Doctrine of the Mean

[JRoberts 0]

I was wondering if anybody had a reason (a passage/quote would be superb!) on why Ayn Rand rejected Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean as described in the Nicomachean Ethics.

[Free Capitalist 0]

What book of the Ethics?

[JRoberts 0]

Book II.ii, starting at 1104a11 and II.vi-viii.

[Free Capitalist 0]

I've heard from one of Dr. Peikoff's lectures that he believes Aristotle got some things very right, and some very wrong. The right things were of course in the metaphysics and the epistemology, but that he was wrong in ethics with the notion of the Golden Mean. I don't remember him clarifying what he meant in that lecture.

[Oleksandr 0]

I found this: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golden_mean_(philosophy)

Looks pretty bad with the idea of moderation between "extremes."

[Oleksandr 0]

Also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicomachean_E...The_Golden_Mean

[Paul's Here 0]

I was wondering if anybody had a reason (a passage/quote would be superb!) on why Ayn Rand rejected Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean as described in the Nicomachean Ethics.

I can't find a reference, but if I remember correctly, Dr. Peikoff said somewhere that Aristotle held that the Mean was good because it was between two extremes. Peikoff stated that if one identifies what is right or true on one side and what is wrong or false on the other side, there is not justification to choose the middle.

[ewv 0]

I was wondering if anybody had a reason (a passage/quote would be superb!) on why Ayn Rand rejected Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean as described in the Nicomachean Ethics.

If you want a definitive answer with direct quotes you will have to listen to Leonard Peikoff's lecture on Aristotle in his series on the history of western philosophy. He criticized the doctrine of the mean on several grounds, as well as evaluating the other major positions taken by Aristotle.

[JRoberts 0]

I found this: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golden_mean_(philosophy)

Looks pretty bad with the idea of moderation between "extremes."

Why does that look so bad?

[JRoberts 0]

I can't find a reference, but if I remember correctly, Dr. Peikoff said somewhere that Aristotle held that the Mean was good because it was between two extremes. Peikoff stated that if one identifies what is right or true on one side and what is wrong or false on the other side, there is not justification to choose the middle.

I would agree with Peikoff. However, my interpretation of Aristotle shows that Aristotle, too, would agree with Dr. Peikoff.

Aristotle does not promote the mean because it is a mean. Rather, his observations of the world lead him to the conclusion that bad or vice can lie both in excess and deficiency. While it is bad not to eat and good to eat, at the same time, it is bad to eat too much. While it is bad not to excercise and good to exercise, it is bad to exercise too much. Thus the mean for Aristotle is chosen because it is the good, the "right ammount at the right time for the right reasons under the right circumstances", between two vices. How does this disagree, in effect, with Dr. Peikoff?

[JRoberts 0]

If you want a definitive answer with direct quotes you will have to listen to Leonard Peikoff's lecture on Aristotle in his series on the history of western philosophy. He criticized the doctrine of the mean on several grounds, as well as evaluating the other major positions taken by Aristotle.

I would love to listen to this lecture, but last I checked, it was quite expensive. Do you know if this has changed, or if there might be a free version?

[JRoberts 0]

I found this quote from Aristotle which might help illuminate more what his position is:

If it is thus, then, that every art does its work well- by looking to the intermediate and judg/ing its works by this standard (so that we often say of good works of art that it is not possible either to take away or to add anything, implying that excess and defect destroy the goodness of works of art, while the mean preserves it; and good artists, as we say, look to this in their work), and if, further, virtue is more exact and better than any art, as nature also is, then virtue must have the quality of aiming at the intermediate. I mean moral virtue; for it is this that is concerned with passions and actions, and in these there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. Similarly with regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. Now virtue is concerned with passions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success; and being praised and being successful are both characteristics of virtue. Therefore virtue is a kind of mean, since, as we have seen, it aims at what is intermediate.

-EN II.vi

We all agree that Ayn Rand was in no way a Platonist. Therefore, she does not view virtue as knowledge. Like Aristotle, Ayn Rand believes that virtue lies in action. In fact, Ayn Rand's ethics is very action oriented. Be this the case, would it not be appropriate for us to understand the nature of actions themselves? Meaning: what is action, what are its characteristics, etc. Aristotle would say that an action can either not be done, done correctly, or done too much. For example, in regards to the action of bravery, a person can either not be brave (a coward), ie. not performing brave acts; a person can be brave (he is brave at the right times for the right reasons for the right duration under the right circumstances); and a person can be too brave (rash), meaning that he takes the act of bravery out of context, acting in the wrong way, at the wrong time, for the wrong duration, or under the wrong circumstances. Viewed in this light, the Doctrine of the Mean is actually a form of objectivity.

[Paul's Here 0]

I can't find a reference, but if I remember correctly, Dr. Peikoff said somewhere that Aristotle held that the Mean was good because it was between two extremes. Peikoff stated that if one identifies what is right or true on one side and what is wrong or false on the other side, there is not justification to choose the middle.

I would agree with Peikoff. However, my interpretation of Aristotle shows that Aristotle, too, would agree with Dr. Peikoff.

Aristotle does not promote the mean because it is a mean. Rather, his observations of the world lead him to the conclusion that bad or vice can lie both in excess and deficiency. While it is bad not to eat and good to eat, at the same time, it is bad to eat too much. While it is bad not to excercise and good to exercise, it is bad to exercise too much. Thus the mean for Aristotle is chosen because it is the good, the "right ammount at the right time for the right reasons under the right circumstances", between two vices. How does this disagree, in effect, with Dr. Peikoff?

I certainly cannot answer for him. Why don't you send him your question on his website? My response would be that exercising too much or not enough are not extremes that are on opposite ends of the spectrum. If the purpose of exercise is health, then both too much and too little are on the same side of being detrimental to health.

[JRoberts 0]

I certainly cannot answer for him. Why don't you send him your question on his website? My response would be that exercising too much or not enough are not extremes that are on opposite ends of the spectrum. If the purpose of exercise is health, then both too much and too little are on the same side of being detrimental to health.

That's a good idea! I'll send him my question.

As to your answer, you are right. But a distinction must be made. As for something being good or bad, beneficial or detrimental, there are only two things. But as to the nature of the action itself, the action of proper exercise is a mean between too much of that action or too little of that action. The importance of this distinction is this:

Some people take that there are two alternatives, beneficial and detrimental in health, and understand that exercise is good for health, and then think that the more they exercise, the better it is for them. However, this is not the case-they are conflating the principle with the action. Similarly, water is good-we need water. It is valuable to us because we need it to survive. If we don't have water, we will die. But that does not mean that the need for water and the amount of water go hand in hand. Too much water can lead to water poisoning, and a person can die. Thus it is essential to determine what the proper amount of water is for an individual in order to maximize health.

[Duke 0]

As to your answer, you are right. But a distinction must be made. As for something being good or bad, beneficial or detrimental, there are only two things. But as to the nature of the action itself, the action of proper exercise is a mean between too much of that action or too little of that action. The importance of this distinction is this:

No, the nature of virtues is that there can never be too much of them. There is no "mean" of rationality or justice. Nor is there an "extreme" of pride or integrity.

[bborg 0]

-EN II.vi

We all agree that Ayn Rand was in no way a Platonist. Therefore, she does not view virtue as knowledge. Like Aristotle, Ayn Rand believes that virtue lies in action. In fact, Ayn Rand's ethics is very action oriented. Be this the case, would it not be appropriate for us to understand the nature of actions themselves? Meaning: what is action, what are its characteristics, etc. Aristotle would say that an action can either not be done, done correctly, or done too much. For example, in regards to the action of bravery, a person can either not be brave (a coward), ie. not performing brave acts; a person can be brave (he is brave at the right times for the right reasons for the right duration under the right circumstances); and a person can be too brave (rash), meaning that he takes the act of bravery out of context, acting in the wrong way, at the wrong time, for the wrong duration, or under the wrong circumstances. Viewed in this light, the Doctrine of the Mean is actually a form of objectivity.

I was about to use this example when I noticed you had. I would have to reread the section to get it precisely, but my understanding was this: Bravery, according to Aristotle, is a mean of action and wisdom. If you rush to battle without considering the consequences, you're just a fool. If, on the other hand, you know that action is required and won't take it, you're a coward. It's not the worst account of virtues, certainly, but the problem is the definition is relative rather than objective.

[Free Capitalist 0]

Nor is there an "extreme" of pride or integrity.

Why not? It's called haughtiness.

[JRoberts 0]

No, the nature of virtues is that there can never be too much of them. There is no "mean" of rationality or justice. Nor is there an "extreme" of pride or integrity.

On the one hand, yes. And I think Aristotle would agree. He would never say, "Moderate your virtues", "Do not be 'too' courageous." Aristotle believes that these virtues must be practiced to their fullest extent, all the time, and in full force. The difference, though, like I have said before, is not that you can be "too" courageous, in the sense that you can be "too" good, but rather that the action related to courage can be taken out of context. Aristotle's most repetitive phrase in his ethics is, "At the right time, for the right reasons, under the right circumstances, for the right duration, etc.".

Let us take the example of productivity. One must always attempt to be productive, and there is no sense that the good productive can be practiced too much. But you can be "productive" at the wrong times, or for the wrong reasons, or under the wrong circumstances. To work hard is good. To work hard to the point to where your body is failing and you never see your family whom you love and value, then you are not being appropriately productive. In this sense, there is a mean between not working at all (being a sloth), working appropriately, and working too much. Both working too much and not working at all are a detriment.

[JRoberts 0]

I was about to use this example when I noticed you had. I would have to reread the section to get it precisely, but my understanding was this: Bravery, according to Aristotle, is a mean of action and wisdom. If you rush to battle without considering the consequences, you're just a fool. If, on the other hand, you know that action is required and won't take it, you're a coward. It's not the worst account of virtues, certainly, but the problem is the definition is relative rather than objective.

How is Aristotle's ethics relative (or subjective) and not objective?

[Paul's Here 0]

I found this quote from Aristotle which might help illuminate more what his position is:

If it is thus, then, that every art does its work well- by looking to the intermediate and judg/ing its works by this standard (so that we often say of good works of art that it is not possible either to take away or to add anything, implying that excess and defect destroy the goodness of works of art, while the mean preserves it; and good artists, as we say, look to this in their work), and if, further, virtue is more exact and better than any art, as nature also is, then virtue must have the quality of aiming at the intermediate. I mean moral virtue; for it is this that is concerned with passions and actions, and in these there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. Similarly with regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. Now virtue is concerned with passions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success; and being praised and being successful are both characteristics of virtue. Therefore virtue is a kind of mean, since, as we have seen, it aims at what is intermediate.

-EN II.vi

We all agree that Ayn Rand was in no way a Platonist. Therefore, she does not view virtue as knowledge. Like Aristotle, Ayn Rand believes that virtue lies in action. In fact, Ayn Rand's ethics is very action oriented. Be this the case, would it not be appropriate for us to understand the nature of actions themselves? Meaning: what is action, what are its characteristics, etc. Aristotle would say that an action can either not be done, done correctly, or done too much. For example, in regards to the action of bravery, a person can either not be brave (a coward), ie. not performing brave acts; a person can be brave (he is brave at the right times for the right reasons for the right duration under the right circumstances); and a person can be too brave (rash), meaning that he takes the act of bravery out of context, acting in the wrong way, at the wrong time, for the wrong duration, or under the wrong circumstances. Viewed in this light, the Doctrine of the Mean is actually a form of objectivity.

I disagree that the doctrine is a form of objectivity. It may be an attempt at it, but it falls far short. The character of a brave person is completely different than that of a coward or a rash person. A brave person is not a mean between them. Their values are different and their methods of achieiving their values are, as a result, different.

When I decide to use reason, I don't choose between being a whim-worshiper and a dogamatist, and take the middle ground.

[JRoberts 0]

I disagree that the doctrine is a form of objectivity. It may be an attempt at it, but it falls far short. The character of a brave person is completely different than that of a coward or a rash person. A brave person is not a mean between them. Their values are different and their methods of achieiving their values are, as a result, different.

When I decide to use reason, I don't choose between being a whim-worshiper and a dogamatist, and take the middle ground.

How is it not objective?

As to using reason, no you don't. At the same time, the brave person does not say "Well I am about to run into battle. I can either be a coward or rash, but I'll choose the middle ground." Rather, the brave person strives for bravery. But he must actively use his mind at each step to validate if his actions are proper. If he tries to take a hill that is guarded by one hundred men alone, that is not a proper action, and is not bravery. Thus it is his mind, or as Aristotle says, a rational principle, that guides the virtuous man to the proper course of action. In a similar manner, you do not say "Well I can be irrational or a rationalist, so I should choose the middle." Rather, you consistently try to be properly rational. But even in reason, if you do not use it properly, you can become a rationalist. Detaching reason from reality is an improper use of reason, and leads to something just as bad as someone who is irrational or non-rational. Thus reason must be used in the right way and for the right reasons.

[Arnold 0]

Some people take that there are two alternatives, beneficial and detrimental in health, and understand that exercise is good for health, and then think that the more they exercise, the better it is for them. However, this is not the case-they are conflating the principle with the action. Similarly, water is good-we need water. It is valuable to us because we need it to survive. If we don't have water, we will die. But that does not mean that the need for water and the amount of water go hand in hand. Too much water can lead to water poisoning, and a person can die. Thus it is essential to determine what the proper amount of water is for an individual in order to maximize health.

Ha, I remember trying to sort this out long before I knew about Objectivism. My conclusion was that there were different categories being evaluated.

Basically one dealt with quality, and the other quantity. One cannot apply the "mean" to both categories at the same time. Water, by it's nature (quality) is good and essential for man. Quantity is a different matter. Quantity of water required must be judged for the situation. A good quantity in one context, is not a good quantity in another. Obviously there will be a perfect quantity for each situation. Any more is too much, and any less is too little. I suppose one can then apply the term "mean" here, but I don't find it helpful.

[ewv 0]

Detaching reason from reality is an improper use of reason, and leads to something just as bad as someone who is irrational or non-rational. Thus reason must be used in the right way and for the right reasons.

Which is not a "mean" between opposite standards. Every time you try to defend a proper position as a "mean" you are implicitly invoking an actual objective standard of what is right. The doctrine of the mean, like pragmatism, is a parasitic position implemented by way of unacknowledged principles that determine what you decide to be the "mean". That is not "objective".

[bborg 0]

How is Aristotle's ethics relative (or subjective) and not objective?

Cowardice, courage and rashness are qualitatively different than each other. You can say that someone is courageous to one degree or another, but there isn't a degree of cowardice that is "close" to courage. Many people seem to believe, to use another example, that selflessness and selfishness exist on a continuum. Well, at what point does selflessness become selfishness, and how do you measure that in such a system? There's no way to answer that question without identifying the essential characteristics of such behaviors, and then what you have isn't a scale of one to the other but black and white criteria where each falls.

[Duke 0]

Let us take the example of productivity. One must always attempt to be productive, and there is no sense that the good productive can be practiced too much. But you can be "productive" at the wrong times, or for the wrong reasons, or under the wrong circumstances. To work hard is good. To work hard to the point to where your body is failing and you never see your family whom you love and value, then you are not being appropriately productive. In this sense, there is a mean between not working at all (being a sloth), working appropriately, and working too much. Both working too much and not working at all are a detriment.

Productivity is a derivative virtue of rationality. Rationality as applied to certain circumstances is called productivity, but when applied to evaluating other men it is called justice. I don't think one must always attempt to "be productive" if that means being productive regardless of context. Neither would I think one must always attempt to be just, if being just meant trying to use justice where it couldn't be used. The virtues have applications within particular contexts.