A question and analysis relating to evil

[organon 0]

Is evil primarily a psychological phenomenon? And can emotional response be used to infer, or to prove (in the event there is no doubt in regard to causation), a moral evaluation of evil?

In Who is Ayn Rand? (Random House, 1962, p. 72-3), Nathaniel Branden writes:

“The Objectivist ethics is especially significant for the psychotherapist because it is the first psychological morality. It is the first morality to define the issue of good and evil in terms of the actions of one’s consciousness—that is, in terms of the manner in which one uses one’s consciousness.”

Ayn Rand writes, in “The Age of Envy” (in The New Left: The Anti-Industrial Revolution, Penguin Group, 1993?, p. 155):

“[The] clearest manifestation [of hatred of the good] is the attitude of a person who characteristically resents someone’s success, happiness, achievement or good fortune—and experiences pleasure at someone’s failure, unhappiness or misfortune. This is pure, ‘nonvenal’ hatred of the good for being the good: the hater has nothing to lose or gain in such instances, no practical value at stake, no existential motive, no knowledge except the fact that a human being has succeeded or failed. The expressions of this response are brief, casual, as a rule involuntary. But if you have seen it, you have seen the naked face of evil.”

What can we gather from the above?

- That the moral evaluation of an individual originates in the method by which he governs the operation of his mind.

- That emotional response can provide evidence that can be used in the process of determining an individual’s moral evaluation by both himself, and by a rational observer.

Is this true? Is evil primarily a psychological phenomenon? And can emotional response be used as evidence to support or to prove (in the event there is no doubt in regard to causation) a moral evaluation of evil on the part of he who experienced that response?

Of course.

If a man:

- Feels pleasure on reviewing a news story of Marilyn Monroe’s death, his only (implicit) grasp of her, that she was morally good, morally pure, and fundamentally, authentically happy.

- Feels pleasure on reading a news story that a child, about whom he knows nothing else, passed away from cancer at the age of 6.

- Felt pleasure when he saw the first building of the World Trade Center collapse into rubble, with the corollary grasp of the loss of all the innocent lives within it.

Yes, he is without question evil, to a significant degree.

Now, consider the following from Branden’s The Art of Living Consciously (Fireside, 1999?, p. 156-7):

“In the effort to become more conscious, more self-aware, and to reintegrate disowned elements of one’s personality, many persons are hampered by a formidable notion: the belief, mentioned above, that there are such things as “evil thoughts” and “evil emotions” – thoughts and emotions that, simply by their presence, constitute evidence of one’s immorality.

“Desires and emotions as such are involuntary [JR: desires? this is not necessarily true, unless the mind and its desires are governed by emotion, e.g., an evil man who sees a man of authentic pride, instantly feels hatred, and then, hard upon, the desire to see him die violently. Emotions? yes, I would agree]; they are not subject to direct volitional control. The result of subconscious evaluations, they cannot be commanded in and out of existence, any more than beliefs can (JR: What the he__?! I cannot command the belief that an apple is a pear out of existence? Or that socialism is a benevolent political system?). But it is impossible to compute the amount of guilt and suffering produced by the notion that certain desires and emotions are proof of moral culpability. “Because I feel such-and-such, I am a rotten person.” “Because I don’t feel such-and-such, I will burn in hell.”

Are certain desires and emotions proof of moral depravity?

Yes, without question.

Because a man feels “such-and-such” (e.g., glee at the death of a child from cancer), is he a rotten person?

Yes, without question.

“But it is impossible to compute the amount of guilt and suffering produced by the notion that certain desires and emotions are proof of moral culpability.”

Fundamental guilt, and suffering, if deserved, are the emotional price he pays for what he is. And are to be valued – as an emotional indicator that he is on the wrong course.

Now: in what way would such guilt and suffering be irrational?

In the context of their isolation from their psychological origins – in the context of the idea that, by virtue of the fact that they exist, they provide proof of a fundamental, unalterable depravity. Such belief following from the idea that what a man is, he is – if he is evil, then is evil, and that cannot be changed. If he is good, he is good, and that cannot be changed.

Consider the result of this, in his psychology, for one who accepts this idea:

He experiences the desperate fear of identification in relation to his self, of introspection, including in regard to the nature and origin of his emotional responses, for fear of discovering that he is, unalterably, irretrievably, permanently, among the damned.

Yes, evil exists, and emotional response can be used to infer or to prove (given there is no doubt regarding causation) that a man is evil.

However, depravity is not necessarily a fixed, unalterable determination. One’s emotional responses are the product of the contents of one’s consciousness, which are, in at least some, and likely in the vast majority of cases, given that the individual is willing to think about what he thinks, alterable.

Should one not feel he is a rotten person if he experiences emotional responses indicative of depravity?

No, he is without question, at the time of that emotional response, in the relevant context, with the relevant implication regarding the fundamentality of his depravity, evil. That is his actual state at that time.

Is that moral evaluation, of himself and of him by a rational judge, an intrinsic, permanent, "metaphysically" unalterable moral determination?

In many, if not most, if not the vast majority, if not all, cases – no.

(I do not include here an examination of cases where the psychopathology has been expressed existentially to a significant degree in the form of crime -- particularly, in the case of murder with deliberate, unmitigated intent.1)

[Please note that, in the event additions are made to this thread, I may not review them for several days, if not longer; but be certain that I will review the thread in time.]

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1. http://forums.4aynrandfans.com/index.php?showtopic=6788

[organon 0]

A point:

My first concern are individuals who hold rationality as a virtue, and/or admire it (with its expressions in character and life) in others, to whatever degree, explicitly or (far more common, I imagine) implicitly, yet who experience a fundamental fear of objectivity in relation to the identification of their own emotional responses, due to the unjustified fear that they are or might be indicative of an intrinsic, unalterable "evil", to whatever degree -- proceeding from their own (likely faultless) lack of a grasp of from where evil derives.

Do the others, of more fundamental depravity, have the ability to achieve significant, even perfect, moral value in time? Again, assuming no significant existential expression of their evil that irretrievably "poisons the well", given that such can occur 1, yes. But they occupy a far lower place in my hierarchy of values.

1. http://forums.4aynrandfans.com/index.php?showtopic=6788

[Arnold 0]

A point:

My first concern are individuals who hold rationality as a virtue, and/or admire it (with its expressions in character and life) in others, to whatever degree, explicitly or (far more common, I imagine) implicitly, yet who experience a fundamental fear of objectivity in relation to the identification of their own emotional responses, due to the unjustified fear that they are or might be indicative of an intrinsic, unalterable "evil", to whatever degree -- proceeding from their own (likely faultless) lack of a grasp of from where evil derives.

Do the others, of more fundamental depravity, have the ability to achieve significant, even perfect, moral value in time? Again, assuming no significant existential expression of their evil that irretrievably "poisons the well", given that such can occur 1, yes. But they occupy a far lower place in my hierarchy of values.

1. http://forums.4aynrandfans.com/index.php?showtopic=6788

Because I'm not sure of your question, I'm not sure if my answer addresses it. If one accepts life as his highest value, and all that supports that life as good, then all that threatens life is evil. Since reason is the way men support their life, reason is the essence of good, and irrationality is the source of evil.

Morality advocates a reasoned set of values for successful living. Those who use reason in their affairs are moral. If you are asking if someone who was once evil could ever be regarded as perfectly moral because of that, you must specify the period in question. If someone was once a thief, and now regrets it, he may now be perfectly moral, but can never say that his whole life was moral.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

And can emotional response be used as evidence to support or to prove (in the event there is no doubt in regard to causation) a moral evaluation of evil on the part of he who experienced that response?

Of course.

If a man:

- Feels pleasure on reviewing a news story of Marilyn Monroe’s death, his only (implicit) grasp of her, that she was morally good, morally pure, and fundamentally, authentically happy.

- Feels pleasure on reading a news story that a child, about whom he knows nothing else, passed away from cancer at the age of 6.

- Felt pleasure when he saw the first building of the World Trade Center collapse into rubble, with the corollary grasp of the loss of all the innocent lives within it.

Yes, he is without question evil, to a significant degree.

I would be damn careful about making such a judgment based on observations such as these, particularly about others. All I can observe about others is what they say or do. I cannot feel what they are feeling nor access their whole context to know what knowledge and value premises caused them to feel as they did.

For instance, how would you judge someone who read Ayn Rand's novels, claimed to love and respect her ideas and her mind that created them and, at her first opportunity to observe Ayn Rand in public, felt a strong sense of disgust and revulsion? I know judging such a person harshly would be an injustice because that was my response to seeing and hearing Ayn Rand for the first time.

My emotional reaction was caused by the fact that she looked so similar to, and had the same accent as my misery-worshipping, value-hating Russian immigrant aunts. That was the whole context that an outside observer would have no way of grasping. Once I realized which value premises my reaction was coming from, and reminded myself that this was the author of The Fountainhead and not my aunts, the emotion vanished.

If, instead, I had stopped introspecting as soon as I realized my reaction was "inappropriate," I would have condemned myself as evil based on emotions I had not examined and I would have never discovered that my emotion came from my own virtuous rejection of misery-worship.

[organon 0]

My emotional reaction was caused by the fact that she looked so similar to, and had the same accent as my misery-worshipping, value-hating Russian immigrant aunts.

Betsy, in this case, the cause of your emotional response was entirely understandable, and not an indication of a moral flaw in any regard whatever: this reaction was not, in any regard, an emotional response to Miss Rand's moral worth, or the value of her work. You were responding to a relatively superficial aspect of her character, that elicited a strong evaluation unconnected with her values.

In the cases above described, I think that no other causation could rationally be derived than depravity, i.e., no other causation that could reasonably be inferred.

John

[organon 0]

You were responding to a relatively superficial aspect of her character, that elicited a strong evaluation unconnected with her values.

In any kind of negative sense. In fact :-), the reaction you felt toward her was a response derived from an evaluation (although, rationally, the related aspect of her character was not indicative of a moral flaw) that, in a moral sense, she would no doubt support.

[organon 0]

Morality advocates a reasoned set of values for successful living. Those who use reason in their affairs are moral. If you are asking if someone who was once evil could ever be regarded as perfectly moral because of that, you must specify the period in question. If someone was once a thief, and now regrets it, he may now be perfectly moral, but can never say that his whole life was moral.

Hi Arnold,

Given that he not only regrets it, but has corrected, to whatever degree, the psychological cause of his desire to steal, yes, he is then, to some degree, a better man.

Agreed, that we cannot say that he was moral his whole life.

But if we are rational, and, in the context of justice, we are seeking to form an evaluation of the man, should anything else matter than what he is now?

John

[Arnold 0]

Agreed, that we cannot say that he was moral his whole life.

But if we are rational, and, in the context of justice, we are seeking to form an evaluation of the man, should anything else matter than what he is now?

John

It depends on what is intended to be covered by 'matter'. After all, what he is now, follows from all that went before. One cannot wipe the slate clean over his whole lifespan.

If one is concerned only with what the person is now, then I would see no reason to think less of him than one who had never ever been immoral. All this presupposes he has no debt to the past.

If you wonder why I think this, it is because the effort to change and reform one's thinking, is a credit in itself. While it cannot undo the past, can change the future.

There is something to be said for those who reform themselves, and that is that they are now living for the future. In that sense they are perfectly moral.

[Maarten 0]

My emotional reaction was caused by the fact that she looked so similar to, and had the same accent as my misery-worshipping, value-hating Russian immigrant aunts.

Betsy, in this case, the cause of your emotional response was entirely understandable, and not an indication of a moral flaw in any regard whatever: this reaction was not, in any regard, an emotional response to Miss Rand's moral worth, or the value of her work. You were responding to a relatively superficial aspect of her character, that elicited a strong evaluation unconnected with her values.

In the cases above described, I think that no other causation could rationally be derived than depravity, i.e., no other causation that could reasonably be inferred.

John

Yes, but the point is, I think, that in most cases you do not know these additional circumstances. So I would be very careful about judging someone as evil based on such an emotional response alone. Furthermore, emotions as such are dictated by a person's subconsciously integrated value-system. The fact that they experience a certain emotion doesn't say anything beyond indicating that they are holding some premise (whether for good or for bad).

It is impossible for a person to be evil only because of an emotional response, no matter what it is. It depends on whether or not he consciously approves of the value judgment underlying the emotional response.

[organon 0]

Hi Maarten,

Yes, but the point is, I think, that in most cases you do not know these additional circumstances. So I would be very careful about judging someone as evil based on such an emotional response alone.

Assuming there can be no legitimate doubt as to the causation of that emotional response, that is, that there is no basis whatever to doubt that he has

[experienced] pleasure at someone’s [that he has no basis whatever to believe is evil] failure, unhappiness or misfortune (Rand)

is this the case? As in the case of one who felt pleasure on the sight on the first WTC tower collapsing, with the implicit grasp of the loss of all the innocent lives within it.

Furthermore, emotions as such are dictated by a person's subconsciously integrated value-system. The fact that they experience a certain emotion doesn't say anything beyond indicating that they are holding some premise (whether for good or for bad).

Emotions are automatic, yes. And, when causation is established, reveal certain underlying beliefs/values.

Are the beliefs and values a man holds irrelevant to a judgment of his moral worth? If a man believes that rationality is a sin, values the death of rational men, and experiences pleasure on perceiving such death, this is relevant to a moral evaluation of him by a rational observer.

It is impossible for a person to be evil only because of an emotional response, no matter what it is. It depends on whether or not he consciously approves of the value judgment underlying the emotional response.

If the emotional response he experienced on the site of the first WTC tower collapsing was pleasure, and this emotion did indeed derive from his grasp of the destruction of all the positive human values destroyed in that collapse, I disagree; regardless of his conscious approval (which I examine below), he is, to a extremely significant degree, at the moment that response generated, evil.

Now: Does he consciously approve of that emotional response. Is he consciously aware of the beliefs and values informing that response, and does he approve of them.

Assume he does explicitly grasp and approve of the fact that his beliefs and values are fundamentally anti-life, and values the fact that he is so. Then he is evil.

Assume he does not explicitly grasp and approve of the fact that his beliefs and values are fundamentally anti-life, but nevertheless, experiences that emotional reaction. Is he still evil at the time of that response?

Yes, I would argue he is, in the context of that response, at the time it generated, with the corollary implication(s) as to the degree of his depravity.

But this is not something he values, or, in reality or in his view, an unalterable determination. The question of whether he will remain so, which is not necessarily an unalterable determination, depends on his willingness to examine and address the cause of that emotion, i.e., to think about what he thinks.

Now: Let us consider the man who is fundamentally life-oriented, who consciously grasps that his beliefs and values are fundamentally anti-life, and still has no desire whatever to alter his identity in this regard, for whatever reason.

What does this mean?

That he values life, he grasps that he is evil, and yet he is unwilling, for whatever reason, to address the cause in any way to alter that evaluation. That is: he believes that he evil, and that he will not change -- i.e., that he is irredeemably so, either by virtue of his belief that his moral evaluation is intrinsic and unalterable, or by virtue of the fact that, for whatever reason, he believes his negative moral evaluation is alterable, yet he has no intent whatever to do anything about it at any point, now or in the future.

What would the result be?

“No man can survive the moment of pronouncing himself irredeemably evil; should he do it, his next moment is insanity or suicide.” (Rand, Atlas Shrugged)

[organon 0]

Assume he does not explicitly grasp and approve of the fact that his beliefs and values are fundamentally anti-life, but nevertheless, experiences that emotional reaction. Is he still evil at the time of that response?

Yes, I would argue he is, in the context of that response, at the time it generated, with the corollary implication(s) as to the degree of his depravity.

The degree of his depravity is not, I think, anywhere near that of the "man" who explicitly valued a positive emotional reaction to the collapse.

[Maarten 0]

Evil is a moral concept, specifically the lack of it. As such, only those things subject to a man's choice can be evil. Emotions are automated responses, so it is impossible that an emotion as such can be evil.

It is entirely a different matter to judge a man for his professed beliefs and for his taken actions. But that is not what you are proposing here.

[organon 0]

Evil is a moral concept, specifically the lack of it. As such, only those things subject to a man's choice can be evil. Emotions are automated responses, so it is impossible that an emotion as such can be evil.

Hi Maarten,

Consider Miss Rand on this subject:

“[The] clearest manifestation [of hatred of the good] is the attitude of a person who characteristically resents someone’s success, happiness, achievement or good fortune—and experiences pleasure at someone’s failure, unhappiness or misfortune. This is pure, ‘nonvenal’ hatred of the good for being the good: the hater has nothing to lose or gain in such instances, no practical value at stake, no existential motive, no knowledge except the fact that a human being has succeeded or failed. The expressions of this response are brief, casual, as a rule involuntary. But if you have seen it, you have seen the naked face of evil.”

What does she speak of here, and judge as the "naked face of evil"? An individual who experiences resentment or pleasure, in relation to the achievement or destruction, respectively, of rational values. These are emotions ("the expressions of this response are brief, casual, as a rule involuntary." (italics added)).

[Maarten 0]

Note that she says characteristically resents. That means it's more than just isolated instances where such an emotion pops up. However, you did not qualify any such thing in your earlier posts. Any one of your examples doesn't indicate a single thing about a person's morality, unless you change the hypothetical to include knowledge a person reasonably speaking could not have (which, you are doing, by the way).

[organon 0]

Note that she says characteristically resents. That means it's more than just isolated instances where such an emotion pops up.

Whether the resentment of values in general is characteristic indicates, I think, the degree of the depravity, the degree to which it permeates his mind, and whether an overall judgment of general depravity can be made.

Nevertheless, given that such resentment does not imply hatred of values in general, does a rational observer, and the individual who experienced that response, still judge that emotional response, within the appropriate context, as wrong, as immoral, as depraved, as indicative of evil, i.e. of beliefs and of values that are anti-life? Given that causation has been established, and that beliefs and values that are anti-life are without question the cause.

Assume a man is good to some meaningful degree, but, upon perceiving a young man who walks in a way in a way that implies authentic confidence that he sees each night on his walk home from work, he feels a degree of resentment. Assume that his reaction is without question to the grasp of authentic confidence in the sight of another man. His emotional reaction of resentment, its cause unaddressed, occurs each time he sees the young man, and is thus, within the appropriate context, characteristic.

In the relevant context, to the relevant degree (and this is not indicative of fundamental , general depravity), is this reaction immoral, and depraved? Is this emotional response properly judged as wrong, as, in its premises, evil, i.e. following from beliefs and values that are anti-life, given that causation has been established, by us or by him? Yes, of course.

However, you did not qualify any such thing in your earlier posts. Any one of your examples doesn't indicate a single thing about a person's morality, unless you change the hypothetical to include knowledge a person reasonably speaking could not have (which, you are doing, by the way).

I disagree; see below.

Assuming there can be no legitimate doubt as to the causation of that emotional response (italics added), that is, that there is no basis whatever to doubt that he has

[experienced] pleasure at someone’s [that he has no basis whatever to believe is evil] failure, unhappiness or misfortune (Rand)

is this the case? As in the case of one who felt pleasure on the sight on the first WTC tower collapsing, with the implicit grasp of the loss of all the innocent lives within it.

I cannot conceive of a rational basis for the experience of pleasure in this context. Or at the death of a child from cancer about whom he knows nothing.

Nevertheless, should doubt in your mind still exist regarding causation, even in these cases -- then assume that causation has been established with certainty. Given this, can we evaluate this emotional response (of resentment or hatred toward positive human values), as depraved, or as evil.

[organon 0]

Evil is a moral concept, specifically the lack of it. As such, only those things subject to a man's choice can be evil. Emotions are automated responses, so it is impossible that an emotion as such can be evil.

Given that causation has been established (through the identification, by himself or by a rational observer) of beliefs and values that are anti-life, then the emotion is indicative of beliefs and values that are anti-life, and can be judged as evil -- i.e., as indicative of depravity by virtue of the causes from which it is derived.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

Consider Miss Rand on this subject:

"[The] clearest manifestation [of hatred of the good] is the attitude of a person who characteristically resents someone's success, happiness, achievement or good fortune—and experiences pleasure at someone’s failure, unhappiness or misfortune. This is pure, ‘nonvenal’ hatred of the good for being the good: the hater has nothing to lose or gain in such instances, no practical value at stake, no existential motive, no knowledge except the fact that a human being has succeeded or failed. The expressions of this response are brief, casual, as a rule involuntary. But if you have seen it, you have seen the naked face of evil.”

What does she speak of here, and judge as the "naked face of evil"? An individual who experiences resentment or pleasure, in relation to the achievement or destruction, respectively, of rational values. These are emotions ("the expressions of this response are brief, casual, as a rule involuntary." (italics added)).

But one cannot -- and should not -- assume that if someone exhibits such emotions it means that they are caused by hatred of the good. Emotions are an effect that can have more than one cause.

Observe this description of Dominique:

Some mornings, when she awakened in her bedroom, she heard the explosions of blasting at the granite quarry. She stretched, her arms flung back above her head on the white silk pillow, and she listened. It was the sound of destruction and she liked it.

Observe what Dominique did:

She added: "You know, I love statues of naked men. Don't look so silly. I said statues. I had one in particular. It was supposed to be Helios. I got it out of a museum in Europe. I had a terrible time getting it—it wasn't for sale, of course. I think I was in love with it, Alvah. I brought it home with me."

"Where is it? I'd like to see something you like, for a change."

"It's broken."

"Broken? A museum piece? How did that happen?"

"I broke it."

"How?"

"I threw it down the air shaft. There's a concrete floor below."

"Are you totally crazy? Why?"

"So that no one else would ever see it."

And of course there was her campaign to destroy Roark.

Just looking at what Dominque said, did, and felt, would you conclude she hated the good for being the good? That she was "the naked face of evil?”

[organon 0]

What does she speak of here, and judge as the "naked face of evil"? An individual who experiences resentment or pleasure, in relation to the achievement or destruction, respectively, of rational values. These are emotions ("the expressions of this response are brief, casual, as a rule involuntary." (italics added)).

But one cannot -- and should not -- assume that if someone exhibits such emotions it means that they are caused by hatred of the good. Emotions are an effect that can have more than one cause.

Without question, given there is any reasonable basis whatever to doubt, or lack certainty in regard to, the moral nature of the involved causation, one cannot assume that such causation is evil.

Observe this description of Dominique:

Some mornings, when she awakened in her bedroom, she heard the explosions of blasting at the granite quarry. She stretched, her arms flung back above her head on the white silk pillow, and she listened. It was the sound of destruction and she liked it.

Observe what Dominique did:

She added: "You know, I love statues of naked men. Don't look so silly. I said statues. I had one in particular. It was supposed to be Helios. I got it out of a museum in Europe. I had a terrible time getting it—it wasn't for sale, of course. I think I was in love with it, Alvah. I brought it home with me."

"Where is it? I'd like to see something you like, for a change."

"It's broken."

"Broken? A museum piece? How did that happen?"

"I broke it."

"How?"

"I threw it down the air shaft. There's a concrete floor below."

"Are you totally crazy? Why?"

"So that no one else would ever see it."

And of course there was her campaign to destroy Roark.

Just looking at what Dominque said, did, and felt, would you conclude she hated the good for being the good? That she was "the naked face of evil?”

In relation to:

- Her destruction of the statue.

- Her campaign to destroy Roark.

Could these things be considered in isolation and be used to infer, in the absence of any other information, moral depravity? (Roger Enright may have made this error; he invited Dominique to the Enright House, I think, so that she could see the nature of that which (he thought) she was damning in her column.)

When one glance at Dominique in motion, one exchange with her, would provide conflicting data. As it no doubt did in the mind of Enright, when he observed her reaction to the Enright House.

And then, there is the issue of pleasure.

- Did Dominique thoroughly enjoy acting to destroy Roark? Was this a source of genuine, authentic pleasure to her?

Were it so, then I think it would be indicative of fundamental moral depravity.

But I do not think that she would have experienced, even in the midst of her worst errors, a sense of fundamental pleasure were she to have seen him destroyed.

[Scott A. 0]

John, at leat two of the recent threads you have begun, including this one, deal explicitly with the relationship between morality and psychology. Other common themes appear to be degrees of moralilty (or immorality), reformation, and points at which one has essentially crossed over into the realm of evil. Interesting topics, to be sure.

There is certainly a relationship between morality and psychology, but it is very tricky and should be approached with great caution. I think the examples Betsy has given really concretize why. My question for you is whether you could summarize, say in a paragraph, you core perspective on this. I'm not sure if you actually have questions, as your posts start with a question but then proceed to offer an answer. So, I'm curious to know what you are hoping to understand or explain in this and related threads. Thanks.

[organon 0]

Hi there Scott,

There is certainly a relationship between morality and psychology, but it is very tricky and should be approached with great caution. I think the examples Betsy has given really concretize why.

Please recall that with which the thread began, namely:

Is evil primarily a psychological phenomenon? And can emotional response be used to infer, or to prove (in the event there is no doubt in regard to causation), a moral evaluation of evil? (italics added)

My question for you is whether you could summarize, say in a paragraph, you core perspective on this.

If you mean my core perspective in the context of the relation of morality and psychology:

I think that a rational grasp, to whatever degree, explicit or implicit, of one's own moral value, i.e., the possession of authentic self-esteem, is necessary for the achievement and maintenance of psychological health.

[Scott A. 0]

Hello John, my responses are below...

Please recall that with which the thread began, namely:

Is evil primarily a psychological phenomenon? And can emotional response be used to infer, or to prove (in the event there is no doubt in regard to causation), a moral evaluation of evil? (italics added)

If one knew without a doubt that the causes of an emotional response were an anti-life, malevolent view of reality and man (backed by actual immoral acts and/or explicit support for such acts), why would one have to infer anything from the emotional response? In that case, the emotional response would be expected, given what you already know. I think one would only infer something from an emotional response if he did not know beyond doubt what a given person's premises, mental methods, and experiences are. And it is inferences in these cases that one must be very careful about.

My question for you is whether you could summarize, say in a paragraph, you core perspective on this.

If you mean my core perspective in the context of the relation of morality and psychology:

I think that a rational grasp, to whatever degree, explicit or implicit, of one's own moral value, i.e., the possession of authentic self-esteem, is necessary for the achievement and maintenance of psychological health.

Would it not be correct to say that authentic self-esteem is the manifestation of achieving and maintaining psychological health? I take what you write to be saying that self-esteem comes first, that it is a necessary precondition of psychological health. I would say it is mental health in one form.

I also think that the rational grasp of one's moral worth would be part of the process of achieving authentic self-esteem and mental health. One has to act consistently moral and identify fairly explicitly, in conceptual terms, why he knows it to be moral. To me, this speaks to Miss Rand's idea of man as a being of "self-made soul." Achieving high and stable moral status, as well as psychological health, is a process. Grasping one's moral worth would come at some point during that process, after one has appropriate evidence of his moral worth and the right concepts to identify it.

[organon 0]

If one knew without a doubt that the causes of an emotional response were an anti-life, malevolent view of reality and man (backed by actual immoral acts and/or explicit support for such acts), why would one have to infer anything from the emotional response? In that case, the emotional response would be expected, given what you already know. I think one would only infer something from an emotional response if he did not know beyond doubt what a given person's premises, mental methods, and experiences are. And it is inferences in these cases that one must be very careful about.

Given that one already has a thorough grasp of an individual's psychology, either in general or in a given context, then yes, one could infer what his emotional response would be to the perception of a given stimulus.

However, my concern is rather emotion in the context of evidence of the content of that consciousness, as a starting point (not to exclude other factors, e.g., direct interviewing, or behavioral data) from which one then reasons "backward", through the identification of causation, to the content of that consciousness and a moral evaluation of the individual who experienced that emotion.

In a more positive context than that of evil: Were I to go into a coffee shop, and see a young woman looking at me with intense admiration, the nature of her consciousness and the cause of that emotional response then would become something of which I would very likely be interested in learning more.

manifestation of achieving and maintaining psychological health? I take what you write to be saying that self-esteem comes first, that it is a necessary precondition of psychological health. I would say it is mental health in one form.

I also think that the rational grasp of one's moral worth would be part of the process of achieving authentic self-esteem and mental health. One has to act consistently moral and identify fairly explicitly, in conceptual terms, why he knows it to be moral. To me, this speaks to Miss Rand's idea of man as a being of "self-made soul." Achieving high and stable moral status, as well as psychological health, is a process. Grasping one's moral worth would come at some point during that process, after one has appropriate evidence of his moral worth and the right concepts to identify it.

This may take some time to respond to, Scott; it involves, for one, a thorough definition of mental health. I do look forward to discussing this further with you in time, should you then be amenable to doing so. :-)

John

[organon 0]

Given that one already has a thorough grasp of an individual's psychology, either in general or in a given context, then yes, one could infer what his emotional response would be to the perception of a given stimulus.

Rather:

Given that one already has a thorough grasp of an individual's psychology, either in general or in a given context, then yes, one could infer what his emotional response, if any, would be to the perception of a given stimulus.

[Scott A. 0]

However, my concern is rather emotion in the context of evidence of the content of that consciousness, as a starting point (not to exclude other factors, e.g., direct interviewing, or behavioral data) from which one then reasons "backward", through the identification of causation, to the content of that consciousness and a moral evaluation of the individual who experienced that emotion.

Yes, I understood you to be working backwards from the emotion. However, my main point, with which I think you agree, is that you wouldn't need to work backwards if you already knew the person's premises and existential actions.

In a more positive context than that of evil: Were I to go into a coffee shop, and see a young woman looking at me with intense admiration, the nature of her consciousness and the cause of that emotional response then would become something of which I would very likely be interested in learning more.

No doubt. But I think this is different than the situation in which you already know the contents of her consciousness.

manifestation of achieving and maintaining psychological health? I take what you write to be saying that self-esteem comes first, that it is a necessary precondition of psychological health. I would say it is mental health in one form.

I also think that the rational grasp of one's moral worth would be part of the process of achieving authentic self-esteem and mental health. One has to act consistently moral and identify fairly explicitly, in conceptual terms, why he knows it to be moral. To me, this speaks to Miss Rand's idea of man as a being of "self-made soul." Achieving high and stable moral status, as well as psychological health, is a process. Grasping one's moral worth would come at some point during that process, after one has appropriate evidence of his moral worth and the right concepts to identify it.

This may take some time to respond to, Scott; it involves, for one, a thorough definition of mental health. I do look forward to discussing this further with you in time, should you then be amenable to doing so. :-)

Sure, John. Whenever you have the time.

[organon 0]

However, my concern is rather emotion in the context of evidence of the content of that consciousness, as a starting point (not to exclude other factors, e.g., direct interviewing, or behavioral data) from which one then reasons "backward", through the identification of causation, to the content of that consciousness and a moral evaluation of the individual who experienced that emotion.

Yes, I understood you to be working backwards from the emotion. However, my main point, with which I think you agree, is that you wouldn't need to work backwards if you already knew the person's premises and existential actions.

Yes, without question, I imagine that the emotional response of an individual to a given stimulus significantly relevant to his or her values could be predicted, with high or extremely high probability, even certainty, given sufficient knowledge of his or her mind, and all the relevant data.

The question I would ask, would be: by what method was the knowledge that allows this prediction, initially gained?

Following the establishment of the contents of that mind's significant content, emotional response could then be valued as a validation of one's grasp of what the person is -- as when one's wife, with whom one is watching The Little Mermaid, laughs during the "Kiss the Girl" scene -- or sobs uncontrollably at Neil's (?) death in Dead Poets Society.

In a more positive context than that of evil: Were I to go into a coffee shop, and see a young woman looking at me with intense admiration, the nature of her consciousness and the cause of that emotional response then would become something of which I would very likely be interested in learning more.

No doubt. But I think this is different than the situation in which you already know the contents of her consciousness.

Yes, as described above.

This may take some time to respond to, Scott; it involves, for one, a thorough definition of mental health. I do look forward to discussing this further with you in time, should you then be amenable to doing so. :-)

Sure, John. Whenever you have the time.

I admit that I have not yet completed such an explicit definition to any thorough degree whatever, and am unsure of the timeframe of that completion; it could be considerable, although it is not an insignificant priority in any regard. When it, and the relevant work related to it, is complete, I look forward to that conversation. :-)

John (organon)