Life and Values

[Guest Michelle F. Cohen]

There is no need to consider that, if other people with beloved pets act on the same principle that I do, and I were the drowning person, my life would be forfeit. Nor is there any need to consider how devastated I would be if the life of a loved one could have been saved by Rose, but she didn't save him or her; because she assigned a higher value to her beloved pet than to me, my wife or husband, or my child. That's the way it should be. She should value her beloved pet more than she should value a stranger.

But this is good?

Consider a lonely man whose only companion is a dog he had for years. Couldn't it be conceivably self-sacrifical for him to save a stranger whom he will never see again and then spend the rest of his life in loneliness without his dog? Should he be consolled by the thought that if ever his life is in danger, another dog-lover will save him rather than the dog?

[Rose Lake 0]

Consider a lonely man whose only companion is a dog he had for years. Couldn't it be conceivably self-sacrifical for him to save a stranger whom he will never see again and then spend the rest of his life in loneliness without his dog? Should he be consolled by the thought that if ever his life is in danger, another dog-lover will save him rather than the dog?

Okay for him. But a number of those arguing in favor of saving their own beloved pets over a human stranger have been young with most of their lives ahead of them, and/or people with families.

[Rose Lake 0]

And by people with families, I am referring to chosen family, i.e. spouses and/or children.

[Guest Michelle F. Cohen]

Okay for him. But a number of those arguing in favor of saving their own beloved pets over a human stranger have been young with most of their lives ahead of them, and/or people with families.

I can see your point. Personally, I would save a stranger rather than the dog I've had for ten years, because I have a husband and a son as companions, and I can also get another dog. But I also remember how devastated I was as a child when my dog died after eating rat poisoning. Even though I got another dog, it was never the same as the dog who died. So I understand that for some people a dog means everything.

[RayK 0]

It is hard to choose what would be done without a certain context, in this post they keep changing. With that said I see nothing wrong with either direction of choice as long as it is in line with the person's values.

I grew up taking care of animals, not by choice. My parents bought horses when I was four, then chickens, cats, cows and pigs. My parents also had dogs before I was even born. I grew up taking care of all these animals again without choice. In upper New York state in the middle of winter I had to go and feed the animals before going to school. When I came home from school I had to clean their stalls or pins before doing anything else. I have buried many dogs, cats, chickens and horses. I can say without a doubt that I hated almost all of it. I did not choose to have any of these animals and received very little benefit from any of them.

With that conext in mind and using Objective Ethics as my guide I think most of you can guess my choice, most times. I do not put very much value in animals, and it really does not affect me when they die.

My children have two dogs that they love very much. I provide for those dogs as it brings me happiness to see my children happy. But, I would not have any animals if not for my children.

[Rose Lake 0]

I can see your point. Personally, I would save a stranger rather than the dog I've had for ten years, because I have a husband and a son as companions, and I can also get another dog. But I also remember how devastated I was as a child when my dog died after eating rat poisoning. Even though I got another dog, it was never the same as the dog who died. So I understand that for some people a dog means everything.

I think that, so long as a beloved pet actually does mean everything to a person in tenuous circumstances (as in your example), it could be alright -- although if the person who drowned as a result of this choice was a top value to a dominantly rational family, and/or a great value to men in general, it would be horribly tragic.

What I object to, is those who have relationships with people to whom they assign a higher value than the value they assign to their beloved pet, arguing for saving that pet over a human stranger. It is holding a double standard to be unwilling to make the same decision for a stranger that one would want made by a stranger for oneself.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

Rose Lake, I'm having difficulty in discerning your argument in regard to morality. (It might be helpful if, instead of phrasing others' views in a negative light, instead you present a more direct, positive statement of your own view).

There is no need to consider that, if other people with beloved pets act on the same principle that I do, and I were the drowning person, my life would be forfeit.

If the principle upon which one acts is that of rational self-interest, then considering our morality what purpose does it serve to highlight that you may not benefit from the specific actions of someone else acting in their own rational self-interest? In analogy, if it is in my rational self-interest to foreclose on a loan due me, need I modify my action by considering what would happen if someone else forclosed on a loan to me?

Nor is there any need to consider how devastated I would be if the life of a loved one could have been saved by Rose, but she didn't save him or her; because she assigned a higher value to her beloved pet than to me, my wife or husband, or my child.

This seems to beg the question. The issue is about the morality of the action -- whether or not it can be in a person's rational self-interest -- not about the feelings of another.

Perhaps it might be of value if I can add some perspective to this question, especially since I am the one who posed it. Leaving out the pet, under normal conditions I think that, on one extreme, it is generally agreed that it would be immoral not to save a complete stranger if doing so did not endanger yourself at all. On the other extreme, I suspect we would all agree that it is moral to save your loved one, say, a wife, husband, or child, rather than a stranger, if the circumstances permit only saving one.

The first example establishes that a human stranger is a value, while the second example establishes that a higher value takes precedence over the lower value you place on the stranger. The question posed in this thread is, in essence, can a pet be of such value to you that it is morally proper to save the pet rather than the stranger? Is it rational to value the life of a beloved pet more than the life of a complete stranger? And, for now, I might even broaden the question further by asking is it ever rational to have a non-human value so great that it is valued higher than the life of a stranger?

[Stephen Speicher 0]

What I object to, is those who have relationships with people to whom they assign a higher value than the value they assign to their beloved pet, arguing for saving that pet over a human stranger.

I don't follow the logic here. That a person can value A higher than B, does not obviate the ability to value B more than C.

It is holding a double standard to be unwilling to make the same decision for a stranger that one would want made by a stranger for oneself.

I do not understand why this a double standard. If my life is at stake in an emergency, I would not think that the morality of my concerns to be an issue. Of course any rational person would want his life to be saved. Demanding of another, however, that my life must be saved regardless of any other considerations, now that would be a double standard.

[jenbryn 0]

I think that, so long as a beloved pet actually does mean everything to a person in tenuous circumstances (as in your example), it could be alright -- although if the person who drowned as a result of this choice was a top value to a dominantly rational family, and/or a great value to men in general, it would be horribly tragic.

What I object to, is those who have relationships with people to whom they assign a higher value than the value they assign to their beloved pet, arguing for saving that pet over a human stranger. It is holding a double standard to be unwilling to make the same decision for a stranger that one would want made by a stranger for oneself.

Are you saying you would expect a stranger to sacrifice his much-loved pet to save you? If so, I think this is asking too much. (Regardless of the other relationships he may have and how high a value they are to him.)

I can completely understand how a pet can be too great a value to give up to save the life of a stranger. If saving a stranger requires giving up a high value, doesn't it become a sacrifice to do so?

[jenbryn 0]

I realize that this is a dead thread, but I had to come back to it when I was ready to. For the last six months I, along with my wife, had to nurse our sick Missy as she was suffering kidney failure. She died a couple of weeks ago. It was the worst thing that I have ever experienced. I remembered this thread, and my arguments, and thought it was time to reestablish them.

So sorry to hear you went through this. I know when my cat died, the sense of loss was much stronger than I expected. No cute cuddly kitten could replace my deaf, skin-and-bones, 21 year-old cat--all I wanted was to have her back. Pets are definitely in their own category of values.

[Rose Lake 0]

Rose Lake, I'm having difficulty in discerning your argument in regard to morality. (It might be helpful if, instead of phrasing others' views in a negative light, instead you present a more direct, positive statement of your own view).

If the principle upon which one acts is that of rational self-interest, then considering our morality what purpose does it serve to highlight that you may not benefit from the specific actions of someone else acting in their own rational self-interest?

I was trying (unsuccessfully) to work through the logic of someone (who seems to have his own close human relationships, or a great potential for them) choosing to save even a beloved pet rather than a human stranger. To me, it would be very important to prevent another person from suffering a kind of loss that for me would be so painful that I can't think about it - yes I'm an evader on that. I would act based on what I know about the value of my own close relationships.

I could never stand to know that, by choosing a pet over a human being who might be another rational person's top value, that I had consigned a good individual to the agony that I would suffer in losing a loved one. I couldn't take that chance, period. And frankly, I find it a little depressing that many people would choose to save their pets over a stranger, even if that choice is a rational one; because I think the entire scenario is a negative commentary on the nature and level of human relationships within the culture in general - and that is just something that I have to get used to.

And yes, I would act in the way that I would hope that a stranger would act for me. I have no grounds whatever to demand it, but I do hope for it. That is the sole reason I can offer for choosing to save a stranger over a pet.

In analogy, if it is in my rational self-interest to foreclose on a loan due me, need I modify my action by considering what would happen if someone else forclosed on a loan to me?

I don't think a loan (under normal circumstances) is analogous to an emergency. And I don't think that an emergency is a good foundation for a discussion of morality. This thread seems more about clarifying one's hierarchy of values.

This seems to beg the question. The issue is about the morality of the action -- whether or not it can be in a person's rational self-interest -- not about the feelings of another.

Yes, sorry.

Perhaps it might be of value if I can add some perspective to this question, especially since I am the one who posed it. Leaving out the pet, under normal conditions I think that, on one extreme, it is generally agreed that it would be immoral not to save a complete stranger if doing so did not endanger yourself at all. On the other extreme, I suspect we would all agree that it is moral to save your loved one, say, a wife, husband, or child, rather than a stranger, if the circumstances permit only saving one.

The first example establishes that a human stranger is a value, while the second example establishes that a higher value takes precedence over the lower value you place on the stranger. The question posed in this thread is, in essence, can a pet be of such value to you that it is morally proper to save the pet rather than the stranger?

Yup.

Is it rational to value the life of a beloved pet more than the life of a complete stranger?

That depends on who you are.

And, for now, I might even broaden the question further by asking is it ever rational to have a non-human value so great that it is valued higher than the life of a stranger?

The example of Aristotle's text in the context of the middle ages was pretty good. So again, it depends on the people, the object, the society, and the conditions of existence.

[Paul's Here 0]

The main problem in dealing with questions involving emergencies is the issue of context. Whenever this type of discussion occurs, it seems like each person puts his normal context of values into the situation posed by the question. However, in a real emergency, there are so many things that would come into play that affect the specific decision that it may not simply be a question of morality anymore. In a real emergency, instantaneous judgments have to be made, sometimes after assessing the situation with limited or no knowledge; sometimes not even thinking about the context. Many people here claim that they would save their highly valued dog first. Many years ago I visited Yellowstone National Park which has hot spring that you can walk right up to and stand over boiling water bubbling from the earth. In a book in a gift store, I read a story of a man whose dog jumped into one of these hot springs. The man, automatically reacted to save his dog and jumped in after him. Of course, they both died.

Personally, I think emergencies make for interesting philosophic arguments. But I don't think that one should get too emotionally involved or too deep into an argument that hostilities break out. The only real way to handle an emergency is to have planned for the possibility beforehand and practiced what actions you might take. The specifics of what really happens in an emergency will dictate how you act. If the stranger is drowning within 3 feet of you and your dog is 100 feet offshore, to let a stranger drown would be immoral no matter how you look at it.

[PhilO 0]

Let's step this up one more notch.

Let's say it isn't just a stranger, but a neighbor who's a casual acquaintance. You know that he's married and has 3 kids, but nothing much more. You don't have a particular opinion about him, for good or bad.

Who's still for saving the pet over this man?

[Stephen Speicher 0]

I was trying (unsuccessfully) to work through the logic of someone (who seems to have his own close human relationships, or a great potential for them) choosing to save even a beloved pet rather than a human stranger. To me, it would be very important to prevent another person from suffering a kind of loss that for me would be so painful that I can't think about it - yes I'm an evader on that. I would act based on what I know about the value of my own close relationships.

I could never stand to know that, by choosing a pet over a human being who might be another rational person's top value, that I had consigned a good individual to the agony that I would suffer in losing a loved one. I couldn't take that chance, period. And frankly, I find it a little depressing that many people would choose to save their pets over a stranger, even if that choice is a rational one; because I think the entire scenario is a negative commentary on the nature and level of human relationships within the culture in general - and that is just something that I have to get used to.

I'm not sure I understand the view expressed, nor am I sure about the source of your depressing feeling. Are you are you saying that the only rational justification for the choice of the pet over the stranger is due to the particular society in which we live, due to the "nature and level of human relationships within the culture in general," and that in a better society such a choice would not be justifiable? If so, I note that in our society, and even in a conceivably better society, it is with a sense of benevolence that I grant a potential value to a stranger. But a potential value is just that, a potential, and that potential must be judged in conjunction with actual values, and weighed accordingly. So even in a substantially better society, is it not rationally justifiable to have an actual non-human value that is greater than the potential value of a human stranger?

I guess I want to understand if your view is tied to this particular society, or whether it actually holds even a reasonably much better society, as a matter of principle. And, if it is a matte rof principle, then I would like to understand what that principle is.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

The main problem in dealing with questions involving emergencies is the issue of context. Whenever this type of discussion occurs, it seems like each person puts his normal context of values into the situation posed by the question. However, in a real emergency, there are so many things that would come into play that affect the specific decision that it may not simply be a question of morality anymore.

Okay, then remove the emergency situation entirely. Under normal and most reasonable of circumstances, can it be rationally proper to value the life of a beloved pet over the life of a complete stranger?

[Guest Michelle F. Cohen]

Okay, then remove the emergency situation entirely. Under normal and most reasonable of circumstances, can it be rationally proper to value the life of a beloved pet over the life of a complete stranger?

I can provide a non-emergency context: You have a small amont of money which you can spend either by buying a toy for your pet or by making a donation to a charity organization.

[Rose Lake 0]

I'm not sure I understand the view expressed, nor am I sure about the source of your depressing feeling. Are you are you saying that the only rational justification for the choice of the pet over the stranger is due to the particular society in which we live, due to the "nature and level of human relationships within the culture in general," and that in a better society such a choice would not be justifiable?

No, and yes. In any culture, no matter how advanced, there will be those who value their pets over human strangers. But I believe that in a very advanced culture, valuing a beloved pet over a human stranger would be inconceivable to a greater number of people; because I think that the value of a rational men to each other is greater than the value of pets to man. And if most human beings were good, I think there would be no contest between a pet and a human being, if there ever was an emergency situation like the one specified, where the only options are all below zero, i.e. negative or more negative.

If so, I note that in our society, and even in a conceivably better society, it is with a sense of benevolence that I grant a potential value to a stranger. But a potential value is just that, a potential, and that potential must be judged in conjunction with actual values, and weighed accordingly. So even in a substantially better society, is it not rationally justifiable to have an actual non-human value that is greater than the potential value of a human stranger?

It could be. But I think it would be less likely.

I guess I want to understand if your view is tied to this particular society, or whether it actually holds even a reasonably much better society, as a matter of principle. And, if it is a matte rof principle, then I would like to understand what that principle is.

I know that a potential is not an actual. Nevertheless, if I think to myself, "What if the drowning man [let's say it's a man] is someone like Harry Binswanger or Stephen Speicher? I could not live with having been in a position to save such a man, but chose my pet instead. And I could never be comfortable with the suffering that my choice would cause to Jean or Betsy, so that I could have my pet. For me, that would be a sacrifice. And I guess in my projected better world, my idea is that many others would feel the same.

[jenbryn 0]

And, for now, I might even broaden the question further by asking is it ever rational to have a non-human value so great that it is valued higher than the life of a stranger?

This got me wondering: can a different level of value be placed on basic human life, depending on who you are and what your other values are? Can one person rationally consider the life of a stranger a "medium level value" where another would consider the stranger's life a "high value"? It seems to me that something as universal as basic human life would have an equal value for all rational people, assuming that they value life itself.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

This got me wondering: can a different level of value be placed on basic human life, depending on who you are and what your other values are? Can one person rationally consider the life of a stranger a "medium level value" where another would consider the stranger's life a "high value"? It seems to me that something as universal as basic human life would have an equal value for all rational people, assuming that they value life itself.

But that is saying, in effect, that the life of a stranger is an intrinsic value that has a fixed place in every person's hierarchy of values, apart from and independent of the judgment and evaluation of the person who does the valuing. And further, this demands an equal assessment on the potential value of a stranger, independent of and without consideration of all the rest of one's values. This all seems to contradict both the objective nature of values, as well as the role and importance of human purpose in forming values.

[jenbryn 0]

But that is saying, in effect, that the life of a stranger is an intrinsic value that has a fixed place in every person's hierarchy of values, apart from and independent of the judgment and evaluation of the person who does the valuing. And further, this demands an equal assessment on the potential value of a stranger, independent of and without consideration of all the rest of one's values. This all seems to contradict both the objective nature of values, as well as the role and importance of human purpose in forming values.

Yes, I see how what I said previously seems to put an intrinsic value on human life.

I am trying to see how one person could properly value a stranger's life highly, while another could value it less highly. (Assuming both value their own lives.) What would be the rational reason for such a difference? If one person has encountered a lot of harmful people in their life, would it be reasonable to value a stranger's life less than someone who has encountered many good people?

[Paul's Here 0]

Okay, then remove the emergency situation entirely. Under normal and most reasonable of circumstances, can it be rationally proper to value the life of a beloved pet over the life of a complete stranger?

Of course. Everyone who owns a pet acts that way. When you spend your hard earned money to buy food for a pet when there are hungry people in the community (not to mention around the world) one is stating that one values the pet above the stranger. I spend extra money on my dog when he goes to the vet for health care (he's not yet covered by government mandated insurance).

I'm curious as to what anyone would think of some stranger who walked up to them and said, "Here's a $1,000. My dog has a life-threatening disease, but I know that humans need the money more than my non-volitional, non-moral agent pet."

[PhilO 0]

The more I think about this question, the more I realize that it could (perhaps should) be stated in a more abstract way:

Is there any non-human value at all that you would save over the life of another human being, in an emergency?

Stating it this way has the virtue of focusing on the principle involved: hierarchy of value. It also abstracts away from the particular scenario of drowning - it could be a fire, for example, and also the particular value involved. It also abstracts the nature of the person - it includes not just strangers but people you know, possibly even like.

As I think of it that way, I was kind of surprised to realize that there are indeed non-human values of mine (either existing or ones that I could imagine) that I would rescue as a priority over some people, including people that I know (and that there are some people that I would place first above all else, including considerable risk to my own life.)

[Stephen Speicher 0]

I am trying to see how one person could properly value a stranger's life highly, while another could value it less highly. (Assuming both value their own lives.) What would be the rational reason for such a difference? If one person has encountered a lot of harmful people in their life, would it be reasonable to value a stranger's life less than someone who has encountered many good people?

I suppose that could be one reason. But, more generally, you say that one person values a stranger's life "highly," while another values it "less highly." But more or less highly in relation to what? Two people can agree that objectively there is a potential value to a stranger, but where that potential value sits within each of their own hierarchy of values is what gives rise to your comparison of "highly," and "less highly." In the context of this thread, many here have made clear that the life of a beloved pet can be valued above the life of a stranger. If, for instance, the issue instead was a certain sum of money versus the stranger, then perhaps one person for whom that sum represents his life savings might choose one way, while another person for whom that sum represents a relatively small amount, would choose another way. The issue has to do with where those values fit within one's hierarchy of values. You simply cannot assign a number, like "26" to a stranger and say that a stranger must rank 26th in everyone's hierarchy of values.

[Paul's Here 0]

-----------

Is there any non-human value at all that you would save over the life of another human being, in an emergency?

----------

Well, I have several books signed by Ayn Rand that would be the first thing I'd rescue in my house if there ever was a fire (assuming no one in my family was home). Like I said in Post 239, it is very difficult to sit in a normal situation and say exactly how one would act in a real emergency. The lack of real psychological pressure to make instantaneous decisions really colors one's suppositions.

There's an expression in the military (I don't remember the exact words) but it holds that soldiers will respond to a situation when they come under fire in a manner that is dictated by their training. Unfortunately, most people don't train themselves how to respond in emergency situations.

[jenbryn 0]

.... But, more generally, you say that one person values a stranger's life "highly," while another values it "less highly." But more or less highly in relation to what? Two people can agree that objectively there is a potential value to a stranger, but where that potential value sits within each of their own hierarchy of values is what gives rise to your comparison of "highly," and "less highly." In the context of this thread, many here have made clear that the life of a beloved pet can be valued above the life of a stranger. If, for instance, the issue instead was a certain sum of money versus the stranger, then perhaps one person for whom that sum represents his life savings might choose one way, while another person for whom that sum represents a relatively small amount, would choose another way. The issue has to do with where those values fit within one's hierarchy of values. You simply cannot assign a number, like "26" to a stranger and say that a stranger must rank 26th in everyone's hierarchy of values.

What!? I thought a stranger ranked 19th in everyone's hierarchy of values! Now I'm totally confused....

In all seriousness, I do see how one person could place a stranger higher than a pet, while another would place the pet above a stranger in their value hierarchy. And I see how a sum of money might substitute for the pet as a quantifiable value. But does the value of the stranger vary between the two value hierarchies, or just the value of the pet? It seems to me that it is the pet (or money) that one person values more or less highly than the other, not the stranger.

To answer the question of "more or less highly in relation to what?" I mean in relation to the ultimate value of one's own life. Can the value of a stranger change in relation to that ultimate value, depending on certain factors?

The idea of one person valuing a the life of stranger less because he has encountered a lot of harmful people seems flawed to me. It would be like a particular person valuing justice less highly, because he has encountered a lot of irrational laws. Doesn't the life of a stranger have an objective value, like justice does?