The (Possible) Virtue of Benevolence

[Betsy Speicher 0]

In any case, I do not consider benevolence extended towards someone's actual or potential good to be a separate virtue but simply an instance of the virtue of justice since it involves giving others what they deserve.

This confuses me. What, then, is the difference between benevolence and justice? Also, given that you see benevolence as an instance of justice, why issues do you have with considering benevolence a virtue?

Benevolence means acting a certain way towards others and not just toward those others who deserve it. To the degree that others don't deserve it, benevolence is not a virtue at all.

[jordanz 0]

Does he define "humanity"?

I found this in the same section:

Recognizing the humanity of others means recognizing that they share the same kinds of basic needs and capacities that one possesses. These include: their capacity of volition, which means that they are fundamentally independent, self-directed beings; their need for visibility. Recognizing that they are as human as we includes recognizing the fundamental harmony of interests between them and us.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

As a contrast, here is how Kelley defines benevolence:

A commitment to treating others as potential trading partners by recognizing their humanity and individuality and acting accordingly.

The Logical Structure of Objectivism, Chapter 6

Kelley's take on benevolence strikes me as pragmatic and manipulative rather than an honest emotional response to virtue or a just action taken in response to someone's actual or potential virtue.

How would one apply Kelley's concept of the virtue of benevolence to dealing with evil men? Should we extend benevolence to Ahmadinejad and sit down and chat with him because he is, after all, a human and an individual and, who knows, we might be able to make a deal with him?

[PhilO 0]

Kelley's take on benevolence strikes me as pragmatic and manipulative rather than an honest emotional response to virtue or a just action taken in response to someone's actual or potential virtue.

How would one apply Kelley's concept of the virtue of benevolence to dealing with evil men? Should we extend benevolence to Ahmadinejad and sit down and chat with him because he is, after all, a human and an individual and, who knows, we might be able to make a deal with him?

Some thoughts are beginning to crystallize for me on this subject.

I think benevolence is a sense of life issue. As such, it is not a virtue, because the concept does not apply.

So, there are at least two major problems with benevolence treated as a virtue:

1) As primarily an *emotional/subconscious state*, it is not a tool of cognition. It doesn't tell you about the nature of other people; it's more a reflection of one's own psychological condition. This is in direct contrast to the intellectual, explicit judgement required to apply the virtue of justice.

2) Treat as a "virtue", it has a "built-in result" regardless of the nature of others that one is dealing with (because, after all, benevolence is expressed towards *others*): it says treat others nicely. But, as in Betsy's example, not all men deserve to be treated nicely. What then?

So, "benevolence as a virtue" is simply another philosophic rationalization for an old ethical theory: altruism, the notion that one must act to benefit others regardless of their nature. It's the Christian ethics in different clothing.

Benevolence *is* real, and it is meaningful, but only as seen in the context of the sense of life state of a virtuous individual.

[jordanz 0]

Kelley's take on benevolence strikes me as pragmatic and manipulative rather than an honest emotional response to virtue or a just action taken in response to someone's actual or potential virtue.

How would one apply Kelley's concept of the virtue of benevolence to dealing with evil men? Should we extend benevolence to Ahmadinejad and sit down and chat with him because he is, after all, a human and an individual and, who knows, we might be able to make a deal with him?

Here are more quotes form the same section of LSO:

Just as in law a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty, another person should be presumed to be of decent moral character in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

Benevolence is logically the last of the virtues, because it depends on the trader principle, and on conclusions from our discussions of other virtues. In one's social interactions, true benevolence is an expression of one's complete social ethic, and would be a different virtue without the others. Without justice, generosity becomes blind charity. Without independence, civility becomes currying favor. Without the principles of trade, sensitivity becomes the basis for manipulation and coercion. But although the justification of benevolence is logically derivative, it is still a vitally important virtue. One's benevolence is one's means of dealing with others on a daily basis: it colors all one's social interactions.

[Cometmaker 0]

But if you've "talked" with them, you have evidence to form an opinion or judgment about whether they deserve kindness. Whether I am friendly, polite, rude or dismissive does not depend upon any assumption on my part about other people. It depends upon my view of myself and what I choose to convey to others about myself.

Are you saying here that there is no direct cognitive relationship between philosophically-holding a benevolent universe premise and acting benevolently?

[Betsy Speicher 0]

Here are more quotes form the same section of LSO:

Just as in law a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty, another person should be presumed to be of decent moral character in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

That is wrong. Decent moral character is an actual trait, just as guilt is. In the absence of evidence, it is as invalid to presume a person to be of good character as it is to presume him guilty. What one may properly do is consider an unknown person of whom one knows no evil to be potentially of decent moral character and, on that basis, a person deserving benevolence.

Benevolence is logically the last of the virtues, because it depends on the trader principle, and on conclusions from our discussions of other virtues. In one's social interactions, true benevolence is an expression of one's complete social ethic, and would be a different virtue without the others. Without justice, generosity becomes blind charity. Without independence, civility becomes currying favor. Without the principles of trade, sensitivity becomes the basis for manipulation and coercion. But although the justification of benevolence is logically derivative, it is still a vitally important virtue.

Here Kelley is openly admitting that advocating benevolence without the Objectivist virtues would be blind charity, currying favor, manipulation, and coercion. Only by practicing the Objectivist virtues can benevolence be morally acceptable.

Therefore, why isn't simply practicing the Objectivist virtues outlined by Ayn Rand sufficient? Isn't treating benevolence as a separate virtue superfluous -- perhaps dangerously so -- because it can be used to rationalize self-sacrifice, second-handedness, and seeking power over others?

[Paul's Here 0]

But if you've "talked" with them, you have evidence to form an opinion or judgment about whether they deserve kindness. Whether I am friendly, polite, rude or dismissive does not depend upon any assumption on my part about other people. It depends upon my view of myself and what I choose to convey to others about myself.

Are you saying here that there is no direct cognitive relationship between philosophically-holding a benevolent universe premise and acting benevolently?

No, I'm saying that the benevolent universe premise has no relationship to regarding benevolence as a primary ethical virtue.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

But if you've "talked" with them, you have evidence to form an opinion or judgment about whether they deserve kindness. Whether I am friendly, polite, rude or dismissive does not depend upon any assumption on my part about other people. It depends upon my view of myself and what I choose to convey to others about myself.

Are you saying here that there is no direct cognitive relationship between philosophically-holding a benevolent universe premise and acting benevolently?

My own view is that a benevolent sense of life and the virtue of justice are both necessary for benevolent actions. If you feel threatened by your fellow men, it is hard to be kind to them.

[jordanz 0]

Here are more quotes form the same section of LSO:

Just as in law a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty, another person should be presumed to be of decent moral character in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

That is wrong. Decent moral character is an actual trait, just as guilt is. In the absence of evidence, it is as invalid to presume a person to be of good character as it is to presume him guilty. What one may properly do is consider an unknown person of whom one knows no evil to be potentially of decent moral character and, on that basis, a person deserving benevolence.

I disagree. Given the context of the United States, I believe that most people I meet have a base level of moral character. I don't need them to prove to me that they have decent character before I'm benevolent towards them. I am benevolent towards them until they prove they are not deserving. Of course, if I have other evidence (demeanor, etc.) I act accordingly.

[jordanz 0]

Therefore, why isn't simply practicing the Objectivist virtues outlined by Ayn Rand sufficient? Isn't treating benevolence as a separate virtue superfluous -- perhaps dangerously so -- because it can be used to rationalize self-sacrifice, second-handedness, and seeking power over others?

Kelley deals with all these objections in LSO. Here are more quotes:

Benevolence is not simply a matter of how one should treat people of good moral character—if it were, then it would be little more than an extension of the principle of sanction. It is a basic approach to others in virtue of their humanity, one that is based on a universal, presumptive evaluation of others as worthy potential trading partners.

How is benevolence distinct from moral sanction? Both encourage others to be sources of value. Moral sanction appeals to others' need for a sense of themselves as morally worthy, and it is basically reactive: it expresses one's evaluation of their moral character, a judgment which would be premature in most cases in which one deals with others.

Benevolence also differs from justice in that it is a basic response to others that they deserve in virtue of their humanity. It is not based on a more detailed moral judgment; it is directed at their potential and not necessarily their character, of which one often knows little.

[jordanz 0]

I think benevolence is a sense of life issue. As such, it is not a virtue, because the concept does not apply

....

[it's] primarily an *emotional/subconscious state*, it is not a tool of cognition.

Somehow, I've become the official LSO copy/paster

It is important to emphasize that benevolence is a virtue, and not an emotion. The conclusion of diagram 6.8 means that one should act toward others with good will (the etymological meaning of "benevolence"), not necessarily with good feelings. For instance, in the course of a sports match or other explicit competition, one's immediate feelings - being focused on the concrete, competitive goals of the game - may include irritation toward the opposing team. It is natural in competition to respond to the other person as an opponent to be overcome, but of course a competitive opponent is not truly an enemy. Benevolence in this case consists in practicing the civilities of good sportsmanship, which demonstrate to one's opponents that one recognizes that the conflict of the game is artificial and does not extend into broader realm of social life.

[Paul's Here 0]

I think benevolence is a sense of life issue. As such, it is not a virtue, because the concept does not apply

....

[it's] primarily an *emotional/subconscious state*, it is not a tool of cognition.

Somehow, I've become the official LSO copy/paster

-----------

So what is your view?

[Paul's Here 0]

I think benevolence is a sense of life issue. As such, it is not a virtue, because the concept does not apply

....

[it's] primarily an *emotional/subconscious state*, it is not a tool of cognition.

Somehow, I've become the official LSO copy/paster

It is important to emphasize that benevolence is a virtue, and not an emotion. The conclusion of diagram 6.8 means that one should act toward others with good will (the etymological meaning of "benevolence"), not necessarily with good feelings. For instance, in the course of a sports match or other explicit competition, one's immediate feelings - being focused on the concrete, competitive goals of the game - may include irritation toward the opposing team. It is natural in competition to respond to the other person as an opponent to be overcome, but of course a competitive opponent is not truly an enemy. Benevolence in this case consists in practicing the civilities of good sportsmanship, which demonstrate to one's opponents that one recognizes that the conflict of the game is artificial and does not extend into broader realm of social life.

As a Yankees fan, I do not like Boston Red Sox fans and will not be friends with one!

[Cometmaker 0]

Therefore, why isn't simply practicing the Objectivist virtues outlined by Ayn Rand sufficient? Isn't treating benevolence as a separate virtue superfluous -- perhaps dangerously so -- because it can be used to rationalize self-sacrifice, second-handedness, and seeking power over others?

Kelley deals with all these objections in LSO. Here are more quotes:

I don't know how anybody who is accustomed to the clarity and exactness of Ayn Rand's writings could claim that the author of these quotes "deals" with anything at all. There's some universal attribute called "humanity" which is a "virtue", according to the quotes you pasted. I had not read anything about David Kelley or anything written by him until this time, but based on these quotes, I'll stick to Objectivism.

[jordanz 0]

Somehow, I've become the official LSO copy/paster

So what is your view?

I'm not a very good student of Objectivism. I've read all the major works, but it's been 15-20 years since I've reviewed a lot of them. My interest is using Objectivism as a tool to live my life. As such, I prefer The Objectivist Center to ARI. I've applied the basic tenets of Objectivism to my life (ideas that both sides would agree on) to great success.

On this particular issue, I'm very confused by the differences. They seem quite subtle and arcane to me. One side says that benevolence can be a good thing, but not a virtue. David Kelley argues that it is one of the major virtues. Above, Betsey argues that it's an instance of justice which seems to imply to me that it's at least a minor virtue. I will need to do a lot more studying in order to argue these differences intelligently. This said, I personally value and try to maintain a benevolent outlook towards my fellow man.

[bborg 0]

I'm not a very good student of Objectivism. I've read all the major works, but it's been 15-20 years since I've reviewed a lot of them.

I would recommend you reread Ayn Rand's works. Every time I go back to them, I'm amazed all over again at her clarity and ability to communicate the essentials. I won't tell you whether you should prefer ARI or TOC - obviously that's a decision you and you alone will have to make. However, if you care to understand Objectivism better, there is no better source than its author. Also, as much as I enjoy reading the work of ARI intellectuals, Ayn Rand was in a league all her own. Take the time to enjoy her genius.

[Vespasiano 0]

I do not view benevolence -- defined in my dictionary as "a disposition to do good" -- as necessarily a virtue (action taken to gain and/or keep a value). In fact, when misdirected toward the undeserving, benevolence can be a positive vice.

I would say, rather, that true benevolence is a byproduct or corollary of a virtuous, value-driven and value-achieving life. As such, it is only possible to and among virtuous, value-achieving individuals.

[jordanz 0]

I'm not a very good student of Objectivism. I've read all the major works, but it's been 15-20 years since I've reviewed a lot of them.

I would recommend you reread Ayn Rand's works. Every time I go back to them, I'm amazed all over again at her clarity and ability to communicate the essentials. I won't tell you whether you should prefer ARI or TOC - obviously that's a decision you and you alone will have to make. However, if you care to understand Objectivism better, there is no better source than its author. Also, as much as I enjoy reading the work of ARI intellectuals, Ayn Rand was in a league all her own. Take the time to enjoy her genius.

Agreed unequivocally. I also need to re-read Piekoff's OPAR.

[B. Royce 0]

Some further thoughts on benevolence as a possible virtue.

Virtue is action to achieve or maintain a value.

Is there an action the essence of which is benevolent? If I give a bum change, what is the nature of the action? Is it not giving? If I take some change out of my pocket and throw it on the ground at his feet, I have "given" in a scornful manner; I have given malevolently. If I give nothing, but sincerely say, "I wish you success in finding a job", I have spoken in a benevolence manner (even if I didn't smile in speaking). No one would hold that the first instance was benevolent and the second malevolent. If I give out of a sense of duty, the motivation of my giving is altruistic, but if I give because I value a seen potential the motivation of my giving (as long as it does not involve a sacrifice) is selfish.

Or, in another instance, I may purposefully not give, and my motivation may be rational. For I may think, "This person has potential, and it will be better for him if he does not get into the habit of asking for money"---and I might selfishly proceed to tell him just that. Now, my manner of speaking to him might be benevolent, but benevolence (or malevolence) is in no way the nature of any of my actions.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

Decent moral character is an actual trait, just as guilt is. In the absence of evidence, it is as invalid to presume a person to be of good character as it is to presume him guilty. What one may properly do is consider an unknown person of whom one knows no evil to be potentially of decent moral character and, on that basis, a person deserving benevolence.

I disagree. Given the context of the United States, I believe that most people I meet have a base level of moral character.

So do I, but people have free will. What most people are and do tells you nothing about any particular stranger. Without any conclusive evidence of evil, it is reasonable to conclude he has a potentially good character, to feel good will toward him, and to treat him with kindness.

I don't need them to prove to me that they have decent character before I'm benevolent towards them. I am benevolent towards them until they prove they are not deserving. Of course, if I have other evidence (demeanor, etc.) I act accordingly.

I think we are saying the same thing -- i.e., you don't have to prove good character before you can be benevolent toward someone. Potentially good character is sufficient for justly extending benevolence to a stranger.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

Therefore, why isn't simply practicing the Objectivist virtues outlined by Ayn Rand sufficient? Isn't treating benevolence as a separate virtue superfluous -- perhaps dangerously so -- because it can be used to rationalize self-sacrifice, second-handedness, and seeking power over others?

Kelley deals with all these objections in LSO. Here are more quotes:

Benevolence is not simply a matter of how one should treat people of good moral character—if it were, then it would be little more than an extension of the principle of sanction. It is a basic approach to others in virtue of their humanity, one that is based on a universal, presumptive evaluation of others as worthy potential trading partners.

I've got problems with this quote.

Objectivism does not hold that benevolence is "how one should treat people of good moral character." Benevolence is how one justly treats people of potentially good moral character too, so it is an example of the Objectivist virtue of justice as defined by Ayn Rand.

How is benevolence distinct from moral sanction? Both encourage others to be sources of value. Moral sanction appeals to others' need for a sense of themselves as morally worthy, and it is basically reactive: it expresses one's evaluation of their moral character, a judgment which would be premature in most cases in which one deals with others.

Wow! This is so manipulative. Kelley is saying one should be benevolent to, or sanction, others to "encourage others to be sources of value" to oneself! How about the idea that one should sanction or be benevolent towards others because they deserve it?

I do not sanction nor am I benevolent towards others so they will sanction or act benevolently toward me, but I'll take Kelley at his word. Maybe he does.

Benevolence also differs from justice in that it is a basic response to others that they deserve in virtue of their humanity. It is not based on a more detailed moral judgment; it is directed at their potential and not necessarily their character, of which one often knows little.

If benevolence is not based on a man's character, actual or potential, what is it based on? Their "humanity?" Their "potential" to give us goodies? By Kelley's reasoning, we should be nice to any evil (character isn't relevant) human being (they have "humanity") in a position to give us what we want (they are "potential trading partners").

[bborg 0]

I've got problems with this quote.

Objectivism does not hold that benevolence is "how one should treat people of good moral character." Benevolence is how one justly treats people of potentially good moral character too, so it is an example of the Objectivist virtue of justice as defined by Ayn Rand.

I’m still sorting this out for myself. Would I be correct to say that acting benevolently is an application of justice within the context you’ve stated (when a person’s character is unknown to you)?

Wow! This is so manipulative.

Yes, it's very selfless isn't it? What especially turned me off was his statement that “Moral sanction appeals to others' need for a sense of themselves as morally worthy”. In other words, someone feels "morally worthy" not based on a self-appraisal of their values, but based on the opinions of others! Not only that, but this "need" for approval is something we readers of The Virtue of Selfishness should be endorsing and using for our benefit?

If benevolence is not based on a man's character, actual or potential, what is it based on? Their "humanity?" Their "potential" to give us goodies? By Kelley's reasoning, we should be nice to any evil (character isn't relevant) human being (they have "humanity") in a position to give us what we want (they are "potential trading partners").

Good news, Iran!

[jordanz 0]

FYI - The entire book is available for free download. http://objectivistcenter.org/cth--1354-Log...bjectivism.aspx

[bborg 0]

FYI - The entire book is available for free download. http://objectivistcenter.org/cth--1354-Log...bjectivism.aspx

Why is this called, "The Logical Structure of Objectivism"? Why isn't it called, "The Logical Structure of BS"? For Kelley to present his ideas as a part of someone else's philosophy is dishonest and highly disrespectful, both to the philosophy's owner and to readers who want to know what Objectivism is about. Not only does he include his personal ideas in the same book, but he does not seem to differentiate them from Ayn Rand's, or bother to use a disclaimer.

Benevolence is a commitment to treating others as potential trading partners by recognizing their humanity and individuality and acting accordingly. Its main elements are civility, sensitivity, and generosity towards others.38

His bolding, implying that this is an official definition. Where does the endnote lead? Why, to Unrugged Individualism, by David Kelley! Apparently, Kelley is co-author of Objectivism! Brilliant! Hey, check this out. "David Kelley thinks eating babies is a virtue.1"

1 Myself, in this post.

See how great that works?