The legitimacy of parental obligation

[Brian Smith 0]

n the context of a life-based moral standard, given that man is the rational animal, there are no irrational virtues.

In the context of the Objectivist moral standard, this is correct. There are NO irrational virtues. But the Objectivist moral standard is not the ONLY context in which the term 'virtue' (or 'value' etc) is used. Therefore the concept 'virtue' must be NEUTRAL. It must apply to ALL the given context, NOT just the Objectivist context.

In order to identify an action as virtuous, its moral excellence must be demonstrated, by reference to a moral standard.

Yes. And by reference to his OWN moral standard, a rational man may identify X action to be non-virtuous. But that does not prevent the rational man from referencing a DIFFERENT moral standard, and then identify that exact same action as virtuous. Obviously he certainly does not AGREE with the identification (because he does not accept that different moral standard), but that doesn't change the fact that, according TO the other moral standard, it IS a virtue.

That is why the concept 'virtue' does not include ANY reference to a PARTICULAR moral standard - because ALL moral standards necessarily have them (by the nature of the concept 'morality'). As such, the concept 'virtue' cannot properly reference ONE particular moral standard, since it has to apply to ALL moral standards.

[Brian Smith 0]

Is this a definition of virtue, or a description of virtue?

So the claim has been CHANGED? The claim is NOW that this is NOT, as previously identified, "Miss Rand's definition of 'virtue'"?

Dr. Peikoff explicitly states otherwise. In OPAR, he writes:

"Virtue" in the Objectivist definition, is "the action by which one gains and keeps [a value].

[organon 0]

In order to identify an action as virtuous, its moral excellence must be demonstrated, by reference to a moral standard.

Yes. And by reference to his OWN moral standard, a rational man may identify X action to be non-virtuous. But that does not prevent the rational man from referencing a DIFFERENT moral standard, and then identify that exact same action as virtuous.

We can identify that in the context of non-life based moral standard, i.e. a death-based standard, a given irrational action is virtuous, e.g., faith, or humility, or necrophilia, or virtually anything.

Obviously he certainly does not AGREE with the identification (because he does not accept that different moral standard), but that doesn't change the fact that, according TO the other moral standard, it IS a virtue.

In the context of a standard other than life, whatever that may be (whether that of a major religion, or that invented twenty minutes ago by a thorough bottomdweller, drunk in his apartment) -- faith, or humility, or flying a plane into a skyscraper, or murder, or theft, or necrophilia, or virtually any irrational action you can imagine, can be demonstrated as virtuous.

That is why the concept 'virtue' does not include ANY reference to a PARTICULAR moral standard - because ALL moral standards necessarily have them (by the nature of the concept 'morality'). As such, the concept 'virtue' cannot properly reference ONE particular moral standard, since it has to apply to ALL moral standards.

The concept of "virtue" is defined as: moral excellence; goodness; righteousness. The moral excellence of an act must be demonstrated before it can be called a virtue, whatever the moral standard.

Do non-life based moral standards exist? Yes.

In the context of such standards, are the related virtues -- e.g., achieving death by flying a plane into a skyscraper, or necrophilia, or virtually any action imaginable that is irrational in nature -- demonstrable ? Yes.

In the context of man's life, are such virtues demonstrable? No.

If an individual offers to a rational man the argument that: flying a plane into a skyscraper is a virtue, because it will achieve the value of 72 virgins in Paradise, does the rational man agree that, within this context, it is a virtue? Yes.

Does he realize that, in the context of a life-based moral standard, such action is depraved? Yes.

[organon 0]

Is this a definition of virtue, or a description of virtue?

So the claim has been CHANGED? The claim is NOW that this is NOT, as previously identified, "Miss Rand's definition of 'virtue'"?

Dr. Peikoff explicitly states otherwise. In OPAR, he writes:

"Virtue" in the Objectivist definition, is "the action by which one gains and keeps [a value].

I would argue that, if considered a definition of virtue, this definition cannot be isolated from the context. Dr. Peikoff is addressing this issue in the context of morality. The relevant chapter is titled, "The Good".

[Brian Smith 0]

We can identify that in the context of non-life based moral standard, i.e. a death-based standard, a given irrational action is virtuous, e.g., faith, or humility, or necrophilia, or virtually anything.

Excellent. Which means, in order to be able to do this, the definition of 'virtue' cannot make reference to any particular virtue of any particular moral system.

In the context of a standard other than life, whatever that may be (whether that of a major religion, or that invented twenty minutes ago by a thorough bottomdweller, drunk in his apartment) -- faith, or humility, or flying a plane into a skyscraper, or murder, or theft, or necrophilia, or virtually any irrational action you can imagine, can be demonstrated as virtuous.

Excellent again - for the very same reason.

All types of virtue - be they Objectivist, Christian, or whatever - share one thing in common - one thing which makes them ALL virtues. They are ALL the 'actions by which one gains and keeps a value.' That is the definition OF 'virtue'.

Of course, Objectivism identifies very particular virtues - very particular actions by which one gains and keeps a value.' And they are very different from the very particular virtues - the very particular actions by which one gains and keeps a value - in Judaism, etc. So while Objectivist virtues will certainly include in their identification 'rationality', others virtues certainly will not.

[PhilO 0]

By identifying what rationality is, and that it is thus properly identified as a virtue, in the context of the definition of virtue, i.e., moral excellence; goodness; righteousness (such moral excellence demonstrated by reference to a life-based moral standard).

But here you've already specified what type of moral standard. As you noted, communism is a type of government - it is not however a rational government. Similarly, altruism is a type of ethics - it not however a rational ethics. The principle is exactly the same. Self-sacrifice is a virtue according to the ethics of altruism, but not according to a rational ethics.

Men can easily have irrational values, a value being that which one acts to gain and or/keep, to use Ayn Rand's admirably precise definition. Note that it does not specify that such a value is in fact a rational value, and that the other values expended to gain and/or keep it (which is invariably the case, all value pursuit implies a cost including the cost of time) are actually worthwhile in a rational hierarchy of values. The altruist who seeks sacrifice, the second-hander who seeks approval of others, etc., are all seeking values, but they are not rational values.

[Brian Smith 0]

I would argue that, if considered a definition of virtue, this definition cannot be isolated from the context.

It is fortunate then that no such attempt has been made.

[Brian Smith 0]

I would argue that, if considered a definition of virtue, this definition cannot be isolated from the context.

It is fortunate then that no such attempt has been made.

To make this last point clear - this definition has been kept in "the context of morality". It has simply been prevented from being limited to the context of one morality alone.

[organon 0]

By identifying what rationality is, and that it is thus properly identified as a virtue, in the context of the definition of virtue, i.e., moral excellence; goodness; righteousness (such moral excellence demonstrated by reference to a life-based moral standard).

But here you've already specified what type of moral standard. As you noted, communism is a type of government - it is not however a rational government. Similarly, altruism is a type of ethics - it not however a rational ethics. The principle is exactly the same. Self-sacrifice is a virtue according to the ethics of altruism, but not according to a rational ethics.

Agreed, without question.

Men can easily have irrational values, a value being that which one acts to gain and or/keep, to use Ayn Rand's admirably precise definition. Note that it does not specify that such a value is in fact a rational value.... The altruist who seeks sacrifice, the second-hander who seeks approval of others, etc., are all seeking values, but they are not rational values.

And the terrorist, who seeks the value of Paradise and 72 virgins, yes, he is seeking a value, by means of the virtue described by his religion.

In the context of that religion, is the virtue of flying a plane into a skyscraper morally excellent? Yes, it is.

Given a life-based standard, is such a virtue morally excellent? No.

Given that we identify that the standard of a man is not life-based, are any of the limitless acts of depravity he may consider virtues any longer of interest to us? No.

[organon 0]

What is Miss Rand's definition of virtue in Galt's speech?

"... virtue is the act by which one gains and/or keeps [a value]."

One cannot consider this statement in isolation from the context of the meaning of the word "virtue".

This "statement" IS the "meaning of the word "virtue"". In fact, it is explicitly identified above as its definition.

If considered a definition, outside of any moral context whatever, i.e., outside of any context that relates it the good, the context in which the word "virtue" is properly held, then no.

The identification of an act as virtuous requires the demonstration of its moral excellence, in the context of a moral standard, whatever that may be.

[Brian Smith 0]

The identification of an act as virtuous requires the demonstration of its moral excellence, in the context of a moral standard, whatever that may be.

Since one cannot validly make an appeal to any particular moral standard in the definition of 'virtue', what then can be the meaning of "moral excellence"? It can only be 'the action by which one gains and keeps a value'. If it means anything else, it would again limit the term 'virtue' to some particular moral standards as opposed to being applicable to ALL.

As such, including 'moral excellence' in the definition is, at best, a redundancy. It is therefore properly stricken.

[organon 0]

Under what concept would you include actions that involved gaining and/or keeping a value and are non morally excellent, good or righteous?

(This was a question asked by an individual I will not identify (as I have not gained his permission to do so) in a post, among many, that were removed from the thread.)

Answer: If they are not virtues, when evaluated by the relevant standard, then they are not virtues.

[organon 0]

The identification of an act as virtuous requires the demonstration of its moral excellence, in the context of a moral standard, whatever that may be.

Since one cannot validly make an appeal to any particular moral standard in the definition of 'virtue', what then can be the meaning of "moral excellence"?

The moral excellence, or virtue, of an action is demonstrated by reference to a moral standard, whatever that may be. No particular moral standard is implied.

It can only be 'the action by which one gains and keeps a value'. If it means anything else, it would again limit the term 'virtue' to some particular moral standards as opposed to being applicable to ALL.

As such, including 'moral excellence' in the definition is, at best, a redundancy. It is therefore properly stricken.

'Virtue' is a concept that exists in a moral context. It is defined as moral excellence, or goodness. The evaluation of an act as virtuous requires the demonstration of its moral excellence in the context of a moral standard, whatever that may be. No particular moral standard is implied in the definition; only that the action be identified as morally excellent in the context of whatever standard forms the basis of the judgment.

[PhilO 0]

Given that we identify that the standard of a man is not life-based, are any of the limitless acts of depravity he may consider virtues any longer of interest to us? No.

Interest in a positive sense, no. But if your goal is to understand horrible parents, and so forth, then such irrational values may be of interest for the purposes of understanding and rational action.

[Brian Smith 0]

'Virtue' is a concept that exists in a moral context.

Yes. But not in any particular moral context (ie not in the context of only Objectivism, or only Islam, etc). So the standards of any one particular morality cannot be applied or inserted into the definition itself.

It is defined as moral excellence, or goodness.

As I thought had already been established, that is NOT Objectivism's definition of virtue. Is the claim being changed once AGAIN?

Oh - and 'goodness' is identified by WHAT a man values. "Virtue' is simply the action one takes to gain and keep those values - to gain and keep what one has identified as good - has identified as worth pursuing. Thus, as I indicated, anything beyond 'the action by which one gains and keeps a value" is redundant.

[Paul's Here 0]

Under what concept would you include actions that involved gaining and/or keeping a value and are non morally excellent, good or righteous?

(This was a question asked by an individual I will not identify (as I have not gained his permission to do so) in a post, among many, that were removed from the thread.)

Answer: If they are not virtues, when evaluated by the relevant standard, then they are not virtues.

Since I was the one who asked that question previously, I will follow up on this. How can your conclusion be contained in your premises? This is clearly not logical. "If not virtues, then not virtues." The issue is if an action is a virtue in one morality, it may not be a virtue in another morality. So defining the concept with reference to morally excellence, goodness or righteousness, which are applicable to particular moral codes within that context, would leave it meaningless. It doesn't identify what people are doing when you'd apply the concept. Plus, those issues of morally excellence, goodness or righteousness can only be understood as being achievable by acting on virtues after defining a moral code.

[Brian Smith 0]

WHATEVER action by which one gains and keeps a value IS excellence in morality. It is so necessarily. That is why its inclusion would be a redundancy.

[Paul's Here 0]

Under what concept would you include actions that involved gaining and/or keeping a value and are non morally excellent, good or righteous?

(This was a question asked by an individual I will not identify (as I have not gained his permission to do so) in a post, among many, that were removed from the thread.)

Answer: If they are not virtues, when evaluated by the relevant standard, then they are not virtues.

So when a religious person practices the virtue of faith, when evaluated by Objectivist standards, that person is not practicing a religious virtue? Faith is certainly not a virtue in Objectivism's morality, but are you saying that people who practice faith are not acting to achieve their values?

[Paul's Here 0]

WHATEVER action by which one gains and keeps a value IS excellence in morality. It is so necessarily. That is why its inclusion would be a redundancy.

I'm not sure I understand this. If I'm in college and want to be an engineer but I only study 1/2 hour a day, is that excellenct in morality?

[Brian Smith 0]

I'm not sure I understand this.

If 'virtue' is the action by which one gains and keeps a value, what action which does that would not be identified as morally excellent? In other words, what virtue, when exercised, is NOT an instance of moral excellence?

[Paul's Here 0]

I'm not sure I understand this.

If 'virtue' is the action by which one gains and keeps a value, what action which does that would not be identified as morally excellent? In other words, what virtue, when exercised, is NOT an instance of moral excellence?

Have I not exercised a virtue when I study 1/2 hour per day?

[Brian Smith 0]

Have I not exercised a virtue when I study 1/2 hour per day?

That would depend, wouldn't it? If one thinks that is the action by which one gains and keeps a particular value, then yes, it would be a virtue. Of course, if one thinks that is NOT the action by which one gains and keeps that value, then it would not be a virtue.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

Virtue is defined as: moral excellence; goodness; righteousness. It is a concept that exists in a moral context.

Where did this definition come from? By the standards set forth in ItOE, Chapter 5, it is a rather poor definition. It totally lacks a genus and a differentia.

Miss Rand writes in "The Objectivist Ethics" that: "virtue is the act by which one gains and/or keeps [a value]."

Now that is a good and proper definition. It has a genus (the act) and a differentia (by which one gains and/or keeps a value). Using that, you can look at reality and see whether something is a virtue. Is it an action? Is the action taken in order to gain or keep a value? If the answer to both is "yes" then it is a virtue.

Is this (quote from Ayn Rand) a definition of virtue, or a description of virtue?

It is a very good definition describing the essential characteristic of what she calls a virtue.

Now let's look at "virtue" defined as "moral excellence; goodness; righteousness." This is merely a list of synonyms. It doesn't define, denote, or describe anything. It simply pushes the issue several steps back to the meanings of the terms "moral excellence," "goodness," "righteousness" which are left undefined.

[Paul's Here 0]

Have I not exercised a virtue when I study 1/2 hour per day?

That would depend, wouldn't it? If one thinks that is the action by which one gains and keeps a particular value, then yes, it would be a virtue. Of course, if one thinks that is NOT the action by which one gains and keeps that value, then it would not be a virtue.

Which is why I disagree with the WHATEVER in "WHATEVER action by which one gains and keeps a value IS excellence in morality." It is not just whether I 'think' a particular action is a virtue. The action needs to be objective, not simply what I think it to be or any action I take to gain and/or keep it. The action must be appropriate to the value sought, in both effort and value hierarchy. Then one may say that the virtue is morally excellent.

PS. (I haven't thought about this part very much before, but I'm not sure that I'd say a virtue is morally excellent. I think it may be more appropriate to say that the agent of the virtue is morally excellent. Perhaps you could explain how that would apply to virtue.)

[Brian Smith 0]

Which is why I disagree with the WHATEVER in "WHATEVER action by which one gains and keeps a value IS excellence in morality." It is not just whether I 'think' a particular action is a virtue. The action needs to be objective, not simply what I think it to be or any action I take to gain and/or keep it.

This is the same error as trying to insert 'rational' into the definition of 'virtue'.

If I consider reaching heaven to be a value, and I think the act of self-sacrifice is the means of attaining that value, then my act of self-sacrifice is virtuous. Of course, my action is not even close to 'objective'. But that is immaterial. It is because I consider it a value and because I take the actions I think are necessary to gain and keep that value, that my actions are quite validly identified as virtuous (even though, by Objectivist standards of morality, my actions would be the farthest thing from virtuous).

One has to keep in mind, in this context, that one is identifying 'virtue' according to the standards of the person who is performing the action. That is quite a different context than when one is identifying the virtuous nature of that person's action from one's OWN standard (or even the standard of a third party).