Doctrine of the Mean

[Duke 0]

Nor is there an "extreme" of pride or integrity.

Why not? It's called haughtiness.

If you think that, you don't understand what pride is.

[Free Capitalist 0]

Nor is there an "extreme" of pride or integrity.

Why not? It's called haughtiness.

If you think that, you don't understand what pride is.

Sure I do. Realization and acknowledgment of one's worth. Haughtiness is that principle, taken too far and applied incorrectly.

[ewv 0]

How is Aristotle's ethics relative (or subjective) and not objective?

Cowardice, courage and rashness are qualitatively different than each other. You can say that someone is courageous to one degree or another, but there isn't a degree of cowardice that is "close" to courage. Many people seem to believe, to use another example, that selflessness and selfishness exist on a continuum. Well, at what point does selflessness become selfishness, and how do you measure that in such a system? There's no way to answer that question without identifying the essential characteristics of such behaviors, and then what you have isn't a scale of one to the other but black and white criteria where each falls.

Which may turn out to be a "borderline case", but it takes objective standards to identify that, too, before you can go on to properly classify and assess the behavior.

[ewv 0]

Nor is there an "extreme" of pride or integrity.

Why not? It's called haughtiness.

If you think that, you don't understand what pride is.

Sure I do. Realization and acknowledgment of one's worth. Haughtiness is that principle, taken too far and applied incorrectly.

Which behavior is not "realization and acknowledgement of one's worth" and therefore is not an "extreme version" of something it is not.

Also, integrity is not pride, integrity is the integration of one's thoughts and actions. "Haughtiness" is not an "extreme" of that either.

[Free Capitalist 0]

Sure I do. Realization and acknowledgment of one's worth. Haughtiness is that principle, taken too far and applied incorrectly.

Which behavior is not "realization and acknowledgement of one's worth" and therefore is not an "extreme version" of something it is not.

This wasn't clear to me.

In what way is haughtiness not a 'realization and acknowledgment of of one's worth'? It is that, but it assigns too many things on the side of personal worth rather than what is appropriate. You've seen images of puffed up personages, filled with their own self-importance -- they assign too much to themselves than is their due, and 'acknowledgement of their own worth' is not something they lack.

[Paul's Here 0]

Sure I do. Realization and acknowledgment of one's worth. Haughtiness is that principle, taken too far and applied incorrectly.

Which behavior is not "realization and acknowledgement of one's worth" and therefore is not an "extreme version" of something it is not.

This wasn't clear to me.

In what way is haughtiness not a 'realization and acknowledgment of of one's worth'? It is that, but it assigns too many things on the side of personal worth rather than what is appropriate. You've seen images of puffed up personages, filled with their own self-importance -- they assign too much to themselves than is their due, and 'acknowledgement of their own worth' is not something they lack.

It is not just a matter of assigning "too many things" to his personal worth. It is a matter of his method of assignment.

Haughtiness means "blatantly and disdainfully proud." Distain means "a feeling of contempt for someone or something regarded as unworthy or inferior." (E.g., I'm better than you because I have a more expensive car.) Blantant means "completely obvious, conspicuous, or obtrusive especially in a crass or offensive manner." [Definitions from M-W Online]

In what way are these characteristics applicable to someone who realizes and acknowledges his own worth in the sense that a proud (in the Objectivist sense) person does? The two are non-commensurate, in my opinion, and it is a quirk of English that the two concepts are designated by the same word.

[ewv 0]

Sure I do. Realization and acknowledgment of one's worth. Haughtiness is that principle, taken too far and applied incorrectly.

Which behavior is not "realization and acknowledgement of one's worth" and therefore is not an "extreme version" of something it is not.

This wasn't clear to me.

In what way is haughtiness not a 'realization and acknowledgment of of one's worth'? It is that, but it assigns too many things on the side of personal worth rather than what is appropriate. You've seen images of puffed up personages, filled with their own self-importance -- they assign too much to themselves than is their due, and 'acknowledgement of their own worth' is not something they lack.

Such people are typically anything but secure in their sense of self worth, but in any event such obnoxious overt behavior is not a 'realization or acknowledgment of one's self worth. Nor is a subjective and false sense of one's "importance" (to whom?) a form of actual pride, "extreme" or not.

An alleged scale of degrees gives you nothing on which to identify such differences. You have to know what they are, already have a standard, and then apply it before you can begin to claim you have found a "mean" as the alleged criterion. This why those who attempt to rely on "avoiding extremes" wind up package-dealing all kinds of things with pride, independence, and integrity as they harbor implicit standards and resentments actually driving their decisions.

[Free Capitalist 0]

An alleged scale of degrees gives you nothing on which to identify such differences. You have to know what they are, already have a standard, and then apply it before you can begin to claim you have found a "mean" as the alleged criterion. This why those who attempt to rely on "avoiding extremes" wind up package-dealing all kinds of things with pride, independence, and integrity as they harbor implicit standards and resentments actually driving their decisions.

Mind you, from what I've read of Aristotle he didn't state that you happen upon the virtue by avoiding the extremes. And in any case, that's not how I approach it. You're right, you have to know the definition of that something in the middle, before you know how to steer towards it.

But that still doesn't negate Aristotle's quantitative observation that virtues lie in the mean. I don't think he advocates looking for the mean as a guide to virtue, and in any case I don't advocate it, but nevertheless virtues do lie in the middle, such as with this discussion about haughtiness being an extension of pride. And it's not a mathematical middle, because Aristotle again says that most virtues lie closer to one of the extremes than the other; e.g. Courage is so much like Recklessness as to often be mistaken for it, while Cowardice lies far on the other side and is a clear antithesis.

[Free Capitalist 0]

In what way are these characteristics applicable to someone who realizes and acknowledges his own worth in the sense that a proud (in the Objectivist sense) person does?

It doesn't, because Haughtiness is not a synonym for Pride. It's a vice, which is often mistaken for pride because the two look so similar -- namely, assigning to oneself a large proportion of merit. Obviously haughtiness makes a mistake at some point, as you observe, but otherwise it wouldn't be a vice; of course it entails a mistake somewhere, namely assinging too much merit to oneself, or for wrong reasons. But it is regardless of whether this discussion takes place in an Objectivist crowd; I've seen many a student of Objectivism assign to themselves the role and moral stature of John Galt, and act in accordance with that role and its merits, rather than acting in accordance with their own character and the merit of that. In fact, a former friend of mine recently has acted in exactly this way, hence the "former". Haughtiness is indeed a problem, and if we realize that it doesn't fall too far from pride, we'll be careful in staying prideful but keeping ourselves from slipping into the vice nearby.

[Duke 0]

Sure I do. Realization and acknowledgment of one's worth. Haughtiness is that principle, taken too far and applied incorrectly.

How can you take a proper acknowledgement of your own worth "too far"? Where does a rational evaluation of something turn into an irrational evaluation when used consistently?

[Duke 0]

It's a vice, which is often mistaken for pride because the two look so similar -- namely, assigning to oneself a large proportion of merit.

I don't think they look similar, because virtues are an issue of method, not of number. Pride, like the rest of the virtues, is a derivative of rationality. That means that it is a specific application of the method of rationality in a particular context. Proportions of merit don't matter when discussing pride. Pride does not say anything about assigning a certain amount of merit--it says to follow a certain method when acknowledging your merit.

The method of achieving knowledge of the virtues is to understand our nature, including the method of our survival. If we have a method of survival, there can never be "too much of it" or a mean between "survival and not surviving" as achieving our values.

[ewv 0]

An alleged scale of degrees gives you nothing on which to identify such differences. You have to know what they are, already have a standard, and then apply it before you can begin to claim you have found a "mean" as the alleged criterion. This why those who attempt to rely on "avoiding extremes" wind up package-dealing all kinds of things with pride, independence, and integrity as they harbor implicit standards and resentments actually driving their decisions.

Mind you, from what I've read of Aristotle he didn't state that you happen upon the virtue by avoiding the extremes. And in any case, that's not how I approach it. You're right, you have to know the definition of that something in the middle, before you know how to steer towards it.

And you have to have a definition of what is good, all of which leaves the 'mean' as a useless, parasitical doctrine.

But that still doesn't negate Aristotle's quantitative observation that virtues lie in the mean. I don't think he advocates looking for the mean as a guide to virtue, and in any case I don't advocate it, but nevertheless virtues do lie in the middle, such as with this discussion about haughtiness being an extension of pride. And it's not a mathematical middle, because Aristotle again says that most virtues lie closer to one of the extremes than the other; e.g. Courage is so much like Recklessness as to often be mistaken for it, while Cowardice lies far on the other side and is a clear antithesis.

None of which defines how to use the doctrine of the mean as a standard, which is required before any "observations" can be made to illustrate it.

The claims that "haughtiness" is an "extension" of "pride" and that virtues "lie in the middle" are completely contrary to Objectivism.

[JRoberts 0]

Ha, I remember trying to sort this out long before I knew about Objectivism. My conclusion was that there were different categories being evaluated.

Basically one dealt with quality, and the other quantity. One cannot apply the "mean" to both categories at the same time. Water, by it's nature (quality) is good and essential for man. Quantity is a different matter. Quantity of water required must be judged for the situation. A good quantity in one context, is not a good quantity in another. Obviously there will be a perfect quantity for each situation. Any more is too much, and any less is too little. I suppose one can then apply the term "mean" here, but I don't find it helpful.

In terms of quantity, I think it is helpful in that man is so different and varied, that the exact specific nature of his mean is different than everybody else (I'm not talking about virtue here). So understanding your mean can help you in the future. Finding out how far you can run helps you understand the perfect amount to run, so that when you decide to run tomorrow, you know your proper limit. We use this sort of mean everyday (at least healthy people).

I don't necessarily think, however, that Aristotle's virtues necessarily admit of quantity. I don't think that it is the "quantity" of the action of courage as much as it is the action of courage taken out of context.

[JRoberts 0]

Which is not a "mean" between opposite standards.

The mean lies between two "extremes" of use, both improper. Logic will state that the person who refuses to use reason is different than the person who improperly uses reason. Though both of them are improper or immoral, they are two separate things that stand on opposite ends of the spectrum.

Every time you try to defend a proper position as a "mean" you are implicitly invoking an actual objective standard of what is right. The doctrine of the mean, like pragmatism, is a parasitic position implemented by way of unacknowledged principles that determine what you decide to be the "mean". That is not "objective".

This is where I see Aristotle's ethics to be objective! His objectivity lies in his understanding that 1.) His virtues are universally applicable, and that 2.) His virtues are contextually correct for each person.

[JRoberts 0]

Cowardice, courage and rashness are qualitatively different than each other. You can say that someone is courageous to one degree or another, but there isn't a degree of cowardice that is "close" to courage.

Aristotle addresses then when he states that all virtues lie closer to one extreme than another. Courage and rashness lie closer together because they both deal with a "positive", with the actual attribute of bravery, versus cowardice, which is the absence of bravery.

Many people seem to believe, to use another example, that selflessness and selfishness exist on a continuum. Well, at what point does selflessness become selfishness, and how do you measure that in such a system? There's no way to answer that question without identifying the essential characteristics of such behaviors, and then what you have isn't a scale of one to the other but black and white criteria where each falls.

Black and white and a continuum are not mutually exclusive. 95% is not 100%. 50% is not 100%. 0% is not 100%.

I believe that a continuum in selfishness and selflessness exists. The compartmentalized person, for example, exists on such a continuum. While he may be 75% selfish, and thus act in a way conducive to following his life, there are still areas that he accepts selflessness. This is the whole point of a "mixed" system, be it in ethics or politics. You can share certain attributes of opposite virtues and vices to differing degrees, and the more that you hold the positive attributes, the better off you are. Of course, we all know that the best way to live-the way to live that is most conducive to flourishing-is to live at the 100%.

Notice though, even here, that selfishness can be a mean between selflessness and irrational selfishness. Selfishness taken out of context is not the same thing as selflessness. At the same time, it is not the healthy and proper thing to do.

[JRoberts 0]

Productivity is a derivative virtue of rationality. Rationality as applied to certain circumstances is called productivity, but when applied to evaluating other men it is called justice. I don't think one must always attempt to "be productive" if that means being productive regardless of context. Neither would I think one must always attempt to be just, if being just meant trying to use justice where it couldn't be used. The virtues have applications within particular contexts.

This is where, akin to Aristotle, one must use reason (Aristotle calls it a rational principle) to understand the context, and to act appropriately. Acting out of context is improper.

[ewv 0]

Which is not a "mean" between opposite standards.

The mean lies between two "extremes" of use, both improper. Logic will state that the person who refuses to use reason is different than the person who improperly uses reason. Though both of them are improper or immoral, they are two separate things that stand on opposite ends of the spectrum.

Every time you try to defend a proper position as a "mean" you are implicitly invoking an actual objective standard of what is right. The doctrine of the mean, like pragmatism, is a parasitic position implemented by way of unacknowledged principles that determine what you decide to be the "mean". That is not "objective".

This is where I see Aristotle's ethics to be objective! His objectivity lies in his understanding that 1.) His virtues are universally applicable, and that 2.) His virtues are contextually correct for each person.

He may have been attempting to be objective, but the doctrine of the mean does not supply an objective standard. You can't just "use reason", you need objective standards. For all the attempts to show how "reasonable" the "mean" is in specific cases, they all rely on an implicit standard for what is reasonable.

[JRoberts 0]

He may have been attempting to be objective, but the doctrine of the mean does not supply an objective standard. You can't just "use reason", you need objective standards. For all the attempts to show how "reasonable" the "mean" is in specific cases, they all rely on an implicit standard for what is reasonable.

What do you mean by objective standard?

Do you mean, for example, that Aristotle does not specifically say "This is exactly how to be courageous; here is step one, step two, and step three."?

[ewv 0]

If you want a definitive answer with direct quotes you will have to listen to Leonard Peikoff's lecture on Aristotle in his series on the history of western philosophy. He criticized the doctrine of the mean on several grounds, as well as evaluating the other major positions taken by Aristotle.

I would love to listen to this lecture, but last I checked, it was quite expensive. Do you know if this has changed, or if there might be a free version?

The lecture series is expensive. For some reason they price relatively shorter lecture recordings, which are not available in transcript form, much higher than carefully edited, longer books.

But if you are interested in topics like this you have to listen to that lecture series. (As far as I know, this particular topic is only discussed there.) Maybe you could borrow someone's notes or find some group that rents the tapes to play them for an audience the way it used to be done (which is how I heard them). Try contacting ARI to see what they suggest.

[ewv 0]

He may have been attempting to be objective, but the doctrine of the mean does not supply an objective standard. You can't just "use reason", you need objective standards. For all the attempts to show how "reasonable" the "mean" is in specific cases, they all rely on an implicit standard for what is reasonable.

What do you mean by objective standard?

Do you mean, for example, that Aristotle does not specifically say "This is exactly how to be courageous; here is step one, step two, and step three."?

See Leonard Peikoff's Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (OPAR), especially chapters 6-9. Ayn Rand did not just say to use reason, she described and validated a whole collection of fundamental virtues as the standards of thought and action in accordance with man's life as the basic standard of ethics.

Providing steps for how to achieve some particular assumed virtue is not the same thing as either validating it or relying on a relative standard like the doctrine of the mean. Pragmatists also can provide step by step instructions (in the name of "science") to do something that "works", but they also rely implicitly on unstated assumptions for what it means for something to "work", for what purpose, and why it should be pursued.

[ewv 0]

I certainly cannot answer for him. Why don't you send him your question on his website? My response would be that exercising too much or not enough are not extremes that are on opposite ends of the spectrum. If the purpose of exercise is health, then both too much and too little are on the same side of being detrimental to health.

That's a good idea! I'll send him my question.

It would be best to understand the explanations already available so you can properly frame your question. Otherwise you might (if he answers at all) get a more general kind of answer that does not address what you are looking for and you will have blown your opporchancity. It would be best to first understand what he has already said in his lecture on Aristotle in the series, then refer to it for any additional question you want to home in on.

[Carlos 0]

Notice though, even here, that selfishness can be a mean between selflessness and irrational selfishness. Selfishness taken out of context is not the same thing as selflessness. At the same time, it is not the healthy and proper thing to do.

How is a man supposed to look at Mother Teresa and Saddam Hussein and arrive at the proper principled view of rational selfishness as a mean between them? Or to put it another way, how is a man supposed to look at Mother Teresa and Saddam Hussein, and then arrive at John Galt as the mean between those? Without Objectivism, the best you could arrive at would be something like the owners of Starbucks: that a proper life is a balance of self-achievement and duty towards benefitting society.

To even execute this view of the mean you are having to relate categorically different things by means of differences of quantity, which is ridiculous, because it drops an entire context of principles and concepts behind the things you are comparing. For example, to try to find a mean between a selfless person and an 'irrational selfish' person would be to look for some middle-ground of behavior, which ignores the vast array of metaphysical, ethical, epistemological views that the individual may hold.

All in all, it doesn't make any sense, and sounds more like an attempt to distort Objectivism so that some kind of marriage of Objectivism and the Classics can be performed.

[bborg 0]

How is a man supposed to look at Mother Teresa and Saddam Hussein and arrive at the proper principled view of rational selfishness as a mean between them? Or to put it another way, how is a man supposed to look at Mother Teresa and Saddam Hussein, and then arrive at John Galt as the mean between those? Without Objectivism, the best you could arrive at would be something like the owners of Starbucks: that a proper life is a balance of self-achievement and duty towards benefitting society.

Excellent point.

[JRoberts 0]

Providing steps for how to achieve some particular assumed virtue is not the same thing as either validating it or relying on a relative standard like the doctrine of the mean. Pragmatists also can provide step by step instructions (in the name of "science") to do something that "works", but they also rely implicitly on unstated assumptions for what it means for something to "work", for what purpose, and why it should be pursued.

The reason I asked my question was because Objectivism, too, does not give you an exact, step-by-step system of rules for each virtue. Meaning, Ayn Rand does not say, "If you encounter situation A, do A; if situation B, do B; if C, do not do C" and so on. Some systems do, or try to do, this. It cannot work. If this is what you meant by objective standard, then I would state that such a standard is impossible. Both Ayn Rand and Aristotle gave an objective definition of a virtue, but then stated that each individual had to properly and contextually apply that virtue in their own life (Tara Smith discusses this in her book, "Viable Values"). This does not amount to subjectivism though. It still is possible to acontextually use a virtue, which in Aristotle's case would amount to falling into a vice. Both courage and rashness deal with the issue of bravery. In each specific situation, an individual must properly use his rational principle to understand how to properly apply the virtue of courage. If he does not properly apply it, he is rash. But, what is rash in one situation may not be rash in another situation. Similarly, Ayn Rand has stated that it is proper to "tell a lie", yet this does not amount to dishonesty. If a known rapist knocks on your door asking where your daughter is, your response of "I don't know", followed by a quick call to the police, is not lying.

[JRoberts 0]

How is a man supposed to look at Mother Teresa and Saddam Hussein and arrive at the proper principled view of rational selfishness as a mean between them? Or to put it another way, how is a man supposed to look at Mother Teresa and Saddam Hussein, and then arrive at John Galt as the mean between those? Without Objectivism, the best you could arrive at would be something like the owners of Starbucks: that a proper life is a balance of self-achievement and duty towards benefitting society.

A man isn't supposed to determine the correct life by observing other people. Ayn Rand never said this. Aristotle never said this. Both agree that other people are not the standard of measurement.

To even execute this view of the mean you are having to relate categorically different things by means of differences of quantity, which is ridiculous, because it drops an entire context of principles and concepts behind the things you are comparing. For example, to try to find a mean between a selfless person and an 'irrational selfish' person would be to look for some middle-ground of behavior, which ignores the vast array of metaphysical, ethical, epistemological views that the individual may hold.

This is not a proper use of the Doctrine of the Mean. Aristotle never says, "Look at the vices, and in the middle you will find the virtue." A virtue is not a virtue because it lies in the middle. Aristotle gives a clear reason on why his virtues are virtues. See the Nicomachean Ethics, especially Books II and III.

All in all, it doesn't make any sense, and sounds more like an attempt to distort Objectivism so that some kind of marriage of Objectivism and the Classics can be performed.

Trying to clarify a problem is not a distortion. Please send all future attacks via PM.