational values, mistaken values, etc. that someone seeks to gain and/or keep.

As a result, "virtue" can refer to that which gains or keeps 1) proper values or 2) any old value.

In order to avoid confusion when discussing values and virtues, it is necessary to specify and define which concept of "value" one is using.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

If virtue is defined as: an action, rational in nature, by which a rational value is achieved, no, I do not dispute it.

Which means, since the Objectivist definition of 'virtue' does NOT include 'rational' in it (and rightly so), you DO dispute it.

That explains our disagreement. You have an invalid definition of 'virtue'.

I don't see it that way. The word "virtue" can refer to two different concepts. It can mean either "an action which achieves a rational value" (which is the way organon is using it) or ""an action which achieves any value" (which is the way Brian is using it).

Neither organon or Brian is using an "invalid" definition. They are discussing two different concepts.

[organon 0]

Do you dispute the principle that creation of value is a virtue?

...I dispute it...

This presents a problem.

Objectivism identifies "the process of creating...values" (specifically material values) to BE a virtue - specifically the virtue of 'productiveness'. 'Creation' is "the process of creating." Thus it appears you dispute this Objectivist principle. However, your dispute appears to be over something greater than a single virtue. Your dispute seems to be with the Objectivist definition of 'virtue' itself.

Objectivism defines 'virtue' as the action by which one gains and keeps a value. Creating a value is exactly that action. By definition the creation of value IS virtue. Yet you claim it is not.

Thus the question is, on what basis do you dispute the Objectivist definition of 'virtue'? And - what is your alternate definition of 'virtue'?

To indicate the full context of what was said:

I do dispute the contention that the existence of a value necessarily implies virtue on the part of any agent that had a role in the fact it now exists, including a criminal who failed to fire [at a loved one] because he heard a siren nearby.

Regarding “virtue”, see below.

[organon 0]

There is a vital point I would like to make.

In relation to virtue:

Virtue is defined as: moral excellence; goodness; righteousness. It is a concept that exists in a moral context.

Given this, if an individual claims an action is virtuous, it requires that he demonstrate its moral excellence by reference to a moral standard, i.e., demonstrate that it is good.

demonstration: the act or circumstances of proving or being proved conclusively, as by reasoning or a show of evidence.

If an individual asserts that an action is virtuous, the burden of proof is on him to demonstrate it is so.

What were Ayn Rand’s thoughts in this regard?

Miss Rand wrote:

Rationality is man's basic virtue, the source of all his other virtues. ("The Objectivist Ethics")

What is the underlying moral standard?

Man’s life.

Given that man’s life is the moral standard, and given that man is the rational animal, the virtue of rationality and of any virtues established as proceeding from rationality can be demonstrated, i.e., proved conclusively. And can thus legitimately be called virtues.

Whether an action is virtuous, i.e. morally excellent or good, in the context of a life-based standard, given that man is the rational animal, is established by a determination of whether that action is rational.

In the context of a life-based standard, rationality is essential to whether a virtue can be judged as valid (well grounded in truth), i.e., as morally excellent or good, and whether it can be legitimately be called a virtue.

Rationality is man's basic virtue, the source of all his other virtues. ("The Objectivist Ethics")

If a virtue is alleged to be valid, and is irrational, it is not valid (given man’s life as the standard of moral value, and given that man is the rational animal), as its moral excellence (the definition of virtue) cannot be demonstrated. And it cannot be called a virtue, for those who care for the meaning of the word.

And there other moral standards, and other derivative values and virtues? E.g., the virtues of faith, humility, service to others (as a moral primary)? Of course.

But:

“[Y]ours is the morality of Death.” (Galt’s Speech)

[Brian Smith 0]

"Value" can have two meanings...

I would suggest the issue here is not about different 'meanings' but about different TYPES of the same thing.

Just as I would say 'government' has one meaning, I would also say 'value' has one meaning.

'Government' is an institution that holds the exclusive power to enforce certain rules of social conduct in a given geographic area.

'Value' is that which one acts to gain and/or keep.

Now, within the category of government, there are many different sub-categories - many different TYPES - of government. For instance:

1) an institution that holds the exclusive power to enforce certain rules of social conduct in a given geographic area - in which property is privately owned.

2) an institution that holds the exclusive power to enforce certain rules of social conduct in a given geographic area - in which property is collectively owned.

etc

And so too within the category of virtue, there are many different sub-categories - many different TYPES - of virtue. For instance:

1) those things which one acts to gain and/or keep - which, in fact, promote human life.

2) those things which one acts to gain and/or keep - which, in fact, are irrational/mistaken.

etc

Thus there are socialist governments, communist governments, capitalist governments, etc.. But all of these are simply types of the one concept: 'government'.

Thus, too, there are Objectivist values, Christian values, collectivist values, etc.. But all of these are simply types of the one concept: 'value'.

Now, of course IF one is NOT speaking solely of the concept 'government', but is instead referencing one of the particular TYPES of government, then it is indeed extremely important to identify WHICH of those many types of 'government' one is referencing. And, IF one is NOT speaking solely of the concept 'value', but is instead referencing one of the particular TYPES of value, then it is also indeed extremely important to identify WHICH of those many types of 'value' one is referencing.

The word "virtue" can refer to two different concepts

Just as with the terms 'government' and 'value', I would suggest there is one meaning of 'virtue' here - and it too has different sub-categories - different types (Christian virtue, Objectivist virtue, etc). And, just as with 'government' and 'value', IF one is NOT speaking solely of the concept 'virtue', but is instead referencing one of the many particular TYPES of virtue, then -again- it is indeed extremely important to identify WHICH of these types one is referencing.

Neither organon or Brian is using an "invalid" definition. They are discussing two different concepts.

Given the above, I must disagree.

That said, if "an action, rational in nature, by which a rational value is achieved" was simply an attempt to distinguish between the concept 'virtue' and one of its many sub-categories (namely 'Objectivist virtue'), then while I disagree with the means by which the attempt was made, I certainly agree that such a distinction is valid. In fact, such a distinction had been my very point.

So, to put it simply, if there is in fact no dispute over the absence of 'rational' from the concept of 'virtue', then there is no disagreement here.

However, if there is a dispute over the omission of 'rational' from the definition of 'virtue', then I must again identify organon's definition of 'virtue' as an anti-concept - a concept which is meant to replace and obliterate a legitimate concept.

[organon 0]

Which means, since the Objectivist definition of 'virtue' does NOT include 'rational' in it (and rightly so), you DO dispute it. (italics added)

What is Miss Rand's definition of virtue in Galt's speech?

"... virtue is the act by which one gains and/or keeps [a value]."

One cannot consider this statement in isolation from the context of the meaning of the word "virtue".

Virtue is a concept that exists in a moral context – it is defined as: moral excellence; goodness; righteousness. It thus requires that the moral excellence; goodness; righteousness; of an action be demonstrated, before that action can legitimately be called a virtue.

Should a man murder another man in order to obtain his car, is that an action by which a value was gained? Yes.

Can such an action be demonstrated to be virtuous? And thus considered, given that we care for the meaning of the word (morally excellent; good; righteous), a virtue?

No.

Rationality is man's basic virtue, the source of all his other virtues. ("The Objectivist Ethics")

http://forums.4aynrandfans.com/index.php?s...amp;#entry58838

[organon 0]

That explains our disagreement. You have an invalid definition of 'virtue'.

I don't see it that way. The word "virtue" can refer to two different concepts. It can mean either "an action which achieves a rational value" (which is the way organon is using it) or ""an action which achieves any value" (which is the way Brian is using it).

Neither organon or Brian is using an "invalid" definition. They are discussing two different concepts.

I would argue that ‘virtue’ does not primarily relate to an identification of that at which an action aims, but rather to the establishment that such action is morally excellent, or good.

If a man pursues an irrational value, not grasping, within the context of his knowledge, that it is irrational, yet is morally excellent in its pursuit, then he is still virtuous, or good.

For example, consider Gail Wynand’s first love (the empty-headed, though beautiful, young woman, who asked him, I think, “Am I prettier than Maggie Kelly?”).

Was the value irrational? Yes; and when he grasped this, he left.

Was he morally faultless in the means by which he obtained that value? Yes.

(Were he to continue to pursue an irrational value, having grasped it is irrational, by means of evasion, then he would no longer be virtuous.)

[organon 0]

Government' is an institution that holds the exclusive power to enforce certain rules of social conduct in a given geographic area...

This is correct.

...there are socialist governments, communist governments, capitalist governments, etc.. But all of these are simply types of the one concept: 'government'.

And all can, without question, legitimately be called governments, in the context of the definition.

Why? Because, by reference to what they are, it can be demonstrated, in the context of the definition, they are so.

In relation to virtue: The establishment of the action as morally excellent; good; righteous; depends upon the demonstration that it is indeed so, by reference to a moral standard.

http://forums.4aynrandfans.com/index.php?s...amp;#entry58838

[Brian Smith 0]

However, if there is a dispute over the omission of 'rational' from the definition of 'virtue', then I must again identify organon's definition of 'virtue' as an anti-concept - a concept which is meant to replace and obliterate a legitimate concept.

I see there is still such a dispute. I thus stand by this identification.

Virtue ... is a concept that exists in a moral context.

WHOSE moral context? Is there only one moral context possible?

What is the underlying moral standard?

Of WHOSE morality? Christian morality?

As I have indicated in previous posts, just like 'government', the terms 'morality', 'virtue', 'value', do not identify just the rational forms of those things. It identifies ALL the forms of those things - rational AND irrational - mistaken AND accurate.

To eliminate from those concepts ALL but the rational forms is to blank out all those other facts of reality.

So - I have a question to ask: does Christianity preach particular virtues?

[organon 0]

Are there irrational moral codes, and irrational values, and virtues?

Yes, without question.

Are the “virtues” suggested by these codes to be legitimately considered virtues?

The burden of proof rests on he who asserts the positive. He must demonstrate, by reference to a moral standard, that these are, in fact, virtues (i.e., morally excellent; good; righteous).

If, for example, a man claims that: murder; theft; fraud; are virtues, do we entertain this? Or do we say, should we bother to speak: Prove it (in the context of the definition.)

[Brian Smith 0]

What is Miss Rand's definition of virtue in Galt's speech?

"... virtue is the act by which one gains and/or keeps [a value]."

One cannot consider this statement in isolation from the context of the meaning of the word "virtue".

This "statement" IS the "meaning of the word "virtue"". In fact, it is explicitly identified above as its definition.

[organon 0]

As I have indicated in previous posts, just like 'government', the terms 'morality', 'virtue', 'value', do not identify just the rational forms of those things. It identifies ALL the forms of those things - rational AND irrational - mistaken AND accurate.

"Government", as you indicated above, is defined as: an institution that holds the exclusive power to enforce certain rules of social conduct in a given geographic area.

Whether a given governmental form is rational is wholly inapplicable to its identification as a government, in the context of the definition of that word.

Virtue, however, is a moral concept, defined as: moral excellence; goodness; righteousness.

The identification of an act as a virtue, in the context of the definition, requires the establishment of such moral excellence, by reference to a moral standard.

http://forums.4aynrandfans.com/index.php?s...amp;#entry58838

[organon 0]

What is Miss Rand's definition of virtue in Galt's speech?

"... virtue is the act by which one gains and/or keeps [a value]."

One cannot consider this statement in isolation from the context of the meaning of the word "virtue".

This "statement" IS the "meaning of the word "virtue"". In fact, it is explicitly identified above as its definition.

I disagree; the word is defined as: moral excellence; goodness; righteousness. One cannot consider a proposition while ignoring the meaning of the words that compose it.

The identification of a given act as morally excellent, requires the demonstration that it is so, by reference to a moral standard.

[Brian Smith 0]

Are there irrational moral codes, and irrational values, and virtues?

Yes, without question.

It has been claimed that this is the meaning of 'virtue': 'an action, rational in nature, by which a rational value is achieved"

It has been further claimed that there are, "without question", "irrational virtues".

By the claimed definition, that would mean there ARE such things as "irrational acts which are rational in nature, by which a rational value is achieved." That is a blatant contradiction. If an action is irrational, it cannot be identified as rational in nature.

And that is why the claimed definition of 'virtue' is an anti-concept.

[organon 0]

It has been further claimed that there are, "without question", "irrational virtues".

This is what I think you are referring to, and what was actually said:

[Are] there other moral standards, and other derivative values and virtues? E.g., the virtues of faith, humility, service to others (as a moral primary)? Of course.

It was also said, in the same post:

If a virtue is alleged to be valid, and is irrational, it is not valid (given man’s life as the standard of moral value, and given that man is the rational animal), as its moral excellence (the definition of virtue) cannot be demonstrated. And it cannot be called a virtue, for those who care for the meaning of the word.

Are there other moral standards, and other derivative values, and virtues, that are irrational? Yes. But, in the context of a life-based standard, an alleged "virtue" that is irrational in nature, cannot be called a virtue, as its moral excellence (given the definition of the word) cannot be demonstrated.

[Brian Smith 0]

What is Miss Rand's definition of virtue in Galt's speech?

"... virtue is the act by which one gains and/or keeps [a value]."

One cannot consider this statement in isolation from the context of the meaning of the word "virtue".

This "statement" IS the "meaning of the word "virtue"". In fact, it is explicitly identified above as its definition.

I disagree; the word is defined as: moral excellence; goodness; righteousness. One cannot consider a proposition while ignoring the meaning of the words that compose it.

If Miss Rand's statement is NOT - as explicitly claimed - "the definition of virtue," what is it - and why WAS it identified AS the definition?

If Miss Rand's statement IS - as explicitly claimed - "the definition of virtue", then on what basis can one "disagree" that it IS the definition?

[organon 0]

Are there irrational moral codes, and irrational values, and virtues?

Yes, without question.

It has been claimed that this is the meaning of 'virtue': 'an action, rational in nature, by which a rational value is achieved"

It has been further claimed that there are, "without question", "irrational virtues".

By the claimed definition, that would mean there ARE such things as "irrational acts which are rational in nature, by which a rational value is achieved." That is a blatant contradiction. If an action is irrational, it cannot be identified as rational in nature.

And that is why the claimed definition of 'virtue' is an anti-concept.

In the context of a life-based moral standard, given that man is the rational animal, there are no irrational virtues.

Are there irrational moral codes, and irrational values, and virtues?

Yes, without question.

Yes, such codes exist; yes, they suggest values, and virtues, of a non-rational nature. However, the moral standard in these cases is not man's life.

[Y]ours is the morality of Death.

[organon 0]

What is Miss Rand's definition of virtue in Galt's speech?

"... virtue is the act by which one gains and/or keeps [a value]."

One cannot consider this statement in isolation from the context of the meaning of the word "virtue".

This "statement" IS the "meaning of the word "virtue"". In fact, it is explicitly identified above as its definition.

I disagree; the word is defined as: moral excellence; goodness; righteousness. One cannot consider a proposition while ignoring the meaning of the words that compose it.

If Miss Rand's statement is NOT - as explicitly claimed - "the definition of virtue," what is it - and why WAS it identified AS the definition?

If Miss Rand's statement IS - as explicitly claimed - "the definition of virtue", then on what basis can one "disagree" that it IS the definition?

One cannot consider a proposition while not keeping in mind the definition of the concepts that compose it.

[Brian Smith 0]

Are there other moral standards, and other derivative values, and virtues, that are irrational? Yes.

If the ONLY definition of virtue is, as claimed, "an action, rational in nature, by which a rational value is achieved" then the claim that there are 'virtues that are irrational' is the claim that there are "irrational actions, rational in nature..."

n the context of a life-based moral standard, given that man is the rational animal, there are no irrational virtues.

In the context of the Objectivist moral standard, this is correct. There are NO irrational virtues. But the Objectivist moral standard is not the ONLY context in which the term 'virtue' (or 'value' etc) is used. Therefore the concept 'virtue' must be NEUTRAL. It must apply to ALL the given context, NOT just the Objectivist context.

[organon 0]

One cannot consider a proposition while not keeping in mind the definition of the concepts that compose it.

To elaborate on this point:

Government: an institution that holds the exclusive power to enforce certain rules of social conduct in a given geographic area.

Is communism a governmental form? Yes.

How do we know this?

By identifying what communism is, and that it is thus properly identified as a government, in the context of the definition of government.

Is rationality a virtue? Yes.

How do we know this?

By identifying what rationality is, and that it is thus properly identified as a virtue, in the context of the definition of virtue, i.e., moral excellence; goodness; righteousness (such moral excellence demonstrated by reference to a life-based moral standard).

In this context, is faith a virtue? Can it be demonstrated to be so? No.

[Brian Smith 0]

What is Miss Rand's definition of virtue in Galt's speech?

"... virtue is the act by which one gains and/or keeps [a value]."

One cannot consider this statement in isolation from the context of the meaning of the word "virtue".

This "statement" IS the "meaning of the word "virtue"". In fact, it is explicitly identified above as its definition.

I disagree; the word is defined as: moral excellence; goodness; righteousness. One cannot consider a proposition while ignoring the meaning of the words that compose it.

If Miss Rand's statement is NOT - as explicitly claimed - "the definition of virtue," what is it - and why WAS it identified AS the definition?

If Miss Rand's statement IS - as explicitly claimed - "the definition of virtue", then on what basis can one "disagree" that it IS the definition?

One cannot consider a proposition while not keeping in mind the definition of the concepts that compose it.

This does not answer the specific questions as they were asked. Two statements have been explicitly identified in one post as the definition of 'virtue'. So:

1) Which ONE is the definition?

2) Why was the other statement iidentified as the definition if it is not?

[organon 0]

n the context of a life-based moral standard, given that man is the rational animal, there are no irrational virtues.

In the context of the Objectivist moral standard, this is correct. There are NO irrational virtues. But the Objectivist moral standard is not the ONLY context in which the term 'virtue' (or 'value' etc) is used. Therefore the concept 'virtue' must be NEUTRAL. It must apply to ALL the given context, NOT just the Objectivist context.

In order to identify an action as virtuous, its moral excellence must be demonstrated, by reference to a moral standard.

The only way that an irrational virtue can be demonstrated is by reference to a moral standard other than life.

A being who does not hold his own life as the motive and goal of his actions, is acting on the motive and standard of death. (Galt's Speech)

[organon 0]

This does not answer the specific questions as they were asked. Two statements have been explicitly identified in one post as the definition of 'virtue'. So:

1) Which ONE is the definition?

2) Why was the other statement iidentified as the definition if it is not?

Virtue is defined as: moral excellence; goodness; righteousness. It is a concept that exists in a moral context.

Miss Rand writes in "The Objectivist Ethics" that: "virtue is the act by which one gains and/or keeps [a value]."

Is this a definition of virtue, or a description of virtue?

description: a representation in words of the nature and characteristics of a thing

Would Miss Rand believe that, absent a demonstration of moral excellence, by reference to a moral standard, whether irrational or rational, an action could be considered a virtue, given that this is the definition of the word?