Life and Values

[organon 0]

I haven't read the entire thread, but here are some quick thoughts.

A rational life always trumps a pre-rational one, unless one is dealing with pure (and known) evil. To allow a rational being to die through inaction, when to do otherwise would preserve his or her life, would be immoral.

A lower lifeform is not within the province of morality – it does not have free will, and does not choose its course. A man does, and thereby, given that he values his life chooses the right, acquires value – value to a rational consciousness, for the same reasons that he values himself. The existence of any man with a trace of value, who wishes to live, to whatever degree, is properly a higher value in one’s hierarchy than any other form of life.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

A rational life always trumps a pre-rational one, unless one is dealing with pure (and known) evil.

When you say "trumps," in what way is that meant? If you mean "trumps" in terms of value, then that would seem to be refuted by everyday action. There are starving (and rational) people in Africa, but I choose to spend my money on feeding my dog rather than send my money to a starving person in Africa. If you meant "trumps" in some other way, then please specify that meaning.

To allow a rational being to die through inaction, when to do otherwise would preserve his or her life, would be immoral.

I doubt you intended this statement as an out-of-context absolute, but that is how it seems. There are many factors involving value that, in fact, come into play. For instance, is the inaction immoral regardless of the risk? Do you not have to assess what values are at stake, e.g., the value of your life against the other, as weighed within the confines of the risk to your life by taking some specific action?

A lower lifeform is not within the province of morality – it does not have free will, and does not choose its course. A man does, and thereby, given that he values his life chooses the right, acquires value – value to a rational consciousness, for the same reasons that he values himself. The existence of any man with a trace of value, who wishes to live, to whatever degree, is properly a higher value in one's hierarchy than any other form of life.

I do not follow this reasoning. Granted that morality applies only to acts of volition, but I fail to see why that fact determines our individual hierarchy of values. This argument again seems to claim of me that I should feed a starving man 6000 miles away, rather than feed my dog.

[PhilO 0]

A rational life always trumps a pre-rational one, unless one is dealing with pure (and known) evil. To allow a rational being to die through inaction, when to do otherwise would preserve his or her life, would be immoral.

Well, say hypothetically that you and your wife have a week old baby, who is certainly pre-rational. Are you claiming that it would be immoral to choose your baby's life over that of an adult (whether a stranger, a neighbor, perhaps even a friend)?

[organon 0]

[Response to Stephen Speicher follows:]

"When you say "trumps," in what way is that meant? If you mean "trumps" in terms of value, then that would seem to be refuted by everyday action. There are starving (and rational) people in Africa, but I choose to spend my money on feeding my dog rather than send my money to a starving person in Africa. If you meant "trumps" in some other way, then please specify that meaning."

Yes, in terms of value, in the context of an emergency situation where both lives are at stake and I can take immediate, non-self-endangering action to save one of these. No sacrifice on my part is involved, but a small investment of time.

Now: is it more rational to feed a stranger thousands of miles away in Africa, rather than one's dog? This now involves a sacrifice, potentially – of the money involved – and more importantly: of sending funds for food, rather than supporting the rule of law there, and letting them feed themselves. But this calls to mind a political context, that the best way to feed individuals in Africa is by supporting the rule of law and capitalism.

(“No amount of western foreign aid can bring about the political and socioeconomic climate necessary for economic growth. Instead, foreign aid allows vicious dictators to remain in power. It enables them to buy the allegiance of cronies and the military equipment to oppress their own people, not to mention being able to set up 'retirement' accounts in Swiss banks.” – Walter Williams, Money and Freedom: Foreign Aid to Africa – pardon, read this today : ) )

Perhaps thousands of Africans die daily, and my entire monthly income might be gone to save only a fraction of these; the only long-term solution here is political. But this is an entirely different context than: two lives in danger before me, one rational, one not, and I can save one of these, with no sacrifice on my part, but for a small amount of time.

"I doubt you intended this statement as an out-of-context absolute, but that is how it seems. There are many factors involving value that, in fact, come into play. For instance, is the inaction immoral regardless of the risk? Do you not have to assess what values are at stake, e.g., the value of your life against the other, as weighed within the confines of the risk to your life by taking some specific action?"

Let me specify my assumption that: the life in the example can be saved by trading no other value for it, but for a small amount of time. I am also assuming that one's life is not at risk here -- given risk to one's own life, it's a judgment call -- but it is the rational life that would be my priority.

"I do not follow this reasoning. Granted that morality applies only to acts of volition, but I fail to see why that fact determines our individual hierarchy of values. This argument again seems to claim of me that I should feed a starving man 6000 miles away, rather than feed my dog."

I mean that a rational being, a moral being, a being such as myself, will always be of greater value to me, given the above, than a non-rational being, in the context of which to save when both lives are in danger – when the danger to my life is minimal if any – and when the only sacrifice on my part is a small amount of time. Metaphorically, another man is a brother, to whatever degree he stands in the light; Rand wrote:

“the irreplaceable value which is your consciousness, and the incomparable glory which is your existence”

It is this that I would not sacrifice to save an animal.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

Perhaps thousands of Africans die daily, and my entire monthly income might be gone to save only a fraction of these; the only long-term solution here is political. But this is an entirely different context than: two lives in danger before me, one rational, one not, and I can save one of these, with no sacrifice on my part, but for a small amount of time.

With all due respect, I think you miss the point I tried to make about values (which point, ironically, is contained overall in your response). You did not simply look at some starving African man (and, I would say starvation qualifies as an emergency) as "allow[ing] a rational being to die through inaction," but rather you judged and evaluated the circumstances according to your values. It is because you value some things more than the existential life of that particular man ("the only long-term solution here is political," etc.) that you choose not to save his life by sending him money.

The overall point is that rational judgment cannot be divorced from a system of values, and values are chosen, not ordained as being inherent in nature. There are facts of reality that must be considered in forming values -- to go against your nature and the nature of reality is suicidal -- but the particular things that we value are chosen. In general, according to proper standards the life of a volitional being is a greater potential value than the life of an animal. But just as for the outcome it is important to evaluate the particular volitional being (Hitler comes to mind), so too it is important to evaluate the particular animal. Where is it ordained that it is improper to love a dog so much as to value him greater than the life of a stranger? And, going further, even away from life as the alternative, where is it ordained that a particular material or spiritual object cannot be valued greater than the life of a stranger? What if the choice is between your irreproducible lifetime of poetic works, and the stranger? Or, say, a scientist's irreproducible cure for a disease affecting millions, against the life of that stranger? Why is any of that different from the irreproducible life of a beloved pet? Maybe you do not value a pet that much, but someone else's personal values are not your own.

Metaphorically, another man is a brother, to whatever degree he stands in the light; Rand wrote:

"the irreplaceable value which is your consciousness, and the incomparable glory which is your existence"

It is this that I would not sacrifice to save an animal.

Note that she speaks of your consciousness, your existence, both of which are supported by your values. It is not a sacrifice to choose what you value most.

[organon 0]

Hello Stephen,

Perhaps the key to our disagreement is in the objective nature of a rational value structure -- and the idea that some things are in (virtually) all cases, to a rational man, more valuable than others.

I am arguing that it is not rational to save a dog before a human being, ceteris paribus – and by this I mean virtually any human being (as I wrote initially, but for a case of pure (and known) evil, as with Hitler. In his context, I would go for the dog (or a working shoelace)). But, all else equal, I am arguing that you save the man (again, but for a case of known and pure evil).

When we debate helping a starving African, other contexts, issues, come into play -- but I can tell you that I believe any man who, with no risk to his own life, is choosing between saving a drowning stranger or his drowning dog, should choose the man. The man is, in virtually all cases, of greater objective value.

You write that,

“values are chosen, not ordained as being inherent in nature”

I agree that values are personally chosen, and the hierarchy is an individual matter – but it ought to correspond to reality. Some things are in all cases more valuable than others, to a rational man. One -- if he is rational, and I take it this is the only sort of man we are considering -- will value some things higher than others – will value his self-esteem, higher than any particular meal – will value integrity, higher than approval – and will value human life, higher than that of an animal, when, all else equal, he has the chance to save the man.

I quoted Rand re the "irreplaceable value" and "incomparable glory" in this sense: that a human being is virtually always of greater value than a non-rational form of life. Yes, it is always "_your_" consciousness, and your own hierarchy -- but that hierarchy needs to be informed by reality.

You asked, "Where is it ordained..." -- I would answer, in the fact that a volitional consciousness has an objective value which an animal's does not share -- and as I value myself, so do I value any man who is engaged in the same journey.

John

[Stephen Speicher 0]

Perhaps the key to our disagreement is in the objective nature of a rational value structure ...

John, with all due respect, you continue to assert, not demonstrate or prove, that the objective nature of values necessarily conforms to your own hierarchical structure. I also note that you continue to fail to address the particular examples offered. Phil stated one example, and I gave two. I can offer many more, but it would be nice if you would at least take a direct stand towards the examples given.

[organon 0]

To the three examples:

In the case of the great artwork: I would save the stranger. I would be immensely sorry to lose the volume of poetry, or the novel, or the book of screenplays; but we are talking of weighing it against a human life. In the case of the cure for a disease causing an epidemic, and deaths: I would save the cure. In both cases: it is human life that would be my primary concern. As it would be in the case of the baby (pardon for the delay, Phil); if the baby is indeed not yet rational, not yet "human" in the cognitive sense, I might well give the life of the stranger priority.

Let's recall the original question, though -- a pet, versus a human life. This, though I have had pets that I have loved, is a choice between: a living, thinking mind, not likely that of a murderer, but that of a human being of some value -- and an animal.

My goal is to have my value hierarchy conform to reality, not vice versa : ) -- if you believe it does not, arguments welcome.

John

[Burgess Laughlin 0]

[...] a volitional consciousness has an objective value which an animal's does not share [...]

What do you mean by "objective value"?

[RayK 0]

John,

Maybe you can explain how a human that you know nothing about nor will probably ever see again can have a higher value to you than an animal that brings you great happiness that enhances your life. In other words, what enhancdement in your life will you recieve from the saving of the human life over your loved/valued pet?

Values are choosen by each individual in accordance to their own personal value hierarchy. Their is no intrinsic value in a human life to another person until and if that person chooses that other person as a value.

Again, I think that these emergency moral situations are of little value in discussing. Why? Because, how many times in your life, or anyone else's for that matter, have you had to make the choice of the subject line. To judge a person as being immoral without having the full context, which is almost immpossible in emergency situations, is immoral.

With that said I would like to illustrate a certain context and my actions.

Lets say I am having a birthday party for one of my children and there are many young guest. One of those young guest starts to drown, ironically at the same amazing time, my child's dog is also drowning. If, and this is a big if, I could only save one, I would save the young child. This action is in accordance to my own value hierarchy, as I do not value animals very much (I explained why in an earlier post).

Another instance, I am walking along a river-walk and a looter comes running down the river-walk being chased by police. To escape he jumps from a bridge into the water so that he can hide. Again, ironically my dog just happens to be drowning at the same time. This time I choose to save my dog over the human.

[organon 0]

Hello Mr. Laughlin,

I mean an actual value, in the context of a life-based standard, which can be recognized by a rational mind: the value of a consciousness capable of thought and reason. I believe that a consciousness of this nature is properly, in virtually all cases, valued above a consciousness of a non-rational nature.

John

[Burgess Laughlin 0]

I mean an actual value, in the context of a life-based standard, which can be recognized by a rational mind: [...]

So, a sculpture, a manuscript of notes on a new theory of physics, and a pet could be examples of objective values, for a particular rational person?

I am asking about examples as a way of making sure I understand your definition of "objective value."

[Stephen Speicher 0]

... if the baby is indeed not yet rational, not yet "human" in the cognitive sense, I might well give the life of the stranger priority.

Though I am flabbergasted that you would value the life of a stranger over the life of your own child, I do give you credit for consistency with your view.

Let's recall the original question, though -- a pet, versus a human life. This, though I have had pets that I have loved, is a choice between: a living, thinking mind, not likely that of a murderer, but that of a human being of some value -- and an animal.

No, that's how you phrase the choice. For another, the choice is the potential value of a human stranger as compared to the actual value of the pet, a choice determined by the value placed on each. It is perfectly understandable, to me, that some rational people value the pet less than the potential value of the stranger, and others value the pet. Each choice is governed by the actual personal value placed by the individual, not some supposedly inherent value "out there." Values are contextual, not out-of-context absolutes.

My goal is to have my value hierarchy conform to reality, not vice versa : ) -- if you believe it does not, arguments welcome.

There is nothing wrong with your goal; it is one all rational people share. The problem is that you seem to think that there is only one proper hierarchy that includes personal values, as dictated by reality. Is chocolate the only flavor of ice-cream that conforms to reality, or can rational people choose vanilla or butter pecan instead?

[Stephen Speicher 0]

Again, I think that these emergency moral situations are of little value in discussing. Why? Because, how many times in your life, or anyone else's for that matter, have you had to make the choice of the subject line.

These sort of discussions are of little value for determining one's morality, precisely because we do not live on a lifeboat experiencing emergency after emergency. But, as attested by the almost 300 (currently) posts in this thread, issues such as these can help to clarify just what one's morality actually is.

[organon 0]

So, a sculpture, a manuscript of notes on a new theory of physics, and a pet could be examples of objective values, for a particular rational person?

I am asking about examples as a way of making sure I understand your definition of "objective value."

Yes, all of these can have objective value to a rational valuer, and without question be objective values to that valuer -- i.e., actual values in the context of a life-based standard.

But: to let a man die, to save a non-rational life -- to save a fish, or parrot, or cat, or dog -- to me, this would be an immense sacrifice, and immoral. But (1) why? And (2) does this reason rationally apply to the judgment of men in general -- in the same way that integrity is properly valued by a rational man more highly than social approval?

[To be continued tomorrow. : ) ]

John

[RayK 0]

These sort of discussions are of little value for determining one's morality, precisely because we do not live on a lifeboat experiencing emergency after emergency. But, as attested by the almost 300 (currently) posts in this thread, issues such as these can help to clarify just what one's morality actually is.

I would think that these issues can carify one's actions, but I think that one's morality is already set. Hence, why each emergency boat situation and my actions can be totally different but my morals remain the same

[Stephen Speicher 0]

These sort of discussions are of little value for determining one's morality, precisely because we do not live on a lifeboat experiencing emergency after emergency. But, as attested by the almost 300 (currently) posts in this thread, issues such as these can help to clarify just what one's morality actually is.

I would think that these issues can carify one's actions, but I think that one's morality is already set. Hence, why each emergency boat situation and my actions can be totally different but my morals remain the same

But, again, note the hundreds of posts and the differing views, these from most who would say they share the same morality. Situations such as these may help some ( not all, just some) to clarify their understanding of the moral principles they hold.

[Paul's Here 0]

Yes, all of these can have objective value to a rational valuer, and without question be objective values to that valuer -- i.e., actual values in the context of a life-based standard.

But: to let a man die, to save a non-rational life -- to save a fish, or parrot, or cat, or dog -- to me, this would be an immense sacrifice, and immoral.

---------

John

Don't you see that the way you've phrased the alternative is in a manner that is independent of my particular value hierarchy? If the choice is simply to "to let a man die, to save a non-rational life" then the choice can not be immoral because you have implicitly excluded the issue of the value each has to me. If a pet can be an objective value to me, then what would it mean if I were to give it up for a lesser value?

The real question is "do I let a man die, to save a non-rational life if I value the non-rational life more?" Or perhaps you'd want to ask "is it rational/moral to value non-rational life above a rational life?" But you cannot exclude my evaluation of the entities being considered when you formulate the alternatives. Your first sentence seems to indicate this context, but your second sentence ignores the context set up by the first. Whose actual values are you referring to "in the context of a life-based standard"?

[Paul's Here 0]

--------

But, again, note the hundreds of posts and the differing views, these from most who would say they share the same morality. Situations such as these may help some ( not all, just some) to clarify their understanding of the moral principles they hold.

I agree. I'd also include that it helps to understand exaclty what real value one places on specific values in particular contexts. I think that one of the ways one prepares oneself for emergency situation is to think about what one would do if that situation arose. The specifics may not arise, such as a drowning dog and a stranger, but a more frequent situation might be an animal jumps in front of your car. Do you swerve to miss the animal and move into oncoming traffic or do you run over the animal? Most people don't think about this situation and react automatically to miss the animal without realizing the consequences.

[B. Royce 0]

organon,

in post #279 you say, "...a rational being will always be of greater value to me...than a non-rational being, in the context of which to save when both lives are in danger...and when the only sacrifice on my part is a small amount of time."

A question: how do you determine how much time is a "small amount"? Where do you draw the line?

And remember, time is not just time, it is your time, for the use of your energy to achieve your values.

What if you're living in a communist country where all of Ayn Rand's books have been confiscated; you have a friend who read Atlas Shrugged and the ideas excited you, but the book was taken before you could read it. Now, a black market dealer says he has a copy; you say you'll rush home for a hidden piece of silver; he says be back in twenty minutes or he's selling it to someone else. On the way back from your house you see a man drowning in the river. You're an excellent swimmer; to save him will will take only a "small amount" of time, but more than the ten minutes you have left to get that book. That book is not a rational being, it is not even alive. What do you do? How do you choose?

[organon 0]

Let me ask all of you who have responded, a question:

Imagine that you were on the receiving end of this judgment -- whether versus a pet, a sculpture, or anything non-rational you choose to name. What arguments would you offer, if any? Assume that there is no hope of survival whatever, unless the man to whom you are appealing grants you his assistance.

John

[Dufresne 0]

Imagine that you were on the receiving end of this judgment -- whether versus a pet, a sculpture, or anything non-rational you choose to name. What arguments would you offer, if any? Assume that there is no hope of survival whatever, unless the man to whom you are appealing grants you his assistance.

I'd offer him all of my wealth.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

Let me ask all of you who have responded, a question:

Imagine that you were on the receiving end of this judgment -- whether versus a pet, a sculpture, or anything non-rational you choose to name. What arguments would you offer, if any? Assume that there is no hope of survival whatever, unless the man to whom you are appealing grants you his assistance.

Here you have changed the situation. The choice was between a complete stranger -- one for which you could not discern anything about other than he is a human being -- and a beloved pet. But, even so, at least the same principle applies in that one should make a decision based on value. So, if I was the one in need of help and I knew the person was deliberating between saving someone or something else rather than me (not too likely a situation for deliberation because if there was sufficient time for talk then it is likely he could save us both), I would let him know just how good of a person I am. If that wasn't convincing I would offer him whatever tangible assets I had, in the hope that that would offset the value he would lose.

Let me ask you, John, a question in this vein. If there were two men in need of assistance and you could only save one, what else other than the relative value you placed on each could you use to decide which one to save? That is exactly the same process when deciding whether to save a stranger or your beloved pet -- personal value.

[Ed from OC 0]

Imagine that you were on the receiving end of this judgment -- whether versus a pet, a sculpture, or anything non-rational you choose to name. What arguments would you offer, if any? Assume that there is no hope of survival whatever, unless the man to whom you are appealing grants you his assistance.

I assume he and I would be complete strangers initially. I would try my best to raise my value to him, until I was valuable enough to rescue. Maybe I would offer him lots of cash, or the keys to my car, or the promise to provide him another pet or sculpture or whatever.

The point is, for a volitional consciousness, values are not automatic or intrinsic. They are chosen for a particular purpose by a particular individual ("to whom? for what?"). Is it possible for a person to rationally choose to not save a person in your example? Certainly. What matters (as always) is the context. Journalistically, it would be hard to imagine such a case when saving a person's life would be so casually dismissed, but metaphysically, it can't be ruled out, given the natures of man and of values.

A simple example is: how should one react to finding a container of poison? A person in a normal, everyday context may feel the need to be cautious around it, so that he doesn't have an accident. Yet, a person dying of a terminal illness may react with relief and joy, as he can finally end his pain. Or, an exterminator has a sense of joy, because the poison enables him to earn a living. Or, a baby reacts with curiousity to the shiny container. Or, a scientist reacts with joy at finding poison that contains a rare compound he needs for his experiments. And so on.

Note that all of these are rational, objective values placed on the poison -- and yet they are each different. Context is what matters.

In the example of choosing between something I value very highly and the life of a stranger, there is no other means of choosing between them other than going with the higher value, which means consulting my personal value hierarchy. As stated in the example, I would choose the other thing. But the stranger has some opportunity to convince me otherwise. If he can, then his value to me needs to be higher than that of the other thing. But in so doing, I am not consulting some other standard of value, I am still relying on my own personal values. I am not reaching for some intrinsic value (which would be a contradiction, by the way). There is nothing in human nature that says: "Thou shalt value all men above other things (unless a particular man is evil)."

FYI, it may be worthwhile to re-read "The Objectivist Ethics" in The Virtue of Selfishness in light of this discussion.

[organon 0]

What I have been arguing, is that a rational life is a difference in kind -- and ought to occupy a higher place in a rational man's hierarchy -- have a higher personal value -- than a lower form of life, or an inanimate object (with no implications for saving human lives).

I have been thinking about the question a great deal today -- and one of the things that has come to mind is Jean Valjean, a favorite literary hero of mine. If you know Les Miserables (and (Stephen) I think you do, as I recall your wife loves the musical : ) ), do you recall his night of distraught deliberation, before going to Arras to turn himself in? Can you see him deliberating in the same manner over saving Fido, versus saving a man, when saving Fido has no further implications for human lives? I think that without question, he would dive in and save the man in virtually all cases. But I would agree that this in itself is not a final, explicit argument.

I am not saying that value is intrinsic -- but that (changing Ed's formulation slightly) Valjean would likely agree that a rational valuer will value the lives of men above all other things (but for a particular man who is evil). The loss of a rational, thinking mind, even one that I will never know again -- to see the light - the light of a rational consciousness - leave his eyes, the breath leave his body, his form go limp so that a pet might live -- this is a sacrifice which I could not make.

John