Reproductivness as means to one's life?

[B. Royce 0]

No, I do not mean to imply that a concept cannot be rationally widened from its original usage. I do not see that calling a bee a worker is rational, or scientific. Otherwise, why not call all animals workers? Is not a vulture "working" when he soars around all day looking for food? As for a slave, he has a will and he has choices: work (slower or faster), or don't work and get whipped. The bee has no choice whatsoever; it is not a worker.

You have got to 'bee' in a union to be considered a worker.

How about a bee in a bonnet? He might be a barber!

[Ifat Glassman 0]

I know at this point I'm probably creating a major brain inflation, but one last point is that I heard Peikoff sometimes take the following approach to ethics: When considering if something is good or not, ask yourself, does it give you pleasure, and does it go against the requirements of life (against rationality)? If not (and it gives pleasure), then it's good.

He does not actually try to reduce everything to life as the standard. He uses our mechanism of pleasure as an aid to judge if something is a value to us. Seems to me he is counting on something (that he does not state) to assume that the second method follows from the first.

I can't speak for Dr. Peikoff, but I would say that I agree with his view because I am not an emotional skeptic.

I am not a cognitive skeptic because I trust my senses and ability to reason. I don't doubt any of my conclusions until or unless I find a contradiction and then I make an effort to resolve it. Likewise, I trust and enjoy my pleasant emotions and have no reason to doubt or need to analyze or justify them. Only an unpleasant "warning" emotion requires that I deal with or fix something.

I agree with your explanation, but I think your explanation is missing (or rather does state explicitly) the essential piece connecting human life as the standard (of good/bad) and pleasure. The essential thing that you are depending on is that your emotions and pleasure/pain mechanism really DO reflect "your life as the standard of value". I think this is what you mean by not being an "emotional skeptic".

I agree with the essence of your answer (though I think it is missing), and I want to present the explanation for it:

Assume an extremely intellectual person tried to apply the moral principle of his life as the standard of value in his life. But, he would not use emotions or sensations at all. He knows, because Ayn Rand observed it, that pleasant emotions are the automatic result of living by principles that reflect and lean on the principle of "one's life as the standard of value".

Alright, he tells himself, then now I will think about the variety of actions available to me and logically identify how each of them contributes to my survival as a human being or goes against it.

Since he no longer relies on the sensation of hunger, he calculates calories and eats according to his calculations. He then considers getting a dog: He ties it to his life as the standard of value by identifying that a dog reflects many common values and attributes of human beings (for instance, it has emotions and it likes to play), that the state of playing provides rest from intellectual activity and brings more simple values to one's focus. then he tries to choose a career: He recognizes that his own psychology and associations result from childhood experiences. He accepts his nature as a given and analyzes what would fit his nature the most given his own psychology which he requires years to analyze.

In short, his task is daunting if not practically impossible without the aid of his emotions. Heck, even to learn enough about your own psychology takes years. Emotions, on the other hand, as the sum of our relevant subconscious ideas subsumes vast amount of knowledge, and at the same time instantly tell you what profession you are attracted to. It takes your psychology for granted and produces a result, without the need to consciously understand it.

But, assume for a moment that one's emotions did not reflect his life as the standard, that in fact he can feel attracted to activities that destroy his human nature and endanger his life. Then, if he wanted to live, he would not be able to rely on his emotions (pleasant or unpleasant). And in fact the reward for successful living would NOT be happiness for such a person (not until he changes his subconscious ideas).

This case illustrates that to make decisions using ethics we must use both our emotions and logical thinking. Our emotions suggest a course of action, and our conscious mind double checks it to see that it does not contradict one's survival (long term). This produces the most efficient way to make decisions and apply ethics to one's life.

(And this also reflects our nature - by that I am referring to emotions as a motivational force for action).

Now consider the case of sex, or reproduction: those things are pleasurable to us even though they do not directly serve our survival. Reproduction is the reason we are alive, but the appropriate context for judging if something is for one's self-interest is not the life of his ancestors or his species, but his own life. So even though it is the case that we are alive because our parents reproduced - who the hell cares about that, in the context of deciding if sex or raising kids is good for you - it is not relevant.

Even though everything else about us is built to achieve our own survival, reproductiveness does not (metaphysically) do so. It is not like feeling pleasure from a warm fire or food (which directly serves out survival).

In this case we feel pleasure but the ultimate result (that we are "designed" to achieve) is babies. For an animal it is experienced as serving the animal (since it is pleasurable), but in fact it serves the next generation. Taking care of an offspring is perceived as pleasant, and to the animal it appears as a self-interest. But the goal it serves is the survival of the next generation.

So this part confuses me, because I can no longer think of pleasure as a mechanism serving my own survival - not fully. (even though it does serve it in an indirect way, as I've discussed with softwareGuru).

Personally speaking (outside the context of a discussion in philosophy) - All I care about is to feel good. To be happy, for as much as I can for as long as possible to me. If my nature had been that I get pleasure from peeling apples (to give a crazy example), I would certainly peel them, because all I care about is the good feeling, so long as it does not contradict my long-term goal. But I don't know yet how to connect this to Objectivist ethics, since Objectivist ethics replies on life as the standard, and happiness as the unavoidable result of that standard.

I discovered what I came here to discover - I discovered in what way reproductiveness serves an organism's own survival. There are still some left-over questions though (as I've presented).

[Ifat Glassman 0]

... putting aside the "art-like" function, if you only say that sex is good because it is pleasurable, I think this is wrong as an explanation why it is good.

I think the "art-like" function is non-trivial to a human being. In fact, I'd be open to the notion that it is primary.

Yes, I am open to this option as well. In fact I think it is unavoidable (to recognize this) as a benefit for human life. Not sure though how to integrate this conclusion with the rest of my knowledge of Objectivist ethics (that I've presented here).

But, for now, I want to ask about the deeper question you raised, by using a different example... some supposed "good" other than sex. I understand you as saying this: in the case of sex we have the evidence of pleasure, and we also can understand the biological roots as to why such pleasure is part of our "design". However, we aren't hedonists, and our sensations and emotions are not the final word. Fair enough. Any thoughts on how this would apply to something even more fundamental than sex: to purpose and productiveness?

I think my reply to Betsy's post answers this question.

But since it was long and contained a lot of ideas, I'll answer your question to bring out the part that is relevant to what you're asking me:

In the choice of career and purpose the best method to make a decision would be to use our emotions as a first estimation and "direction-giver", and then use logical analysis to make sure that it serves our survival. In this case, it is clear how productivity is required for our existence, so all that's left is to make sure that the kind of career you are attracted to does not contradict this goal.

Imagine this scenario: Sue is an businessman's heiress whose trust fund gave her enough to live a very comfortable life. She could lounge around a beach all day long, sipping expensive liquor, served to her by a servant. Others cook for her and take care of the mansion. Yet, she isn't really happy. A psychologists advises her to join a charity and take an active part in it. She does. It's nowhere near a full time job, but gives her something to plan for at least once a week, organizing fund-raisers. Sometimes, when she's sipping a drink on the beach, she finds herself making plans about how best to raise new funds for the charity. She reports that it does make her happier.

This is analogous to the sex example: while we see the person is happier, and understand the biological reasons they are designed this way, we also see that the action does not directly further their longevity.

My question is: if you think this example is similar, do you think that purpose and productiveness cannot be called a "virtue" in Sue's case, but that they're optional values that are fine since they make her happy?

Oh, I see your question. It's a very good one. I'll have to think about it more to give answers to all your questions. So I'll get back to it later, but for now I'll answer what I can:

My answer is that it is still a virtue.

I can give a partial explanation that involves human psychology and the need of purpose and self esteem to live. But I think the full explanation is: That since human beings need to act by principle, they cannot change their principles based on the changing context of their life. If something is a requirement of human survival, you cannot use that principle for half your life and then throw it to the wasteland the second half. Just as you cannot lie when the specific context may earn you a promotion, but be honest otherwise. The meaning of a principle is that it serves your long-term requirements of survival.

(An additional thought: if someone inherits a huge sum of money, is he equally moral if he stays a bum and never learn how to produce anything new, as if he used the fortune as an industrialist? I don't think so. Even though metaphysically he does not have to produce things to survive, it is an exception to the human state. Normally, people need to be creative and produce to survive. He does not, but his life is supported by the fact that someone else acted on that principle of productivity as a virtue. There would be a collision if he considered the origin of his fortune good and himself as deserving it, and at the same time not run his life by the same principle that had made the fortune possible to begin with. So I'd say it is a virtue, and not an optional one in this case)

Still, after answering your question, I don't see how it is similar to sex. What is the principle that makes sex a requirement for one's long-term survival?

Ifat, in the above you say, "So even though in the context of the bee's own life, it does act to sustain others, not just itself (and sometimes at the price of risking its own life)..). This part in parentheses is not applicable, since the concept of "price", and of "risk" and reward can be applied and understood only in a human context. The bee cannot pay a price, it cannot suffer a loss or enjoy a gain. Furthermore, all ethical concepts (including altruism and egoism) are not applicable to animals. When it comes to understanding ethics, animal behavior is entirely irrelevant.

While the bee does not "take a risk" (in the sense it makes a decision), it acts in a way that endangers its life to preserve the life of other bees. Part of the concept of "taking a risk" for humans involves volition, but the concept can still apply for a lion attacking an unusually big animal, even if its behavior is automatic. Just as a plant can be alive (but still not alive in a human sense). A bee can automatically act to sustain some other bee's life while its actions put itself in danger. It is not altruism in the sense of a conscious choice of an idea, but I can still use it to describe a metaphysical phenomenon. To me it appears as a useful and legitimate use of the word (though I can understand an objection as well on the ground that it would be too confusing). I agree that this cannot be done with all concepts. There is no such thing as an "evil bee" or an evasive bee.

But anyway, this is very far off from the topic at hand, in my understanding.

[RayK 0]

Ifat, in the above you say, "So even though in the context of the bee's own life, it does act to sustain others, not just itself (and sometimes at the price of risking its own life)..). This part in parentheses is not applicable, since the concept of "price", and of "risk" and reward can be applied and understood only in a human context. The bee cannot pay a price, it cannot suffer a loss or enjoy a gain. Furthermore, all ethical concepts (including altruism and egoism) are not applicable to animals. When it comes to understanding ethics, animal behavior is entirely irrelevant.

While the bee does not "take a risk" (in the sense it makes a decision), it acts in a way that endangers its life to preserve the life of other bees. Part of the concept of "taking a risk" for humans involves volition, but the concept can still apply for a lion attacking an unusually big animal, even if its behavior is automatic. Just as a plant can be alive (but still not alive in a human sense). A bee can automatically act to sustain some other bee's life while its actions put itself in danger. It is not altruism in the sense of a conscious choice of an idea, but I can still use it to describe a metaphysical phenomenon. To me it appears as a useful and legitimate use of the word (though I can understand an objection as well on the ground that it would be too confusing). I agree that this cannot be done with all concepts. There is no such thing as an "evil bee" or an evasive bee.

But anyway, this is very far off from the topic at hand, in my understanding.

Although you state that this might be far off the topic at hand, when you are ready you might try a couple of questions to stimulate some answers. For example you might want to ask yourself why would a bee act automatically to save another bee that is part of the same hive, but not all bees? If a bee is acting without volition, what is it that drives it to do so? If a bee was acting to automatically bring a benefit to the species (as some theorist state) then why does the been not act that way toward all bees? If a bees are acting for their individual benefit, why does it automatically go in harms way as this it against the organism/bee? A non-contradictory answer must be had, and I think something more fundamental than the species and individual organism is the answer.

Just something for you to think about, or discard.

[B. Royce 0]

Ifat, it does not matter that you can't _think_ of pleasure as a mechanism serving your survival, for in fact, it does. When you open your eyes in the morning there is the pleasure of light and the pleasure of seeing; your first drink of water might give you pleasure, or the touch of a clean shirt to put on. You could make a list of all the things that give you even the slightest pleasure, then try going even one day without experiencing them. Put a patch over one eye so that when you wake up the effect of light will be less; sprinkle a little salt into that first glass of water; put on old dirty clothes; eat the kind of cereal you don't like, and _don't_ sit in a comfortable chair to do it; listen to music you don't like and look at paintings you hate, and above all, don't speak to anyone you like or love. It's simple; just one day.

[Betsy Speicher 0]

I am not a cognitive skeptic because I trust my senses and ability to reason. I don't doubt any of my conclusions until or unless I find a contradiction and then I make an effort to resolve it. Likewise, I trust and enjoy my pleasant emotions and have no reason to doubt or need to analyze or justify them. Only an unpleasant "warning" emotion requires that I deal with or fix something.

I agree with your explanation, but I think your explanation is missing (or rather does state explicitly) the essential piece connecting human life as the standard (of good/bad) and pleasure. The essential thing that you are depending on is that your emotions and pleasure/pain mechanism really DO reflect "your life as the standard of value". I think this is what you mean by not being an "emotional skeptic".

The pleasure/pain mechanism doesn't always reflect what is good for my life. That is why I am not a hedonist.

The mechanism (and its specific contents) evolved because they gave the organisms who had it survival and/or reproductive advantages. Some pleasurable things, like the pleasure of eating food, directly benefit the life of the organism who enjoys eating, while the pleasures of sex may not benefit the organism at all but may simply lead to more offspring who like sexual activity.