Life and Values

[Stephen Speicher 0]

What I have been arguing, is that a rational life is a difference in kind -- and ought to occupy a higher place in a rational man's hierarchy -- have a higher personal value -- than a lower form of life, or an inanimate object (with no implications for saving human lives).

But where is your argument in support of your "ought," the "ought" that is supposed to determine a man's personal value structure? You have asserted the conclusion repeatedly, but you have not provided an argument. Saying that something is "different in kind" is not an argument.

I have been thinking about the question a great deal today -- and one of the things that has come to mind is Jean Valjean, a favorite literary hero of mine. If you know Les Miserables (and (Stephen) I think you do, as I recall your wife loves the musical : ) ) ...

We both love the musical, having seen it several times. And I have read the book several times. But I fail to see what bringing in Jean Valjean has to do with the issue. I too would "save the man in virtually all cases." But what do we learn from that?

I truly appreciate the poetic way in which you expressed what the loss of that life would mean to you, but poetry is not an argument. You claim you are not saying that value is intrinsic, and yet you remove rational choice from the context of personal values. Doing so leaves nothing but value as being intrinsic. But a man's personal values should be objective, the facts of reality as evaluated by his mind using a rational standard. If you cannot demonstrate why a rational standard places a human life above anything else, regardless of context, then you are in effect asserting value as being intrinsic.

[organon 0]

But I fail to see what bringing in Jean Valjean has to do with the issue.

I think it was in "The Psycho-Epistemology of Art" that Rand described the usefulness of a hero in concretizing a moral ideal; a man might ask himself, "What would Roark do?", and immediately know the answer to a difficult moral question, rather than going through volumes of theory. But it is just a starting point -- as I said, it is not a final and explicit argument.

[Paul's Here 0]

What I have been arguing, is that a rational life is a difference in kind -- and ought to occupy a higher place in a rational man's hierarchy -- have a higher personal value -- than a lower form of life, or an inanimate object (with no implications for saving human lives).

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John

Remember the original question: "Would it ever be morally proper to love a pet so much as to value its life over that of a human stranger?" For some the answer is 'yes,' for some the answer is 'no.' If you want to value other peoples lives above your other non-rational values, then you are free to make such judgment. However, you cannot say that others ought to arrange their hierarchy the same way unless you are prepared to hold that they should hold certain facts above their own values. In other words, you hold that some values are intrinsic.

[Stephen Speicher 0]

But I fail to see what bringing in Jean Valjean has to do with the issue.

I think it was in "The Psycho-Epistemology of Art" that Rand described the usefulness of a hero in concretizing a moral ideal; a man might ask himself, "What would Roark do?", and immediately know the answer to a difficult moral question, rather than going through volumes of theory.

Miss Rand was reporting what some readers of The Fountainhead had done, and, continuing on, she says "this helped them to isolate and to identify the reasons, the moral principles that would have guided him." With all due respect to those readers, I do not need an image of Jean Valjean to isolate and identify the moral principles applicable here. That's what I have been doing throughout this extremely long thread.

But it is just a starting point -- as I said, it is not a final and explicit argument.

Well, since you brought up Miss Rand in this regard, note that, unlike how she viewed Howard Roark, Miss Rand did not consider Valjean to be an ideal man. If you want a "starting point," perhaps a more ideal character would be better suited for that purpose.

Regardless, I think we really are far beyond appealing to fictional characters here.

[bignosedcopperking 0]

There are two types of evil men that I can imagine. Both men will hold my notes on Atlas Shrugged for my doctorate dissertation over the water, while another stranger man is drowning, after he has pushed the drowning man in the water, and asks me to choose. One man doesn't know that I can possibly choose the notes; and the other knows how important the notes are to me. Either way, I choose the notes.

And though I care very little for animals, if in some bizarro world I came to love a pet that much, I would choose the pet.

And speaking poetically now, I would execute the man who stole the manuscript and burned my magnum opus.

And here's a bizarre example: I'm in love with this girl, who seems like a pet, because her devotion seems exaggerated, and she gets all excited and runs to me when she sees me, so much so it is embarassing to me. But I would be with her if it wasn't for my rich father who claims that he will die of a heart attack and shame if I dare to be with a woman so ridiculous and of low stature--and I believe him. If I choose the girl, I will kill my father; if I choose my father, I will kill the girl of a broken heart. I would choose the girl.

Jose Gainza.

[organon 0]

However, you cannot say that others ought to arrange their hierarchy the same way unless you are prepared to hold that they should hold certain facts above their own values. In other words, you hold that some values are intrinsic.

Paul, can you elaborate on this? In particular, "unless you are prepared to hold that they should hold certain facts above their own values".

Now: Is there any hierarchical value order that we can say is rational in virtually all cases, i.e. that any rational man's value hierarchy ought to be ordered, in this case, in a certain manner? For example -- the valuing of integrity higher than approval. Is this universal, and objectively correct, i.e. correct in relation to reality, for any rational mind that values itself? I would argue that yes, of course this is the case. A consciousness can in its own personal hierarchy value approval higher than integrity, but it would be wrong to do so; it would be in error. Are there any objections to this?

[Stephen Speicher 0]

Now: Is there any hierarchical value order that we can say is rational in virtually all cases, i.e. that any rational man's value hierarchy ought to be ordered, in this case, in a certain manner? For example -- the valuing of integrity higher than approval. Is this universal, and objectively correct, i.e. correct in relation to reality, for any rational mind that values itself? I would argue that yes, of course this is the case. A consciousness can in its own personal hierarchy value approval higher than integrity, but it would be wrong to do so; it would be in error. Are there any objections to this?

Ayn Rand demonstrated that integrity is a practical necessity for self-survival, If you value your life then you act in accordance with that virtue. But what has any of that to do with our issue? From the broadest context you can demonstrate that man at his best is objectively more valuable to men than dog at this best (medicine, inventions, etc.), but the objective value you place on a particular man and a particular dog depends upon your personal context.

[Paul's Here 0]

Paul, can you elaborate on this? In particular, "unless you are prepared to hold that they should hold certain facts above their own values".

Now: Is there any hierarchical value order that we can say is rational in virtually all cases, i.e. that any rational man's value hierarchy ought to be ordered, in this case, in a certain manner? For example -- the valuing of integrity higher than approval. Is this universal, and objectively correct, i.e. correct in relation to reality, for any rational mind that values itself? I would argue that yes, of course this is the case. A consciousness can in its own personal hierarchy value approval higher than integrity, but it would be wrong to do so; it would be in error. Are there any objections to this?

The issue under discussion in this thread has not been with regard to a hierarchy of rational values, but with regard to the hierarchy of specific values that vary among individuals. In ethics, a hierarchy provides a structure of values from more important to less important. The hierarchy is dependent upon the purpose of one’s life. An individual's hierarchy depends upon his own specific choices he's made during his life and how he's ordered his values. For example, “Productive work is the central purpose of a rational man's life, the central value that integrates and determines the hierarchy of all his other values” (TOE in VOS). Certainly, all rational men ought to agree with this because it is a principle required to live the life a rational being. Because some people value doctors more than engineers or scientists more than plumbers, hierarchy does not mean that doctors, engineers, scientists and plumbers fit into a specific order for all rational people. The same argument goes all the way down to examples with unknown strangers and personal pets that one loves.

Unless you can show that valuing a pet that has brought enjoyment into my life is irrational when placed above a stranger who has no value in relation to myself, then your argument has no merit. Simply saying that rational beings have greater value than non-rational beings does not demonstrate anything in relation to my hierarchy. It does not connect to the purpose of my life. My goal in life is not to value all rational beings, but to value those people or things that touch my life with enjoyment and purpose.

[Rose Lake 0]

...In the case of the cure for a disease causing an epidemic, and deaths: I would save the cure. In both cases: it is human life that would be my primary concern. As it would be in the case of the baby (pardon for the delay, Phil); if the baby is indeed not yet rational, not yet "human" in the cognitive sense, I might well give the life of the stranger priority.

...

If you're married, I'd think that your wife might be interested in clarifying this issue between you. And if you're not married, and unless/until you change your mind about this, I think that in the interest of full-disclosure before marriage, a future wife ought to know your thinking on this.

...

Unless you can show that valuing a pet that has brought enjoyment into my life is irrational when placed above a stranger who has no value in relation to myself, then your argument has no merit. Simply saying that rational beings have greater value than non-rational beings does not demonstrate anything in relation to my hierarchy. It does not connect to the purpose of my life. My goal in life is not to value all rational beings, but to value those people or things that touch my life with enjoyment and purpose.

But this was not how the dilemma was posed, i.e. "a stranger who has no value in relation to [ones]self." All we know for the hypothetical situation is: a stranger.

So it seems clear that there is an element of risk involved in either choosing to save the stranger, or not choosing to save the stranger, i.e. one has no way of knowing whether that particular stranger has an extraordinarily high value, like Ayn Rand or George Washington, an extraordinary high disvalue, like Immanuel Kant or Noam Chomsky, or anything in between.

Since I tend to believe that saving the innocent is more important than punishing the guilty, I personally would err on the side that the stranger has enough value to risk losing the pet. But the moment that I know any essential of the stranger's identity, statistically, the chances for his survival, on my watch, take a big dive.

There seem to be at least two basic approaches to thinking about the dilemma (and there may be more). But the basic two I am thinking of are: statistically or not. It seems to me that those who believe that they would choose the pet are making their hypothetical choice based on statistical probability about the stranger's potential value to them. And those who believe that they would choose the stranger are making their hypothetical choice based on an idea of what is possible (if not probable) about the stranger's potential value.

[B. Royce 0]

If you're married, I'd think that your wife might be interested in clarifying this issue between you. And if you're not married, and unless/until you change your mind about this, I think that in the interest of full-disclosure before marriage, a future wife ought to know your thinking on this.

But this was not how the dilemma was posed, i.e. "a stranger who has no value in relation to [ones]self." All we know for the hypothetical situation is: a stranger.

So it seems clear that there is an element of risk involved in either choosing to save the stranger, or not choosing to save the stranger, i.e. one has no way of knowing whether that particular stranger has an extraordinarily high value, like Ayn Rand or George Washington, an extraordinary high disvalue, like Immanuel Kant or Noam Chomsky, or anything in between.

Since I tend to believe that saving the innocent is more important than punishing the guilty, I personally would err on the side that the stranger has enough value to risk losing the pet. But the moment that I know any essential of the stranger's identity, statistically, the chances for his survival, on my watch, take a big dive.

There seem to be at least two basic approaches to thinking about the dilemma (and there may be more). But the basic two I am thinking of are: statistically or not. It seems to me that those who believe that they would choose the pet are making their hypothetical choice based on statistical probability about the stranger's potential value to them. And those who believe that they would choose the stranger are making their hypothetical choice based on an idea of what is possible (if not probable) about the stranger's potential value.

I would differ with you here, Rose. I think those who would choose their pet would be doing so because they know the value of their pet to them. To act to save the stranger would be to regard what they don't know as being above what they do know. It would be like saying, "I'm ignorant as to whether this is a value, therefore I'll regard my ignorance as if it were knowledge.

[Rose Lake 0]

I would differ with you here, Rose. I think those who would choose their pet would be doing so because they know the value of their pet to them. To act to save the stranger would be to regard what they don't know as being above what they do know. It would be like saying, "I'm ignorant as to whether this is a value, therefore I'll regard my ignorance as if it were knowledge.

The consideration for the value of the pet was included in what I was saying. Of course I assume that a beloved pet (as specified) has a known value to its owner. But clearly, if that were the sole consideration there would be no dilemma to consider or discuss. What I was trying to get at was any thinking beyond one's immediate emotional reaction about his pet. Acting on an emotion, without any thought about the meaning of one's action, including the nature and origin of his own feelings, would simply be emotionalism. So the statistical part had to do with one's (presumed) consideration of the stranger.

[B. Royce 0]

The consideration for the value of the pet was included in what I was saying. Of course I assume that a beloved pet (as specified) has a known value to its owner. But clearly, if that were the sole consideration there would be no dilemma to consider or discuss. What I was trying to get at was any thinking beyond one's immediate emotional reaction about his pet. Acting on an emotion, without any thought about the meaning of one's action, including the nature and origin of his own feelings, would simply be emotionalism. So the statistical part had to do with one's (presumed) consideration of the stranger.

Yes, I see what you mean. But statistics do not give me specific knowledge about _this_ individual stranger; I'm still ignorant about him, whereas I don't need any statistics to know I value my dog.

[Rose Lake 0]

Yes, I see what you mean. But statistics do not give me specific knowledge about _this_ individual stranger; I'm still ignorant about him, whereas I don't need any statistics to know I value my dog.

Right. And the point then is: How does one consider something about which the only information he has is "a human stranger." One is in a sort of (hypothetical and temporary) pre-scientific state, in which case relying on statistics certainly seems to me to be one reasonable approach.

[Paul's Here 0]

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But this was not how the dilemma was posed, i.e. "a stranger who has no value in relation to [ones]self." All we know for the hypothetical situation is: a stranger.

A stranger is "a person or thing that is unknown or with whom one is unacquainted" or "one ignorant of or unacquainted with someone or something" (Online Dictionary). So my saying that a stranger is one "who has no value in relation to [ones]self" is simply added for reference and clarity to indicate what I consider a stranger to be. Can you demonstate how someone with whom I am unacquainted with or ignorant of can be a value to me? I'm not talking about a potential value either, but an actual value, as my pet is to me.

So it seems clear that there is an element of risk involved in either choosing to save the stranger, or not choosing to save the stranger, i.e. one has no way of knowing whether that particular stranger has an extraordinarily high value, like Ayn Rand or George Washington, an extraordinary high disvalue, like Immanuel Kant or Noam Chomsky, or anything in between.

Since I tend to believe that saving the innocent is more important than punishing the guilty, I personally would err on the side that the stranger has enough value to risk losing the pet.

So you've changed the situation. You're assuming that the stranger can be a potential value to you. So you've personallized the issue and you can not longer classify the person as a complete stranger.

But the moment that I know any essential of the stranger's identity, statistically, the chances for his survival, on my watch, take a big dive.

There seem to be at least two basic approaches to thinking about the dilemma (and there may be more). But the basic two I am thinking of are: statistically or not. It seems to me that those who believe that they would choose the pet are making their hypothetical choice based on statistical probability about the stranger's potential value to them. And those who believe that they would choose the stranger are making their hypothetical choice based on an idea of what is possible (if not probable) about the stranger's potential value.

The use of statistics to judge strangers implies that you value statistics for judging people's potential value. I don't. I use actual observation and knowledge. Consider this example. Yesterday, I was watching a TV show from decades ago (The Big Valley). The show was about a group of strangers who approached the house and asked for a place to stay overnight. The owner could have said "get off my land" but said "you can sleep in the barn with the horses." She didn't say "I don't know you but there's a 50% chance you might be good employees, so go upstairs and sleep in the guest rooms." As it turned out, they were thieves and murderers.

Since I don't have horses or a barn, my dog sleeps in my bed!!

[Paul's Here 0]

Right. And the point then is: How does one consider something about which the only information he has is "a human stranger." One is in a sort of (hypothetical and temporary) pre-scientific state, in which case relying on statistics certainly seems to me to be one reasonable approach.

This would be a valid approach if the only thing that was under judgment was the stranger. Since the example under discussion includes the real value (100% certainty) of a pet, the comparison with ignorance doesn't follow.

[Rose Lake 0]

A stranger is "a person or thing that is unknown or with whom one is unacquainted" or "one ignorant of or unacquainted with someone or something" (Online Dictionary). So my saying that a stranger is one "who has no value in relation to [ones]self" is simply added for reference and clarity to indicate what I consider a stranger to be. Can you demonstate how someone with whom I am unacquainted with or ignorant of can be a value to me? I'm not talking about a potential value either, but an actual value, as my pet is to me.

So you've changed the situation. You're assuming that the stranger can be a potential value to you. So you've personallized the issue and you can not longer classify the person as a complete stranger.

The use of statistics to judge strangers implies that you value statistics for judging people's potential value. I don't. I use actual observation and knowledge. Consider this example. Yesterday, I was watching a TV show from decades ago (The Big Valley). The show was about a group of strangers who approached the house and asked for a place to stay overnight. The owner could have said "get off my land" but said "you can sleep in the barn with the horses." She didn't say "I don't know you but there's a 50% chance you might be good employees, so go upstairs and sleep in the guest rooms." As it turned out, they were thieves and murderers.

Since I don't have horses or a barn, my dog sleeps in my bed!!

This would be a valid approach if the only thing that was under judgment was the stranger. Since the example under discussion includes the real value (100% certainty) of a pet, the comparison with ignorance doesn't follow.

I am utterly baffled by these posts. First, I am astounded to receive a question requesting a demonstration of how a total stranger can be an actual value to me. But I will comply. For instance: I don't know who invented toilet paper -- but I'm sure glad he (or she) did! I benefit from that every day! And I can multiply that by many more important inventors about whom I am totally ignorant. An even more valuable stranger would be whoever came up with the first symbolic alphabet -- something else that is an actual value to me (and most other human beings) every day. I received these values from a stranger or strangers about whom I am in complete ignorance.

Assuming that a stranger is a potential value is my approach (as opposed to the other one I mentioned, i.e. the statistical approach). It's not "changing the situation." It's one way of dealing with being in a position of ignorance when, nevertheless, some decision and action are required. "Personalizing the issue" is not giving me any more knowledge about the particular stranger. It is merely a part of thinking about what the best way for me to proceed would be.

My thinking will not make the stranger less of a stranger, or [somehow] infuse me with some actual knowledge about him. This whole dilemma is focused around how one proceeds when faced with the choice between acting to save a known value (specifically a beloved pet) vs. someone unknown (the stranger) -- who may potentially be to the pet-owner -- a value, a non-value, or a disvalue. That is the given situatuion. If one wants to discuss something else, there is no particular problem with doing so. But then one is changing the nature of the dilemma as posed, which I have not tried to do.

A case of even odds (as stated) between two alternatives cannot even be a rudimentary guide in choosing between them. So statistics would be utterly unhelpful in such a case. My only point about statistics was: It can be, and from my observation, seems to be, a guide to some people with regard the dilemma as posed; even if I do not think that I would use statistical probability for the purpose of making a decision regarding this particular dilemma.

[Rose Lake 0]

P.S. The statistical part applies only to the stranger part of the equation. I have said repeatedly that I am aware that the value of the pet is already known, and has been taken into consideration by the pet owner. But if one does not consider the stranger at all because he knows nothing particular about him, I submit that the pet owner is acting irrationally. If one considers the stranger statistically, he is acting on the basis of statistics. If one acts based on a stranger having potential value, he is taking a risk for a possible value.

[B. Royce 0]

Right. And the point then is: How does one consider something about which the only information he has is "a human stranger." One is in a sort of (hypothetical and temporary) pre-scientific state, in which case relying on statistics certainly seems to me to be one reasonable approach.

What statistics are we talking about here? Are 80% of all people basically rational productive people? 55%? 90%? It's very vague and indefinite. And if I am a traveler going through a state capitol where a greater percentage of the people are lousy bureaucrats, have the percentages dipped below 50? One definite statistic I do know, however---that my pet is absolutely a value to me. My strong emotions, when seeing my pet in danger, express his value to me; whereas my weaker emotions toward the stranger express _his_ value. If, after saving my pet, I found out that the stranger had been working for a pro-Objectivist group, I would feel sad that he hsd drowned, but i would not feel guilty, for I would have virtuously acted on the the knowledge I had at the time. To consider vague statistics as a guide to my actions is to tread the ground of argumentum ignorantium.

[Paul's Here 0]

I am utterly baffled by these posts. First, I am astounded to receive a question requesting a demonstration of how a total stranger can be an actual value to me. But I will comply. For instance: I don't know who invented toilet paper -- but I'm sure glad he (or she) did! I benefit from that every day! And I can multiply that by many more important inventors about whom I am totally ignorant. An even more valuable stranger would be whoever came up with the first symbolic alphabet -- something else that is an actual value to me (and most other human beings) every day. I received these values from a stranger or strangers about whom I am in complete ignorance.

And it is the toilet paper and the alphabet that are the values, not the unknown people. For all you know, they could have been altruist Catholics who supported communist victory during WWII. Or perhaps they were Platonists who wanted you to be subservient to a philosopher king.

Assuming that a stranger is a potential value is my approach (as opposed to the other one I mentioned, i.e. the statistical approach). It's not "changing the situation." It's one way of dealing with being in a position of ignorance when, nevertheless, some decision and action are required. "Personalizing the issue" is not giving me any more knowledge about the particular stranger. It is merely a part of thinking about what the best way for me to proceed would be.

Without getting into the math, statistics doesn't work in complete ignorance. Some knowledge of the events must be known to apply statistics. To calculate the odds of rolling a 4 on a die, one has to know how many sides there are on the die. If the number is unknown (a stanger), then no statistics are possible. And statistics only applies to knowledge of the outcome. The fact that here are numbers on the faces of the die, how many sides there are, how many die are being rolled, etc. are certain (no stranger).

My thinking will not make the stranger less of a stranger, or [somehow] infuse me with some actual knowledge about him. This whole dilemma is focused around how one proceeds when faced with the choice between acting to save a known value (specifically a beloved pet) vs. someone unknown (the stranger) -- who may potentially be to the pet-owner -- a value, a non-value, or a disvalue. That is the given situatuion. If one wants to discuss something else, there is no particular problem with doing so. But then one is changing the nature of the dilemma as posed, which I have not tried to do.

The assumption that the stranger is a potential value does change the problem. The only way to find out is to investigate: ask the stranger questions, find out if anyone else knows him, do a background check on the information you gather, etc. The simple fact of beginning that process makes that person not a stranger: you have devoted mental effort to gather information, i.e., you've already placed a value on him that a stranger qua stanger doesn't have.

A case of even odds (as stated) between two alternatives cannot even be a rudimentary guide in choosing between them. So statistics would be utterly unhelpful in such a case. My only point about statistics was: It can be, and from my observation, seems to be, a guide to some people with regard the dilemma as posed; even if I do not think that I would use statistical probability for the purpose of making a decision regarding this particular dilemma.

[Paul's Here 0]

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I received these values from a stranger or strangers about whom I am in complete ignorance.

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And one more point. You weren't in complete ignorance of them. You know that they were at least productive enough to produce toilet paper. Else, why would you give them your money?

[B. Royce 0]

One thing further I might add. One should not consider one's pet in isolation. The value of a pet is more than that of a mere (strange) animal. Your pet allows you to act with unquestioning total benevolence around it all the time. It helps you see the reflection of the inner innocense of you and helps you to maintain a happy relationship with reality. So, when you act to save your pet, in a sense you're acting to save part of yourself.

[Paul's Here 0]

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But if one does not consider the stranger at all because he knows nothing particular about him, I submit that the pet owner is acting irrationally.

That is an interested charge. Perhaps we have a different conception of what the original question was. So let me repeat it.

Would it ever be morally proper to love a pet so much as to value its life over that of a human stranger? Given a scenario where both are drowning and you can only save one, can it be moral to save the pet instead of the stranger?

This example, as I understand it, implies that one has to make a decision and act immediately. Rational action requires that I act to gain and/or keep my values. If my pet and a stanger are drowning, how am I supposed to "consider the stranger" to increase his value to me so that I have sufficient knowledge to save him rather than my pet? Should I wait till he resurfaces from the water and ask him questions while my dog drowns? I'm not sure what to do here. Perhaps you can enlighten me.

[Rose Lake 0]

What statistics are we talking about here? Are 80% of all people basically rational productive people? 55%? 90%? It's very vague and indefinite. And if I am a traveler going through a state capitol where a greater percentage of the people are lousy bureaucrats, have the percentages dipped below 50? One definite statistic I do know, however---that my pet is absolutely a value to me. My strong emotions, when seeing my pet in danger, express his value to me; whereas my weaker emotions toward the stranger express _his_ value. If, after saving my pet, I found out that the stranger had been working for a pro-Objectivist group, I would feel sad that he hsd drowned, but i would not feel guilty, for I would have virtuously acted on the the knowledge I had at the time. To consider vague statistics as a guide to my actions is to tread the ground of argumentum ignorantium.

But assuming some degree of rationality, there are reasons that give rise to the various emotions. And these are likely based on our experiences. I should clarify that what I mean here by a statistical approach is not third-party sociological studies. I am primarily referring to one's own experiences. For instance, let's say that in one's life, about 80% of those one meets seem okay on the surface.

But after long experience, one knows that about 60% of that 80% have some seriously bad ideas mixed in with some better premises. In total the people one meets may be doing some good things, along with some things that are active objective disvalues, like supporting environmentalism and regulations, etc. (And I am just making these numbers up, but hope that I am conveying my meaning).

I submit that statistics, in this sense, are one's guide, if one is using, as a standard of value-judgment something like 'stronger emotion' vs. 'weaker emotion.'

[Rose Lake 0]

And it is the toilet paper and the alphabet that are the values, not the unknown people. For all you know, they could have been altruist Catholics who supported communist victory during WWII. Or perhaps they were Platonists who wanted you to be subservient to a philosopher king.

...

But the invention did not come out of thin air, it required an inventor. And to whatever extent the invention is a value to me, so is the inventor. I could judge the other parts of his character as bad (if they were). But it would be rank injustice to deny that the inventor was necessary to the creation of the value from which I benefit.

The assumption that the stranger is a potential value does change the problem. The only way to find out is to investigate: ask the stranger questions, find out if anyone else knows him, do a background check on the information you gather, etc. The simple fact of beginning that process makes that person not a stranger: you have devoted mental effort to gather information, i.e., you've already placed a value on him that a stranger qua stanger doesn't have.

There is no way in an emergency to give a questionnaire to the stranger. Nevertheless, we must make a decision based on something. I'm at the point where I'm not really even comprehending what issues are being raised here. I think I have been making a fairly straightforward point, and am unsure what the meaning is of the responses.

And one more point. You weren't in complete ignorance of them. You know that they were at least productive enough to produce toilet paper. Else, why would you give them your money?

I am losing the thread of what all this has to do with the dilemma.

[B. Royce 0]

But assuming some degree of rationality, there are reasons that give rise to the various emotions. And these are likely based on our experiences. I should clarify that what I mean here by a statistical approach is not third-party sociological studies. I am primarily referring to one's own experiences. For instance, let's say that in one's life, about 80% of those one meets seem okay on the surface.

But after long experience, one knows that about 60% of that 80% have some seriously bad ideas mixed in with some better premises. In total the people one meets may be doing some good things, along with some things that are active objective disvalues, like supporting environmentalism and regulations, etc. (And I am just making these numbers up, but hope that I am conveying my meaning).

I submit that statistics, in this sense, are one's guide, if one is using, as a standard of value-judgment something like 'stronger emotion' vs. 'weaker emotion.'

Right, you have to be "making these numbers up" because you really don't have any numbers, no definite knowledge. You(that is _you_ in general, in this rescue situation) do have the definite knowledge that you value your pet. Your emotions express this, but I did not say that they were your standard of judgment. However, if your mind and values are well-integrated, your emotions (value responses) will help guide you when you have to take quick action.