The legitimacy of parental obligation

[Paul's Here 0]

Which is why I disagree with the WHATEVER in "WHATEVER action by which one gains and keeps a value IS excellence in morality." It is not just whether I 'think' a particular action is a virtue. The action needs to be objective, not simply what I think it to be or any action I take to gain and/or keep it.

This is the same error as trying to insert 'rational' into the definition of 'virtue'.

If I consider reaching heaven to be a value, and I think the act of self-sacrifice is the means of attaining that value, then my act of self-sacrifice is virtuous.

But that is because the virtue is consistent with the value. Suppose the example was: If I consider reaching heaven to be a value, I think studying biology was the means of attaining that value. Is my studying a virtuous act simply because I consider it a means to achieve the value?

Of course, my action is not even close to 'objective'. But that is immaterial. It is because I consider it a value and because I take the actions I think are necessary to gain and keep that value, that my actions are quite validly identified as virtuous (even though, by Objectivist standards of morality, my actions would be the farthest thing from virtuous).

One has to keep in mind, in this context, that one is identifying 'virtue' according to the standards of the person who is performing the action. That is quite a different context than when one is identifying the virtuous nature of that person's action from one's OWN standard (or even the standard of a third party).

[Brian Smith 0]

But that is because the virtue is consistent with the value.

According to whom?

Suppose the example was the following: If I consider reaching heaven to be a value, I think studying biology was the means of attaining that value. Is my studying a virtuous act simply because I consider it a means to achieve the value?

If I understand the example, yes. By what - and whose - standard would it not?

Is the suggestion here that virtue must be adherence to someone else's ideas of value or someone else's idea of how to gain that value?

[organon 0]

Under what concept would you include actions that involved gaining and/or keeping a value and are non morally excellent, good or righteous?

(This was a question asked by an individual I will not identify (as I have not gained his permission to do so) in a post, among many, that were removed from the thread.)

Answer: If they are not virtues, when evaluated by the relevant standard, then they are not virtues.

So when a religious person practices the virtue of faith, when evaluated by Objectivist standards, that person is not practicing a religious virtue? Faith is certainly not a virtue in Objectivism's morality, but are you saying that people who practice faith are not acting to achieve their values?

Hello Paul,

So when a religious person practices the virtue of faith, when evaluated by Objectivist standards, that person is not practicing a religious virtue? Faith is certainly not a virtue in Objectivism's morality, but are you saying that people who practice faith are not acting to achieve their values?

In the context of evaluation by the moral standard of man's life, faith is not a virtue. Why? Because, in the context of that standard, given that man is the rational animal, it cannot be demonstrated to be so, i.e., to be morally excellent.

In the context of evaluation by the another moral standard, i.e. of a religion that holds faith to be a virtue in the context of belief in God and admission to heaven, it is a virtue. Why? Because, in the context of that standard, it can be demonstrated to be so, i.e., to be morally excellent.

[organon 0]

WHATEVER action by which one gains and keeps a value IS excellence in morality. It is so necessarily. That is why its inclusion would be a redundancy.

Not until its moral excellence, in the context of whatever standard is forming the basis of the judgment, has been demonstrated.

If a man kills another man to obtain admission to Paradise, and the moral standard, in the context of which the evaluation is made, is admission to Paradise, then the action is, by that standard, morally excellent, and, in the context of that standard, it is a virtue.

If a man kills another man to obtain admission to Paradise, and the moral standard, in the context of which the evaluation is made, is that of man's life, then the action is, by that standard, not morally excellent, as the value and related virtue is not rational, and, in the context of that standard, it is not a virtue.

[alann 0]

Neither organon or Brian is using an "invalid" definition. They are discussing two different concepts.

Just to see if I can expand on Betsy's point (any error in the following is my fault not hers) and Organon's most recent post, above:

One needs to have a way to discuss philosophic concepts generically and specifically. Yes, there is an Objectivist definition of 'Virtue'. There is also a more general concept of virtue that doesn't assume an Objectivist foundation, or how do you discuss Plato or Nietszche or Hume or Kant? These concepts have been around a long time and abused for far longer than they were properly used. To contrast the Christian or Kantian concept of 'Virtue', you have to have a definition that works for both. I.e. Virtue, to a Christian is self-sacrifice to god or The Poor, or whoever's "need" is greater. To an Objectivist, creating and producing for the betterment of your own life is a Virtue. So a general definition that would subsume both might be: "Virtue is ones achievement of Values consistent with ones Ethical principles. A 'Value' would always be Rand's: "That which one acts to gain and/or keep," since it contains no prejudice toward rational nor irrational philosophy, Objectivist Ethics, or Rotten Ethics.

An Objectivist definition of 'Virtue' would be "The achievement of objective Values," or "The successful pursuit and achievement of Values consistent with ones own rational, long-range self-interest." Or just look in VOS or OPAR for the relevant definition.

Arguing that the ONLY definition of 'Virtue' is the Objectivist one is essentially begging the question, since it makes it impossible even to discuss other contrasting (and, yes, invalid) definitions of 'Virtue'. Ultimately, though, it is right to say that Christian Ethics, for example, is, if not an oxymoron, demonstrably inconsistent with life, with ones own happiness, and therefore unworkable, if one attempts to follow them consistently. But you do need words to discuss that fact.

It just seems that two honest men are talking past each other, unless I'm misunderstanding something.

[organon 0]

Virtue is defined as: moral excellence; goodness; righteousness. It is a concept that exists in a moral context.

Where did this definition come from? By the standards set forth in ItOE, Chapter 5, it is a rather poor definition. It totally lacks a genus and a differentia.

I offer the following, in this context, as a start (subject to change as the thread continues):

Family: Objective evaluation.

Genus: Objective evaluation in a moral context.

Differentia: Objective evaluation in a moral context of an action, specifically, in the context of whether an action can be considered morally excellent, such evaluation made in the context of a moral standard, whatever that may be.

[organon 0]

Neither organon or Brian is using an "invalid" definition. They are discussing two different concepts.

Just to see if I can expand on Betsy's point (any error in the following is my fault not hers) and Organon's most recent post, above:

One needs to have a way to discuss philosophic concepts generically and specifically. Yes, there is an Objectivist definition of 'Virtue'. There is also a more general concept of virtue that doesn't assume an Objectivist foundation, or how do you discuss Plato or Nietszche or Hume or Kant? These concepts have been around a long time and abused for far longer than they were properly used. To contrast the Christian or Kantian concept of 'Virtue', you have to have a definition that works for both. I.e. Virtue, to a Christian is self-sacrifice to god or The Poor, or whoever's "need" is greater. To an Objectivist, creating and producing for the betterment of your own life is a Virtue. So a general definition that would subsume both might be: "Virtue is ones achievement of Values consistent with ones Ethical principles. A 'Value' would always be Rand's: "That which one acts to gain and/or keep," since it contains no prejudice toward rational nor irrational philosophy, Objectivist Ethics, or Rotten Ethics.

An Objectivist definition of 'Virtue' would be "The achievement of objective Values," or "The successful pursuit and achievement of Values consistent with ones own rational, long-range self-interest." Or just look in VOS or OPAR for the relevant definition.

Arguing that the ONLY definition of 'Virtue' is the Objectivist one is essentially begging the question, since it makes it impossible even to discuss other contrasting (and, yes, invalid) definitions of 'Virtue'. Ultimately, though, it is right to say that Christian Ethics, for example, is, if not an oxymoron, demonstrably inconsistent with life, with ones own happiness, and therefore unworkable, if one attempts to follow them consistently. But you do need words to discuss that fact.

It just seems that two honest men are talking past each other, unless I'm misunderstanding something.

Hello alann,

Here is a relevant excerpt from the thread:

The identification of an act as virtuous requires the demonstration of its moral excellence, in the context of a moral standard, whatever that may be.

Since one cannot validly make an appeal to any particular moral standard in the definition of 'virtue', what then can be the meaning of "moral excellence"?

The moral excellence, or virtue, of an action is demonstrated by reference to a moral standard, whatever that may be. No particular moral standard is implied. (italics added)

It can only be 'the action by which one gains and keeps a value'. If it means anything else, it would again limit the term 'virtue' to some particular moral standards as opposed to being applicable to ALL.

As such, including 'moral excellence' in the definition is, at best, a redundancy. It is therefore properly stricken.

'Virtue' is a concept that exists in a moral context. It is defined as moral excellence, or goodness. The evaluation of an act as virtuous requires the demonstration of its moral excellence in the context of a moral standard, whatever that may be. No particular moral standard is implied in the definition; only that the action be identified as morally excellent in the context of whatever standard forms the basis of the judgment. (italics added)

"Virtue is ones achievement of Values consistent with ones Ethical principles [JR: whatever such principles may be].

This seems fine, and does not conflict with the above in any regard.

[organon 0]

I'm not sure I understand this.

If 'virtue' is the action by which one gains and keeps a value, what action which does that would not be identified as morally excellent? In other words, what virtue, when exercised, is NOT an instance of moral excellence?

If the standard by which the determination of moral excellence is being made is man's life, and the action by which the value was acquired was not consistent with man's life, then the action is not morally excellent, in the context of that standard.

If a car was acquired by means of murder, was a value acquired? Yes. In the context of an evaluation of the moral excellence of that act by the standard of man's life, was that action morally excellent? No.

Because a value was acquired, indicates nothing as to the moral excellence of the act by which it was acquired, such evaluation made by reference to a moral standard (either that of man's life, or another).

[Brian Smith 0]

Yes, there is an Objectivist definition of 'Virtue'. There is also a more general concept of virtue that doesn't assume an Objectivist foundation, or how do you discuss Plato or Nietszche or Hume or Kant?

I would suggest that the definition of virtue identified by Miss Rand IS the definition of 'virtue'. I would suggest this definition subsumes ALL the different types of virtues there are, be they Objectivist, Platonic, Humean, Bob's, etc.. So there is 'virtue' and then there is 'Objectivist virtue', 'Christian virtue', etc..

I identify this point more fully in THIS POST

[organon 0]

Which is why I disagree with the WHATEVER in "WHATEVER action by which one gains and keeps a value IS excellence in morality." It is not just whether I 'think' a particular action is a virtue. The action needs to be objective, not simply what I think it to be or any action I take to gain and/or keep it.

This is the same error as trying to insert 'rational' into the definition of 'virtue'.

No, it isn't.

Virtue is a concept that exists in a moral context; it is defined as moral excellence.

To establish that an action is virtuous, requires a demonstration of its moral excellence by reference to a standard, whatever that may be.

If a value is acquired by means that, in the context of the actor's own moral standard, for example, is not morally excellent, then, in the context of his own evaluation by that standard, the action is not morally excellent, i.e., not a virtue.

Which is why I disagree with the WHATEVER in "WHATEVER action by which one gains and keeps a value IS excellence in morality." It is not just whether I 'think' a particular action is a virtue. The action needs to be objective (italics added), not simply what I think it to be or any action I take to gain and/or keep it.

To elaborate, if I may: the action needs to evaluated as morally excellent in the context of a moral standard, whatever that may be -- i.e., objectively evaluated as morally excellent in the context of that standard.

[organon 0]

Yes, there is an Objectivist definition of 'Virtue'. There is also a more general concept of virtue that doesn't assume an Objectivist foundation, or how do you discuss Plato or Nietszche or Hume or Kant?

I would suggest that the definition of virtue identified by Miss Rand IS the definition of 'virtue'. I would suggest this definition subsumes ALL the different types of virtues there are, be they Objectivist, Platonic, Humean, Bob's, etc.. So there is 'virtue' and then there is 'Objectivist virtue', 'Christian virtue', etc..

I identify this point more fully in THIS POST

'Virtue' is a concept that exists in a moral context. It is defined as moral excellence, or goodness. The evaluation of an act as virtuous requires the demonstration of its moral excellence in the context of a moral standard, whatever that may be. No particular moral standard is implied in the definition; only that the action be identified as morally excellent in the context of whatever standard forms the basis of the judgment. (italics added)

http://forums.4aynrandfans.com/index.php?s...amp;#entry58904

[Brian Smith 0]

Virtue is defined as: moral excellence; goodness; righteousness. It is a concept that exists in a moral context.

Where did this definition come from? By the standards set forth in ItOE, Chapter 5, it is a rather poor definition. It totally lacks a genus and a differentia.

I offer the following, in this context, as a start (subject to change as the thread continues):

Family: Objective evaluation.

Genus: Objective evaluation in a moral context.

Differentia: Objective evaluation in a moral context of an action, specifically, in the context of whether an action can be considered morally excellent, such evaluation made in the context of a moral standard, whatever that may be.

What is this now supposed to be a definition of? And what is the full, non-dissected definition?

Is this a THIRD definition of 'virtue'?

[organon 0]

Virtue is defined as: moral excellence; goodness; righteousness. It is a concept that exists in a moral context.

Where did this definition come from? By the standards set forth in ItOE, Chapter 5, it is a rather poor definition. It totally lacks a genus and a differentia.

I offer the following, in this context, as a start (subject to change as the thread continues):

Family: Objective evaluation.

Genus: Objective evaluation in a moral context.

Differentia: Objective evaluation in a moral context of an action, specifically, in the context of whether an action can be considered morally excellent, such evaluation made in the context of a moral standard, whatever that may be.

What is this now supposed to be a definition of? And what is the full, non-dissected definition?

Is this a THIRD definition of 'virtue'?

This is an examination of virtue in the context of epistemology -- in the context of its genus and differentia (a family is suggested as well).

The definition of virtue is visible in the differentia, i.e., objective evaluation in a moral context of an action, specifically, in the context of whether an action can be considered morally excellent, such evaluation made in the context of a moral standard, whatever that may be. Which, of course, is exactly the definition described above.

A definition follows the same principle: it specifies the distinguishing characteristic(s) of the units, and indicates the category of existents from which they were differentiated. (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, Meridian, 1990?, p. 40).

[Paul's Here 0]

Which is why I disagree with the WHATEVER in "WHATEVER action by which one gains and keeps a value IS excellence in morality." It is not just whether I 'think' a particular action is a virtue. The action needs to be objective, not simply what I think it to be or any action I take to gain and/or keep it.

This is the same error as trying to insert 'rational' into the definition of 'virtue'.

No, it isn't.

Virtue is a concept that exists in a moral context; it is defined as moral excellence.

--------------

Betsy has already refuted this definition.

[organon 0]

Which is why I disagree with the WHATEVER in "WHATEVER action by which one gains and keeps a value IS excellence in morality." It is not just whether I 'think' a particular action is a virtue. The action needs to be objective, not simply what I think it to be or any action I take to gain and/or keep it.

This is the same error as trying to insert 'rational' into the definition of 'virtue'.

No, it isn't.

Virtue is a concept that exists in a moral context; it is defined as moral excellence.

--------------

Betsy has already refuted this definition.

And when did this happen? :-)

If you are referring to her claim of epistemological flaws, see:

http://forums.4aynrandfans.com/index.php?s...ost&p=58903

A claim of a poor definition is not a refutation.

[organon 0]

Which is why I disagree with the WHATEVER in "WHATEVER action by which one gains and keeps a value IS excellence in morality." It is not just whether I 'think' a particular action is a virtue. The action needs to be objective, not simply what I think it to be or any action I take to gain and/or keep it.

This is the same error as trying to insert 'rational' into the definition of 'virtue'.

If I consider reaching heaven to be a value, and I think the act of self-sacrifice is the means of attaining that value, then my act of self-sacrifice is virtuous.

But that is because the virtue is consistent with the value. Suppose the example was: If I consider reaching heaven to be a value, I think studying biology was the means of attaining that value. Is my studying a virtuous act simply because I consider it a means to achieve the value?

Paul, in the context of the above exchange, which indicates, I think, some grasp of the moral context of virtue, i.e., that it is not a virtue absent demonstration of its moral excellence in the context of some standard, I am unsure of why you would write without qualification that the fact that virtue is a concept that exists in a moral context had been refuted.

See http://forums.4aynrandfans.com/index.php?s...ost&p=58908

[Betsy Speicher 0]

Arguing that the ONLY definition of 'Virtue' is the Objectivist one is essentially begging the question, since it makes it impossible even to discuss other contrasting (and, yes, invalid) definitions of 'Virtue'.

Actually, it is an example of a "frozen abstraction."

[A] fallacy which may be termed "the fallacy of the frozen abstraction" and which consists of substituting some one particular concrete for the wider abstract class to which it belongs—in this case, substituting a specific ethics (altruism) for the wider abstraction of "ethics."

[Betsy Speicher 0]

Virtue is a concept that exists in a moral context; it is defined as moral excellence.

I've seen this offered many times as if it explains something, but what does "moral excellence" mean? What is it's definition?

[organon 0]

Arguing that the ONLY definition of 'Virtue' is the Objectivist one is essentially begging the question, since it makes it impossible even to discuss other contrasting (and, yes, invalid) definitions of 'Virtue'.

Actually, it is an example of a "frozen abstraction."

This has not been argued in any regard whatever, in the context of a general definition of "virtue". Here is, for example, one of many times this has been indicated in the thread:

'Virtue' is a concept that exists in a moral context. It is defined as moral excellence, or goodness. The evaluation of an act as virtuous requires the demonstration of its moral excellence in the context of a moral standard, whatever that may be. No particular moral standard is implied in the definition; only that the action be identified as morally excellent in the context of whatever standard forms the basis of the judgment. (italics added)

[organon 0]

Virtue is a concept that exists in a moral context; it is defined as moral excellence.

I've seen this offered many times as if it explains something, but what does "moral excellence" mean? What is it's definition?

It depends upon the moral standard involved.

For a devout Christian, the achievement of Paradise is a value. The offered virtues are, e.g., faith, humility, unconditional love. If one exercises these virtues, then he is morally excellent, or good; and should the value be achieved, it will have been virtuously earned, in the context of this moral code.

For a devout Muslim, the achievement of Paradise is a value. The offered virtue, at least according to the Hadith (?), is death in a religious cause. If one exercises this virtue, then he is morally excellent, or good; and should the value be achieved, it will have been virtuously earned, in the context of this moral code.

For a rational man, his own life is his primary value. The related basic virtue is Rationality, which is "the source of all his other virtues." ("The Objectivist Ethics"). If one exercises these virtues, then he is morally excellent, or good; and should the value (his life) be achieved, it will have been virtuously earned, in the context of this moral code.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

Virtue is defined as: moral excellence; goodness; righteousness. It is a concept that exists in a moral context.

Where did this definition come from? By the standards set forth in ItOE, Chapter 5, it is a rather poor definition. It totally lacks a genus and a differentia.

I offer the following, in this context, as a start (subject to change as the thread continues):

Family: Objective evaluation.

Genus: Objective evaluation in a moral context.

Differentia: Objective evaluation in a moral context of an action, specifically, in the context of whether an action can be considered morally excellent, such evaluation made in the context of a moral standard, whatever that may be.

This is an examination of virtue in the context of epistemology -- in the context of its genus and differentia (a family is suggested as well).

The definition of virtue is visible in the differentia, i.e., objective evaluation in a moral context of an action, specifically, in the context of whether an action can be considered morally excellent, such evaluation made in the context of a moral standard, whatever that may be. Which, of course, is exactly the definition described above.

A definition follows the same principle: it specifies the distinguishing characteristic(s) of the units, and indicates the category of existents from which they were differentiated. (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, Meridian, 1990?, p. 40).

So where is the definition? How would can this be stated as "Virtue is [genus][differentia]? What are the distinguishing characteristics? A synonym like "morally excellent" is not a characteristic. What does "morally excellent" mean? What is the definition of "morally excellent?"

[RayK 0]

John, a virtue according to Objectivism is not what you keep trying to define it as. A virtue is an action that one takes to gain a value, the highest virtue being an "unbreached rationality."

[organon 0]

Virtue is defined as: moral excellence; goodness; righteousness. It is a concept that exists in a moral context.

Where did this definition come from? By the standards set forth in ItOE, Chapter 5, it is a rather poor definition. It totally lacks a genus and a differentia.

I offer the following, in this context, as a start (subject to change as the thread continues):

Family: Objective evaluation.

Genus: Objective evaluation in a moral context.

Differentia: Objective evaluation in a moral context of an action, specifically, in the context of whether an action can be considered morally excellent, such evaluation made in the context of a moral standard, whatever that may be.

This is an examination of virtue in the context of epistemology -- in the context of its genus and differentia (a family is suggested as well).

The definition of virtue is visible in the differentia, i.e., objective evaluation in a moral context of an action, specifically, in the context of whether an action can be considered morally excellent, such evaluation made in the context of a moral standard, whatever that may be. Which, of course, is exactly the definition described above.

A definition follows the same principle: it specifies the distinguishing characteristic(s) of the units, and indicates the category of existents from which they were differentiated. (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, Meridian, 1990?, p. 40).

So where is the definition? How would can this be stated as "Virtue is [genus][differentia]? What are the distinguishing characteristics? A synonym like "morally excellent" is not a characteristic. What does "morally excellent" mean? What is the definition of "morally excellent?"

Virtue: objective evaluation (family) in a moral context (genus) of an action (differentia). Namely, the evaluation of whether an action is, according to the moral standard forming the basis of the judgment, morally excellent, or good.

Whether an action is a virtue, i.e. morally excellent or good, depends upon the moral standard involved.

http://forums.4aynrandfans.com/index.php?s...ost&p=58951

[organon 0]

John, a virtue according to Objectivism is not what you keep trying to define it as. A virtue is an action that one takes to gain a value, the highest virtue being an "unbreached rationality."

Hi Ray,

In order to say that an action, by which one achieves a value, is virtuous, requires that that action be identified, in the context of the moral standard used for the evaluation, as good, or morally excellent.

Assume that our moral standard is man's life, and our virtues and values are those described by Miss Rand.

In this context, were a man to gain a car by means of murder, was a "value" gained? Yes. Was the means by which it was achieved virtuous, i.e. morally excellent or good, in the context of a rational moral standard? No.

(A demonstration that the highest virtue is an "unbreached rationality", something with which I without question agree, requires the context of a moral standard, according to which rationality can be demonstrated as morally excellent, and the highest virtue. The moral standard needed in this case is that of Man's Life. But at present, those involved in the thread are focusing on "virtue" in a more general sense.)

John

[Betsy Speicher 0]

Virtue is defined as: moral excellence; goodness; righteousness. It is a concept that exists in a moral context.

Where did this definition come from? By the standards set forth in ItOE, Chapter 5, it is a rather poor definition. It totally lacks a genus and a differentia.

I offer the following, in this context, as a start (subject to change as the thread continues):

Family: Objective evaluation.

Genus: Objective evaluation in a moral context.

Differentia: Objective evaluation in a moral context of an action, specifically, in the context of whether an action can be considered morally excellent, such evaluation made in the context of a moral standard, whatever that may be.

This is an examination of virtue in the context of epistemology -- in the context of its genus and differentia (a family is suggested as well).

The definition of virtue is visible in the differentia, i.e., objective evaluation in a moral context of an action, specifically, in the context of whether an action can be considered morally excellent, such evaluation made in the context of a moral standard, whatever that may be. Which, of course, is exactly the definition described above.

A definition follows the same principle: it specifies the distinguishing characteristic(s) of the units, and indicates the category of existents from which they were differentiated. (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, Meridian, 1990?, p. 40).

So where is the definition? How would can this be stated as "Virtue is [genus][differentia]? What are the distinguishing characteristics? A synonym like "morally excellent" is not a characteristic. What does "morally excellent" mean? What is the definition of "morally excellent?"