What is Justice

[bborg 0]

if I punish a good man , based on all the facts I know or can get - I have not failed to achieve the value of justice.

I don’t think this example addresses my point, though. I am not questioning the virtue of the man who honestly and objectively judges the character of others, even when he might make a mistake. Innocent errors are not breaches of morality. My only point is that independent of his judgments, reality is what it is. I raised the issue of “justice” used in two different ways because I have focused on the value, not the virtue. If the value justice means the protection of the good, then has that value been achieved when a good man is punished?

Regarding your example: Say that I have access to evidence that proves a man has been harmed wrongly. I present the evidence to you, you agree that a mistake was made, and amends are made. Now, if the value of justice was achieved by the error, as you’ve argued, then what reason would you have to admit new evidence? What would explain your horror at the realization that a good man had been punishment for something he didn’t do? If, in fact, you had not failed to dispense justice before, then what is there to correct?

[Alon Tsin 0]

I don’t think this example addresses my point, though. I am not questioning the virtue of the man who honestly and objectively judges the character of others, even when he might make a mistake. Innocent errors are not breaches of morality. My only point is that independent of his judgments, reality is what it is. I raised the issue of “justice” used in two different ways because I have focused on the value, not the virtue. If the value justice means the protection of the good, then has that value been achieved when a good man is punished?

The concept of value presupposes two questions - of value to whom and for what?

The value of Justice is of value to me (answer to first question) , in order to allow me to interact with people of value to me (answer to the second question). If you want to apply this value to society, the concept of justice would be of value to all the individuals in the society(answer to first question), in order to allow them to trade/interact with people with acceptable values and to be protected from people with bad values (answer to the second question).

When you ask if the value of justice has been achieved when a good man is punished , you drop the question that must follow - By whom was the value achieved and for what? The answer is that the value of justice in this case was achieved by the judge in order to protect the other people from this "bad" man. The fact that there was a gap in the judge's knowledge has no bearing since the judge is not omniscient. The only fact is that the judge thought the man to be "bad" , based on his knowledge, and he fulfilled the value of Justice by keeping him away from the "good" people.

Regarding your example: Say that I have access to evidence that proves a man has been harmed wrongly. I present the evidence to you, you agree that a mistake was made, and amends are made. Now, if the value of justice was achieved by the error, as you’ve argued, then what reason would you have to admit new evidence?

As a judge,I base my verdict on knowledge. As a rational judge, I know that, because I am not omniscient, I don't necessarily have all the required knowledge. Therefore, there is no logical reason for me not to admit new evidence, if it is relevant.

What would explain your horror at the realization that a good man had been punishment for something he didn’t do? If, in fact, you had not failed to dispense justice before, then what is there to correct?

Once again, since Justice is based on the knowledge of the judge (whether a man or a real judge), if a new knowledge is revealed to the judge, he will correct the judgment. The fact that the previous judgment was an error does not invalidate it. The judgment itself was valid - the knowledge wasn't.

Since I (as judge) did all I could to procure all the facts about the case, and diligently analyzed them, I will not feel "horror" at the realization. I will empathize with the wrongfully accused man, of course, and then I will ask the police some very pointed questions. I will not feel guilty, but rather sad and angry at the police that failed to bring me all the facts.

[Arnold 0]

Once again, since Justice is based on the knowledge of the judge (whether a man or a real judge), if a new knowledge is revealed to the judge, he will correct the judgment. The fact that the previous judgment was an error does not invalidate it. The judgment itself was valid - the knowledge wasn't.

I agree. There are two issues; the act of judging, and the information used in that judgement. A deficiency in the latter is not a deficiency in the former.

That the RESULT is not just, is a reflection on knowledge, not on judgement.

[Arnold 0]

But something can still be objectively just or unjust, just as it can be true or false, even if no man exists with the correct knowledge. For something to be true or false there is no need for a god who knows all. There is no need for a consciousness, just for reality.

Actually I don't think this is right. Truth is the recognition of fact, and that requires a consciousness. It was a fact that the earth went around the sun a million years ago, but at that time it was true for no one.

[Paul's Here 0]

I think you missed the point of my question. I was not referring to the problem of judging if a person has the virtue of justice by the context of his own knowledge, or by some other, broader knowledge. I think the definition given by Peikoff for the virtue of justice is perfect.

I was referring to a different problem, which is objectivity of justice. The definition, as I understand it, determines justice according to some context of knowledge of some man. But something can still be objectively just or unjust, just as it can be true or false, even if no man exists with the correct knowledge. For something to be true or false there is no need for a god who knows all. There is no need for a consciousness, just for reality.

I disagree with your formulation. In principle, the only things required for objectivity and justice are that all of the available evidence was taken into account, the judge used his reason in evaluating the evidence, the judge formulated the proper actions to take with respect to the individual, and the judges actions are consistent with the evidence.

Here is the problem: I am claiming there are two concepts of justice. You only use one of them, and then you judge everything I say out of using the one you accepted. There is no point in doing that. If I use the word "cake" to mean X and you use it to mean Y, then of course whatever statement I say using "cake" as X would be wrong from your point of view. There is no need to repeatedly point it out, it is obvious to both of us. Therefor the focus, for efficient discussion, should be either saying that my other concept of justice is invalid and does not respond to anything in reality, or contains some contradictions (NOT with the other concept, but with the ideas it leans on). So please stop beating the horse, which was never alive.

When you say: "In principle, the only things required for objectivity and justice are that all of the available evidence was taken into account, the judge used his reason..." You are using Peikoff's definition, which I already said I do not disagree with. You are using "cake" as Y to show why "cake" as X is wrong. And of course it would be, there was never an argument about that. The argument is about whether "cake" as X is a valid concept.

I would suggest giving several concrete example as to what you mean by your concept of justice. Who does it relate to, how is it exercised, in what context? Don't start with an example of a judge, start with an example of how you would use justice in your daily life. Once you've identified your concept, and provided a definition, please distinguish it from Peikoff's concept (or mine). Once you've done that, perhaps you can demonstrate how one can be objectively just even if no one has the correct knowledge. I think then we can discuss your concept more clearly.

[Paul's Here 0]

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If the value justice means the protection of the good, then has that value been achieved when a good man is punished?

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The value that has been achieved is that he was give a fair trial using legally objective methods by society.

[Paul's Here 0]

I disagree with your statement that justice was not done for the reasons I state in Post 16 below.

What would such an example be called then? Justice gone wrong? An error of justice? Because obviously regardless of whether the judge made the decision objectively and honestly, he was wrong and the accused received a sentence he did not deserve.

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I would simply state an error was made and the accused received a sentence he did not deserve in light of the new evidence. I wouldn't call it an error of justice, I would call it at error due to lack of knowledge. Justice continues to be done by letting the man go free.

[Paul's Here 0]

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Your last sentence is somewhat confusing to me. Success at what? The sentence and your context seems to be implying "if I am rational and if I am just, there is no guarantee that I am successful at being rational or just?" If that is the case, I would claim that is a contradiction and it opens the door to skepticism. In reality, "if I am rational and if I am just, there is no guarantee that I did not make an error." If I make an error, that does not negate the judgment of justice, just as your scientist was wrong but not irrational. Justice means "granting to each man that which he deserves" within the context of available knowledge.

Success at reaching a true principle, or at treating someone as they deserve. Sorry, I thought the meaning was implicit in my argument. Just because you are making a decision objectively does not guarrantee that you are right. It is possible to treat someone wrongly even if you are basing your judgment on objective observation. Just because you went about the judgment the right way does not mean they were deserving of the way you treated them. This is an example of an innocent error. Sometimes there may be no way for you to know all the relevant facts (or that way may be unethical), but that does not change the truth or falsity of your conclusion. As Dr. Binswanger explained it in one of his lectures (don't remember which), you can be "contextually certain", but not "contextually right". If a surgeon operates on a patient who was misdiagnosed and dies on the table, you can say the surgeon was right to be certain about what he was doing, but you can't say the patient is therefore "contextually alive". You knowledge or ignorance does not change reality.

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I would put it this way. If the judge was fully moral when the judgment was made but subsequent facts had come to light that change the judgment, then the basic issue is not one of morality but of epistemology. Lack of knowledge and ignorance can be deadly, which is why one wants to avoid being in those conditions. So the real issue, in my opinion, that has come under discussion here is, "How does one acquire certainty that one is aware of those facts that are required to issue a just decision?"

[Paul's Here 0]

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I disagree. There is no such implication in my statement. If two men reach different conclusions based upon different evidence, I would certainly not be surprised. Now if two men reach different conclusions based upon the same evidence, then there is a basis for argument. It is possible that both judgments could be just, but that implies a wider context of knowledge that would account for the two conclusions.

I don't think the implication was intended, but I do believe your argument appeals to primacy of consciousness. If justice means the act pursuing justice, then it seems by definition it is reduced to actions of consciousness and not to the facts of reality.

Take the example I raised, about two men forming two different conclusions. If justice merely means making judgments about people's character objectively on the evidence available to you, then both conclusions are by definition just. However I think it's clear that when a conflict like this occurs, at least one person is wrong. That's because justice means people getting what they deserve, and that is based on the facts of reality and not on the evaluations of others.

I most emphatically disagree for the reasons I've already given. Justice is based upon the facts and is applied to other by one's evaluaiton of their character and actions. If justice is soley people getting what they deserve, deserve from whom? On what basis? Deserve from others based upon their evaluation. You did not address the example I gave you that addresses the issue of the two men forming different conclusions. There is no violation of justice.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

if I punish a good man , based on all the facts I know or can get - I have not failed to achieve the value of justice.

I don’t think this example addresses my point, though. I am not questioning the virtue of the man who honestly and objectively judges the character of others, even when he might make a mistake. Innocent errors are not breaches of morality.

Perhaps we can clarify this issue by making a distinction between the value of justice and the virtue of justice.

Justice, the value, is a state where each man gets what he deserves. Justice, the virtue, is the act by which one seeks to gain and keep the value of justice.

Thus, a man can enact the virtue of justice by seeking to give each man what he deserves whether or not he succeeds in doing it.

[Paul's Here 0]

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That's because justice means people getting what they deserve, and that is based on the facts of reality and not on the evaluations of others.

As Dr. Peikoff notes

In judging an individual's character and conduct, the just man follows the same epistemological principles as a scientist; he is ruled by the same single-minded concern: to discover the truth. This requires of him two steps: first he must identify the facts of a given case; then he must evaluate them by reference to objective moral principles.

Evaluation of others is essential to justice. And when it comes to me performing the evaluation, the context of my values is important. I place my friends in a hierarchy of values based upon their character and their value to me. I don't expect you to place my friends in the same hierarchy with respect to your values. Justice does not require that you evaluate people in the context of my values. I wouldn't expect you to regard my best friend as your best friend simply because he embodies the values of a rational philosophy.

[bborg 0]

Perhaps we can clarify this issue by making a distinction between the value of justice and the virtue of justice.

Justice, the value, is a state where each man gets what he deserves. Justice, the virtue, is the act by which one seeks to gain and keep the value of justice.

Thus, a man can enact the virtue of justice by seeking to give each man what he deserves whether or not he succeeds in doing it.

Yes, precisely my point. You can seek to do justice, and yet fail to achieve it. The seeking is not the value. Think of Kant, whose belief was ethics reduced to the phrase "do your duty". According to Kant, it was the form of the action that mattered, not the result. As in his epistemology, the form becomes the content.

While I don't believe anyone here has intended it, the same error is being made with reference to justice: that as long as the form is obeyed, the value is achieved.

I'm sorry but I don't know of any clearer way to put it. I'll leave my case as is.

[Paul's Here 0]

Perhaps we can clarify this issue by making a distinction between the value of justice and the virtue of justice.

Justice, the value, is a state where each man gets what he deserves. Justice, the virtue, is the act by which one seeks to gain and keep the value of justice.

Thus, a man can enact the virtue of justice by seeking to give each man what he deserves whether or not he succeeds in doing it.

Yes, precisely my point. You can seek to do justice, and yet fail to achieve it. The seeking is not the value. Think of Kant, whose belief was ethics reduced to the phrase "do your duty". According to Kant, it was the form of the action that mattered, not the result. As in his epistemology, the form becomes the content.

While I don't believe anyone here has intended it, the same error is being made with reference to justice: that as long as the form is obeyed, the value is achieved.

I'm sorry but I don't know of any clearer way to put it. I'll leave my case as is.

I don't believe you've demonstated that the value of justice has not been achieved. An individual accused of a crime was given a fair trial using objective principles and judgments. What more can an individual expect or does he deserve? Does he deserve to be exonerated when there is insufficient justitfication? Should he expect omniscience? The value of justice was achieved by the virtue of justice. When additional evidence reveals an error was made, it is only in that context of knowledge that one can then assess that an error was made. One cannot hold up claiming that values were really achieved because someday evidence may be found that might prove an error in judgment. So I deny that I am holding that the form of the action is all that matters and not the result.

[bborg 0]

I don't believe you've demonstated that the value of justice has not been achieved. An individual accused of a crime was given a fair trial using objective principles and judgments. What more can an individual expect or does he deserve? Does he deserve to be exonerated when there is insufficient justitfication? Should he expect omniscience? The value of justice was achieved by the virtue of justice. When additional evidence reveals an error was made, it is only in that context of knowledge that one can then assess that an error was made. One cannot hold up claiming that values were really achieved because someday evidence may be found that might prove an error in judgment. So I deny that I am holding that the form of the action is all that matters and not the result.

But this is not about expectation and certainty. Those are issues of epistemology, as separate from ethics. I defined justice as a value ("protection of the good") and stated my view on when that value is achieved (when the good is protected). Your cognitive means of verifying that the good has been protected is again an issue of epistemology and not ethics.

I did not recommend that we "hold up" judgment because we can make mistakes. Obviously we can only act on what we know. My only point is that when a mistake is made, what that means is that we have failed to achieve justice because the person being judged did not receive the treatment they deserved. I don't understand how you can acknowledge that in such an example the person was treated wrongly, but at the same time claim their treatment was just. This contradiction needs to be resolved.

If your argument is that justice is determined not by whether the good has been protected, but by whether you are honestly seeking justice, then indeed this is the same as making the form into its own content. It is essentially saying that the field of ethics follows from epistemology, rather than metaphysics; that how you should act is determined by your means of knowing, rather than by the requirements of your life. The other name for this is the primacy of consciousness. Only by this error could I claim a contradiction such as that a person can be treated wrongly justly. Either someone is getting what they deserve, or they aren't. It can't be both ways. Just as a patient on the operating table is either alive or dead, independent of what the surgeon knows or doesn't know.

[System Builder 0]

I've been noticing some apparent confusion about the meaning of "objectivity" in some of the postings in this thread (regarding the relationship of consciousness and existence). There is an excellent series of excerpts on objectivity in the on-line Ayn Rand Lexicon. I hope they will help to clear up some of the points in dispute.

Another point that I haven't seen specifically mentioned is what happens after new evidence becomes available that affects past judgments. Rationality requires any affected past judgments to be revised appropriately as needed. This also means rectifying any past judgments of other people to the maximum extent possible. In a 1971 Ford Hall Forum Q&A (excerpted in Ayn Rand Answers, pp. 45-46), Ayn Rand applied this principle to capital punishment, concluding: "I'm against capital punishment on epistemological, not moral, grounds." Morally, a premeditating murderer deserves it. But epistemologically, a case can be made, especially today, that the risk of error is too great to risk taking the life of someone who may be innocent. No restitution is possible after death.

[Paul's Here 0]

I don't believe you've demonstated that the value of justice has not been achieved. An individual accused of a crime was given a fair trial using objective principles and judgments. What more can an individual expect or does he deserve? Does he deserve to be exonerated when there is insufficient justitfication? Should he expect omniscience? The value of justice was achieved by the virtue of justice. When additional evidence reveals an error was made, it is only in that context of knowledge that one can then assess that an error was made. One cannot hold up claiming that values were really achieved because someday evidence may be found that might prove an error in judgment. So I deny that I am holding that the form of the action is all that matters and not the result.

But this is not about expectation and certainty. Those are issues of epistemology, as separate from ethics. I defined justice as a value ("protection of the good") and stated my view on when that value is achieved (when the good is protected). Your cognitive means of verifying that the good has been protected is again an issue of epistemology and not ethics.

I did not recommend that we "hold up" judgment because we can make mistakes. Obviously we can only act on what we know. My only point is that when a mistake is made, what that means is that we have failed to achieve justice because the person being judged did not receive the treatment they deserved. I don't understand how you can acknowledge that in such an example the person was treated wrongly, but at the same time claim their treatment was just. This contradiction needs to be resolved.

If your argument is that justice is determined not by whether the good has been protected, but by whether you are honestly seeking justice, then indeed this is the same as making the form into its own content. It is essentially saying that the field of ethics follows from epistemology, rather than metaphysics; that how you should act is determined by your means of knowing, rather than by the requirements of your life. The other name for this is the primacy of consciousness. Only by this error could I claim a contradiction such as that a person can be treated wrongly justly. Either someone is getting what they deserve, or they aren't. It can't be both ways. Just as a patient on the operating table is either alive or dead, independent of what the surgeon knows or doesn't know.

Please demonstrate how your version of justice is independent of epistemology or morality? How does "getting what one deserve" lie outside these fields? How does one protect the good outside of anyone's judgment of what constitutes the good. How do you establish the requirements for your life without a means of knowing? You have not yet demonstrated how you would resolve this, other than saying that the value of justice was not acquired. You have not established how you achieve justice without a process of justice. You assert that if an error is made, the value is retroactively negated and not achieved once the error is identified. Or perhaps you think the value was never achieved since an error was made. Demonstrate your theory please.

One of the metaphysical requirements for life in society is that individuals be judged by objective rules. The exercise of justice is a metaphysical requirement for life. There is no contradiction in my statements, nor any implication of the primacy of consciousness.

[Paul's Here 0]

On to the Cruise. So I'll catch up with everyone after next week.

Ciao for now.

Paul

[Ifat Glassman 0]

First I would like to make one thing clear again: No one here is arguing about whether or not the "judge" is virtuous. We all agree that the judge is.

(This is for whoever would join the discussion)

The concept of value presupposes two questions - of value to whom and for what?

...

When you ask if the value of justice has been achieved when a good man is punished , you drop the question that must follow - By whom was the value achieved and for what? The answer is that the value of justice in this case was achieved by the judge in order to protect the other people from this "bad" man. The fact that there was a gap in the judge's knowledge has no bearing since the judge is not omniscient. The only fact is that the judge thought the man to be "bad" , based on his knowledge, and he fulfilled the value of Justice by keeping him away from the "good" people.

It is not a value for society if a good man is sent to prison. It is not a value to society, not to the judge, and not to the person himself, since reality is that the man is NOT bad. If I think that cutting my own, healthy arm is good, and I cut it off, I did not achieve a value.

Once again, since Justice is based on the knowledge of the judge (whether a man or a real judge)

Is it just that this man goes to prison? If you ask the judge, you get one answer. If you ask the person who is accused, you get another. One says "this is just" one says "this is not just". So are they both right?

But something can still be objectively just or unjust, just as it can be true or false, even if no man exists with the correct knowledge. For something to be true or false there is no need for a god who knows all. There is no need for a consciousness, just for reality.

Actually I don't think this is right. Truth is the recognition of fact, and that requires a consciousness. It was a fact that the earth went around the sun a million years ago, but at that time it was true for no one.

I consider Truth to be the status of an idea which matches reality. 'Truth' is not a process of recognition, but a status.

The process of identifying and determining the status is done by a human, and also the idea (which is in question) is the "product" of a consciousness. But the status itself exists with no need for a consciousness. A consciousness performs the identification, but it is not required for the status to be what it is, just as it is not required to have a consciousness for existence to exist.

This is my understanding.

Maybe you should start a new thread about "What is truth"

[Ifat Glassman 0]

I would suggest giving several concrete example as to what you mean by your concept of justice. Who does it relate to, how is it exercised, in what context? Don't start with an example of a judge, start with an example of how you would use justice in your daily life. Once you've identified your concept, and provided a definition, please distinguish it from Peikoff's concept (or mine). Once you've done that, perhaps you can demonstrate how one can be objectively just even if no one has the correct knowledge. I think then we can discuss your concept more clearly.

Yes, excellent suggestion. I'll follow your suggestion in parts, since it requires plenty of time from me. I'll post it in next few days.

One step in that direction: Everything bborg has said so far expresses my own understanding perfectly. Heh, even more than perfectly (manner of speaking): He explained things I did not consider, but agree with (Justice as a value).

I would put it this way. If the judge was fully moral when the judgment was made but subsequent facts had come to light that change the judgment, then the basic issue is not one of morality but of epistemology.

Of course. The judge is fully moral, no one disagrees with that.

Lack of knowledge and ignorance can be deadly, which is why one wants to avoid being in those conditions. So the real issue, in my opinion, that has come under discussion here is, "How does one acquire certainty that one is aware of those facts that are required to issue a just decision?"

I don't think this is the issue at all. Your question is about the process of objective judgement, while the discussion is about 'Justice' as a value (as bborg explained).

[EdFab 0]

Peikoff on Justice:

"Justice" is the virtue of judging men's character and conduct objectively and of acting accordingly, granting to each man that which he deserves.

Is there a distinction between the concepts "justice" and "the virtue of justice"? If so, what is it?

Ayn Rand says something very specific about justice on page 51 of the "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology". In chapter 5, "Definitions", she devotes a paragraph to the definition of the concept "justice". Especially notice the italicized sentences, and compare them to Mr. Peikoff's definition. Notice that not once is the word "virtue" entertained in Ayn Rand's definition:

For instance: what fact of reality gave rise to the concept "justice"? The fact that man must draw conclusions about the things, people and events around him, i.e., must judge and evaluate them. Is his judgment automatically right? No. What causes his judgment to be wrong? The lack of sufficient evidence, or his evasion of the evidence, or his inclusion of considerations other than the fact of the case. How, then, is he to arrive at the right judgment? By basing it exclusively on the factual evidence and by considering all the relevant evidence available. But isn't this a description of "objectivity"? Yes, "objective judgment" is one of the wider categories to which the concept "justice" belongs. What distinguishes "justice" from other instances of objective judgment? When one evaluates the nature or actions of inanimate objects, the criterion of judgment is determined by the particular purpose for which one evaluates them. But how does one determine a criterion for evaluating the character and actions of men, in view of the fact that men possess the faculty of volition? What science can provide objective criterion of evaluation in regard to volitional matters? Ethics. Now, do I need a concept to designate the act of judging a man's character and/or actions exclusively on the basis of all the factual evidence available, and of evaluating it by means of an objective moral criterion? Yes. That concept is "justice."

Nowhere in that paragraph is there a mention of virtue, and those were Ayn Rand's exact words. I don't understand why Mr. Peikoff uses the word "virtue" in the definition of the concept of justice. I think "virtue" is a separate concept, and a wide-ranging one. "Virtue", to me, is a sort of measurement that determines how good a thing is, comparing a thing against objective standards that are different for each type of existent. A screwdriver will have its own standards with which to measure or determine its "virtue". A work of art will have different standards with which to measure its virtue. So too will "Justice" have its own standards by which to measure the virtuousness of any particular act of justice. If we are to say "Justice is the virtue of...", then what prevents us from saying "Art is the virtue of....", "Beauty is the virtue of....", "Ethics is the virtue of..." It is better, I think, to factor out "virtue", place it in its own concept, and have that concept subsume every set of objective standards for which the existents are measured against to determine their virtuousness.

[Alon Tsin 0]

...

It is not a value for society if a good man is sent to prison. It is not a value to society, not to the judge, and not to the person himself, since reality is that the man is NOT bad. If I think that cutting my own, healthy arm is good, and I cut it off, I did not achieve a value.

A value is decided and achieved through rational thinking. Your example with you cutting off your arm is not relevant, since a decision to cut it off is (in a staggering majority of cases) absolutely irrational, and therefore irrelevant to this discussion.

You say: "Reality is that the man is not bad". I strongly disagree with this sentence, since perhaps this sentence is the crux of the argument here.

I have searched the Ayn Rand Lexicon, and found no definition of of the concept "Reality", so I am going to try and define it myself. Reality is merely the axiom of existence , the axiom of identity and the law of causality. To be even more crude I'd say that Reality is a bunch of things happening according to the laws of the universe. No more, no less.

If a rock falls in reality, it simply falls. If an animal dies in reality, it simply dies. If a man is executed, he simply dies. There is no such thing in reality as "Deserve" or "Just". It is simple causality - A man breaks his neck, he's dead. A man eats food, he lives. A man robs someone, he has more property. A man kills someone, the other man is dead. That's all there is to it. Reality is nothing else.

As Ayn Rand pointed out, man has to use his mind to survive in this world. Through the use of man's mind - and only through the use of man's mind - can you form Concepts, Values, Abstractions and Judgments. They do not exist in the world without a mind to form them - They cannot be divorced from the human mind.

A rational man can only know reality by the use of his senses and his mind. He can only know what he gets by his senses and his mind. He cannot be omniscient and know everything there is. He has to rely on the knowledge he has in order to make decisions.

When a rational "Society" (not in the communist sense, but in the Objectivist sense as individuals) puts someone behind bars, it is done in the context of the knowledge they have. You (Ifat) , as a person with a mind, can say that the society gained no value by imprisoning him, but the rational society doesn't have your knowledge, so in their view- they have gained a value. After they gain the knowledge that the man is innocent they might, in retrospect, understand that their action did not do justice to the man. Not because the concept"Justice for the man" was somehow floating around in reality waiting for people to understand they are wrong, but because they performed a reevaluation of the man in their minds.

There is no such thing as "In reality, it has value" (or any similar sentences) , because you must have a mind to decide whether something has value or not.

Is it just that this man goes to prison? If you ask the judge, you get one answer. If you ask the person who is accused, you get another. One says "this is just" one says "this is not just". So are they both right?

Right for who? If there is a third person who observes the argument, then he may decide that only one of them is right (as happens here on the Forum many times). There is no "right answer" floating around in reality that decides who is right and who is wrong. That's intrinsic, and that's the flaw in you argument.

[RayK 0]

EdFab,

I do not understand what you are trying to get at in your post. A virtue is an action that one applies to achieve their values. Justice is a virtue, it is the act of judging someone for what they are worth and no more.

[EdFab 0]

EdFab,

I do not understand what you are trying to get at in your post. A virtue is an action that one applies to achieve their values. Justice is a virtue, it is the act of judging someone for what they are worth and no more.

RayK, my point was about definitions, and that there was something definitive mentioned about the definition of the concept of justice, made by Ayn Rand herself. Your definition of virtue, to me, is more of a type of virtue, related specifically to human actions. However, to me Virtue is a wider concept that designates how good a thing is, any existent thing, in terms of its nature, as compared to a set of objective standards. By my definition, I can investigate the virtue of inanimate objects as well as the virtue of human actions. The measurement is with respect to objective standards that are appropriate for the thing under investigation, as determined by its nature.

[Arnold 0]

It is not a value for society if a good man is sent to prison. It is not a value to society, not to the judge, and not to the person himself, since reality is that the man is NOT bad. If I think that cutting my own, healthy arm is good, and I cut it off, I did not achieve a value.

Once again, since Justice is based on the knowledge of the judge (whether a man or a real judge)

Is it just that this man goes to prison? If you ask the judge, you get one answer. If you ask the person who is accused, you get another. One says "this is just" one says "this is not just". So are they both right?

But something can still be objectively just or unjust, just as it can be true or false, even if no man exists with the correct knowledge. For something to be true or false there is no need for a god who knows all. There is no need for a consciousness, just for reality.

Actually I don't think this is right. Truth is the recognition of fact, and that requires a consciousness. It was a fact that the earth went around the sun a million years ago, but at that time it was true for no one.

I consider Truth to be the status of an idea which matches reality. 'Truth' is not a process of recognition, but a status.

The process of identifying and determining the status is done by a human, and also the idea (which is in question) is the "product" of a consciousness. But the status itself exists with no need for a consciousness. A consciousness performs the identification, but it is not required for the status to be what it is, just as it is not required to have a consciousness for existence to exist.

This is my understanding.

Maybe you should start a new thread about "What is truth"

This may be cleared up without starting a new thread, if you realize a "status", is a status of a consciousness. There is no status, or idea of truth without consciousness. Reality as such, just is, regardless of our presence, but truth refers to a correspondence between consciousness and reality.

[Arnold 0]

[is it just that this man goes to prison? If you ask the judge, you get one answer. If you ask the person who is accused, you get another. One says "this is just" one says "this is not just". So are they both right?

Yes - with reference to their context, you admit the judge made no error in judgement, so until evidence shows otherwise, how can one say he is not just?

The RESULT of his judgement, according to facts not available to him, is not just for the man in prison. But this latter context is not one you can use in relation to the judge. The essence of your solution is one of context.

One cannot expect the same answer to apply to different contexts. There are two answers to your question, not one.