Reproductivness as means to one's life?

[~Sophia~ 0]

When it comes to the species that have short life spans and a large number of offspring - individual death is not significant and thus the evolutionary pressure to preserve every single organism is low.

And thus the dependency of one bee's survival on the actions of another or sacrifice of one for the benefit of another (not the best scenarios for an individual bee) is not selected against in the process of evolution.

[RayK 0]

Sophia, if in your post (#73) you are stating that the specie is the fundamental unit of selection, then I must disagree.

Please define fundamental unit of selection.

I said that a better adaptation for survival is the driving force behind evolution. It is not necessarily to make every individual organism better adapted. A bee did not evolve to be able to survive on its own - it needs the combined effort of other type of bees. A human can. When it comes to the species that have short life spans and a large number of offspring - individual death is not significant and thus the evolutionary pressure to preserve every single organism is low.

I instead think that the fundamental unit of selection is the "genetic replicator" of which the individual organism is the carrier.

What is a genetic replicator? A whole genome? Single gene?

I do not know what that means. Genetic material does not "decide" or "select" which random genetic changes stay. Its preservation, if that was the goal of the process, could be achieved by much simpler means.

In the context that August Weismann, Richadard Dawkins and some others use it, a genetic replicator is the germ-line.

I do not believe that I stated that genetic material decides or selects what changes are beneficial. I said that the fundamental unit of selection is the genetic replicator of which I meant that the genetic replicator is the primary benefactor from natural selection. To be successful gene replicators need to have three qualities: longevity, fecundity, and fidelity. I will try and explain these three qualities in accordane to my understanding of Richard Dawkins explanation in his book The Extended Phenotype. A replicator needs to have longevity so that it can have the time to replicate and make many copies. A replicator obviously needs to be able to make a large amount of copies if it is going to outpace other replicators. And a replicator must have fidelity or a certain amount of accuracy to be successful. But the replicators breakdowns in accuracy are what cause the mutations that drive evolution.

To give you another perspective on the same idea (if you do not alreay know it) I will quote Dr. Helena Cronin from her book The Ant and the Peacock.

"Genes do not present themselves naked to the scrutiny of natural selection, instead they present their phenotypic effects. (...) Differences in genes give rise to difference in these phenotypic differences. Natural selection acts on the phenotypic differences and thereby on genes. Thus genes come to be represented in successive generations in proportion to the selective value of their phenotypic effects."

[Arnold 0]

I do not believe that I stated that genetic material decides or selects what changes are beneficial. I said that the fundamental unit of selection is the genetic replicator of which I meant that the genetic replicator is the primary benefactor from natural selection.

A gene is not a creature, and so cannot be a benefactor. Organisms can benefit from good genes, not the reverse.

[~Sophia~ 0]

I said that the fundamental unit of selection is the genetic replicator of which I meant that the genetic replicator is the primary benefactor from natural selection.

Selection works on phenotypes. The frequency changes provide a record of evolution, but are not its fundamental cause. Natural selection happens at the level of organismic survival and reproduction. It is the differential survival success that drives the gene frequency changes and it is a mistake to identify the gene frequency changes as causal.

If, in fact, genes are the real actors, any consequence of a gene should be equally capable of carrying gene's interest in the process of selection. Why then limit phenotypes to bodies? Genes are favored only and only if they contribute to the copying capacity of the whole organism.

Furthermore, a multi-cellular organism (most of biological life) is a nested hierarchy of replication units, several of which may be undergoing adaptive evolution simultaneously (multilevel evolution). Natural selection takes place at every level that replicates and leads to conflicts of interest. An individual unites the contrasting information from lower levels - it represents the interest of the whole against the individual elements on the lower levels. The individual is, in the majority of the cases, the most obvious unit of selection.

Selection process selects on units at various levels, starting with ultimate replicators such as the gene, the individual, and the group.

[RayK 0]

I do not believe that I stated that genetic material decides or selects what changes are beneficial. I said that the fundamental unit of selection is the genetic replicator of which I meant that the genetic replicator is the primary benefactor from natural selection.

A gene is not a creature, and so cannot be a benefactor. Organisms can benefit from good genes, not the reverse.

I disagree that a genetic replicator cannot be a benefactor and have spent the last couple of pages of this thread explaining why.

[RayK 0]

Natural selection takes place at every level that replicates and leads to conflicts of interest. An individual unites the contrasting information from lower levels - it represents the interest of the whole against the individual elements on the lower levels. The individual is, in the majority of the cases, the most obvious unit of selection.

Selection process selects on units at various levels, starting with ultimate replicators such as the gene, the individual, and the group.

You have just contradicted your ealier post when you tried to defend that selection works toward the benefit of the specie.

I do not have time this morning to answer fully your's and Arnold's post, but I will attempt later.

[~Sophia~ 0]

Natural selection takes place at every level that replicates and leads to conflicts of interest. An individual unites the contrasting information from lower levels - it represents the interest of the whole against the individual elements on the lower levels. The individual is, in the majority of the cases, the most obvious unit of selection.

Selection process selects on units at various levels, starting with ultimate replicators such as the gene, the individual, and the group.

You have just contradicted your ealier post when you tried to defend that selection works toward the benefit of the specie.

I expanded my answer. I don't think there is one level at which selection works. It works on various levels from gene, cell, organism, species, between species even (because there is often between species dependency like in your bees example).

[RayK 0]

I expanded my answer. I don't think there is one level at which selection works. It works on various levels from gene, cell, organism, species, between species even (because there is often between species dependency like in your bees example).

I disagree, and propose that if you were to take away the species, the organism and the cell, what would be left? This is the type of question that one must answer as we did not always have cells, organisms and species to be the fundamental unit of explanation and instead are left with the genetic replicator.

To answer or give an idea of what a genetic replicator is, I wll once again quote Richard Dawkins:

"The neo-Weismannist view of life which this book advocates lays stress on the genetic replicator as a fundamental unit of explanation. I believe it has an atom-like role to play in the functional, teleonomic explanation. If we wish to speak of adaptaions as being "for the good of" something, that something is the active germ-line replicator. This is a small chunck of DNA, a single "gene" according to some definitons of the word. But I am of course not suggesting that small genetic units work in isolation from each other, any more than a chemist thinks that atoms do. Like atoms, genes are highly gregarious. They are often strung together along chromosomes, chromosomes are wrapped up in groups in nuclear membranes, enveloped in cytoplasm and enclosed in cell membranes. Cells too are normally not isolated, but cloned to form the huge conglomerates we know as organisms. We are now plugged into the familiar embedded hierarchy, and need go no further. Functionally speaking, too, genes are gregarious. They have phenotypic effects on bodies, but they do not do so in isolation....

The reason I may sound reductionistic is that I insist on an atomistic view of unit of selection, in the sense of the units that actually survive or fail to survive, while being whole-heartedly interactionist when it comes to the development of the phenotypic means by which they survive..." Richard Dawkins (1982) The Extended Phenotype The Long Reach of the Gene. Oxford University Press. pp. 113-114.

[~Sophia~ 0]

Richard Dawkins

Ray, I obviously don't agree with Richard Dawkins for the reasons I presented. If you would like to explore another side of this debate I recommend The Structure of Evolutionary Theory by Stephen Jay Gould.

I am going to respectfully bow out of this discussion.

(To answer your argument: Natural selection occurs at every level of replication therefore simplicity of life in the far past does not present a contradiction. )

[RayK 0]

Richard Dawkins

Ray, I obviously don't agree with Richard Dawkins for the reasons I presented. If you would like to explore another side of this debate I recommend The Structure of Evolutionary Theory by Stephen Jay Gould.

I am going to respectfully bow out of this discussion.

(To answer your argument: Natural selection occurs at every level of replication therefore simplicity of life in the far past does not present a contradiction. )

I have already read Mr. Gould's many works.

I understand your reply but that does not answer the question of what is the fundamental unit of replication.

Thank you for your time.

[Ifat Glassman 0]

However, does this not imply 2 ultimate ends for every living organism?

I don't conceptualize it that way. An amoeba is "designed" to divide because otherwise it would not exist. Though I don't like the word "design", I think it is more accurate to ask: "why is the amoeba designed that way?" than it is to ask "why does the amoeba do that?" People like Dawkins conceptualize the end of the "design" as: genes perpetuating themselves. That way you get a single end. I think that's a more accurate way of considering non-volitional organisms. These are not truly "individual ends" in the human/volitional sense anyway.

Throw a third end into the mix. You might have seen the internet-famous video of a herd of buffalo trying to rescue a calf from a couple of lions. They do so at some risk to their life (at least limb), even though the risk is small. Why? Why are they "designed" to take any risk at all? It seems to me that they are designed to protect the calf because that design ensures their own protection, when they are calves. Instead, if one conceptualizes it as an end pursued by an individual (like a human end), the attempted rescue cannot serve either ultimate end noted above: neither their life, nor their reproduction. I don't think that is the right way to conceptualize it. Wouldn't a biologist view it just as I do -- not as there being two or three ends to their "design"?

The "third" is part of what I was assuming under the "second". I guess I did not choose the right word for the variety of things that I subsume under it. So I'll give a better list now:

Reproductive organs, pleasure as result of sex, pregnancy with all the processes that support it (including taking away resources from the mother's body to the forming baby), after-birth hormones encouraging paternal behavior (this could be in either sex and encourage taking care of the young, produce milk in the female in mammals, or variety of other instinctual behavior in other animals).

I'd have to think more to find a proper name for it (next-generation-survival or survival of the species?). When you look at a wider context then the actions on an animal in its life-time, obviously you see that whatever behavior it has for the sake of someone else's survival is what ultimately produces best survival for the species, and therefore best chances of survival for every individual animal in that species. However, in the context of the goals an animal's metaphysical aspects serve - it is not just one goal, it is not just its own survival.

After you made your post I thought of a different case, of bees. I don't know too much about bees, but I know the worker bees work most of the time to support the hive and the next generation of bees and maybe even the queen. So here you may even see a case of working to save members of the species (not necessarily the next generation). So you can say about this example that it does not fall under "next-generation-survival". Still, I think once you say the two goals are preservation of the organism's existence, and preservation of the species, pretty sure you'd be done with ultimate goals. 2 can and do explain all as far as I see.

And you know, another thing I thought of, I looked in OPAR to see how Peikoff explain why sex is good, and all I saw is that it is basically pleasurable (and serves a similar need like art, allowing a person to experience their self-esteem directly). But putting aside the "art-like" function, if you only say that sex is good because it is pleasurable, I think this is wrong as an explanation why it is good. Good is established against life as the standard. Pleasure is a result of living correctly, but ethically speaking, as a philosopher, you cannot explain that something is good by saying that it is pleasurable (goes back to my discussion with Betsy).

And my point here is that unless you can show how sex serves the organism's survival, saying it is good by any other standard goes outside the Objectivist ethics.

It is so easy for us, because of our psychology, to see that something is metaphysically designed to give us pleasure and say "oh, obviously, therefore it is good". But when you're a philosopher showing that the standard of good is that which serves your survival, and pleasure is the result (of successful living) then you can no longer use the previous approach to prove that something is good.

The fact is, however, that we are the offspring of people who reproduced and really enjoyed the process. As a result, we inherited the physical means to enjoy it too. When an individual can look forward to experiencing that kind of enjoyment, it is a strong motivation for choosing to live and take life-preserving actions.

What you say about pleasure as motivation for living is true. But why can't I use this (what you observed) to make the following argument: "Killing people gives me pleasure. Pleasure, in the long run, motivates me for living, reminds me that there is something worth putting an effort for. Therefore, killing people is good".

Obviously, one would say that killing people is against the requirements of one's survival (and that in judging if killing people is good or bad one leaves the question of pleasure out). Well, but why don't not ask the same question about sex? How does sex (outside pleasure) serve a man's survival?

I know at this point I'm probably creating a major brain inflation, but one last point is that I heard Peikoff sometimes take the following approach to ethics: When considering if something is good or not, ask yourself, does it give you pleasure, and does it go against the requirements of life (against rationality)? If not (and it gives pleasure), then it's good.

He does not actually try to reduce everything to life as the standard. He uses our mechanism of pleasure as an aid to judge if something is a value to us. Seems to me he is counting on something (that he does not state) to assume that the second method follows from the first. Just wonder what it is. Since according to the second approach sex is good, and according to the first it needs to be established. So if I didn't wreck your brain by now and you're still reading and got an answer, I'd love to hear it. In fact I think I'll fire this one to Peikoff as well, it's a very interesting question.

[RayK 0]

After you made your post I thought of a different case, of bees. I don't know too much about bees, but I know the worker bees work most of the time to support the hive and the next generation of bees and maybe even the queen. So here you may even see a case of working to save members of the species (not necessarily the next generation). So you can say about this example that it does not fall under "next-generation-survival". Still, I think once you say the two goals are preservation of the organism's existence, and preservation of the species, pretty sure you'd be done with ultimate goals. 2 can and do explain all as far as I see.

If I understand you right, you are stating that a bee, which has no consciously chosen ethical code, is acting in an altruistic way for the betterment of the specie. And that it is supposedly within the bee's nature to act in this fashion for the betterment of the species. Just as before I must disagree with this idea. Might I ask that you ponder why it is not in man's nature to act this way? Might I ask why bees of one hive do not work for another hive and why they actaully fight with another hive? Might I once again offer that it is something much more fundamental.

[B. Royce 0]

Ifat, you have to be careful when you use an _imagined_ example, such as a killer who gets pleasure from killing. For first, you have to establish that it is pleasure he is feeling, and not relief from pain. He himself might even call it pleasure, but that doesn't make it so. Just because we can imagine a specific situation, doesn't mean it actually exists.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

The fact is, however, that we are the offspring of people who reproduced and really enjoyed the process. As a result, we inherited the physical means to enjoy it too. When an individual can look forward to experiencing that kind of enjoyment, it is a strong motivation for choosing to live and take life-preserving actions.

What you say about pleasure as motivation for living is true. But why can't I use this (what you observed) to make the following argument: "Killing people gives me pleasure. Pleasure, in the long run, motivates me for living, reminds me that there is something worth putting an effort for. Therefore, killing people is good".

Under some circumstances, killing is good. For instance, right now, I hope the Israelis kill a "disproportionate" number of Palestinian terrorists. The important thing is to look at an action in context.

In the appropriate context, sex is pleasurable and pleasure is life-enhancing and life-promoting and that is its primary value.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

I know at this point I'm probably creating a major brain inflation, but one last point is that I heard Peikoff sometimes take the following approach to ethics: When considering if something is good or not, ask yourself, does it give you pleasure, and does it go against the requirements of life (against rationality)? If not (and it gives pleasure), then it's good.

He does not actually try to reduce everything to life as the standard. He uses our mechanism of pleasure as an aid to judge if something is a value to us. Seems to me he is counting on something (that he does not state) to assume that the second method follows from the first.

I can't speak for Dr. Peikoff, but I would say that I agree with his view because I am not an emotional skeptic.

I am not a cognitive skeptic because I trust my senses and ability to reason. I don't doubt any of my conclusions until or unless I find a contradiction and then I make an effort to resolve it. Likewise, I trust and enjoy my pleasant emotions and have no reason to doubt or need to analyze or justify them. Only an unpleasant "warning" emotion requires that I deal with or fix something.

[B. Royce 0]

The fact is, however, that we are the offspring of people who reproduced and really enjoyed the process. As a result, we inherited the physical means to enjoy it too. When an individual can look forward to experiencing that kind of enjoyment, it is a strong motivation for choosing to live and take life-preserving actions.

What you say about pleasure as motivation for living is true. But why can't I use this (what you observed) to make the following argument: "Killing people gives me pleasure. Pleasure, in the long run, motivates me for living, reminds me that there is something worth putting an effort for. Therefore, killing people is good".

Under some circumstances, killing is good. For instance, right now, I hope the Israelis kill a "disproportionate" number of Palestinian terrorists. The important thing is to look at an action in context.

In the appropriate context, sex is pleasurable and pleasure is life-enhancing and life-promoting and that is its primary value.

I agree, and it must be remembered that while pleasure is life-enhancing, it does not automatically guide you in taking life-enhancing actions.

[bborg 0]

I am not a cognitive skeptic because I trust my senses and ability to reason. I don't doubt any of my conclusions until or unless I find a contradiction and then I make an effort to resolve it. Likewise, I trust and enjoy my pleasant emotions and have no reason to doubt or need to analyze or justify them. Only an unpleasant "warning" emotion requires that I deal with or fix something.

I'm a little confused at this. Are you assuming here that one has the right value premises, or are you saying that regardless of one's premises it is only necessary to analyze unpleasant emotions?

[softwareGuru 0]

The "third" is part of what I was assuming under the "second". ... When you look at a wider context then the actions on an animal in its life-time, obviously you see that whatever behavior it has for the sake of someone else's survival is what ultimately produces best survival for the species, ...

Yes, I agree. And the immediate recipient of the "help" may be a slightly different type within the species (the bee example), or even a different species (I think some scavengers and "parasites" would be examples).

... putting aside the "art-like" function, if you only say that sex is good because it is pleasurable, I think this is wrong as an explanation why it is good.

I think the "art-like" function is non-trivial to a human being. In fact, I'd be open to the notion that it is primary.

But, for now, I want to ask about the deeper question you raised, by using a different example... some supposed "good" other than sex. I understand you as saying this: in the case of sex we have the evidence of pleasure, and we also can understand the biological roots as to why such pleasure is part of our "design". However, we aren't hedonists, and our sensations and emotions are not the final word. Fair enough. Any thoughts on how this would apply to something even more fundamental than sex: to purpose and productiveness?

Imagine this scenario: Sue is an businessman's heiress whose trust fund gave her enough to live a very comfortable life. She could lounge around a beach all day long, sipping expensive liquor, served to her by a servant. Others cook for her and take care of the mansion. Yet, she isn't really happy. A psychologists advises her to join a charity and take an active part in it. She does. It's nowhere near a full time job, but gives her something to plan for at least once a week, organizing fund-raisers. Sometimes, when she's sipping a drink on the beach, she finds herself making plans about how best to raise new funds for the charity. She reports that it does make her happier.

This is analogous to the sex example: while we see the person is happier, and understand the biological reasons they are designed this way, we also see that the action does not directly further their longevity.

My question is: if you think this example is similar, do you think that purpose and productiveness cannot be called a "virtue" in Sue's case, but that they're optional values that are fine since they make her happy?

[Betsy Speicher 0]

I am not a cognitive skeptic because I trust my senses and ability to reason. I don't doubt any of my conclusions until or unless I find a contradiction and then I make an effort to resolve it. Likewise, I trust and enjoy my pleasant emotions and have no reason to doubt or need to analyze or justify them. Only an unpleasant "warning" emotion requires that I deal with or fix something.

I'm a little confused at this. Are you assuming here that one has the right value premises, or are you saying that regardless of one's premises it is only necessary to analyze unpleasant emotions?

When it comes to pleasant emotions, unless there is a conflict (between reason and emotion or between emotions), I assume my emotions come from valid value premises and I enjoy them rather than doubt and analyze them. Analyzing unpleasant emotions, however, is necessary.

[Ifat Glassman 0]

After you made your post I thought of a different case, of bees. I don't know too much about bees, but I know the worker bees work most of the time to support the hive and the next generation of bees and maybe even the queen. So here you may even see a case of working to save members of the species (not necessarily the next generation). So you can say about this example that it does not fall under "next-generation-survival". Still, I think once you say the two goals are preservation of the organism's existence, and preservation of the species, pretty sure you'd be done with ultimate goals. 2 can and do explain all as far as I see.

If I understand you right, you are stating that a bee, which has no consciously chosen ethical code, is acting in an altruistic way for the betterment of the specie. And that it is supposedly within the bee's nature to act in this fashion for the betterment of the species. Just as before I must disagree with this idea. Might I ask that you ponder why it is not in man's nature to act this way? Might I ask why bees of one hive do not work for another hive and why they actaully fight with another hive? Might I once again offer that it is something much more fundamental.

Gee, no need to be so polite sure, I will "ponder". My answer is actually already included in my previous post, but I'll bring it out and emphasize it here:

Whatever seemingly "altruistic" behavior a bee engages in, it is designed to do so because ultimately the similar behavior of other bees enhances its own survival. In other words it is "wired" in a certain way that maximizes its chances of survival given its nature. So even though in the context of the bee's own life, it does act to sustain others, not just itself (and sometimes at the price of risking its own life), ultimately similar behavior of other bees maximizes its own chances of survival.

So I don't think we really are in disagreement about this.

Ifat, you have to be careful when you use an _imagined_ example, such as a killer who gets pleasure from killing. For first, you have to establish that it is pleasure he is feeling, and not relief from pain. He himself might even call it pleasure, but that doesn't make it so. Just because we can imagine a specific situation, doesn't mean it actually exists.

The fact is, however, that we are the offspring of people who reproduced and really enjoyed the process. As a result, we inherited the physical means to enjoy it too. When an individual can look forward to experiencing that kind of enjoyment, it is a strong motivation for choosing to live and take life-preserving actions.

What you say about pleasure as motivation for living is true. But why can't I use this (what you observed) to make the following argument: "Killing people gives me pleasure. Pleasure, in the long run, motivates me for living, reminds me that there is something worth putting an effort for. Therefore, killing people is good".

Under some circumstances, killing is good.

I think you both are missing my point. The killing example is non-essential here. I might as well put any unbeneficiary (to life) behavior there. My point was to show a "hole" (or that something is not complete) in your (Betsy) argument. The problem is not a missing context; I was assuming in this context a sadist.

It might be the case that pleasure really IS the reason why sex ultimately serves one's survival, but by the way you explained it, the explanation is not complete, which is why I can use it to justify all sorts of weird behavior as long as one gets pleasure out of it.

[B. Royce 0]

Ifat, in the above you say, "So even though in the context of the bee's own life, it does act to sustain others, not just itself (and sometimes at the price of risking its own life)..). This part in parentheses is not applicable, since the concept of "price", and of "risk" and reward can be applied and understood only in a human context. The bee cannot pay a price, it cannot suffer a loss or enjoy a gain. Furthermore, all ethical concepts (including altruism and egoism) are not applicable to animals. When it comes to understanding ethics, animal behavior is entirely irrelevant.

[B. Royce 0]

Ifat, in the above you say, "So even though in the context of the bee's own life, it does act to sustain others, not just itself (and sometimes at the price of risking its own life)..). This part in parentheses is not applicable, since the concept of "price", and of "risk" and reward can be applied and understood only in a human context. The bee cannot pay a price, it cannot suffer a loss or enjoy a gain. Furthermore, all ethical concepts (including altruism and egoism) are not applicable to animals. When it comes to understanding ethics, animal behavior is entirely irrelevant.

I should add that this post is meant as a caution against inadvertently allowing anthropomorphism to cloud one's thinking. In fact I just ran across an instance of this when I looked up the lifespan of bees. One paragraph of the article began "Worker bees work very hard..." What?!----was my response. I guess I should go on to wonder if some bees are more competent than others, or if some are lazy, or perhaps others are day-dreaming about vacations and goofing off! "work very hard"? How could one possibly tell? Bees just do what they do, and that is all.

Let us be clear. Bees not only do not "work together", they do not "work" at all, and they are not "workers". The concept of "worker" is a human one only. True, you may visit a factory and see a lot of men busily performing different tasks, and then see a beehive and see a lot of bees doing things, but the superficial comparison stops right there. The bees are not little men with goals and plans and deadlines in mind, with standards of competence and right and wrong. Note, I am not directing this at Ifat, simply making a general observation, which I do because it is so easy to let anthropomorphic ideas subtly infiltrate one's thinking.

[Paul's Here 0]

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Let us be clear. Bees not only do not "work together", they do not "work" at all, and they are not "workers". The concept of "worker" is a human one only. True, you may visit a factory and see a lot of men busily performing different tasks, and then see a beehive and see a lot of bees doing things, but the superficial comparison stops right there. The bees are not little men with goals and plans and deadlines in mind, with standards of competence and right and wrong. Note, I am not directing this at Ifat, simply making a general observation, which I do because it is so easy to let anthropomorphic ideas subtly infiltrate one's thinking.

Are you implying that a concept cannot be widened from its original usage, or the same word used in a different but similar context? If a slave is simply performing the tasks he was told to do, is he not working at his task?

[B. Royce 0]

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Let us be clear. Bees not only do not "work together", they do not "work" at all, and they are not "workers". The concept of "worker" is a human one only. True, you may visit a factory and see a lot of men busily performing different tasks, and then see a beehive and see a lot of bees doing things, but the superficial comparison stops right there. The bees are not little men with goals and plans and deadlines in mind, with standards of competence and right and wrong. Note, I am not directing this at Ifat, simply making a general observation, which I do because it is so easy to let anthropomorphic ideas subtly infiltrate one's thinking.

Are you implying that a concept cannot be widened from its original usage, or the same word used in a different but similar context? If a slave is simply performing the tasks he was told to do, is he not working at his task?

No, I do not mean to imply that a concept cannot be rationally widened from its original usage. I do not see that calling a bee a worker is rational, or scientific. Otherwise, why not call all animals workers? Is not a vulture "working" when he soars around all day looking for food? As for a slave, he has a will and he has choices: work (slower or faster), or don't work and get whipped. The bee has no choice whatsoever; it is not a worker.

[Arnold 0]

No, I do not mean to imply that a concept cannot be rationally widened from its original usage. I do not see that calling a bee a worker is rational, or scientific. Otherwise, why not call all animals workers? Is not a vulture "working" when he soars around all day looking for food? As for a slave, he has a will and he has choices: work (slower or faster), or don't work and get whipped. The bee has no choice whatsoever; it is not a worker.

You have got to 'bee' in a union to be considered a worker.