Justification Options

[ADS]

Wouldn't it be more exact to say that there are some instances where rights simply do not apply?

Good question. I'd have to think about it some more.

I'm glad you also find the question interesting, as I'd like to think it through more as well.

One question is: whose context are we talking about? What might be an emergency to me may not be for someone else who is involved.

Perhaps this is a good example of what you have in mind (as I do not think the case that Megan provided is valid as stated). Someone who has been stranded at sea for many days finally washes up on land, in a remote area. He needs food so desparately that, after not finding anyone available to help him, he breaks into the nearest house and steals whatever he needs to stay alive. So, here, the person who broke into the house was in an emergency, whereas the homeowner (who we can say was not home at the time) was not. So, the question is: assuming this person was right to break into the house (and I would certainly say he was), did he violate the rights of the homeowner?

In answer, I would still say "no." I don't see how it is either useful or correct to ascribe a right to someone that it would be proper to violate. It still seems the same as two people being in a lifeboat, and one having no option but to kill the other and use him for food in order to stay alive. The person who was killed did not have any rights in that context.

This does raise at least one big question, though. What role does the law play in these sorts of cases? I would definitely say that the man who broke into the house has a legal obligation to make the homeowner whole again, but can this be squared with him not having broken any rights to begin with? Again, I think so. By analogy, the government is not violating the rights of someone that they subpoenia before court, and yet one could plausibly argue that the government (or perhaps the prosecution or the defense) has a legal obligation to pay this person's lost wages (assuming their employer is not already contractually obligated to pay them). And, if the government (or whomever) refused to pay his wages, then they would be violating his rights -- but not a moment before.

Does morality apply or not? I think moral principles do apply, but one might choose to violate them and face the consequences afterward.

But moral principles are defined with reference to what furthers your life. So, can there be a situation where a moral principle applies and tells you to do one thing, but self-preservation demands that you do another? I don't see how.

A loved one in danger due to an accident might, if no option is available, lead me to commit a crime to save her; for instance, stealing medicine. Yes, I'd pay the price, and yes, the theft would be immoral and criminal; but I'd not regret my choice.

Again, why do you describe it as immoral? As for criminal, I think that's a big question: is the aforementioned man who broke into the house a criminal? Should objective law make exceptions for such cases and not prosecute, as long as restitution is provided? And as for restitution, how would that apply to the man who killed his partner in the lifeboat in order to eat him?

Again, I certainly don't claim to have all the answers here, but I hope the above stimulates discussion.

[jedymastyr]

At least, I don't think there's any commandment forbidding the husband to steal the drug, so long as he is willing to accept the consequences afterwards. No proper moral principle can demand that a man sacrifice such a crucial value. That would be altruism.

I am not fully satisfied with my analysis on this subject, but I think I have a perspective that's not been addressed yet so I would like to state it.

The relationship the wife is a social relationship--as such, it can only have value in the context of social interactions. A fundamental principle underlying proper social interactions is the non-initiation of force principle. Wouldn't stealing the medicine be violating a fundamental principle on which the wife's value to the husband rests?

In lifeboat situations, you are in a situation where the fundamental principles of ethics do not apply. In this case, you're violating a principle underlying social interaction--for the sake of maintaining a social value.

It seems like a (fallacy of the stolen concept)-type argument.

Note that none of this applies if the woman steals the medicine herself...I am not sure about that at this point.

[Ed from OC]

Someone who has been stranded at sea for many days finally washes up on land, in a remote area. He needs food so desparately that, after not finding anyone available to help him, he breaks into the nearest house and steals whatever he needs to stay alive. So, here, the person who broke into the house was in an emergency, whereas the homeowner (who we can say was not home at the time) was not. So, the question is: assuming this person was right to break into the house (and I would certainly say he was), did he violate the rights of the homeowner?

In answer, I would still say "no." I don't see how it is either useful or correct to ascribe a right to someone that it would be proper to violate.

"To violate" -- what? The homeowner's property rights.

Notice that, as I mentioned, it matters to whom the emergency exists. Certainly it is not an emergency for the homeowner, who therefore should expect his rights to be protected. If anyone coming along claims his emergency trumps the rights of others, how is that different from saying that the needs of one person are a claim on the rights of others? Is it just the existence of the emergency? In my view, the stranger is in the wrong, tries to make amends, and accepts his punishment. I see that as the more consistent position. In a just world, his context would be taken into account, and a sentence would be lenient.

The stranger doesn't have the right to trespass. If he respects the rights of others, then he acknowledges that he is in the wrong and accepts the punishment.

This does raise at least one big question, though. What role does the law play in these sorts of cases? I would definitely say that the man who broke into the house has a legal obligation to make the homeowner whole again, but can this be squared with him not having broken any rights to begin with? Again, I think so.

How? I don't see it, if I understand your position correctly.

But moral principles are defined with reference to what furthers your life. So, can there be a situation where a moral principle applies and tells you to do one thing, but self-preservation demands that you do another? I don't see how.

That's partly in the nature of it being an emergency. While the goal is to return as soon as possible to a normal, life-promoting context, that doesn't mean one has carte blanche to do absolutely anything, does it? Surely the nature of the emergency shapes the extent to which the normal rules of morality apply. Lying may be appropriate at the point of a gun, but not if one is starving on the beach. So, I'd argue that emergency situations do not mean morality completely disappears.

Again, why do you describe it as immoral? As for criminal, I think that's a big question: is the aforementioned man who broke into the house a criminal? Should objective law make exceptions for such cases and not prosecute, as long as restitution is provided? And as for restitution, how would that apply to the man who killed his partner in the lifeboat in order to eat him?

Maybe we should stick to one concrete, and the starving-stranger-on-a-beach case is good. If a decent man in such a situation broke into my home and fed himself, then when confronted fessed up and offered full restitution, I don't think I would even press charges. Certainly the legal tradition of ranges of sentences take into account the various contexts. I don't know, though, that there should necessarily be a legal exception, (1) because it is an emergency situation, and (2) because

BTW, do you see a parallel to Roark's dynamiting of Cortland? I do.

(Great discussion, but it's nearly midnight. Arrgh. Well, to be continued...)

[Ed from OC]

Posted too soon!

Certainly the legal tradition of ranges of sentences take into account the various contexts. I don't know, though, that there should necessarily be a legal exception, (1) because it is an emergency situation, and (2) because

... I'm concerned about opening a Pandora's box of exceptions, with every defendant trying to claim it was an emergency and therefore he's innocent. But, I'm not a legal scholar, and this implication isn't my main interest in this discussion.

[ADS]

"To violate" -- what? The homeowner's property rights.

Just to be clear, I wasn't claiming that there was any violation of anything going on. Rather, I was saying that if one posits rights (which I'm currently not), then one is positing rights that it is proper to violate. This still strikes me as a contradiction that I do not see how to resolve. And if you resolve it by saying that the man was immoral when breaking into the house, then this leads us back to the question of how one can be immoral for doing what one needs to do in order to preserve one's life (which I readdress below).

Notice that, as I mentioned, it matters to whom the emergency exists.

I still don't see why.

If anyone coming along claims his emergency trumps the rights of others, how is that different from saying that the needs of one person are a claim on the rights of others? Is it just the existence of the emergency?

Yes. This being an emergency makes it fundamentally different from an altruist who says, "I need food so you have an obligation to feed me."

In my view, the stranger is in the wrong, tries to make amends, and accepts his punishment. I see that as the more consistent position. The stranger doesn't have the right to trespass. If he respects the rights of others, then he acknowledges that he is in the wrong and accepts the punishment.

Okay, but could you provide more argument for this position? I'm still not seeing your justification.

This does raise at least one big question, though. What role does the law play in these sorts of cases? I would definitely say that the man who broke into the house has a legal obligation to make the homeowner whole again, but can this be squared with him not having broken any rights to begin with? Again, I think so.

How? I don't see it, if I understand your position correctly.

Are you asking how I can say that 1) the starving person still has a legal obligation to pay the homeowner back, or 2) that such an obligation does not imply that the starving person violated the rights of the homeowner? I gave the beginnings of an argument for the latter, although I can expand on it if you want.

That's partly in the nature of it being an emergency. While the goal is to return as soon as possible to a normal, life-promoting context, that doesn't mean one has carte blanche to do absolutely anything, does it?

Anything that you need to do to get out of the emergency, sure. It was in this sense that I was saying that normal moral principles (e.g., rights) do not apply. I'm certainly not saying that the starving man can take any irrelevant action he pleases, like going off and finding someone to rape.

So, I again ask: given that we are egoists, how can moral principles point us away from self-preservation? I think this is a crucial question that someone taking your position needs to answer. (And keep in mind that the whole derivation of moral principles is in the context of what we need for self-preservation.)

BTW, do you see a parallel to Roark's dynamiting of Cortland? I do.

In some respects, although I don't see how Roark was under an emergency. Like you said, perhaps we should stick to one example.

(Great discussion, ...

I agree! I really hope we can come to a resolution, as I find this to be a very interesting and very tricky issue.

[RayK]

After thinking about this question some more I have come to a different first response.

I think that the person that makes up this hypothetical question is a destroyer. A destroyer of a rational ethics, epistemology, metaphysics and the totality of philosophy. So, my first response to the person that ask this question would be, where do you see this in reality? I would be surprised if they said in a capitalistic society. I think this is just what they are trying to destroy, that being a rationally selfishish ethics and politics. I think that maybe they are a Kantian or a Marxist and are again trying to destroy a rational philosophy.

If we look at medicine and charity in a capilistic society we can view things such as St. Judes or the Jerry Lewis telethon or even the abundance of wealth that would never come in a society of self-sacrifice/altruism. The situation that this person is trying to create, I have never seen in a capitalistic society. It might happen in a mixed society such as what one views in Atlas Shrugged. But, then I would say that you get "what you deserve brother", and end it right there.

[Betsy Speicher]

Just to be clear, I wasn't claiming that there was any violation of anything going on. Rather, I was saying that if one posits rights (which I'm currently not), then one is positing rights that it is proper to violate. This still strikes me as a contradiction that I do not see how to resolve. And if you resolve it by saying that the man was immoral when breaking into the house, then this leads us back to the question of how one can be immoral for doing what one needs to do in order to preserve one's life (which I readdress below).
I still don't see why.

The way to resolve the apparent contradiction is to realize that it isn't a contradiction at all. The premises are not mutually exclusive. A personal can have an unalienable right to his property, which he cannot ever lose and always applies, AND another man can properly and morally violate them in the posited emergencies. Violation and alienation are two separate issues.

"Alienation" means separation, but since rights are inherent in rational personhood, a man always has them. "Violation" mean that a man uses force to prevent another man from exercising a right -- a right that is unalienable.

It is important to keep the distinction between alienation and violation clear because collectivists and other opponents of freedom love to blur the distinction by arguing: There is no such thing as inalienable rights because people's "rights" are violated all the time.

[ADS]

The way to resolve the apparent contradiction is to realize that it isn't a contradiction at all. The premises are not mutually exclusive. A personal can have an unalienable right to his property, which he cannot ever lose and always applies, AND another man can properly and morally violate them in the posited emergencies. Violation and alienation are two separate issues.

One can have inalienable rights that can be violated, so in that sense they are two separate issues. But how can one have inalienable rights that can be morally violated? That's the question. As Peikoff writes in OPAR (emphasis in original):

A right is a prerogative that cannot be morally infringed or alienated. Factually, criminals are possible; innocent men can be robed or enslaved. In such cases, however, the victim's rights are still inalienable: the right remains on the side of the victim; the criminal is wrong.

How can there be a right (moral principle) that actually applies, and yet it is okay to violate? What meaning does the phrase "moral principle that actually applies" have in such a context? If a right defines and sanctions a man's freedom of action in a social context, then doesn't it of necessity not sanction anyone that infringes on that freedom?

[B. Royce]

After thinking about this question some more I have come to a different first response.

I think that the person that makes up this hypothetical question is a destroyer. A destroyer of a rational ethics, epistemology, metaphysics and the totality of philosophy. So, my first response to the person that ask this question would be, where do you see this in reality? I would be surprised if they said in a capitalistic society. I think this is just what they are trying to destroy, that being a rationally selfishish ethics and politics. I think that maybe they are a Kantian or a Marxist and are again trying to destroy a rational philosophy.

If we look at medicine and charity in a capilistic society we can view things such as St. Judes or the Jerry Lewis telethon or even the abundance of wealth that would never come in a society of self-sacrifice/altruism. The situation that this person is trying to create, I have never seen in a capitalistic society. It might happen in a mixed society such as what one views in Atlas Shrugged. But, then I would say that you get "what you deserve brother", and end it right there.

I think you have brought up a very good point, Ray. Though, of course, there will be some innocent (young) people who think of such questions merely because they have heard similar questions raised by, perhaps, not so innocent others.

[B. Royce]

Sticking with the starving man on the island who stumbles upon a house: if he sees some sign of recent habitation (such as a well-tended garden) he will knock on the door. If there is no response, can we expect him, in his condition, to even wonder about when the owner might return? "Go in", we would tell him, "find something to eat. However, if the owner returns while you are eating, he might ask that you finish eating outside. For you not to comply would be insulting and immoral; you would be initiating force against a man who, simply by being alive and productive, has already saved your life."

[Betsy Speicher]

One can have inalienable rights that can be violated, so in that sense they are two separate issues. But how can one have inalienable rights that can be morally violated?

Let's separate the metaphysical and the man-made here. Rights are a metaphysical fact inherent in man's nature. It is not a matter open to human choice. Whether or not to violate another man's rights IS a choice that can be morally evaluated.

Every "is" implies an "ought" because metaphysical facts have value-significance. The metaphysical fact that all men have rights means that we ought to recognize them and not violate them as a matter of moral principle -- but in some contexts, the principle does not apply. It is similar to the way we ought to act in accordance with other metaphysical facts EXCEPT when other facts change the context.

For instance, the metaphysical fact of gravity implies that you should not jump out of a fifth floor window. If the building is on fire and that window is your only escape, it is not immoral to jump. Likewise, you ought to respect rights but, if you have to violate someone's rights to preserve a higher value, it is moral to do so. After the fact, you also have a moral obligation to make restitution and take all the other consequences of the fact that you did violate someone's rights.

[ADS]

Let's separate the metaphysical and the man-made here. Rights are a metaphysical fact inherent in man's nature.

No, rights are moral principles, and all moral principles are man-made (the moral is the volitional). Rights are based on man's nature, but their existence requires an act of human choice. This can be seen from the sheer fact that all of morality is based on the choice to live. But, even further, observe that Ayn Rand defined a "right" as "a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man's freedom of action in a social context" (emphasis added). One must choose to enter into such a context, and if you don't then rights don't apply. Peikoff says this explicitly in OPAR: "When men do decide to form (or reform) an organized society... That is the context in which the principle of rights arises" (351-352).

You're speaking of rights as if they are acontextual, which is the very thing I'm arguing against. Rights, like all moral principles, are contextual, and there are real situations in which they do not apply.

It is not a matter open to human choice.

So if someone chooses to commit murder and we throw him in jail, is it the case that the murderer still has rights, but it's just that it is now okay for us to violate them?

[ADS]

But, even further, observe that Ayn Rand defined a "right" as "a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man's freedom of action in a social context" (emphasis added). One must choose to enter into such a context, and if you don't then rights don't apply. Peikoff says this explicitly in OPAR: "When men do decide to form (or reform) an organized society... That is the context in which the principle of rights arises" (351-352).

I should offer a few clarifications, so this discussion does not go too far afield.

1) I do not deny, and have no problem saying, that people have a "moral right" to take certain actions outside of civil society. But this only means that such actions are absolutely morally right, not that one has a political right to perform them (since politics hasn't arisen yet).

2) Perhaps one could argue that it is a metaphysically given fact that one has a moral (not political) right to take certain actions in certain contexts (although even here I'm not sure). But, regardless, it would beg the question to assert that emergencies like the one(s) we are talking about fall within that context. The very question at issue is whether the relevant rights apply in the case of such emergencies.

3) When I say that the starving man does not violate the homeowner's rights, I'm talking about both political rights and moral rights. My present position is that the homeowner cannot claim a political or moral right to his food in this kind of (very extraordinary) situation. It is, again, just like a lifeboat situation: you do not have a political or moral right to your life if you and a group of people are trapped in a lifeboat and everyone is going to starve unless someone is killed and eaten. All moral claims against someone harming you are, in my view, out the window.

[Betsy Speicher]

No, rights are moral principles, and all moral principles are man-made (the moral is the volitional).

This is an equivocation on "moral" similar to the equivocation on "value" that Dr. Peikoff discusses in his lectures on "Unity in Epistemology and Ethics" (Cassette) (CD) The moral principle of "rights" (that identifies the metaphysical fact that man's life requires freedom of action in a social context unimpeded by the initiation of physical force) must be distinguished from the idea of "rights" as any claim some men consider moral to make on other men (by whatever standard).

Rights are based on man's nature, but their existence requires an act of human choice.

No, metaphysical facts do not require an act of human choice to exist, but they do require volitional acts to identify, recognize, and implement them. Men have rights -- by their nature -- whether other men choose to respect them or to violate them.

This can be seen from the sheer fact that all of morality is based on the choice to live.

All proper morality is based on the choice to live, but there are plenty of ethical systems which are not.

But, even further, observe that Ayn Rand defined a "right" as "a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man's freedom of action in a social context" (emphasis added). One must choose to enter into such a context, and if you don't then rights don't apply. Peikoff says this explicitly in OPAR: "When men do decide to form (or reform) an organized society... That is the context in which the principle of rights arises" (351-352).

Those are the metaphysical facts that give rise to a proper concept of rights defined by a proper code of morality.

You're speaking of rights as if they are acontextual, which is the very thing I'm arguing against. Rights, like all moral principles, are contextual, and there are real situations in which they do not apply.
So if someone chooses to commit murder and we throw him in jail, is it the case that the murderer still has rights, but it's just that it is now okay for us to violate them?

No, he has rights which he chose to exercise by declaring, in action, that he does not recognize a man's right to life. We are treating him, in all justice, in accordance with his own chosen standard. We treat him as a man whohas abandoned the right to his own life.

[Betsy Speicher]

Perhaps one could argue that it is a metaphysically given fact that one has a moral (not political) right to take certain actions in certain contexts (although even here I'm not sure).

"Rights" are a political concept -- the most basic one. By a "not political" right, do you mean any claim a man may properly make on other men or any freedom of action he might claim? Then you really mean a morally proper action and not a right.

But, regardless, it would beg the question to assert that emergencies like the one(s) we are talking about fall within that context. The very question at issue is whether the relevant rights apply in the case of such emergencies.

3) When I say that the starving man does not violate the homeowner's rights, I'm talking about both political rights and moral rights.

That, I think, is what is causing the confusion. "Rights" are being used outside of a political context which is where they belong.

My present position is that the homeowner cannot claim a political or moral right to his food in this kind of (very extraordinary) situation.

Mine is that the homeowner has a right (a proper moral-political concept identifying a metaphysical fact) to his property and the starving man is moral (but does not have the right) to take the property in the emergency.

It is important to distinguish the totality of all moral and proper actions from the large subset that involves the recognition of rights. They are not always the same thing.

[B. Royce]

If I, starving, enter a man's house and find food, it is his food, to which he has a right. To say that he has a right to it is just another way of saying it is his, it is acknowledging the metaphysical fact that his mind and body and, by extension, the products thereof, are his. So, when I eat his food, I am violating his rights, and it is just that I make restitution. If the two of us are starving it is not right that one of us kills and eats the other, for no restitution is possible, and by destroying justice the killer would be making himself unfit to live. Making one's self unfit to live violates the purpose of morality and life.

[Stephen Speicher]

If the two of us are starving it is not right that one of us kills and eats the other, for no restitution is possible, and by destroying justice the killer would be making himself unfit to live. Making one's self unfit to live violates the purpose of morality and life.

But if this truly is a "lifeboat" type of emergency, are you saying it would be right if you both died of starvation, and it would not be right if one saved his own life by killing the other?

[ADS]

This is an equivocation on "moral" similar to the equivocation on "value" that Dr. Peikoff discusses in his lectures on "Unity in Epistemology and Ethics" (Cassette) (CD) The moral principle of "rights" (that identifies the metaphysical fact that man's life requires freedom of action in a social context unimpeded by the initiation of physical force) must be distinguished from the idea of "rights" as any claim some men consider moral to make on other men (by whatever standard).

I have already said that, for now, I'm at least leaving open the possibility that it is a metaphysically given fact that certain actions are morally right, and I have given my explanation for why this does not affect my psoition. Other than this I'm not sure what you're driving at, as I have not listened to this lecture.

If you're speaking of rights in the normal, political sense, I have my doubts that Dr. Peikoff holds that there are rights simply "in" man's nature, regardless of whether men have chosen to enter into political society. Dr. Binswanger gave an explanation not too long ago on HBL which rejected this idea of rights, and it is in accord with everything I have heard Dr. Peikoff say on the subject.

No, he has rights which he chose to exercise by declaring, in action, that he does not recognize a man's right to life. We are treating him, in all justice, in accordance with his own chosen standard. We treat him as a man whohas abandoned the right to his own life.

Which means that rights don't apply always, to all people at all times.

"Rights" are a political concept -- the most basic one. By a "not political" right, do you mean any claim a man may properly make on other men or any freedom of action he might claim? Then you really mean a morally proper action and not a right.

I was saying that I have no problem with speaking of a "moral right" do to such and such, even in the state of nature. If you would rather speak in terms of "It is morally proper to do such and such" rather than "One has a moral right to do such and such" then that's fine, as I do take those to be essentially equivalent.

That, I think, is what is causing the confusion. "Rights" are being used outside of a political context which is where they belong.

I don't see how this is relevant, given the above.

Mine is that the homeowner has a right (a proper moral-political concept identifying a metaphysical fact) to his property and the starving man is moral (but does not have the right) to take the property in the emergency.

It is important to distinguish the totality of all moral and proper actions from the large subset that involves the recognition of rights. They are not always the same thing.

In answer to this, I can only ask what it means to say that he has a right to his property if it is moral for someone else to take it. But you have already given an answer to this question, one that I did not agree with, so it seems as though we are going in a circle at this point.

[B. Royce]

But if this truly is a "lifeboat" type of emergency, are you saying it would be right if you both died of starvation, and it would not be right if one saved his own life by killing the other?

Well, I don't see how to say anything other than Yes. The alternative is, as I see it, to live a shorter, nobler life, or a longer ignoble one; or, to end as an independent man, or be a dependent forever after.

[Stephen Speicher]

But if this truly is a "lifeboat" type of emergency, are you saying it would be right if you both died of starvation, and it would not be right if one saved his own life by killing the other?

Well, I don't see how to say anything other than Yes. The alternative is, as I see it, to live a shorter, nobler life, or a longer ignoble one; or, to end as an independent man, or be a dependent forever after.

I'm not sure I understand. Why is it nobler for two people to die, rather than one? And, in what way would the man who chose to live, no longer be an independent man?