Issues with the DIM Hypothesis -- #1 Integration or Identification? Options

[Stephen Speicher]

What really concerns me is that some people are taking the DIM Hypothesis and applying it by condemning other Objectivists as "disintegrated" or as "rationalists" who don't understand Objectivism. Considering that DIM is not yet fully defined and developed and, being an hypothesis, is not yet fully proven, "applying" it like that is appalling.

I agree 110% with that. As unclear as the DIM is to me as presented by Dr. Peikoff, I find it amazing to see people actually argue "He's 75% D and 25% I" or some such classification derived from I don't know what. I am going to continue to evaluate people based on the truth of their ideas, the values they hold and the virtues they practice. I'm not sure how I would actually act toward someone who could be classified as integrated, misintegrated or disintegrated, since truth is not the issue here.

On other forums I have recently seen "disintegration" being bandied about and used as a weapon to bludgeon an opponent, much in the same way that some moralizers misapply their often out-of-context grasp of morality. So much so that, in this vein, a friend has suggested the need for a new concept, "epistemologizer," the epistemological equivalent of a "moralizer" or "psychologizer."

[Betsy Speicher]

From my memory, I believe he said Hobbes could be classified in two of the categories (I don't remember which ones). He said the he wouldn't include Rush Limbaugh in any category because he is so completely unintegrated, espousing religion and freedom, etc.

If that it so, and DIM is a trichotomy, then it contradicts Dr. Peikoff's own definition of what a trichotomy is.

Very early in Lecture 1 he defined a trichotomy as "Three mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possibilities within a given field or question." (DIM 1-1 3:30). If Hobbes can be classified in two categories, then the DIM categories are not mutually exclusive. If Rush Limbaugh cannot be included in any category, then the DIM categories are not jointly exhaustive.

As unclear as the DIM is to me as presented by Dr. Peikoff, I find it amazing to see people actually argue "He's 75% D and 25% I" or some such classification derived from I don't know what. I am going to continue to evaluate people based on the truth of their ideas, the values they hold and the virtues they practice.

That's what I do. I have always made judging people correctly a high personal priority, and I have become a damned good judge of people. I have found that the only way to get the most accurate estimate of others is by doing exactly what you are doing, Paul.

Considering that the subtitle of the DIM course is "The Epistemological Mechanics by which Philosophy Shapes Society" you would think that there should be a clear connection to Objectivist epistemology, but right now I see more conflict than connection.

Which brings up a point that should be addressed: I don't think it is valid to use "mechanics" in connection with "epistemology" unless one means a loose association (or analogy) and not a technical description. Consciousness is not mechanical in nature.

According to Objectivism, human consciousness operates volitionally -- not mechanically -- so that is one of the big conflicts I see between the DIM Hypothesis and Objectivist epistemology.

[PhilO]

For instance, in PhilO's example, when he puts his "seemingly disparate" pieces of information together -- the progessive income tax, socialized medicine, antitrust laws, environmental regulations -- he sees that they are not disparate at all. He sees what they all have in common -- government control of the economy -- which is what he abstracts and integrates into the concept "socialist government."

That is true, but I'm not sure that just similarities captures the full nature of integration. I need to think about that more, particularly about what is meant by "in common".

[Betsy Speicher]

That is true, but I'm not sure that just similarities captures the full nature of integration. I need to think about that more, particularly about what is meant by "in common".

"In common" means the common attributes that all units of a concept have, but in different measure.

[darren]

I'm sorry for joining this discussion late, but I've been thinking about this lately. Since I finally have time to write this weekend and I haven't seen anybody raise the issues I have about this thread, I'll give my response:

Dr. Peikoff's foundational premise is that INTEGRATION is the essence of cognition and the basic function of consciousness. The title of Lecture 2 is "Integration. The One in the Many. Integration as the essence of human cognition from start to finish." In Lecture 2 (Part 1 27:53) he stated, "Integration is the essence of human cognition. It is the basic activity of a conceptual consciousness."

I have those quotes in my own notes. Immediately after those statements I wrote something else down he said that I think is relevant to this thread. Note: I don't type Dr. Peikoff word-for-word, so what I paste below should not be considered his quote. But it is basically what he said:

"The whole essence of a concept is to take an endless stream of particulars and create a whole. A unit. A one which subsumes many."

While it is true that integration is a crucial and fundamental part of the cognitive process, it is not the essence of human cognition, nor the basic activity of a conceptual consciousness, nor all of cognition "from start to finish" -- at least, not according to my understanding of cognition and of Ayn Rand.

Ayn Rand wrote that "Consciousness is identification" and "Consciousness is the faculty of awareness -- the faculty of perceiving that which exists," I take that as meaning that IDENTIFICATION of the facts of reality -- rather than integration alone -- is the essence of cognition and basic function of consciousness.

I think that Dr. Peikoff is not talking about cognition and consciousness, but a specific type of cognition and consciousness: human. In that context, I think Dr. Peikoff is right to refer to integration as the "essence" of human cognition because the ability to integrate is what sets human consciousness apart from the level of consciousness that animals have. We don't just identify existents, we also have the ability to form concepts. We use identification, differentiation, and integration in the process of creating a concept, but the final step is integration and the final result is an integration. It's these integrations we make that lift us out of the perceptual into the conceptual, allowing us to build our knowledge.

This doesn't mean that integration is more important than identification or differentiation, because they're all essential to our cognitive process. I just don't see how useful it is to consider identification as the essence of human cognition because we do a lot more than identify things that exist in reality. Even if you consider integration and differentiation as types of identification, there is still one type of identification that allows man to take vast amounts of data and shrink them into concepts that he can understand and use to build further knowledge, and man alone is capable of doing it. So if one is to identify what makes up human cognition, I don't think it's enough to say that it's identification alone.

And to add a little more context to what Dr. Peikoff means, I want to point out that anyone who meets the prerequisites of his course (ITOE, OPAR, and Atlas Shrugged) is a person who probably understands Objectivist epistemology. I think it's fair for him to skip over giving precise definitions of all the words he uses or explain all the relations of his hypothesis to Objectivist epistemology because it can be assumed that the listener understands what he means. Or to put in another way, when I speak with an Objectivist I'm sometimes more casual in how I speak about philosophy or ideas than I would if I'm talking with someone who does not understand Objectivism, because I just assume the Objectivist knows what I mean. From what I've heard of the DIM Hypothesis so far, I don't think the lecture is intended as a proof of his hypothesis, but rather his presentation of some discoveries he's made during his study of the history of philosophy and man. I want to wait for the book before seriously tackling the ideas in his lecture not just because of time-constraints, but because I want to see it presented in a more precise manner (like in a book where he can explain exactly what he means when he talks about human cognition, or when he uses phrases like "from start to finish").

[Free Capitalist]

I would just like to respond to one part of darren's post:

"The whole essence of a concept is to take an endless stream of particulars and create a whole. A unit. A one which subsumes many."

But again this brings up a point Betsy raised (and which Ayn Rand stated), that you don't only subsume a bunch of particulars into one whole, you also divide which particulars not to integrate into the whole. The process is just as much division as it is integration.

[Betsy Speicher]

I think that Dr. Peikoff is not talking about cognition and consciousness, but a specific type of cognition and consciousness: human. In that context, I think Dr. Peikoff is right to refer to integration as the "essence" of human cognition because the ability to integrate is what sets human consciousness apart from the level of consciousness that animals have.

That's not true. Higher animals have a perceptual-level consciousness that does some degree of integration. It automatically integrates sensations into percepts and retains them in memory by association (another form of integration).

But the main problem with regarding integration as "the essence of human cognition from start to finish" is that this omits or ignores an equally essential function of a conceptual human consciousness -- differentiation.

Consciousness, as a state of awareness, is not a passive state, but an active process that consists of two essentials: differentiation and integration

Thus a definition complies with the two essential functions of consciousness: differentiation and integration. The differentia isolates the units of a concept from all other existents; the genus indicates their connection to a wider group of existents.

We don't just identify existents, we also have the ability to form concepts.

But what is a concept? According to Ayn Rand:

A concept is a mental integration of two or more units which are isolated according to a specific characteristic(s) and united by a specific definition.

When the two or more units are isolated, that is differentiation. When they are united, that is integration. Concept formation requires both differentiation and integration, not just integration, and that is why a proper definition has a genus and a differentia and not just a genus.

This doesn't mean that integration is more important than identification or differentiation, because they're all essential to our cognitive process. I just don't see how useful it is to consider identification as the essence of human cognition because we do a lot more than identify things that exist in reality.

In fact, we don't. Every function of consciousness is an act of identification -- including integration.

Integration requires the identification of similarities. Differentiation requires the identification of differences. Causal inference (another crucial function of a conceptual consciousness) requires the identification of the relationship between an entity and its properties and/or actions.

Ayn Rand said "Consciousness is identification" and that includes everything that consciousness does.

[Betsy Speicher]

And to add a little more context to what Dr. Peikoff means, I want to point out that anyone who meets the prerequisites of his course (ITOE, OPAR, and Atlas Shrugged) is a person who probably understands Objectivist epistemology.

It is assumed that those taking the course have read those books, but understanding them is another matter entirely -- especially a difficult and abstract book like ItOE. Dr. Peikoff has mentioned many cases where he thought he understood some Objectivist concept -- and did on some level -- only to later gain a deeper understanding of it. That certainly happened to me with regard to ItOE. I "kinda understood" the general sense of what Ayn Rand was was saying when I first read it, but really understood it much better after my second or third or seventh reading.

I think it's fair for him to skip over giving precise definitions of all the words he uses or explain all the relations of his hypothesis to Objectivist epistemology because it can be assumed that the listener understands what he means.

I wouldn't assume so, because DIM deals with very abstract ideas and it is important to establish their relationship to reality from the beginning. Observe how Ayn Rand always defined her terms up front, even when the ideas were not as abstract as those in ItOE or DIM, and even when she was addressing an Objectivist audience.

Precise definitions are especially required with DIM because this is a new hypothesis and because -- as I have been pointing out -- Dr. Peikoff uses terms in ways that are different from the way Ayn Rand did.

Dr. Peikoff cannot just assume that that his audience understands what he is taking about. I don't and, judging by the responses and questions from the audience throughout the series of DIM lectures, I'm not the only one.

[darren]

But again this brings up a point Betsy raised (and which Ayn Rand stated), that you don't only subsume a bunch of particulars into one whole, you also divide which particulars not to integrate into the whole. The process is just as much division as it is integration.

The process may be just as much division as integration, but the final result is integration. I don't disagree that differentiation is essential to the process.

But the main problem with regarding integration as "the essence of human cognition from start to finish" is that this omits or ignores an equally essential function of a conceptual human consciousness -- differentiation.

I don't agree that Dr. Peikoff is ignoring differentiation, I think he's just focusing on the final step of concept-formation. An individual can identify things that exist in reality all day and differentiate facts about those things he perceives all day, but he hasn't really gained any knowledge until he integrates the data into concepts.

I don't disagree with what you say about what consciousness is or how we form concepts. I just think that since our ability it's our concepts (i.e. our mental integrations) that set our knowledge apart from everything else, I don't think that it's enough to say that "identification" is the essence of our type of consciousness. But I'm repeating myself.

The funny thing is, when the DIM Hypothesis comes up in discussions I've had with local Objectivists I'm one of the ones who question it, the way Leonard Peikoff used it to determine who to vote for in the last election, and the way I've seen other Objectivists use it to judge other things. But I never thought to criticize the hypothesis on based on how he uses phrases like "human cognition" because I think it's pretty clear what he means (whether I agree or disagree with what he means). When I read that the hypothesis is founded on the idea that all of human cognition is integration or that he wants us drop all our dichotomies in favor of trichotomies, I can't agree. Is he not using his terms as precise as he should be? Perhaps. Is he not showing us the relationship between his hypothesis and Objectivist epistemology? Maybe. Does this hypothesis turn Objectivist epistemology on its head? No.

[Betsy Speicher]

The process may be just as much division as integration, but the final result is integration.

Sometimes it is and sometime it isn't. It is when you combine existing concepts into wider concepts, but not when you differentiate a wider concept into narrower concepts such as when you start with the concept of "man" and form the narrower concepts "woman," "husband," "lawyer," etc.

I don't agree that Dr. Peikoff is ignoring differentiation, I think he's just focusing on the final step of concept-formation.

But why is he doing that? If he does so because he believes focusing on integration is essential to understanding what shapes society, why does he believe integration is so significant and differentiation of lesser importance?

If Dr. Peikoff is going beyond, or giving a very different emphasis, to ideas that Ayn Rand put forth -- to go so far as to declare that integration is the essence of cognition when Ayn Rand did not -- the onus of proof is on him to justify doing so. He can't just go ahead and assert and assume it is true.

An individual can identify things that exist in reality all day and differentiate facts about those things he perceives all day, but he hasn't really gained any knowledge until he integrates the data into concepts.

That's not true. There are plenty of things I know -- individual concrete facts like what I ate for breakfast -- that I have not integrated into concepts nor do I have any cognitive need to. I can remember what I ate without overloading the crow and there is nothing significant about what I eat on various mornings to justify forming any concepts about it.

I don't disagree with what you say about what consciousness is or how we form concepts. I just think that since our ability it's our concepts (i.e. our mental integrations) that set our knowledge apart from everything else,

But concepts are not just mental integrations, or definitions would not need differentias. They are integrations and differentiations.

I don't think that it's enough to say that "identification" is the essence of our type of consciousness.

Ayn Rand did, and she said so explicitly.

The funny thing is, when the DIM Hypothesis comes up in discussions I've had with local Objectivists I'm one of the ones who question it, the way Leonard Peikoff used it to determine who to vote for in the last election, and the way I've seen other Objectivists use it to judge other things. But I never thought to criticize the hypothesis on based on how he uses phrases like "human cognition" because I think it's pretty clear what he means (whether I agree or disagree with what he means). When I read that the hypothesis is founded on the idea that all of human cognition is integration or that he wants us drop all our dichotomies in favor of trichotomies, I can't agree. Is he not using his terms as precise as he should be? Perhaps. Is he not showing us the relationship between his hypothesis and Objectivist epistemology? Maybe. Does this hypothesis turn Objectivist epistemology on its head? No.

Maybe DIM doesn't completely contradict Objectivist epistemology, but all the things you just mentioned do pose serious problems for the hypothesis. If it leads to conclusions, like who to vote for, that contradict your own knowledge and conclusions, it is time to check your premises. In this case, the premises I am checking are the ones at the foundation of the DIM Hypothesis.

[darren]

The process may be just as much division as integration, but the final result is integration.

Sometimes it is and sometime it isn't. It is when you combine existing concepts into wider concepts, but not when you differentiate a wider concept into narrower concepts such as when you start with the concept of "man" and form the narrower concepts "woman," "husband," "lawyer," etc.

In the case of "woman," "husband," and "lawyer," isn't integration still the final step? Even though you would use differentiation to break up "man" into more narrow concepts, each of the new concepts are still retained with their own integration.

Maybe DIM doesn't completely contradict Objectivist epistemology, but all the things you just mentioned do pose serious problems for the hypothesis. If it leads to conclusions, like who to vote for, that contradict your own knowledge and conclusions, it is time to check your premises. In this case, the premises I am checking are the ones at the foundation of the DIM Hypothesis.

One way I've talked about the DIM Hypothesis is to say that it's the equation sounds interesting, but I disagree with the numbers that are being plugged into it. We're in a war with militant Islamists (definite M2s) who want to kill us yesterday, but that fact isn't plugged into the DIM equation in the same way that the facts about the popularity of Christian movies and music in our own country are. And on the D side, it's assumed that socialism has been discredited and is no longer a significant force (at least, compared to religion), but it seems that advocates for the D are guiding the debate on every issue and are the bad half in our half-ass war.

[Betsy Speicher]

In the case of "woman," "husband," and "lawyer," isn't integration still the final step? Even though you would use differentiation to break up "man" into more narrow concepts, each of the new concepts are still retained with their own integration.

... and they also retain their own differentiation. A valid concept must always have a differentia. Otherwise, there is no way to retain what distinguishes referents of the concept from all the things that are not referents of the concept.

One way I've talked about the DIM Hypothesis is to say that it's the equation sounds interesting, but I disagree with the numbers that are being plugged into it. We're in a war with militant Islamists (definite M2s) who want to kill us yesterday, but that fact isn't plugged into the DIM equation in the same way that the facts about the popularity of Christian movies and music in our own country are.

You can't classify things properly without clear definitions and standards. If we had clear definitions of "integrated" or "disintegrated" and "misintegrated" it would be easier to tell an "M" from a "D." If we had a clear standard, we could employ it to distinguish an "M1" from an "M2."

Lacking that, all we have are guesses about what Dr. Peikoff means and why he classifies things as he does. One "standard" I have seen proposed, in jest, is that an M1 is a religious person Dr. Peikoff likes, and an M2 is a religious person Dr. Peikoff doesn't like.

[jdperren]

"QUOTE
I don't agree that Dr. Peikoff is ignoring differentiation, I think he's just focusing on the final step of concept-formation." Darrren

"But why is he doing that? If he does so because he believes focusing on integration is essential to understanding what shapes society, why does he believe integration is so significant and differentiation of lesser importance?" Betsy

I can't provide full answers to all these questions, but I have some clues/guesses about this one. Dr. Peikoff engages his audience at length, in essence trying to hash this out <i>during</i> the lecture (or the Q & A section, I've forgotten which now).

His view here (with which I disagree) is that differentiation is largely effortless and not prone to error, hence it needs no philosophical guidance. (He backs off this view somewhat in the subsequent lecture.) That's one of the reasons he is placing so much emphasis on integration and (in my view) short-changing differentiation.

The other reason, I'm being more speculative here, is that he regards analysis (which leans more heavily on differentiation) as some sort of evil. He gives multiple examples of doctrines that have the word analysis in their identification and finds them so horrible that he goes on to state that <i>any</i> theory with the word analysis in it is bad, if not down right wicked.

Jeff

[yandarn]

Intergration is the essential goal of human cognition; it is not the essence of cognition.
As Betsy already stated, the primaries of cognition are 1) identification 2) differentiation 3) integration (in that order), which refutes Peikoff's statement that integration is the basic form of cognition or the essence of cognition.
Peikoff would stand on firmer ground if he were to say that integration is the essence of character -- that the degree to which a person is integrated (or mis-integrated) is the measurement of their current cognitive state. He seems to be conflating status with method. But even the above statement on character would presume someone who is first mis-differentiating.

The character thing wouldn't be breaking new ground, if he were to say it, but at least it wouldn't be uprooting the well-grounded.

David

[sjw]

It's been a long time since I heard the DIM lecture, but I do want to point out that Ayn Rand uses the word "integration" to refer to something more general than merely the integration of concepts/principles, as in for instance this excerpt from ITOE:

"Since the definition of a concept is formulated in terms of other concepts, it enables man, not only to identify and retain a concept, but also to establish the relationships, the hierarchy, the integration of all his concepts and thus the integration of his knowledge." (p. 40 ITOE)

By her last use of the word "integration", I take her to mean: putting together everything you know into a non-contradictory whole. That would include both integrations in the narrower sense as well as differentiations. It includes all knowledge, all identifications. She said something about never failing to correct a contradiction--I think that's the subject here. A differentiation is a subcategory--one can make a contradictory differentiation--and by so doing, cause a lack of integration of this item of knowledge with the rest.

Also, I agree with Peikoff that some people seek to unify their knowledge into a non-contradictory whole, some are passively disintegrated (they bump into contradictions and do nothing) some people actively distintegrate (e.g., by claiming that contradictions exist in reality), some misintegrate by evading parts of reality that don't fit their theory while trying to make the theory self-consistent. On a general level and going by old memories of the course, I don't see a problem in reconciling it with Ayn Rand's epistemology.

[Betsy Speicher]

It's been a long time since I heard the DIM lecture, but I do want to point out that Ayn Rand uses the word "integration" to refer to something more general than merely the integration of concepts/principles, as in for instance this excerpt from ITOE:

"Since the definition of a concept is formulated in terms of other concepts, it enables man, not only to identify and retain a concept, but also to establish the relationships, the hierarchy, the integration of all his concepts and thus the integration of his knowledge." (p. 40 ITOE)

By her last use of the word "integration", I take her to mean: putting together everything you know into a non-contradictory whole. That would include both integrations in the narrower sense as well as differentiations. It includes all knowledge, all identifications. She said something about never failing to correct a contradiction--I think that's the subject here. A differentiation is a subcategory--one can make a contradictory differentiation--and by so doing, cause a lack of integration of this item of knowledge with the rest.

The question I am raising is what is the most fundamental function of consciousness and, therefore, the most fundamental issue in epistemology: identification or integration. My view is that identification is the fundamental and it subsumes both integration and differentiation. I have supplied quotes from Ayn Rand earlier in this thread indicating that it was her view as well.

You make an good point about integrating one's knowledge, but the reason that is important is because reality contains no contradictions. Therefore, if one cannot integrate an idea without contradiction, it means he has mis-identified something and needs to check his premises. Without any evidence that there is a contradiction in one's thinking, however, there is no need to doubt what one does know.

I do not take Ayn Rand to mean we ought to be "putting together everything you know into a non-contradictory whole." Most of the time, since reality is so consistent and a rational man pays attention to it, his identifications will be right and can be integrated into the rest of his knowledge explicitly -- if and when he chooses to do so.

Observe that in the statement you quoted, Ayn Rand says "it enables man" and not "it requires man." Where did Ayn Rand say a man had to or ought to consciously and purposefully integrate everything with everything all the time? A man may or may not choose to explicitly integrate a given fact with the rest of his knowledge (although it is usually integrated in the process of acquiring it as knowledge). What is necessary and essential is correctly identifying the facts of reality.

[Paul's Here]

The question I am raising is what is the most fundamental function of consciousness and, therefore, the most fundamental issue in epistemology: identification or integration. My view is that identification is the fundamental and it subsumes both integration and differentiation. I have supplied quotes from Ayn Rand earlier in this thread indicating that it was her view as well.

You make an good point about integrating one's knowledge, but the reason that is important is because reality contains no contradictions. Therefore, if one cannot integrate an idea without contradiction, it means he has mis-identified something and needs to check his premises. Without any evidence that there is a contradiction in one's thinking, however, there is no need to doubt what one does know.

I do not take Ayn Rand to mean we ought to be "putting together everything you know into a non-contradictory whole." Most of the time, since reality is so consistent and a rational man pays attention to it, his identifications will be right and can be integrated into the rest of his knowledge explicitly -- if and when he chooses to do so.

Observe that in the statement you quoted, Ayn Rand says "it enables man" and not "it requires man." Where did Ayn Rand say a man had to or ought to consciously and purposefully integrate everything with everything all the time? A man may or may not choose to explicitly integrate a given fact with the rest of his knowledge (although it is usually integrated in the process of acquiring it as knowledge). What is necessary and essential is correctly identifying the facts of reality.

I have some concerns about how you interpret the distinction between identification and integration. One cannot know that there is or is not a contradiction in one's thinking until one attempts to integrate various elements of knowledge. How do you identify what one "knows" unless it is integrated with the rest of one's knowledge. The Laws of Logic are both metaphysical and epistemological, and you cannot take the Law of Non-Contradiction solely as a metaphysical statement ("the reason that is important is because reality contains no contradictions.") You cannot call something as knowledge until it is integrated. When Rand formulated the principle "Consciousness is Identification" that, in my opinion, is a metaphysical statement about the nature of consciousness: that it perceives existence. What constitutes knowledge requires the integration of such identifications in accordance with the Laws of Logic. So if I were to answer your question which is more fundamental, I would say that consciousness identifies reality and one claims knowledge through the intregration of such identifications. I wouldn't say that "[identification] subsumes both integration and differentiation," I would say that integration and differentiation presuppose identification when it comes to claims that something is knowledge. But whether something is knowledge cannot be claimed without integration.

Consider this example. I see a man struggling to escape a cage. That is what my identification (perception) is. What knowledge do I claim from such an identification? None, until I integrate my identification with other knoweldge that I possess: Why is he trying to escape? Is he in prison or a concentration camp or a magician? I see that he's wearing prison clothes, there are guards around him, there are other men in adjacent cages, etc.

[oldsalt]

I have some concerns about how you interpret the distinction between identification and integration. One cannot know that there is or is not a contradiction in one's thinking until one attempts to integrate various elements of knowledge. How do you identify what one "knows" unless it is integrated with the rest of one's knowledge. The Laws of Logic are both metaphysical and epistemological, and you cannot take the Law of Non-Contradiction solely as a metaphysical statement ("the reason that is important is because reality contains no contradictions.") You cannot call something as knowledge until it is integrated. When Rand formulated the principle "Consciousness is Identification" that, in my opinion, is a metaphysical statement about the nature of consciousness: that it perceives existence. What constitutes knowledge requires the integration of such identifications in accordance with the Laws of Logic. So if I were to answer your question which is more fundamental, I would say that consciousness identifies reality and one claims knowledge through the integration of such identifications. I wouldn't say that "[identification] subsumes both integration and differentiation," I would say that integration and differentiation presuppose identification when it comes to claims that something is knowledge. But whether something is knowledge cannot be claimed without integration.

Consider this example. I see a man struggling to escape a cage. That is what my identification (perception) is. What knowledge do I claim from such an identification? None, until I integrate my identification with other knoweldge that I possess: Why is he trying to escape? Is he in prison or a concentration camp or a magician? I see that he's wearing prison clothes, there are guards around him, there are other men in adjacent cages, etc.

As I look at everything you've said here, Paul, I find it hard to separate one part from another, if we're talking about the work of consciousness. Isn't that the point of understanding epistemology; i.e., understanding that identification, differentiation, and integration are all a part of a whole? If one fails in any one of these steps, one's understanding has been compromised.

[B. Royce]

Paul, at the onset your knowledge consists of three things: a man, a cage, and the man's movement. Before you can know that he is struggling to escape you would have to identify those.

[Paul's Here]

Paul, at the onset your knowledge consists of three things: a man, a cage, and the man's movement. Before you can know that he is struggling to escape you would have to identify those.

Of course, but the issue is that one has to start with some identification and assume some level of previous knowledge in order to demonstrate the principle. Unless one is only going to only use examples of sensory awareness, then your assumption is built into any example. However, the awareness of a man in a cage who looks to be struggling does not by instelf give you knowledge with respect to the context I presented unless you integrate it with other facts and knowledge. It is the integration that elevates the awareness into knowledge, not the identification. Identification simply means that you are aware of something in reality. Identification is the beginning, knowledge is the end after integration and differntiation has occurred.

[T]he methods which he has to employ require the most rigorous mathematical precision, the most rigorous compliance with objective rules and facts—if the end product is to be knowledge.

An enormous number of identifications have to be made but one does not have to identify everything involved in knowledge. But something is not knowledge until integration and differentiation have been made:

A child is not and does not have to be aware of all these complexities when he forms the concept "table." He forms it by differentiating tables from all other objects in the context of his knowledge. As his knowledge grows, the definitions of his concepts grow in complexity.

As Rand states succinctly,

Starting from the base of conceptual development—from the concepts that identify perceptual concretes—the process of cognition moves in two interacting directions: toward more extensive and more intensive knowledge, toward wider integrations and more precise differentiations.