What is Justice

[bborg 0]

Sorry but I'm done. I started to reply to Alon Tsin's post and found myself repeating an argument I've made already multiple times. If you want to believe that someone can be right even when later evidence contradicts them, be my guest. In my opinion it's like something right out of Kuhn, with his "paradigms". Either something is true, or it's not. There is no "true for him" or "true for that time period". That hardly anyone here can see that this way of speaking is subjectivist and build on primacy of consciousness is distressing to me, so at this point it would be best if I left the discussion. I've had my say, and I would only ask that people address further comments to the "room" and not to me individually.

[Mercury 0]

I think it may help to see it this way: An innocent man goes to jail because of the wrong (unjust) judgment of a just judge. The judge does not know that the man is innocent, but the innocent man knows. The innocent man's consciousness provides the knowledge - the truth - of the error (injustice).

This should remove any charges of intrinsicism, but may raise other issues that I'm yet to consider.

[Arnold 0]

OK, since there is a question on whether truth is contextual, here are some concrete examples:

1) Water boils at 100*c

2) If you pour water out of a glass, it will fall to the floor

3) If you accelerate over a cliff, you will plunge to the ground.

4) Killing a person is immoral

Now all of these statements can be true, but sometimes they are not. The truth depends on context.

1) Is only true at a certain atmospheric pressure.

2) Is not true in earth orbit

3) At 18000 mph, you would start to orbit.

4) Self defence nullifies this

The point of these examples is to show that a proposition can be both right and wrong depending on context. There is no absolute context where a single answer applies to all contexts. This is not subjectivism which is only concerned with conscious imaginings. Contexts are the aspects of reality used to form your conclusions, and the validity of those conclusions is only in relation to those aspects, not others introduced later.

Think of the blood transfusion example. Here is what I once wrote in another thread:

It involves the Boss( and the Researcher ®

B How goes the transfusion experiment?

R Well, all ten recipients of A type blood have done very well.

B What is your conclusion?

R That A type bloods are compatible

B All of them?

R In this context that would be true, yes.

B What context did you have in MIND?

R The context in mind, involves these references [points to 10 patients and

bag of A blood]

Later:

B What's going on, number 11 is as sick as a dog?

R It seems that there is a Ruddy Hellish factor in the blood that is

reacting with patient 11. We are working on it.

Later still:

B Well?

R We have discovered that this RH factor must be taken into account. We were

previously unaware of it.

B So then, it turns out that not all A types are compatible, right?

R In this new context, they are not.

B What is the new context?

R It includes number 11, and in that context, it is not true that A types

are compatible.

B But it's true in the previous context?

R We already proved that.

B Are you saying that the truth of whether A types are compatible or not,

depends on context?

R Yup. By the way, have you seen number 12 around somewhere?

Reality is the absolute.Truth is contextual.

[B. Royce 0]

I think it may help to see it this way: An innocent man goes to jail because of the wrong (unjust) judgment of a just judge. The judge does not know that the man is innocent, but the innocent man knows. The innocent man's consciousness provides the knowledge - the truth - of the error (injustice).

This should remove any charges of intrinsicism, but may raise other issues that I'm yet to consider.

The innocent man may also judge the judge to be innocent, saying, in effect, "If I had only the information he has I, too, would find me guilty."

[Free Capitalist 0]

Sorry but I'm done. I started to reply to Alon Tsin's post and found myself repeating an argument I've made already multiple times. If you want to believe that someone can be right even when later evidence contradicts them, be my guest. In my opinion it's like something right out of Kuhn, with his "paradigms". Either something is true, or it's not. There is no "true for him" or "true for that time period". That hardly anyone here can see that this way of speaking is subjectivist and build on primacy of consciousness is distressing to me, so at this point it would be best if I left the discussion. I've had my say, and I would only ask that people address further comments to the "room" and not to me individually.

bborg, I was with you throughout the whole thread (e.g. achieving the virtue may not achieve the value), until this. Do you really not believe in the contextuality of truth? Truth is not only a metaphysical concept but an epistemological one.

[Ifat Glassman 0]

Truth is the status of an idea which matches reality. Is this status contextual? Or is the knowledge of it contextual?

I don't see how something can match or not match reality according to someone's context. His conclusion of whether or not it matches, depends on his knowledge, but the status itself? Why?

[Arnold 0]

Truth is the status of an idea which matches reality. Is this status contextual? Or is the knowledge of it contextual?

I don't see how something can match or not match reality according to someone's context. His conclusion of whether or not it matches, depends on his knowledge, but the status itself? Why?

Truth is the identification of facts in a given context by a conscience.

I have given concrete examples. I cannot do more than that. The context is a limited aspect of reality.

Water boiling at 100*c is true only in a limited aspect of reality. Another man living in the mountains finds water boils at 90*c. Who is right? You keep wanting one conclusion to apply to all contexts.

Just as water boiling temperatures depend on context, justice in one context is not justice in another context.

[System Builder 0]

The central question raised by Ifat was succinctly stated in the thread-starter posting and repeated in Ifat's subsequent postings (with refinements and clarifications):

Is there a distinction between the concepts "justice" and "the virtue of justice"? If so, what is it?

My concept of justice, to put simply, is that a person gets what they deserve. What determines what he deserves? facts of reality.

. . .

Can it be said that while it is unjust for an innocent man to serve time in prison, that the judge who put him there, while judging the facts available to him objectively, possessed the virtue of justice?

In the literature of Objectivism (as far as I know), justice is always discussed as pertaining to the way people are treated by other people. Ayn Rand describes "justice" as "a concept to designate the act of judging a man's character and/or actions exclusively on the basis of all the factual evidence available, and of evaluating it by means of an objective moral criterion." [On-line Ayn Rand Lexicon, entry on Justice; previously posted in this thread here#45.] Note the primary focus on judging rather than on the judged. Injustice, on this view, is the failure to act justly; it is something which one person or persons do improperly to another person or persons. This implies that whenever someone is said to have suffered an injustice, there always had to be some other person or persons who perpetrated the injustice by acting unjustly.

Justice certainly does not fall from of the sky like rain or sunshine, nor grow on trees like fruit. Normally we don't ascribe justice or injustice to the actions of animals, either. We don't describe the victims of animal attacks as having suffered injustice from the animals, nor do we describe the animals as having acted unjustly. We use different terms to denote the harm that the victim suffers in such cases.

On the other hand, what if a pet animal "bites the hand that feeds it"? Can the pet owner be said to have suffered an injustice in that case, the "injustice" of bad treatment from an "ungrateful" pet? I think probably not. But what if the pet bit its owner because the owner was mistreating the pet somehow? Would we say then that the owner "got what he deserved" in that case, and "justice was served"? Can it be said that the owner was committing an injustice toward the animal?

As a similar example, consider a terrorist making a bomb with which to kill others (maybe even as a suicide bombing). Suppose the terrorist is careless in making the bomb and manages to blow himself up during the bomb making process, without injuring anyone else. Could it be said that "justice was served" in that case, because the terrorist "got what he deserved"?

In these examples, I would ask: who is making the judgment that justice was or was not served, and what is the purpose or value of such a judgment? As I see it, it is us (i.e., human observers) who are doing the judging in such cases. We do it to reinforce our own evaluation of the situation and our response (if any is needed) to the person who suffered the consequences of his own actions.

Thus, even in these special cases, it is still true that the issue of justice involves both a judge and a person or persons being judged, and that the action of the judge (or judges) is the most fundamental factor to consider, since the judge is the root cause of the judgment. (Remember Objectivism's view of causality: actions are actions of entities. Remember also that all judgments are man-made, not metaphysically given.) The benefit or harm done to the person or persons being judged is only consequential, not fundamental, as regards justice.

Ifat's example is a person being convicted of a crime he did not commit. It must be remembered, however, that in the U.S. it is usually a jury, not a judge, who decides issues of fact and pronounces guilt or innocence by applying the rules of law provided by the judge. The right to trial by jury is guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution (Sixth Amendment in the Bill of Rights). In practice, this usually means a jury of 12 "peers," with a meticulous selection process for choosing the jury. A verdict of guilty is supposed to be based not merely on the weight of the evidence, but on overwhelming evidence that establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The verdict also usually needs to be unanimous in criminal cases. The legal system goes to great lengths to avoid convicting an innocent defendant, even if it means letting ten guilty defendants go free.

Still, it is sometimes possible for the judicial system to err despite all the safeguards that have been built into it. Evidence can include circumstantial evidence that occasionally can be misleading when a defendant merely happens to have been in the wrong place at the wrong time. Evidence can also include eyewitness testimony by persons who occasionally may be honestly mistaken about what and who they actually observed. Credibility of witnesses is an issue that juries inevitably have to wrestle with. If, years or even decades later, new methods of DNA testing become available and conclusively prove that a convicted person couldn't have done the deed, then justice certainly demands, at minimum, that he be released from prison immediately (if he is still living and still in prison). But in a case like that, we would normally call it a tragic miscarriage of justice rather than an injustice, since injustice tends to suggest some kind of impropriety by others involved in the case -- such as a prejudiced judge or jury, or dishonest witnesses, etc. Injustice is certainly an apporpriate term to use if such impropriety does exist.

I would thus urge caution in too casually implying that the legal system is "broken" in some significant way, which the term "injustice" seems to suggest. And if errors occur, the rational approach certainly would be to examine closely how the errors happened and what might be done differently in the future to prevent similar errors from happening again.

[Paul's Here 0]

I have given a lot of thought and reading to the disagreements in this thread. I think I've come to some conclusions that will clarify the issues. Ifatart's original question was

Can it be said that while it is unjust for an innocent man to serve time in prison, that the judge who put him there, while judging the facts available to him objectively, possessed the virtue of justice?

Subsequent arguments held that either an injustice was done because an innocent man was sent to jail, or that justice was done because all available evidence was considered and no other requirements for justice can be required.

I think the issue reduces to what the relationship is between justice and individual rights. Confusion between these issues has led to the disagreements, in my opinion.

…claims of right and claims of justice are often confused…

notes Dr. Smith.

For the immediate purpose of clarifying the relationship between rights and the virtue of justice, the principal point is that rights are a function of human nature, in Rand’s view. A person need not do anything to earn his basic rights. … Our basic rights are not the sort of thing that a person can deserve in the way that he might deserve a bonus for outstanding work…

Bear in mind that justice governs reactions to specific qualities or actions of a given individual, such as skill, hard work, incompetence, or carelessness. The obligation to respect rights is not contingent on such variables. A person deserves things because of what he does, as a response to his conduct and character. A person possesses rights, by contrast, simply in virtue of his nature as a human being. While a person is entitled to have his rights respected, then, strictly speaking, he does not deserve to. It is not that he deserves not to; rather, rights are not the sort of thing that a person either does or does not deserve. … The purpose of a proper legal system is to protect individual rights and a legal system is just to the extent that it does that. In that realm, rights and justice often reflect two sides of the same issue. We must not allow the usage of these terms in the legal realm to cloud our understanding of the broader moral status of rights and justice however.

When considering the respect that is due a person’s rights, what that person deserves or has or has not earned ... are not appropriate considerations. … As long as a person truly possess rights, however, he is entitled to have them respected and his deserts are immaterial. ... The question of what a person’s rights entitle him to, however, is distinct from the question of how another person should treat him in order to fulfill the demands of justice.

Thus, to give my full answer to ifatart, I would say that an innocent person who was convicted of a crime had his rights violated, but justice was done provided the objective requirements for rationality were followed.

[Henryk 0]

Ifatart

Truth is a conclusion drawn, when facts correspond to reality. There're many facts in the world, but unless identified, won't be known as truth.

When you say " Truth is the status of an idea which matches reality", what you're saying in effect, is, that the idea is identical to reality, and this assertion could be interpreted as subjective.( match-that which is exactly like another in appearance)

[Henryk 0]

Paul's here

I have to disagree with you conclusion. There's an intrinsic tone to it; justice for it's own sake.

My conclusion is this: Notwithstanding all objective evidence presented to the judge , justice had not been done to the accused person.

[Henryk 0]

Ignore my previous conclusion!

What I meant to say is this: Notwithstanding all objective evidence presented to the judge, an innocent man was found guilty; justice was not served.

[B. Royce 0]

Ignore my previous conclusion!

What I meant to say is this: Notwithstanding all objective evidence presented to the judge, an innocent man was found guilty; justice was not served.

Who had the evidence to show he was innocent?

[Henryk 0]

B. Royce

I believe we're trying to establish, whether justice was done to a man, by convicting him first, and subsequently , after more evidence in his favour - was found innocent.

I would argue that reality is free of contradictions: just as he was innocent after getting out of jail; he was innocent before he was sent there. Judges final ruling , is not always synonymous with justice being done, no matter how scrupulous the judge may have been. In this case justice was administered, but there would be a contradiction to say , that justice was done when sending him to jail, and justice was done after his exoneration.

In reality, judges context notwithstanding, justice in the sense of what the man deserved-- was not done.

[B. Royce 0]

B. Royce

I believe we're trying to establish, whether justice was done to a man, by convicting him first, and subsequently , after more evidence in his favour - was found innocent.

I would argue that reality is free of contradictions: just as he was innocent after getting out of jail; he was innocent before he was sent there. Judges final ruling , is not always synonymous with justice being done, no matter how scrupulous the judge may have been. In this case justice was administered, but there would be a contradiction to say , that justice was done when sending him to jail, and justice was done after his exoneration.

In reality, judges context notwithstanding, justice in the sense of what the man deserved-- was not done.

What the man deserved, consistent with the best evidence known at the time of the judgment, was that the judge be objective. If the evidence pointed to the man's guilt, but the judge had a bias FOR the man and let him off, would that be an act of justice, even if the man was actually innocent?

[Paul's Here 0]

Henry,

You state that "there's an intrinsic tone" in my position. Yet you state, "In reality, judges context notwithstanding, justice in the sense of what the man deserved-- was not done."

Please show me how, in reality, justice is independent of the judgment of the individual doing the judging, epsecially within the context that the judge has followed objective rules of judgment. I don't think you can use the fact that man is capable of error as a means to invalidate whether a virtue was followed. As I stated earlier, what more does a man deserve in society than to be judged by objective standards and rules of evidence? What does it mean to hold that someone deserves a judgment outside of the context of the judge's knowledge?

Errors of knowledge can be devastating, and sending a man who later evidence shows is innocent to jail, certainly falls within that category. But the real injustice would be in keeping the man confined after the judge knows he is innocent (see The Shawshank Redemption).

[Ifat Glassman 0]

Henry,

You state that "there's an intrinsic tone" in my position. Yet you state, "In reality, judges context notwithstanding, justice in the sense of what the man deserved-- was not done."

Please show me how, in reality, justice is independent of the judgment of the individual doing the judging, especially within the context that the judge has followed objective rules of judgment. I don't think you can use the fact that man is capable of error as a means to invalidate whether a virtue was followed.

No one is debating over the virtue of justice. Everyone (including Henry, by my understanding) is talking about the value of justice which is sought. No one is arguing whether or not the judge is virtuous or not.

As I stated earlier, what more does a man deserve in society than to be judged by objective standards and rules of evidence? What does it mean to hold that someone deserves a judgment outside of the context of the judge's knowledge

What they deserve should not be measured by the knowledge of any specific person, yet every person can only answer this question based on his own knowledge (no, this is not an internal contradiction).

Here is an example: Suppose I want to engineer a device in the best way possible. For that I need to learn a lot, and to obtain new knowledge. I am motivated to obtain this knowledge since I know that reality is independent of my current state of mind (in the sense that things are what they are whether I know it or not), and that knowledge is the value I seek.

In the same sense a judge seeks to know all the relevant facts to achieve justice (the state of giving the person what the person deserves - not by the current knowledge the judge has - but by the maximum relevant knowledge possible for the judge to obtain).

The engineer was acting to gain new knowledge because he wanted to build a good device.

The judge is acting to get as much relevant knowledge as possible, beyond his current level of knowledge. Why? what is the value that he seeks by this action? Broader education? satisfying a social interest in potential-criminals' life? What do you call the value which is sought by this action?

I call this value justice, which means granting a man that which he deserves. and what he deserves from me (the judge) can only be judged in reference to facts of reality - not to the random state of my knowledge at some moment.

[Ifat Glassman 0]

What the man deserved, consistent with the best evidence known at the time of the judgment, was that the judge be objective. If the evidence pointed to the man's guilt, but the judge had a bias FOR the man and let him off, would that be an act of justice, even if the man was actually innocent?

Great question Brian.

I'd say that the man got what he deserved, but the judge is not virtuous and did not act justly. I am able to say this because I use the word "justice" for two different concepts: justice as a virtue, and justice as a value.

Here is a parallel:

If I am trying to get an apple from an apple tree by dancing the great chicken dance underneath (prayer to the all mighty chicken god who would supply me with food), and then an apple drops from the sky into my open mouth - did I achieve a value? Did I act rationally? Yes (to first) and No (to second). So this case with justice as a virtue and as a value is similar in principle: Someone acted randomly (not virtuously: not rationally nor justly), but yet by random action he achieved a value which society seeks: to grant each man what he deserves (specifically the value sought is to punish the guilty and to set free the innocents).

The question "would that be an act of justice" happens to combines those two concepts, which makes it so confusing. but it doesn't have to be lumped together: you can make a separation by asking if the judge acted justly by what (you know) he knew, and if the man got what he deserves (again by what you know - and you know he is innocent), and clarify which one of the questions you are asking.

what do you think?

[Paul's Here 0]

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I call this value justice, which means granting a man that which he deserves. and what he deserves from me (the judge) can only be judged in reference to facts of reality - not to the random state of my knowledge at some moment.

If you are using the term justice to mean "granting a man that which he deserves," then granting is a verb which is an action which makes the term a virtue. A value is not an action.

Granted that the Objectivist virtues may be regarded as values in certain contexts, one cannot switch contexts. And this appears to be what is happening here between us. As you are using the concept justice as a value, I would define it as the social or existential condition in which a man gets what he deserves. But how is "what he deserves" determined? Is it a metaphysical condition? If I were hiking in the mountains and I slipped on a rock and broke a leg, would it be proper to say, "I deserved the broken leg" or "I didn't deserve the broken leg"? I think neither applies. That which is "deserving" depends upon a social condition and interaction with other men/women. To deserve something implies that an individual has taken certain actions that warrant the claimed value. An innocent man, in contrast, has done nothing to warrant being put in jail by others. To say that someone is innocent is a judgment by other people just as much as a judgment of guilt. And both depend upon the context of knowledge of the judges. Which is why what a person deserves depends upon others values and knowledge.

I beg to differ on your interpretation of what justice is. It is dependent upon the knowledge of the judger. If FORD comes up with a new car that gets 90 miles per hour, it is justice by those people who choose to buy the product that they pay FORD for the value. If I don't like FORD products, then the application of justice certainly depends upon my knowledge and personal values. I don't expect FORD to just drop a car off in driveway because I deserve a car. Thus, it is others (FORD in this example) who have set the conditions for my getting what I deserve.

[piz 0]

If I am trying to get an apple from an apple tree by dancing the great chicken dance underneath (prayer to the all mighty chicken god who would supply me with food), and then an apple drops from the sky into my open mouth - did I achieve a value? Did I act rationally? Yes (to first) and No (to second).

Tara Smith makes an important distinction in her book, Viable Values, between "benefit" and "value." Benefit is a wider class than value. An example of the difference would be finding a $10 bill on the sidewalk (a benefit but, though valuable, not a value) vs. earning $10 by your work (a value, therefore also a benefit). I would say, based my understanding of her argument, that you did not achieve a value when the apple fell into your mouth, you received a benefit.

While I'm at it, for almost 30 years now the Atlantic Ocean has owed me 20 bucks! The bill was in my pocket when I went in the water and was gone when I came out. Thief!

Also, I humbly beg the Almighty Chicken God (blessed be His Feathers) for his forgiveness for my lack of faith.

[B. Royce 0]

What the man deserved, consistent with the best evidence known at the time of the judgment, was that the judge be objective. If the evidence pointed to the man's guilt, but the judge had a bias FOR the man and let him off, would that be an act of justice, even if the man was actually innocent?

Great question Brian.

I'd say that the man got what he deserved, but the judge is not virtuous and did not act justly. I am able to say this because I use the word "justice" for two different concepts: justice as a virtue, and justice as a value.

Here is a parallel:

If I am trying to get an apple from an apple tree by dancing the great chicken dance underneath (prayer to the all mighty chicken god who would supply me with food), and then an apple drops from the sky into my open mouth - did I achieve a value? Did I act rationally? Yes (to first) and No (to second). So this case with justice as a virtue and as a value is similar in principle: Someone acted randomly (not virtuously: not rationally nor justly), but yet by random action he achieved a value which society seeks: to grant each man what he deserves (specifically the value sought is to punish the guilty and to set free the innocents).

The question "would that be an act of justice" happens to combines those two concepts, which makes it so confusing. but it doesn't have to be lumped together: you can make a separation by asking if the judge acted justly by what (you know) he knew, and if the man got what he deserves (again by what you know - and you know he is innocent), and clarify which one of the questions you are asking.

what do you think?

The relevant question at a time of judgment is, who knows what? and when do they know it? If, at the time of judgment, all the evidence points to a man's guilt, and only he knows he is innocent, then the judge, in stating "Guilty', is giving him what he (the judge) knows he deserves. The (actually) innocent man knows that he is not getting what he deserves according to his knowledge, but that he is getting what he deserves according to the judge's knowledge. His problem then is how to impart his knowledge to the judge, and his only hope of vindication lies in his knowledge that the judge values justice. If he is able to impart this knowledge, then, because the judge continues to value justice, he will be set free. In both cases he will have received what he deserved according to the judge's knowledge and virtue.

[~Sophia~ 0]

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I call this value justice, which means granting a man that which he deserves. and what he deserves from me (the judge) can only be judged in reference to facts of reality - not to the random state of my knowledge at some moment.

But how is "what he deserves" determined? Is it a metaphysical condition?

I think that guilt/innocence in a social setting is determined (at least it should be) by the standard of rational code of ethics (and law should be based on those). When an action occurs it becomes a fact of reality, a fact with a specific moral (and sometimes legal) status. Correct identification of that status then should be the aim and a moral responsibility of those who, for whatever reason, are engaging in the judging. To me, weather or not someone was innocent is a fact of reality.

That identification maybe faulty as errors of knowledge occur in which case justice would not be served. When it comes to the moral status of the judge if he ruled to be best of his knowledge of facts, rational principles, and his intellectual ability, even if the judgment was, in fact, unjust, is morally white. Errors of knowledge are not breaches of morality but they are still errors in relation to reality.

That is how I see it.

[Oleksandr 0]

I think that guilt/innocence in a social setting is determined (at least it should be) by the standard of rational code of ethics (and law should be based on those). When an action occurs it becomes a fact of reality, a fact with a specific moral (and sometimes legal) status. Correct identification of that status then should be the aim and a moral responsibility of those who, for whatever reason, are engaging in the judging. To me, weather or not someone was innocent is a fact of reality.

I wonder, though, what kind of fact of reality it is.

I think that a state of being innocent or guilty is not a metaphysical fact but a moral fact. Thus, it must to be approached from an individual context, without this context, no moral calculation can be made.

For example, a question of "If nobody knows if a person is guilty or not, is he guilty?" doesn't make much sense to me. 'Guilt' is a moral concept, thus the only way to know if a person is guilty is to have the knowledge of what the person did and enough evidence/proof to know if the person deserves to be punished or not.

But going back to the topic of 'Justice' which is more general than just legal matters.

Everyone (including Henry, by my understanding) is talking about the value of justice which is sought.

For example, what would be a just response to some businessman or an artists? Is it unjust that one of them is not recognized well "enough" in their own time? If there is such a thing as a value of justice, then there has to be some certain goal (level of recognition in my example) that one tries to achieve by acting justly. So, then what determines what is enough of recognition that an artist/businessman should get? Does this mean that there is some impersonal calculation that says that "you should give them X respect given your largest possible knowledge if you were to seek out all relevant knowledge to your best effort," and so in the pursuit of this concrete value of justice, one tries to find what is X and then provide X to the receiver?

---

To others in the thread with more Oist experience, can one properly state that within Oist framework that the value being sought in virtue of Justice is to act towards people according to my fullest knowledge of them? Thus, my task wouldn't trying to achieve some abstract pre-calculated value, but instead to always act towards people according to my knowledge, so that anytime my knowledge expands my conclusion and actions always remain correct?

Ayn Rand wrote that the reward of virtue is Life.

Life is the reward of virtue—and happiness is the goal and the reward of life.

Granted that reward is a wider concept that value, yet can it be said that an intermediate value of Justice then is to act according to one's fullest knowledge within a social context? Or is this a restatement of the virtue?

Granted that the Objectivist virtues may be regarded as values in certain contexts, one cannot switch contexts.

Or is this one of those contexts?

[Paul's Here 0]

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I call this value justice, which means granting a man that which he deserves. and what he deserves from me (the judge) can only be judged in reference to facts of reality - not to the random state of my knowledge at some moment.

But how is "what he deserves" determined? Is it a metaphysical condition?

I think that guilt/innocence in a social setting is determined (at least it should be) by the standard of rational code of ethics (and law should be based on those). When an action occurs it becomes a fact of reality, a fact with a specific moral (and sometimes legal) status. Correct identification of that status then should be the aim and a moral responsibility of those who, for whatever reason, are engaging in the judging. To me, weather or not someone was innocent is a fact of reality.

That identification maybe faulty as errors of knowledge occur in which case justice would not be served. When it comes to the moral status of the judge if he ruled to be best of his knowledge of facts, rational principles, and his intellectual ability, even if the judgment was, in fact, unjust, is morally white. Errors of knowledge are not breaches of morality but they are still errors in relation to reality.

That is how I see it.

I agree with most of what you say. But the disagreement seems to be associated with the implications such as what you stated "When it comes to the moral status of the judge if he ruled to be best of his knowledge of facts, rational principles, and his intellectual ability, even if the judgment was, in fact, unjust, is morally white." How can an unjust act be classified as morally white? If the act is a result of an error of knowledge, why not just classify it as such? I don't think that because something happens to someone that otherwise shouldn't or wouldn't have happened, that that means an injustice was done.

I think that Dr. Smith appropriately states the following.

The universe can be neither just nor unjust. While naturally occurring events can benefit or harm a person, nature cannot literally reward or punish or "treat" a person as he deserves. Desert, like justice itself, is a moral concept and as such, not the sort of thing that can be attributed to nonvolitional events.

I interpret this to mean that the part of man's nature that is nonvolitional, his potential for errors of knowledge, is outside of morality and, therefore, justice. Just as a flood can harm a person, so can an error of knowledge. Neither can be called unjust.

[Paul's Here 0]

--------------------

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To others in the thread with more Oist experience, can one properly state that within Oist framework that the value being sought in virtue of Justice is to act towards people according to my fullest knowledge of them? Thus, my task wouldn't trying to achieve some abstract pre-calculated value, but instead to always act towards people according to my knowledge, so that anytime my knowledge expands my conclusion and actions always remain correct?

I don't want to get off topic, so I'll answer concisely. Basically, yes. The value, in such a case, that justice pursues is your reason and your purpose. Why do you expand you knowledge about other people? Which people?

Ayn Rand wrote that the reward of virtue is Life.

Life is the reward of virtue—and happiness is the goal and the reward of life.

Granted that reward is a wider concept that value, yet can it be said that an intermediate value of Justice then is to act according to one's fullest knowledge within a social context? Or is this a restatement of the virtue?

Sounds like a restatement to me.

Granted that the Objectivist virtues may be regarded as values in certain contexts, one cannot switch contexts.

Or is this one of those contexts?

When it can be shown that the virtue is what is being sought by the action, then one can classify it as a value. But one cannot say that justice is a value when one grants to others what they deserve, because that is using the concept as a virtue. For instance, as you state above, if you "always act towards people according to my knowledge, so that anytime my knowledge expands my conclusion and actions always remain correct," then you are pursuing the value of justice.